Judgment :- Varghese Kalliath, J. Our learned brother, Justice Krishnamoorthy opined that itis difficult to agree with the reasoning in 1988 (1) KLT 289 (Ayyappan v. Narayanan Namboodiri) and referred this case for the decision of a Division Bench. Before considering the question referred, we feel that we must give a resume of the facts of the case. 2. Petitioners in this Civil Revision Petition are tenants of an extent of land which belonged to the first respondent, now dead. The land owner filed O.A. No. 556 of 1965 before the Land Tribunal, Muvattupuzha. It was renumbered as O.A. No. 210 of 1977 and again renumbered as O.A 397/77 of the Special Deputy Collector, Land Tribunal, Alleppey. The application was filed under S.15 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, for short, the Act, for resumption of the scheduled property 51 cents, for the purpose of constructing a building for the applicant. As an alternative prayer, applicant claimed that if the entire property cannot be resumed by the applicant, he should be allowed to resume that extent of land determined by the Land Tribunal, for the purpose of constructing a building for the applicant. In the application, the applicant claimed that he is a small holder. It is also stated in the application that the tenants have got 2 acres of garden land and 2 acres of paddy land. It was contended that the applicant-landlord had no other property, other than the property scheduled in the application to construct a building for his residence. 3. Originally, the application was allowed holding that the applicant is entitled to resume one-half of the scheduled property under S.17 of the Act. The applicant was directed to apply for passing a final order for resumption. The original applicant died; his legal representatives got themselves impleaded. They filed LA. No. 301 of 1974 before the Munsiff Land Tribunal, Ernakulam, and the same was transferred to the Deputy Collector (Land Tribunal) Alleppey as LA. No. 232/75. It was found that the applicants are in possession of more than 4 ordinary acres as owner and so, they are not entitled to resumption and dismissed the application. An appeal was preferred as L.R.A. S.No. 798/76 before the appellate Authority (LR) Ernakulam, against the order passed by the Land Tribunal on 25-6-1976. No. 232/75. It was found that the applicants are in possession of more than 4 ordinary acres as owner and so, they are not entitled to resumption and dismissed the application. An appeal was preferred as L.R.A. S.No. 798/76 before the appellate Authority (LR) Ernakulam, against the order passed by the Land Tribunal on 25-6-1976. The appellate Authority found that the Land Tribunal had no jurisdiction to review its order on the basis of a subsequent decision of the High Court and the order was set aside and the case was remanded for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The appellate authority also observed that the Tribunal may also consider the valid objections, if any, raised, regarding the maintainability of the application for resumption for passing the final order for resumption. 4. When the case was remanded, it was given the number O.A. 77/77. The Tribunal allowed the application directing-resumption of the southern 14/ 1/4cents of land comprised in Sy. No. 991/12 A of Mazhuvannur Village shown in red colour in Ext. C2 plan on payment of solatium of Rs. %/- within 30 days from the date of the order, failing which the order will stand cancelled. The plan was also appended to the order stating that it will form part of the judgment. The rent for the unreduced portion was fixed at 31/2 paras of paddy per annum. This order was passed on 31st March, 1978 at Head Quarters. The landlords respondents herein submitted before us that the case was heard in the Camp sitting at Perumbavoor, though the order was passed on 31-3-1978 at Headquarters. 5. The tenants filed an appeal L. R A S No. 413 of 1978. Respondents herein filed an application before the Land Tribunal for extension of time for complying with the directions contained in the order of the Land Tribunal in O.A. No. 397 of 1978 dated 31-3-1978. The application for extension of time was filed on 24-5-1978. It is seen posted to 26-5-1978. It was allowed on 26-5-1978. Time for payment was extended till 31-5-1978. In the application, it is stated that O.A. 397/77 was posted on 9-3-1978 and that the application was heard finally in the camp sitting at Perumbavoor and no definite date was fixed for disposal of the application. It is seen posted to 26-5-1978. It was allowed on 26-5-1978. Time for payment was extended till 31-5-1978. In the application, it is stated that O.A. 397/77 was posted on 9-3-1978 and that the application was heard finally in the camp sitting at Perumbavoor and no definite date was fixed for disposal of the application. Further, it is stated that the landlords were under the bona fide belief that the order on the O.A. will be pronounced only in the next camp sitting of the Tribunal at Perumbavoor. They never knew about the passing of the final order at the Head Quarters and they came to know about the passing of the order only on 19-5-1978. They got a copy of the order on 20-5-1978 and only when they perused the order, they knew that a period of 30 days alone was granted for depositing the solatium. This resulted in not complying with the directions as stipulated in the order. The non-payment of solatium was not with any mala fide intention and for the failure to deposit the amount, there are sufficient excuses for the respondents herein. Though it is seen that the application for extension of time was filed on 24-5-1978 and it was posted to 26-5-1978, it is not seen that any notice was served on the tenants. On the application it is seen stated that the amount was remitted on 29-5-1978. There is no dispute as regards the remittance of the amount. 6. The appeal filed by the tenants, L.R.A.S.413/78 was allowed by order dated 6-6-1980. The appellate authority dismissed the application for resumption. The appeal was allowed mainly on the ground that the landlords cannot be treated as small holders. Landlords filed a civil revision petition before this court, as C.R.P. No. 3058 of 1980. This court was concerned about the question whether the landlords are small holders on the basis of the nature and extent of land held by the landlords. Initially, this court thought that the matter required to be enquired into by the Tribunal, but this court observed that since the matter is an old one, it is inexpedient to remit the case to the Land Tribunal to enable the tenants to adduce evidence as to the nature of 1.92 acres of land held by the landlords. Initially, this court thought that the matter required to be enquired into by the Tribunal, but this court observed that since the matter is an old one, it is inexpedient to remit the case to the Land Tribunal to enable the tenants to adduce evidence as to the nature of 1.92 acres of land held by the landlords. This court observed that the parties can adduce evidence before the appellate authority to prove the correct classification of 1.92 acres of land held by the landlords. The tenants submitted before this court that in case resumption of any portion of the holding is allowed, the tenants should be given an option as provided under S.22(4) of the Act. This court allowed that request of the tenants holding that this court need hardly state that the tenants will be entitled to such option and the right of option will not be denied to them. This court set aside the order of the appellate authority and remanded the case to the appellate authority for fresh disposal, in accordance with law and in the light of the observations of this court in the order in the C.R.P. 7. After remand, the appellate authority considered the appeal L.R.AS. 413/ 78 in the light of the observations and directions of this court in the order in the C.R.P. and dismissed the appeal holding that the landlords - the respondents herein - are entitled to resume 141/4 cents of land in the possession of the tenants. Further, by the order, the appellate authority directed that the tenants are at liberty to file an option as permitted in the order of the High Court before the Deputy Collector, Land Tribunal, on or before 15th January, 1985, failing which the order dated 31-3-1978 of the Deputy Collector (L.T.) will stand confirmed. Further, it was said that the Deputy Collector (L.T.) may finalise the solatium etc. of the surrendered land within a period of two months from the date of the order of the appellate authority, if option is received from the appellants (tenants) as the matter is pending from the year 1970. 8. Further, it was said that the Deputy Collector (L.T.) may finalise the solatium etc. of the surrendered land within a period of two months from the date of the order of the appellate authority, if option is received from the appellants (tenants) as the matter is pending from the year 1970. 8. Counsel for landlords submitted that though resumption was allowed, dismissing the appeal filed by the tenants, as regards the direction contained in the order passed by the Land Tribunal on 31-3-1978, the appellate authority made a modification in so far as the property to be resumed, which was settled by the order of the Land Tribunal dated 31-3-1978 was unsettled, since the tenants were given a right of option, which they have to exercise on or before 15th January, 1985. Further, it has to be no ted that the Tribunal was directed to fix the solatium since the solatium depended on the property to be surrendered. A time limit of two months was fixed for the same. Of course, this was conditional on the receipt of option from the tenants. Counsel for landlords wanted to say that really the order of the appellate authority was reversed substantially the relief granted by the Tribunal in its order dated 31-3-1978. 9. The order of the appellate authority dated 21-7-1984 was challenged in revision in C R.P.No. 859/85. This C.R.P. was heard and disposed of on 15-10-1986. This court set aside the order and remanded the case to the appellate authority for fresh consideration and disposal. It was directed that the appellate authority should consider the evidence adduced on both sides and pass a fresh order as expeditiously as possible. 10. After remand, the appellate authority again considered the appeal and held that the landlords are small holders since the controversy in regard to the nature of 1.92 acres of land held by the landlords was settled by holding that the said property was not coconut garden and only pulayadi waste. The appeal was dismissed. In the result, the landlords got the order of the Land Tribunal allowing resumption, confirmed. 11. The respondents herein had filed an application before the Land Tribunal as E.P. No. 182/ 78 for the execution of the order on O.A. No. 397/77. The appeal was dismissed. In the result, the landlords got the order of the Land Tribunal allowing resumption, confirmed. 11. The respondents herein had filed an application before the Land Tribunal as E.P. No. 182/ 78 for the execution of the order on O.A. No. 397/77. Since there were several proceedings against the order in the application O.A. No. 397/77 by way of appeals and revisions, and since the execution was stayed, nothing happened and so, the landlords filed an application in the form of a fresh E.P. stating all the previous history of the case on 23rd March, 1985, praying the Tribunal, that the property ordered to be resumed, to be delivered to the landlords under S.22(7) of the Act. The said petition was numbered as E.P.No. 21/85. In E.P. No. 21/85, the landlords stated that the tenants did not file a fresh option and there was no occasion for a fresh determination of solatium and so, the solatium paid on the basis of the first order of the Tribunal may be treated as adequate deposit of the solatium required to be paid. This E.P. was stayed by this Court by the order in C.M.P. No. 8908/85 in CR.P.No. 859/85 on 27-3-1985. On 4-10-1985, the landlords filed a petition before the Tribunal stating that the order of stay was not in existence, and that the property should be delivered. But, since the order of stay was in force, the Land Tribunal did not act on that petition. When a final order was passed by the appellate authority, after the remand of the case by this court by its order dated 15-10-1986, the landlords again moved the Tribunal for obtaining delivery of the property by filing a petition dated 15-7-1987. The tenants filed objection on 31-ll-1987. In the objection, they stated that since the landlords have not deposited the solatium within 30 days from the date of the first order, viz. 31-3-1978, the landlords have no right of resumption as per the order in O.A. 77/ 77 and that no property can be resumed from the tenants. The Land Tribunal dismissed the objection by its order dated 5-1-1988 and directed delivery of the property ordered to be resumed. Tenants filed an appeal as L.R. AS. 18/88. The appellate a uthority by its order dated 30-9-1989 confirmed the order of the Land Tribunal. The Land Tribunal dismissed the objection by its order dated 5-1-1988 and directed delivery of the property ordered to be resumed. Tenants filed an appeal as L.R. AS. 18/88. The appellate a uthority by its order dated 30-9-1989 confirmed the order of the Land Tribunal. Now, the tenants have challenged the orders of the Land Tribunal and the appellate authority dated 5-1-1988 and 30-9-1989 in this C.R.P. 12. One of the important questions to be considered in this case is the scope, content and width of sub-sections (3), (7) and (8) of S.22 of the Act read with rules ll and 130 of the Tenancy Rules. A further question that has to be considered is as to the proper and correct construction and understanding of the above sub-sections. 13. The nature of the enactment, object and purpose of the enactment have always got a bearing in the matter of understanding the meaning of the particular provisions of an enactment. Of course, there are several norms and principles for construing and interpreting statutory provisions. But, the fundamental norm that has to be borne in mind in interpreting a statutory provision is to see that the intention of the legislature is given its full effect. The process of interpreting a provision should not lead to frustrate the intention of the legislature, but should be aimed at fructifying its intention. 14. Lord Hailsham observed during the second reading of the Interpretation of Legislation Bill, on 13th February, 1980, reported in The Times, 15th February, 1980, the history of English law and the interpretation of statutes consisted of a battle between two rival schools of thought. These two schools are, one which looked at what the Act was intended to do; the other is the school of thought which looked at what is said. Lord Denning belonged to the first school and he was a strong opponent of the literal approach to statutory interpretation. The adherents to the literal approach point to the difficulties inherent in the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. They say in which cases should judges apply the purposive approach in preference to the literal approach to interpretation. Lord Denning belonged to the first school and he was a strong opponent of the literal approach to statutory interpretation. The adherents to the literal approach point to the difficulties inherent in the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. They say in which cases should judges apply the purposive approach in preference to the literal approach to interpretation. Should they take advantage only when the meaning of the statutory words are not clear and capable of understanding differently by different judges or should the judges take advantage of the purposive approach, when in the view of the judge the result of literal interpretation is unjust, inexpedient or immoral. In regard to questions of morality, justice and expediency, different judges hold different views. 15. The second difficulty is to find out and discern the purpose of legislation. What should be the basis to find out the purpose of legislation? Can the judges refer to Hansard to find out the purpose of an enactment which is brought before them for interpretation. There are conflict of views in regard to referring to Hansard. Lord Denning in fl. v. Local Commissioner for Administration for the North and East area of England, ex pane Bradford Metropolitan City Council (1979) 2 All E.R.881 said that "he is prepared to flout the spirit and the letter of clear and binding precedent by referring to text books which contain extracts from Hansard". Further, it was criticised that the purposive approach requires judge jo make policy decisions in the widest sense of that word. Lord Scar man pointed out in Lim Poh Cho that to find out the purpose of the legislation is a task for which the forensic process is unsuited. 16. In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 Q.B. 481, Lord Denning said: "Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity a judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases". Seaford Court Estates Case had not expressly disapproved by House of Lords. This pat from the House of Lords encouraged Lord Denning to attach the "strict construction lists" and in Magor and St. Seaford Court Estates Case had not expressly disapproved by House of Lords. This pat from the House of Lords encouraged Lord Denning to attach the "strict construction lists" and in Magor and St. Meltons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation (1950) 2 All. E.R.1226 Lord Deisrang said that judges should go uiuher than merely 'ironing out the creases" but should, where a Iacuna appears in an Act, Look to the purpose of the legislation and supply Use omission. Lord Denning observed thus:- "I have no patience with an ultra-legalistic interpretation which would deprive (the appellants ) of their rights altogether. I would repeat what I said in Seaford Court Estates ltd. v. Asher. We do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament and of Ministers to pieces and make nonsense of it. That is an easy thing to do, audit is a thing to which lawyers are too often prone. We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it upto destructive analysis". Lord Simonds expressed clear disapproval when the case came up before the Ho use of Lords, in (1952) AC. 189 thus: "The duty of the courts is to interpret the words that the legislature has used; those words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited (Denning L.J. consider* that) the court, having discovered the intention of Parliament and of Ministers too, must proceed to fill in the gaps, What the legislature has not written, the court must write. This proposition, which restates ina new form the view expressed by the Lord Justice in the earlier case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. asher (to which the Lord Justice himself refers ), cannot be supported. It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation. And it is the less justifiable when it is guesswork with what material the legislature would, if it had discovered the gap had filled it in. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act". 17. It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation. And it is the less justifiable when it is guesswork with what material the legislature would, if it had discovered the gap had filled it in. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act". 17. In London Transport Executive v. Sets (1959) AC, 231, it appears that Lord Denning had accepted that judges cannot fill in gaps in legislation. But, the old dogma was reiterated by Lord Denning in (1969) 2 Chan. 345, thus: "I know that this means that we in this court are filling in a gap left by the legislature - a course which was frowned on some years ago. But I would rather the courts fill in a gap than wait for Parliament to do it. Goodness knows when they would get down to it. I would apply the principle which I stated in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Aher, a judge should ask himself this question: If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out?" The view of Lord Denning got the support of Lord Diplock in the case of Kammis Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. (1971) A.C. 850. Lord Diplock explained that the essence of the purposive approach is for the judge to answer a series of questions: What is the subject-matter of the Act (or part of the act) being interpreted? What object in relation to that subject-matter Parliament intended to achieve by the Act? And lastly, what part in the achievement of that object the section under construction was intended to play? The particular section will then be interpreted according to the object which the court deems the legislation is intended to serve. In (1975) 3 All E.R.158 (Carter v. bradbeer ) Lord Diplock observed that over the last thirty years, the House of Lords has increasingly moved away from the purely literal approach to statutory interpretation towards the purposive approach. Our Supreme Court is also moving away from the literal approach and nearing to the purposive approach in the matter of statutory interpretation. Our Supreme Court is also moving away from the literal approach and nearing to the purposive approach in the matter of statutory interpretation. Vide (1979) 3 SCC 466 (Authorised Officer v. S. Naganatha Ayyar & Others) and 1975 (1) SCC 676 (Union of India and another v. Rajdhani Grains and Jaggery Exchange Ltd. and others). 18. Legislative draftsmanship requires great skill. But, even when experts draft a statute intended for a very high and laudable object of achieving a comprehensive and equalitarian reform aimed at distributive justice qua agricultural land and questions relating to the relationship between landlord and tenant, or landlord and kudikidap-pukars, and the incidental and ancillary matters with the greatest expertise and severe reflective ness and focalization, it is difficult to conceive of all complex situations that may emerge when such a statute is put in operation. Judges must be very cautious and careful in introducing their own innovative activism in giving sense and meaning to a particular provision in the statute in accord with the purpose of the statute and the resultant justice. The caution that has to be borne in mind is a caution not to maim or neutralize the high objectives of the enactment in question. There may be omissions. What may appear as seeming inequities, may find a justification that the intention of the legislature is to promote social distributive justice. No one can afford to hesitate to say that the essence of the legal system is that it has been created, developed and is still controlled by legal profession. It has gone the way the profession, led by the judges, has thought fit, save when the legislature has felt it necessary to make corrections or additions. The law is very much the esoteric business of lawyers. It is neither easily accessible nor easy to understand. It has got an innate character to resist changes. It is encapsulated in the forensic process, meticulously protected by those tireless workers in the legal hive, the teachers and practitioners. It can have greater sensitivity to the winds, let alone the gentle breezes of change than have she judges and the profession who administer it. When it is faced with the choice between certainty and flexibility, most of them will choose certainty, upholding the established rule, even if it be shown to operate harshly or even unjustly. 19. It can have greater sensitivity to the winds, let alone the gentle breezes of change than have she judges and the profession who administer it. When it is faced with the choice between certainty and flexibility, most of them will choose certainty, upholding the established rule, even if it be shown to operate harshly or even unjustly. 19. At times, social change is taken as a formidable threat to the existing legal system as we know it today. Social justice, has a special content and a peculiar dimension, perhaps, an intangible dimension. Today's society means justice in depth, not only penetrating and destroying the inequalities of sex, race and wealth, but also supporting the weak and the exposed, is believed by some to be beyond the reach of the traditional combination of common law rule and equitable relief supplemented where necessary by statute; it appears to need new law, new principles, new remedies, new machinery and new men - Vide 1971 Political Quarterly, Vol. 42 Page ll3. 20. Counsel for respondents submitted that though one of the purposes of the Act was to give protection in abundance to tenants, in that process, the legislature thought that some deserving landlords, though having the regal appellation (Lords) are lot really lords in any sense, perhaps, their tenants may be in comparison, economically n a better position. In this context, the Act contemplated a class of landlords who are ailed small holders, who required a benign treatment. (2) 21. No one can forget that great slogan, He who shall sow, shall reap the crop. Really as are percussion of the social exploitation of this class of people, for long periods, say for ages, led to great revolutions. There were Kings, when told that the people have no bread to eat, seeing the dogs of the Kings were fed with biscuits, replied that if breads are not available, give them cakes. This kind of exploitation led to revolutions. So to avoid bloody revolutions, naturally a peaceful revolutionary reform is required, and certainly the avowed object of the piece of legislation which comes up for consideration in this case, is intended for such a peaceful, social change. The struggle for social justice for ages throughout the world has led to great development in law. So to avoid bloody revolutions, naturally a peaceful revolutionary reform is required, and certainly the avowed object of the piece of legislation which comes up for consideration in this case, is intended for such a peaceful, social change. The struggle for social justice for ages throughout the world has led to great development in law. Time always consoles an unwilling class of people, who have to forgo some of their conveniences and comforts and perhaps, some precious possessions in the process of implementation of the said social changes by legislative actions. We say these words to make sure that in dealing with this case, we are certainly informed of the great and laudable ideology and egalitarian purpose behind the Act. 22. From the narration of facts, it is clear that this case has got a history of 25 years legal fight of a small holder-landlord to obtain a small piece of land, viz. an extent of 141/4 cents. In almost at every stage in the long continuous process of litigation at different tyres, the landlords succeeded. This C.R.P. also is against concurrent decisions of two lower authorities. 23. When the matter came up before our learned brother, Justice Krishnamoorthy, His Lordship thought that the decision reported in 1988 (1) K.L.T. 289 will decide the fate of the C.R.P. and that the reasoning of that decision requires a further probe by a Division Bench. Certainly judicial precedent is made flexible by artistry in distinguishing cases and the rule of overruling a decision by a superior court, sometimes, by a larger bench. 24. S.22 of the Act prescribes some procedure for resumption. For convenience, we quote the entire section. "22. Procedure for resumption.-- (1) A landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction the land is situate for an order of resumption. The application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, "landlord" shall include a landlord referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of S.13. (2) The Land Tribunal shall duly enquire into the application and pass appropriate orders thereon. The application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, "landlord" shall include a landlord referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of S.13. (2) The Land Tribunal shall duly enquire into the application and pass appropriate orders thereon. Where the order allows resumption, it shall specify the extent and location of the land allowed to be resumed, the rent payable in respect of the portion, if any, that would be left after resumption and such other particulars as may be prescribed and directing the landlord to make, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, payments to extinguish the rights of the cultivating tenant and the intermediaries, if any, who would be affected by such resumption. (3) The Land Tribunal may for sufficient reasons, extend the time prescribed under subsection (2) for making payments by the landlord. (4) The cultivating tenant shall be entitled to opt for the location of the portion of the holding which may be allowed to be resumed; and where the tenant has not so opted, the location of the portion to be resumed shall be decided by the Land Tribunal having regard to the nature, fertility and other conditions of the portion of the land which may be allowed to be resumed and the portion left with the cultivating tenant. (5) Where the application is for resumption under S.16 from a tenant who is in possession of land exceeding the ceiling area and there are other landlords under whom the tenant holds, the Land Tribunal shall give notice of the application to all other landlords so far as known to it, specifying a date within which they may apply for resumption of any land from such tenant. The Land Tribunal shall consider all applications from landlords for resumption from such tenant received within the specified time together, and, where the extent of land in the possession of the tenant in excess of the ceiling area is less than the aggregate of the extent of land applied to be resumed by the landlords, the Land Tribunal shall allow resumption by all the landlords equitably having regard to all circumstances. (6) Where any land is resumed after making the payments as directed by me Land Tribunal, all the rights of the cultivating tenant and the intermediaries, if any, holding between the landlord resuming the land and the cultivating tenant in respect of the land, shall stand extinguished. (7) Where landlord deposits the amounts in accordance with the directions of the Land Tribunal, the Land Tribunal shall put the landlord in possession of the land allowed to be resumed, if need be by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same. (8) Where a landlord fails to deposit the amounts in accordance with the directions of the Land Tribunal, the order of resumption shall be treated as cancelled and the landlord shall have no further right for resumption". 25. Certainly sub-clause (3) of S.22 of the Act endows the Tribunal with the power; no doubt, a discretionary power to extend the time prescribed under sub-section (2) for making payments by the landlord. We say the Tribunal is endowed with a power, which is discretionary in nature, for the simple reason, the power under sub-section (3) is a power which can be exercised only for sufficient reasons. It is apposite to make a casual peep into the reasons for the Legislature to grant discretion to a statutory adjudicatory authority. The power of discretion is given to the adjudicatory authority for the reason that in adjudication creativity is essential and that is impossible without discretion. Generally, the creative thinking is done through executive or administrative solution of specific problems. Davis Kenneth Gulp, in Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Enquiry (1969) said: "A legislature may be able to see a problem but it may not know how to solve it. Accordingly it adopts the device of delegation by which it tells the delegate what it wants to do and then leave it to the discretion of the delegate. The delegate, through case to case consideration, tries to solve the problem". Discretionary power is essential to solve particular problems. Discretion, a multi dimensional concept, is a very effective tool indispensable for individualization of justice. Dry rules left without discretion or intemperate by discretion, cannot be in a position to meet with the complexities of modern Government and of modern, social and economic justice. Discretion guarantees creativeness and practicality of rendering justice. 26. Discretion, a multi dimensional concept, is a very effective tool indispensable for individualization of justice. Dry rules left without discretion or intemperate by discretion, cannot be in a position to meet with the complexities of modern Government and of modern, social and economic justice. Discretion guarantees creativeness and practicality of rendering justice. 26. Sub-section (7) of S.22 mandates that when a landlord deposits the amounts due to the tenant in accordance with the directions of the Land Tribunal, the Land Tribunal shall put the landlord in possession of the land allowed to be resumed, if need be by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same. The corresponding rule in regard to payment of what is required under sub-section (2) of S.22 is rule ll of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970, for short, the Roles Rule ll(2) provides that when the landlord makes the deposit, the Land Tribunal shall specify the amounts to the parties and obtain receipts therefor. The rule further provides that the Land Tribunal shall specify the amounts to be paid by the landlord resuming the land and the persons to whom the payments are to be made, and shall further direct that the amount shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. 27. The above rule regarding the time given for deposit has to be understood in the light of sub-section (8) of S.22. It provides that where a landlord fails to deposit the amounts due to the tenant, in accordance with the rules thereto as directed by the Land Tribunal, the order of resumption shall be treated as cancelled and the landlord shall have no further right for resumption. 28. Taking the statutory provisions, viz. sub-sections (3),(7) and (8) of S.22 of the Act and Rule ll(2) of the question was considered by this court in certain decisions as to whether the Tribune got power under sub-section (3) of S.22 of the Act to extend the time of 30 days within which the amount has to be deposited by the landlord after the expiry of the time. Counsel for petitioners submitted that the above question has to be decided on the language of the provisions and also on the basis of the appeals and revisions filed by the parties in this case and the effect of the orders passed in those proceedings. 29.In 1988(1) K.L.T. 289, Padmanabhan, J. considering sub-sections (3),(8) and Rule ll(2) said that after the period for deposit has run out and sub-section (8) has taken effect, the order has become dead. In the case considered by Padmanabhan, J. after the period has run out in July, 1978, on 31st August, 1978, the respondents filed a lodgment schedule with an application and obtained an order on 31-8-1978 to receive the amount. That was without notice. His Lordship said that by that order, the Land Tribunal has not extended time and what has been done is to give a direction to receive the amount and deposit was made on 1-9-1978 as per that order. His Lordship said: "Apart from the question that the Land Tribunal had then no jurisdiction to extend the time, no such power was exercised also. Extension of time under S.22(3) is one involving rights of parties and has to be made by the application of mind on a motion for that purpose and it is not a matter to be inferred from the permission mechanically given to receive the amount on the basis of a lodgment schedule. Further that order is without notice and as such not binding on the tenant. An order under S.20(3) is having serious impact on the right of the tenant accrued under S, 22(8) and it has to be passed after due consideration" 30. The controversial aspect in the above statement is the observation that "the Land Tribunal had then no jurisdiction to extend the time". When the court said so, we understand that the implication is that when once the time has run out, the order works itself out and the Tribunal becomes functus officio in the matter of extension of time and that there is a total deprivation of jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of the order passed. Padmanabhan, J. considered in paragraph 3 of the judgment, the effect of not depositing the amount within time. The view expressed by His Lordship is that on failure to deposit, the consequences take effect automatically by operation of law without any further order. Padmanabhan, J. considered in paragraph 3 of the judgment, the effect of not depositing the amount within time. The view expressed by His Lordship is that on failure to deposit, the consequences take effect automatically by operation of law without any further order. By legal fiction the order for resumption is then treated as automatically cancelled resulting in the further penal consequence of the landlord being disabled to have any further right of resumption, and that by operation of law the order thus becomes nonest and completely erased as if no such order was passed The period provided under an order which has become non-est and thus impossible of execution cannot be extended. Extension pre-supposes the existence of an order which is executable if time for extension is granted. When the order itself has become nonexistent, extension of time is out of question. Sub-section (3) cannot be interpreted in such a way as to nullify the mandatory effect of sub-section (8). If the statutory period was allowed to run out resulting in the non-existence of an executable order, there is no occasion to exercise the jurisdiction under sub-section (3). The only possible interpretation is that the power under sub-section (3) must be sought for and exercised before the period prescribed under Rule ll(2). When once that is not done, and the deposit is not made and the consequence under sub-section (8) take effect, there is no question of exercising the power under sub-section (3). The order becomes dead and a dead order cannot be brought to life. The learned judge made it clear that His Lordship is fortified in the above said formulations by the decisions of this court in 1972 K.L.T. 1014 (Kunhi Pathu v. Ayshu) and 1977 K.L.N. ll3 Case Notes -Case No. 95. 31. In dealing with Rule 130 of the rules, His Lordship said that that rule is only a genera! provision which must be subject to and subservient to the special provisions contained in the Act. A general provision intended to meet general contingencies must always yield to special provisions made to meet particular contingencies. 31. In dealing with Rule 130 of the rules, His Lordship said that that rule is only a genera! provision which must be subject to and subservient to the special provisions contained in the Act. A general provision intended to meet general contingencies must always yield to special provisions made to meet particular contingencies. The power to extend time under S.20(3) could have operation only subject to S.20(8) and the general provision contained in Rule 130 cannot enlarge the scope of the power under S.20(3), The only reconciliatory interpretation, according to His Lordship is that the power under sub-section (3) must be sought for and exercised before the period prescribed under R.ll(2). When once that is not done and the deposit is not made, and the consequence under sub section (8) take effect, there is no question of exercising the power under sub-section (3). 32. We feel that it is not a reconciliatory interpretation. It is plain and clear and no interpretive invasive dissection or construction of sub-sections (3) and (8) of S.22 is necessary and no reconciliatory process is required to hold that the landlord has the right to ask for extension of time before the expiry of the time initially granted as per rules for sufficient reasons. 33. The foundation of the theory that the Tribunal loses its power to extend the time, when once the period is run out, is on the basis that there is no live order and an extension can be given only to an order in existence or an order which can breathe and survive, even though the survival may be precarious. A doctor with life saving drugs can extend the life of a patient, only if the patient is alive. The Tribunal is in the position of a doctor. Just like the doctor has the capacity and power with the help of modern medico technology, at least to lengthen the life of a patient for a short period, the Tribunal also had the same power. The life saving technology is sub-section (3) of S.22 read with R.130 of the rules. When once the order is dead, the Tribunal is in the predicament of a doctor attending a dead person, who can only fold his hand and say' rest in peace' and leave the scene. The question is whether this theory is correct and valid in law. When once the order is dead, the Tribunal is in the predicament of a doctor attending a dead person, who can only fold his hand and say' rest in peace' and leave the scene. The question is whether this theory is correct and valid in law. Certainly, a general power is given under Rule 130 to extend the time even after the expiry of a period fixed by the Tribunal for doing certain act. This saving provision in the rule is identical to section 148 C.P.C. We quote both S.148 C.P.C. and R.130 of the Rules. "S.148. Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. R.130: Extension of time-Where any period is fixed or granted by the Land Tribunal or the appellate authority (or the Taluk Land board) or the Land Board or any other authority or officer for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by these rules, it or he may, in its or his discretion, from time to time, extend such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired." 34. S.148 C.P.C. is a procedural power, the prime devoir of the provision is to save a difficult situation so as to enable the suitors to get justice in accordance with law. All procedural powers are powers to serve the main purpose of the function of the court, viz. to render justice in the cause. No procedural provision should act as the master, but it can only have the status of an aid to assist in rendering justice between the parties. S.148 is intended to enlarge time or period fixed or granted by the court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the court. It is a discretionary power and it is said that this power can be exercised even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. Certainly, nothing has been said as to the operation of this power in a case where the original period fixed expired, which, in turn resulted in lethal consequences. It is a discretionary power and it is said that this power can be exercised even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. Certainly, nothing has been said as to the operation of this power in a case where the original period fixed expired, which, in turn resulted in lethal consequences. It is not uncommon or unusual for the court in order to give more force and ensure prompt compliance of the order to say the consequence of not complying with the order as stipulated by the court. The court thus clothes its order with a consequential effect, of the non-compliance of its order as terrorism. The point to be considered is whether in such cases the court is deprived of its jurisdiction by virtue of its own order even in a case where the court feels that there will be failure of justice because of the operation of the order in terrorism. To hold that the court becomes powerless to call back the lethal consequence will be an unrealistic assumption of a lack of power with the court since anything done by the court, which resulted in injustice can be remedied by the court itself. So we feel that even in a case where lethal consequences are also implanted, in the order for non-compliance of the order within the stipulated time, the court should have power to extend time. We feel that it is difficult to say that the order has taken effect on failure to comply with the order within the stipulated time and there is nothing to be extended may not be a just and correct interpretation of the content of S.148 C.P.C. 35. It was once thought that the power reach of S.148 C.P.C. extended only to a limited area, for example, that if a peremptory order is passed stating an appeal will stand dismissed, if the condition is not satisfied, within a particular period, and when that particular period is run out, the appeal will remain as a dismissed appeal, just like a dead order in this case and so, even with the help of S.148 C.P.C. the court was found powerless to extend the time. In short, it was contended that S.148 can be effectively applied only in cases where there was no automatic operation of the order taking away the life of an appeal or such other peremptory consequences. In short, it was contended that S.148 can be effectively applied only in cases where there was no automatic operation of the order taking away the life of an appeal or such other peremptory consequences. Once it was thought that the application of S.148 is limited to cases where the orders were not peremptory, to the effect if the condition is not satisfied, the order granting the relief will stand cancelled or terminated. The position was considered in depth in AIR 1961 S.C. 882, (Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das). 36. In AIR 1961 S.C. 882, the Supreme Court was considering a case of dismissal of an appeal for non-payment of deficit court fee within the time fixed. The High Court held that the order was peremptory and that even though the application for extension of time was filed before the expiry of time, since no order was passed on the application extending the time, before the expiry of the time fixed in the first order, the application cannot be allowed, because by the passage of time, even though the application for extension of time was pending, the peremptory part of the earlier order took effect and there was nothing alive for the court to exercise its power to extend time. The Supreme Court did not agree with the High Court. The Supreme Court said thus: "....the High Court was not powerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorily fixed the period for payment. S.148, in terms, allowed extension of time, even if the original period fixed had expired, and S.149 was equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections could be invoiced by the applicant, when the time had not actually expired. An order extending time for payment, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed, could operate from the date on which the time fixed expired." Further, the Supreme Court said that-"the procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorism, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estops a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed." 37. They do not, however, completely estops a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed." 37. It is pertinent to note that the Supreme Court was taking a very practical and pragmatic view of the situation to ensure justice, within the confines of law, which is the ultimate devoir of the court, which alone can justify the very existence of courts. The Supreme Court showed absolute pragmatism when it said that: "For example, it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money ordered to be paid and came well in time, but was set upon and robbed by thieves the day previous, he could not ask for extension of time or that the court was powerless to extend it. Such orders are not like the law of Medes and the Persians. Cases are known in which courts have moulded their practice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or proceeding, even though a final order had been passed. We need cite only one such case - Lachmi Narian Marwari v. Balmakund Marwari (ILR 4 Pat. 61= AIR 1924 P.C.198)". The Supreme Court further said that "But we are of opinion that in this case the Court could have exercised its powers first on July 13,1954, when the petition filed within. the time was before it, and again under the exercise of its inherent powers, when the two petitions under S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed. If the High Court had felt disposed to take action on any of these occasions Ss.148 and 149 would have clothed them with ample power to do justice to a litigant for whom it entertained considerable sympathy" (emphasis added). 38. The part which we have emphasised is important. It is significant that the Supreme Court made it clear that though the High Court could have acted on a petition filed within time, but not disposed of by the court, the High Court could have taken action on the other two petitions, exercising its power under Ss.148 and 149. It denotes that even in cases where an order is made by the court for doing a thing within a particular time and a consequence of dismissal of the appeal resulted, the High Court had the power to extend the tm. It denotes that even in cases where an order is made by the court for doing a thing within a particular time and a consequence of dismissal of the appeal resulted, the High Court had the power to extend the tm. a. This aspect of the matter was considered in AIR 1972 All. 246 (Gobard v. 3arsati), Overruling an earlier decision in AIR 1936 All. 477 (GayaD/n v. Lalta Prasad and following AIR 1961 S.C. 882, the Allahabad High Court observed thus:- "Thus, the view, which the Supreme Court has taken in this: The court has power under S.148 C.P.C. to extend the time for doing an act even after the time given has expired; a peremptory order providing for the automatic dismissal of the application of appeal or suit on failure to do the act within the time fixed does not take away the power and jurisdiction of the Court to extend the time in appropriate cases: such peremptory orders are made "in terrorism" in order that dilatory litigants might avoid negligence and delay." The Full Bench said that what is import a nt to note is that even with respect to applications under S.151 C.P.C. which were filed after the expiry of the period fixed by the order, the supreme Court has said that the High Court could have, on those applications, extended the time under Ss.148 and 149 C.P.C. 39. In 1978 KLT 2Q (Sreedharan v. Muhammed Kunhi) a Division Bench of this court, considering the provisions contained in the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, for extension of time to deposit arrears of rent in order to avoid an order of eviction; said: "The circumstance that the one month period of suspension of execution is laid down by the statute does not deprive the Rent Control Court's power to enlarge the period as the power to enlarge or to grant such further period as conferred by the statute itself. There is nothing in the expression "such further period" to suggest that the power to enlarge the period could be exercised only before and not after its expiry. Even though the expression "such other period" would have only empowered the Rent Control Court to substitute a different period by the order of eviction, the words "such further period" by which it was substituted, permits an enlargement by a subsequent order. Even though the expression "such other period" would have only empowered the Rent Control Court to substitute a different period by the order of eviction, the words "such further period" by which it was substituted, permits an enlargement by a subsequent order. The power to enlarge thus flows from S.11(2)(c) itself. Norris this the sole source of power for S.23(1)(i) expressly confers the power to enlarge the time originally fixed or granted as is vested in a court under the Civil Procedure Code. As for the Civil Court, it has got the power to enlarge the time after expiry of the time originally fixed or granted and this can be done even on a motion made after the time has run out." The same power must therefore vest in the Rent Control Court by virtue of S.23(1)(i)". Vide Cheriyan v. Mahadeva Iyer (1971 KLT 199); Subramonian Chettiar v. Krishnaveni Ammal (1964 KLJ 882) and B.C. Kame v. Nemi Chand (AIR 1970 S.C. 981). 40. In (1977) 2 Andhra Weekly Reporter ll7 (Kishwari Begum v. Quadiri begum ), a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court considering how S.148 of the C.P.C. should be interpreted, said thus:- "It is a procedural provision and it should be interpreted so as to allow the Court to meet the several eventualities arising from time to time to do justice between the parties and not in such a narrow manner as to stifle its powers which may result in defeating the ends of justice." Referring to AIR 1961 S.C. 882, the court observed that significantly, the Supreme Court has said that S.148 C.P.C. in terms allows extension of time even if the original period fixed has expired and S.149 is equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not actually expired such procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are in essence in terrorism, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estops a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. They do not, however, completely estops a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. The illustration given by the Supreme Court was highlighted by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court said that the observations of the Supreme Court are plain and clear and disclose that the court has power to extend the time not only when the applications are made before the expiry of the time, but even after the expiry of the prescribed time. The contention that the observations of the Supreme Court do not apply where the court finally disposes of an appeal before it and that the said observations are applicable only when the court is seized of the substantive appeal was negatived. Referring to the case decided by the Supreme Court, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court further said thus: "We are unable to accept even this contention, for, even in the said case before the Supreme Court, the High Court had finally disposed of the appeal. While disposing of the appeal finally, the Court granted three months' time to the plaintiff-appellant to pay the court fee, both on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal, and directed that if they paid the said amount within the time prescribed, the appeal will be allowed with costs; while if they fail to do so, the appeal shall stand dismissed. In such a case it cannot be held that the High Court was seized of the substantive proceeding. Further, the observations of the Supreme Court, extracted by us above, clearly show that the power under S.148, Civil Procedure Code, can be exercised not only on a petition filed before the expiry of the time prescribed by the earlier order or judgment as the case may be, but also on a petition filed after the expiry of the time. Further, the observations of the Supreme Court, extracted by us above, clearly show that the power under S.148, Civil Procedure Code, can be exercised not only on a petition filed before the expiry of the time prescribed by the earlier order or judgment as the case may be, but also on a petition filed after the expiry of the time. The Supreme Court has clearly pointed out that such a power was available both in respect of the petition filed on 8th July, 1954 (i.e. before the expiry of the time prescribed) and also with respect to the two petitions filed after the expiry of the prescribed period (i.e. one under S.151 read with 0.47 R. I Civil Procedure Code)." The Division Bench added that the judgment of the Supreme Court was understood by various High Courts in India as understood by it. They are: Gobardhan v. Barsati (AIR 1972 All. 246), Perissami v. Illuppur Panchayat Board (1973) 1 M.L.J. 244, Shankar v. Parwatibai (AIR 1976 Bom. 241), and New Bangasree Bastialaya v. Ramanlal (AIR 1976 Cal. 335). 41. In Subbiah v. Kasamuthu (AIR 1973 Mad. 437), Gokulakrishnan, J. as he then was, following AIR 1961 S.C. 822, said that the court has got ample powers to grant extension of time, even if the petition is filed subsequent to the expiry of the stipulated period. This was also a case of an order resulted automatically with consequences, if not complied with the condition. 42. Considering the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Rent Control Act (Act 14 of 1961), the Supreme Court in AIR 1970 S.C. 981 (B.C. Kame v. Nemi Chand) said that even where a consequence is contemplated on the failure of payment of arrears of rent, taking a liberal interpretation of the provisions, the court has jurisdiction to extend the time, even after the expiry of the period originally fixed. Of course, in the case, on merits, no extension of time was granted. 43. S.22 of the Act deals with procedure for resumption. Of course, in the case, on merits, no extension of time was granted. 43. S.22 of the Act deals with procedure for resumption. Clause (2) of S.22 makes it obligatory that the Land Tribunal, when passing an order for resumption, to incorporate in the order certain matters which are peremptory in nature and it mandates that the Land Tribunal shall direct the landlord that within such time and in such manner as prescribed to make payments to extinguish the rights of the cultivating tenant and intermediaries, who would be affected by such resumption. Sub-section (3) provides the power to the Land Tribunal to extend prescribed time under sub-section (2) for making payments by the landlord. 44. There is no positive stipulation that the Tribunal's power to extend time prescribed under sub-section (2) extends only till the expiry of the period initially fixed. Of course, this sub-section has to be read along with sub-section (8) of S.22. An absolute power to extend time is given under sub-section (3) of S.22 to the Tribunal and the consequence of failure to deposit is provided under sub-section (8) of S.22 stating that the order of resumption shall be treated as cancelled and the landlord shall have no further right for resumption. 45. It is contended that the time is fixed by sub-rule (2) of Rule ll and so, even the general provision contained in S.130 is not applicable. It was strongly urged that the time for payment is a statutory fixation and not a fixation by virtue of the order of the court. Reading S.22 of the Act as a whole and understanding the scheme of that section, it is difficult for us to agree with this submission. Power is granted to the Tribunal to fix the time for payment is clear from sub-section (2) of S.22. 46. In 1952 KLT 91 (Kamalakshi Amma v. Narayanan a/a/r) M.P. Menon, J. has clearly said that the Tribunal is the authority to fix time in the order that has to be passed under S.22(2) of the Act. His Lordship observed thus: "S.22(2) imposes an obligation on the Tribunal to fix the time within which the landlord should make the deposit. R.ll(2) does not go further, except to the extent of prescribing that not more than 30 days could be granted. His Lordship observed thus: "S.22(2) imposes an obligation on the Tribunal to fix the time within which the landlord should make the deposit. R.ll(2) does not go further, except to the extent of prescribing that not more than 30 days could be granted. But in the present case the Tribunal had fixed no time at all in its order passed under S.22(2). 47. The power of the Tribunal can be seen deposited impliedly under subsection (8) of S.22 also. When sub-section (8) says that when the landlord fails to deposit the amount in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal failure to deposit the amount which invites the consequence is a failure to deposit the amount as directed by the Land Tribunal. So, in effect the direction to deposit an amount within a particular period is by the Land Tribunal. Of course, the rule prescribes that the Tribunal shall give only 30 days at the initial stage. It has to be considered as the maximum period that can be given at the first stage by the Tribunal. But, time is granted by the order of the Land Tribunal, and the failure contemplated is a failure to comply with the directions of the Tribunal engrafted in the order. So, the fixation of the time is by the Tribunal itself. 48. The enlargement of time is a power granted to the Land Tribunal by the statute. In fact, sub-sec. (3) of S.22 is very general in character. Of course, the principle of S.148 may not be applicable in a case where the time is fixed by virtue of a statutory provision and not by virtue of an order of the court. The enlargement of time is a power granted to the Land Tribunal by the statute. In fact, sub-sec. (3) of S.22 is very general in character. Of course, the principle of S.148 may not be applicable in a case where the time is fixed by virtue of a statutory provision and not by virtue of an order of the court. On a reading of sub-section (8) of S.22, we are of opinion that the direction to make the payment within the prescribed time is by the Land Tribunal itself and so, there is no difficulty in applying the provisions contained in R.130 of the Rules, which is in para materia identical to S.148 C.P.C. We have found that if the time is fixed by a court with resulting consequential dismissal of the proceedings on failure to comply with the conditions stipulated in the order, will not deprive of the court its power of enlargement of time under S.148 C.P.C. If the order of the Tribunal says that the amount has to be paid within 30 days of the date of the order and if not paid, the order of resumption shall be treated as cancelled and that the landlord shall have no further right of resumption, it will definitely come within the ambit of the power under Rule 130 of the Rules, which is in effect, an identical provision to S.148 C.P.C. 49. We have to examine this aspect of the matter taking a case where time is extended by the Tribunal within time and then a failure to comply with payment ordered. It is difficult to say a further extension of time is not possible after the expiry of the period on the ground that the fixation of time and the consequence of non-payment within time are not ensued from the order of the Tribunal. It is contended that though the time has to be granted as prescribed by the rules by the Tribunal and such a stipulation of time must be there in the order, the consequence of failure to comply with such a direction, need not be made a part of the order, since the provision contained in sub-section (8) of S.22 provides for it. The order gets its full operation in the case of an order under S.22 of the Act, by virtue of the exercise of the power granted under S.22(2) to the Tribunal read along with the second part of sub-section (8) of S.22. The question is whether it will make a difference and by virtue of that difference, can it be said that the fixation of time is statutory and so no extension is possible invoking the power under R.130 of the Rules. 50. R.130 of the rules and sub-section (3) of S.22 deal only with enlargement of time and the power of the Tribunal to enlarge the time. We have considered the question whether the power of enlargement of time granted to an authority in respect of its own orders, after the expiry of the time fixed is possible or not, in a case where consequence is also stipulated and when that consequence also has taken place. Following the Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1961 S. C. 882 we have to say that even in a case where failure to comply with something to be done within a particular time, with an added clause of a serious consequence, the failure to comply with the condition, will not deprive the authority the right to enlarge the time. We would like to say that R.130 has to get a liberal interpretation since it is a procedural provision. R.130 has to be interpreted in the same spirit as S.148 C.P.C. is interpreted by the Supreme Court. All procedural provisions should be interpreted liberally so as to enable the parties to receive justice in the cause. We would like to say that R.130 has to get a liberal interpretation since it is a procedural provision. R.130 has to be interpreted in the same spirit as S.148 C.P.C. is interpreted by the Supreme Court. All procedural provisions should be interpreted liberally so as to enable the parties to receive justice in the cause. We feel to say that if we give a rigid interpretation to S.22(8), we have to say that in a case where the Land Tribunal passed an order directing deposit of the amount to be paid to the tenants, under sub-section (2) of S.22 within a period of 30 days and if the landlord brings the money to the Land Tribunal and he was not able to get a chalan to deposit the amount and he fails to deposit the amount or in a case where he comes with the money and was robbed off the money and he fails to deposit or in a case where he falls ill, when he reached the office of the Tribunal and falls to deposit the amount, there is failure to deposit wish in the meaning of S.22(8), and in all these circumstances, the landlord is deprived of all remedies since as understood by Padmanabhan,J. it is a dead order and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the time. We feel that it will be against the intention of the legislature and not a correct and just interpretation of the powers given to the Land Tribunal by the statute. We have also to remember the fact that we are considering the scope and content of the discretionary power of the Tribunal to extend time which the legislature thought is necessary to meet the ends of justice since unforeseen eventualities are likely to occur for no fault of the landlord. It is essentially a question of interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. So naturally the statutory provision must get a purposive interpretation. A procedural but a jurisdictional power under S.148 C.P.C. was interpreted with utmost liberality by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 S. C. 882. In this view, we hold that the Land Tribunal has got discretion to enlarge the time even after the expiry of the time initially fixed or subsequently extended by the Tribunal to make the payment under sub-section (2) of S.22 of the Act. In this view, we hold that the Land Tribunal has got discretion to enlarge the time even after the expiry of the time initially fixed or subsequently extended by the Tribunal to make the payment under sub-section (2) of S.22 of the Act. We respectfully disagree with the view taken by this court that under no circumstances, extension of time can be granted by the Tribunal, if no application of time is filed before the expiry of the time fixed for payment of the amount under sub-section (2) of S.22 and we respectfully disagree with the decision reported in 1988 (1) KLT 289,1977 KLT 717 and 1972 KLT 1014, to the extent as indicated above. 51. We have detailed the history of this litigation. According to the land lords, the order was passed at the Head Quarters, though the case was heard in the Camp Sitting and they were not aware of the fact of the pronouncement of the order. As soon as the landlords came to know about the order, they filed an application for extension of time to deposit the amount. Application for extension of time was filed on 24-5-1978. That petition was posted to 26-5-1978 and rightly or wrongly, the Tribunal extended the time till 31-5-1978 and the deposit was made on 29-5-1978. The order allowing extension of time as such was never challenged by the tenants. After a protracted fight before the appellate and the revisional courts, when ultimately the first order was confirmed on 31-1-1987, and thereafter when the landlord moved for recovery of the property ordered to be resumed, the tenants contended that the deposit was not made in accordance with law. In putting forward this contention, the tenants maintained that the order extending time was passed without notice and the order is one without jurisdiction and so, it cannot be given effect to. 52. Padmanabhan, J. in 1988 (1) KLT 289 said that a deposit made beyond the time stipulated without notice will not amount to extension of time and it can be ignored. The position is not identical here. Of course, an order passed by a competent authority without notice cannot be treated as a nullity particularly, when the same was filed in the main case where the parties appeared and got a verdict by the Tribunal. It is also to be noted that the application was posted to a particular date. The position is not identical here. Of course, an order passed by a competent authority without notice cannot be treated as a nullity particularly, when the same was filed in the main case where the parties appeared and got a verdict by the Tribunal. It is also to be noted that the application was posted to a particular date. Further details are not discernible from the file. We feel that it is not legal for us to say that the order is totally without jurisdiction. It may be a wrong order, which can be corrected in appropriate proceedings. In this case, it has not been done. This view we take for the added reason that we have already taken the view that even after the expiry of the period fixed for payment of the amount directed to be paid under S.22(3) of the Act, the Tribunal has got the power to extend the time. 53. Not giving notice to the opposite party is a processual default. This default may give to the aggrieved party reliefs against the resultant injustice. But processual failure cannot make the decision, order or decree, nothing less than a decision order or decree. In a Full Bench decision of this court reported in 1987 (2) KLT 848 (Thambi v. Mathew), Sukumaran, J. observed "even when many such requirements are statutorily incorporated, the violation thereof does not render the decree one without jurisdiction. A distinction exists in clear terms. Such, for example, is the case when the court omits to discharge its statutory duty to consider the question of limitation obligated under S.3 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court had occasion to observe in AIR 1961 S. C. 790 (Kaushalya Devi v. balinath) that "a non-observance of the conditional aid down in O.32, R.7(1) does not make the decree void for it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court at all". See also the decisions reported in AIR 1967 Ker. 97 (Kunheema Umma v. P. Balakrishnan and 1980 KLT 796 (Kunjan v. Janaki). 54. It is not necessary for us to add decisions on the question that a violation of certain statutory procedural provisions would not necessarily render a decision a nullity and that the parties can ignore it without getting a verdict of the superior court that the order is bad. 54. It is not necessary for us to add decisions on the question that a violation of certain statutory procedural provisions would not necessarily render a decision a nullity and that the parties can ignore it without getting a verdict of the superior court that the order is bad. In 1984 (3) All.E.R.140 (Issacs v. robertson) Lord Diplock said thus: "Their Lordships would, however, take this opportunity to point out that in relation to order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction it is misleading to seek to draw distinctions between orders that are 'void' in the sense that they can be ignored with impunity by those persons to whom they are addressed, and orders that are Voidable' and may be enforced unless and until they are set aside. Dicta that refer to the possibility of there being such a distinction between orders to which the descriptions Void' and Voidable' respectively have been applied can be found in the opinions given by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Marsh v. Marsh (1945) AC 271 at 284 and Mac Foy v. United Africa Co. Ltd. (1961) 3 All E.R.1169, (1962) AC 152; but in neither of those appeals nor in any other case to which counsel has been able to refer their Lordships has any order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction been held to fall in a category of court orders that can simply be ignored because they are void ipso facto without there being any need for proceedings to have them set aside. The cases that are referred to in these dicta do not support the proposition that there is any category of orders of a court of unlimited jurisdiction of this kind: what they do support is the quite different proposition that there is a category or orders of such a court which a person affected by the order is entitled to apply to have set aside ex debit o justifies in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court without his needing to have recourse to the rules that deal expressly with proceedings to set aside orders for irregularity and give to the judge a discretion as to the order he will make. The judges in the cases that have drawn the distinction between the two types of orders have cautiously refrained from seeking to lay down a comprehensive definition of defects that attracts ex debit o justifies the right to have it set aside, save that specifically it includes orders that have been obtained in breach of rules of natural justice. The contrasting legal concepts of voidness and violability form part of the English Law of contract. They are inapplicable to order made by a court of unlimited jurisdiction in the course of contentious litigation. Such an order is either irregular or regular. If it is irregular it can be set aside by the court that made it on application to that court; if it is regular it can only be set aside by an appellate court on appeal if there is one to which an appeal lies." 4-55. Of course, the above decision was rendered in regard to the jurisdiction of the court. Entrusting judicial functions of the State to Tribunals at times has now become the pattern. We cannot ignore these realities in the matter of dispensation of justice. In, England, the system of Special Tribunals is conspicuous in administrative law. It has become an important aspect of the machinery of administrative justice, which was given recognition by the Parliament by enacting the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 which has now replaced the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1971. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 was preceded by the Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (the Franks Committee). In fact, this report was a landmark in the development of the Tribunal system. After the report and the enactments, it has been recognised that statutory tribunals are an integral part of the machinery of justice in the state and not merely administrative devices for disposing of claims and arguments conveniently. In an earlier edition of Wada's Administrative Law, the learned author has said thus:- "Outside the ordinary course of law there is a host of special tribunals who jurisdiction to decide legal disputes. They are one of the by-products of an age of intensive government, and in particular they multiply under the welfare state. The movement of progressive society now-a-days might be said (inverting the famous remark of Maine) to be from contract to status. They are one of the by-products of an age of intensive government, and in particular they multiply under the welfare state. The movement of progressive society now-a-days might be said (inverting the famous remark of Maine) to be from contract to status. Less and less are people left to rely on personal transactions enforced by the ordinary law courts. More and more are they made subject to regulatory schemes-national insurance, the health service, state education, agricultural control, rent control, and many other such things are administered under elaborate Acts of Parliament. Here is a new source of social friction, for there are bound to be many disputes." "To add all this work to the tasks of the ordinary courts would not only cause a breakdown; it would also in many cases be wrong in principle. The process of the courts is elaborate, slow and costly. Its defects are those of its merits for the object is to give the highest standard of justice; generally speaking, the public wants the best possible article, and is prepared to pay for it. But in administering social services the aim is different. Disputes must be disposed of smoothly, quickly and cheaply. The object is not the best article at any price, but the best article that is consistent with efficient administration. Moreover, many of these disputes are best decided by bodies on which technical experts can sit. Special forms of tribunal have therefore been devised, and the contract between them and the ordinary courts is striking. A new system for the dispensation of justice has grown up side by side with the old one. National insurance tribunals, rent tribunals, transport tribunals, health service tribunals, together with many others, have come to play a part in the life of the ordinary citizen which is (assuming the ordinary citizen to be law-abiding) likely to be of more direct concern to him than that of the courts of law." Of course, what is quoted above is not seen in the later edition. Though there is cleavage of opinion by the High Courts, some of the High Courts have taken a different view that "inherent jurisdiction is there even with Tribunals of limited jurisdiction." 56. Though there is cleavage of opinion by the High Courts, some of the High Courts have taken a different view that "inherent jurisdiction is there even with Tribunals of limited jurisdiction." 56. Certainly the new system of dispensation of justice has been growing up more powerfully and effective overshadowing the ordinary courts in its width and scope encompassing the serious disputes relating to property and title. This itself makes Tribunals equally important as courts. It should also be remembered that in certain cases, power of the court enjoyed for immemorial period has been taken away by ouster clauses and conferred it on Tribunals. Thus Tribunals are discharging the same and identical functions of dispensation of justice, which the ordinary courts are every day exercising. We do not want to obliterate and remove that thin line--of distinction between a Tribunal and a court, but the line is becoming thinner depending upon the nature of the power granted by the statutes to the Tribunals. If we examine i he Constitution, it is difficult to find a rigid separation of powers in the sense that the judicial power of the State is in the field of courts alone. In fact, by amending the Constitution, powers are given to certain Tribunals in regard to matters over which the High Court alone was exercising its power, as an illustration, we would say, the Central Administrative Tribunal. 57. Art.136 of our Constitution did not show any marked differentiation in the matter of courts and Tribunals. In the matter of special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court, courts did not confine it to orders passed or judgments of the ordinary appellate courts, but also appellate Tribunals. In AIR 1965 S. C. 1595 (Associated Cement Companies v. Sharma) Gajendragadkar C.J. said: "They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers the courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always he so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that ihey discharge. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always he so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that ihey discharge. As in the case of courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial function which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power it is the States inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign Slate, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State by appropriate measures to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties, li is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both the courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State." 58. InArdlidge's Case (1915 A.C. 120) the House of Lords observed that the adjudication by the Local Government Board was one "affecting property and the liberty of a man to do what he chooses with his own". Viscount Haldane L.C. observed thus: - "When, therefore, Parliament entrusts it with judicial duties, Parliament must be taken, in the absence of any declaration to the contrary, to have intended it to follow the procedure which is its own, and is necessary if it is to be capable of doing its work efficiently." Corpus Juries Scandium dealing with Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure in Art.157 indicates that Administrative Tribunals are vested with inherent power. It is stated thus: "Apart from and without reference to statutory authority therefor and subject to some restrictions and limitations, it has been held that an administrative agency may correct or amend its orders. It is stated thus: "Apart from and without reference to statutory authority therefor and subject to some restrictions and limitations, it has been held that an administrative agency may correct or amend its orders. Thus it has been held, except as qualified by statute, administrative tribunals possess the) inherent power to modify their judicial acts to serve the ends of essential justice and the policy of the law; and that the general power of an administrative body over its decisions includes the right to modify a decision so as to reach a different result on the same record." C.K.Allen in "Law in the making" tells us thus: "A vast change has come over our 'administration of justice'. It can no longer be considered as the monopoly of the courts of law.... The government has created tribunals with a lavish hand .... Of course, these are all subordinate jurisdictions and most of them, especially since the passing of the Tribunals and Enquiries Act, 1958, are subject to some form of appeal; while as we have seen, even the determination of statutory (e.g. domestic) tribunals are subject to control by the courts by declaratory judgment. But it s obvious that when we come to consider the 'administration of justice' in England, we are confronted with a system utterly different from that which prevailed a hundred or even fifty years ago. The courts of justice have often the last word, but the first word is usually of more importance to the citizen." 59. All the Tribunals are under the superintending power of a superior court by virtue of the constitutional provisions^ If a Tribunal goes out of its way, jumping the frontiers of powers, it can be corrected by superior courts. From what we have discussed, we feel that the powers exercised by a Land Tribunal are so akin to the powers exercised by a civil court. It has reached the point where it has become indistinguishable in content from the powers of a civil court. This is the reality. This reality has to be recognised when we are dealing with the jurisdictional error of an order passed by the Tribunal, and so we feel that the principle stated in 1984 (3) All. E.R.140 can be extended in the case of the Tribunal, which is also discharging important adjudicatory function, which are normally entrusted to courts. 60. This reality has to be recognised when we are dealing with the jurisdictional error of an order passed by the Tribunal, and so we feel that the principle stated in 1984 (3) All. E.R.140 can be extended in the case of the Tribunal, which is also discharging important adjudicatory function, which are normally entrusted to courts. 60. Counsel for landlords submitted that the final order passed in appeal on 31-1-1987 has to be treated as the order granting resumption to the landlords and if that order is taken as the final order and the executable order, there is no defaulter failure on the part of the landlord to make the deposit as contemplated under sub-section (2) of S.22 of the Act. This argument has been advanced on the principle of merger. In 1988 (1) KLT 289, in paragraph 10, Padmanabhan, J. considering 1982 KLT S.N. Page 15, Case No. 25 (Va/sa/a Kumari and Others v. Beeyathumma and Others) observed that there is no question of an order which has been set aside or materially modified continuing to determine the rights of the parties or operating to have the penal consequences under S.20(8) disabling the landlord and giving a vested right to the tenant when the appellate or revisional order provides otherwise. It is said that "in these cases the appellate or revisional order alone could govern the rights. That cannot be equated with the contingency under S.20(8)". In a way, Padmanabhan, J. has accepted the theory of merger, when he has said that in "these cases the appellate or revisional order alone could govern the rights". 61. In 1982 K.L.T. S.N. Page 15 Case No. 25, this Court said that once the order is found unsustainable in law and is liable to be set aside, there is no substance in the plea that the order is as good as cancelled by virtue of sub-section (8) of S. 22 of the Act and hence the landlords are precluded from questioning the validity of the order in appropriate proceedings under the Act. In the case at hand, it has to be noted that once the appellate court found that the order granting resumption is bad and the appellate court had set aside the order. Of course, there was a revision and the matter was remitted back to the appellate authority. In the case at hand, it has to be noted that once the appellate court found that the order granting resumption is bad and the appellate court had set aside the order. Of course, there was a revision and the matter was remitted back to the appellate authority. In 1982 K.L.T. S.N. Page 15 Case No. 25, this Court considered the eventuality of modifying the order and in such circumstances, it is futile to say that the order that has to be given effect to is the order of the Tribunal. Of course, in that case, there arose such a situation. But, we have to understand the principle of merger under a broad spectrum. 62. The Supreme Court, speaking though Venkatarama Ayyarj. in AIR 1956 S.C. 367 (M/s. Mela Ram & Sons v. Commr. of Income-tax, Punjab) observed that the principle of merger is applicable even in a case where an appeal which is filed beyond the period of limitation and disposed of by the appellate authority, and applying the principle of merger, the order dismissing an appeal on the ground of limitation was found to bean order within the meaning of a statutory provision under the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court said: "AI1 the orders under S.31 being appealable under S.33, the order of dismissal for non-compliance with S.30(3) must also be appealable, and it was so decided in Gyan Manjari Kuari v. Commr. of Income-tax, 1944 Pat.112(AIR V31). How is this view to be reconciled with the contention that S.31 contemplates only orders on the merits of I he assessment and not on preliminary issues? Vide- also the decision in Ananda v. Commr. of Income-tax, 1931 Pat. 306, which was followed in AIR 1944 Pat. ll2 and in Ramnarayana Das v. Commr. of Income-tax (1950 Orissa 205)". 63. Pathak, J. as His Lordship then was, in Rani Choudhury v. Lt. Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury (1982) 2 S.C.C. 596 observed thus: "In the present case, the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation. of Income-tax, 1931 Pat. 306, which was followed in AIR 1944 Pat. ll2 and in Ramnarayana Das v. Commr. of Income-tax (1950 Orissa 205)". 63. Pathak, J. as His Lordship then was, in Rani Choudhury v. Lt. Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury (1982) 2 S.C.C. 596 observed thus: "In the present case, the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation. That it was an appeal even though barred by time is clear from Mela Ram & Sons v. C.I.T. where Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for the court, after referring to Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, Raja Kulkarni v, State of Bombay and Promotho Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee held that "an appeal presented out of time is an appeal, and an order dismissing it as time barred is one passed in appeal. There can be no dispute then that in law what the respondent did was to file an appeal and that the order dismissing it as time-barred was one disposing of the appeal." In 1977 K.L.T. 717 (Yohannan v. Thomas'), a learned single judge of this court observed that it is reasonable to infer that the intention of the legislature was not to give to the landlord time for depositing the compensation awarded till the order becomes final. This court further said that the legislature has also made a provision for getting the time enlarged at the discretion of the Land Tribunal before the time originally fixed expires as is seen in S.22(3) of the Act. 64. Under S.22(3) of the Act, there is no clear indication that the discretion of the Land Tribunal is confined to extension of time before the expiration of the time originally fixed. 65. Now we have held that even after the expiry of the time fixed the Tribunal has got the power to extend the time. There can be no doubt that within the period originally fixed, by virtue of S.22(3), time can be extended. If the court extends time within the period originally fixed, the provision that the order will stand cancelled under S.22(8) on the expiry of one month from the date of the order shall not have any effect. 66. There can be no doubt that within the period originally fixed, by virtue of S.22(3), time can be extended. If the court extends time within the period originally fixed, the provision that the order will stand cancelled under S.22(8) on the expiry of one month from the date of the order shall not have any effect. 66. The observation in 1977 K.L.T. 717 that "when the landlord did not seek extension of time, invoking S.22(3) of the Act or a stay from the appellate authority or the revisional court, as the case may be, but did allow the order of resumption passed by the Land Tribunal to be treated as cancelled, he did so at the peril of his losing the right for resumption once for all" seems to be not warranted by the provisions of the Act. If this proposition is accepted, it will go against the well-recognised theory of merger. An appellate authority cannot adjudicate the correctness of an order which at the time of adjudication stands cancelled. There is no order to be examined at the time of adjudication and there is no necessity to challenge the order. The above formulations may not stand a legal scrutiny. It has to be noted that a right of appeal is given under S.102 of the Act. R.ll(3) provides that the appellate order should give all the details that are required under sub-section (2) of S.22. 67. The Supreme Court in a number of decisions held that an order passed or a judgment rendered in an appeal will have the effect of encapsulating the lower court's order or the judgment and rendering the lower court's order or judgment erased by amalgamating and merging it with the order or judgment of the appellate authority or the appellate court. Admittedly, in this case, there was an appeal filed by the tenants. That appeal was decided only on 31-3-1987. So, the effective order on the petition for resumption is the order passed by the appellate authority in 1987. The principle of merger is also relevant in this case. Then the effect is that it has to be deemed that the order passed by the appellate authority is the order on the resumption application, even if it is a confirming order. The principle of merger is also relevant in this case. Then the effect is that it has to be deemed that the order passed by the appellate authority is the order on the resumption application, even if it is a confirming order. We may say that it is significant to note that at one stage, the appeal was allowed and the resumption application was dismissed and at another stage, the tenants were given an option and the Land Tribunal was directed to give effect to the option that may be given by the tenants and to recalculate the solatium and the amount due as compensation for improvements. We are pointing out these facts only to emphasise that if the principle of merger is not applied, certainly it would create an incongruous position and will cause failure of justice. 68. Rule ll(3) of the Rules provides that the order of the appellate authority against the order of the Land Tribunal under sub-section (2) of S.22 shall, so far as may be, specify the particulars mentioned in the said sub-section and also the particulars mentioned in sub-rules (1) and (2). Rule ll of the Rules reads thus: " Contents of order.--(I) Besides the particulars mentioned in sub-section (2) of S.22, the order passed by the Land Tribunal shall specify the survey numbers and, sub-division numbers, if any for an adequate description of the land allowed to be resumed, the extent of land that will be left after resumption, and the value of the improvements belonging to the cultivating tenant and the other person, if any, interested in the land allowed to be resumed. (2) The order referred to in sub-rule (1) shall also specify the amounts to be paid by the landlord resuming the land, and the persons to whom the payments are to be made, and shall further direct that the amounts shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal within a period of thirty days from the date of the order; and on such deposit being made, the Land Tribunal shall pay the amounts to the parties and obtain receipt therefor. (3) The order of the appellate authority against the order of the Land Tribunal under subsection (2) of S.22 shall, so far as may be, specify the particulars mentioned in the said sub-section and also the particulars mentioned in sub-rules (1) and (2)". (3) The order of the appellate authority against the order of the Land Tribunal under subsection (2) of S.22 shall, so far as may be, specify the particulars mentioned in the said sub-section and also the particulars mentioned in sub-rules (1) and (2)". The appellate authority is found to pass an order as prescribed by R.ll(3). The appellate authority is further mandated to mention the particulars to be mentioned in sub-rules (1) and (2) of R.ll. Sub-rule (2) provides for fixing the time of 30 days. We feel that it is an indication that the appellate authority has got the obligation when disposing of an appeal against the order of resumption to direct payment of the amount within the period prescribed under R.ll(2). It is absolutely necessary, since, perhaps the appeal may be in relation to the inadequacy of the amount determined and if the appellate authority enhances the amount, naturally the appellate authority has to fix a time limit for the deposit of the amount. Perhaps, an eventuality may arise as to whether the amount has to be varied, because the tenant has got always the option to choose that portion of the tenanted property to be retained by him when resumption is allowed. It is significant to note in this case that at one stage, the appellate authority directed the Tribunal to allow the tenant to opt the property to be retained by him and for that a time was stipulated, and further directed the Tribunal that if a different option is given by the tenants, the amount due to improvements payable by the landlord has to be fixed by the Tribunal. So, a power identical to the power granted to the Land Tribunal under rule ll(2) is given to the. appellate authority also. 70. In this case, when the appellate authority passed the final order on 31-3-1987, it has not fixed the amount to be paid, or the time within which the amount has to be paid; it only confirmed the order of the Land Tribunal. The appellate authority failed to pass an order in accordance with Rule ll(3). If the appellate authority has passed an order in accordance with Rule ll(3) there would not have been any difficulty for the landlord to resume the property and these questions may not have arisen at all. 71. The appellate authority failed to pass an order in accordance with Rule ll(3). If the appellate authority has passed an order in accordance with Rule ll(3) there would not have been any difficulty for the landlord to resume the property and these questions may not have arisen at all. 71. In 1982 K.L.T. 91, M.P. Menon, J. considering the obligation of the Tribunal to pass an order in accordance with rule ll(2) said thus:- "S.22(2) imposes an obligation on the Tribunal to fix the time within which the landlord should make the deposit. Rule ll(2) does not go further, except to the extent of prescribing that not more than 30 days could be granted. But in the present case, the Tribunal had fixed no time at all in its order passed under S.22(2). Without such a fixation, there could have been no "extension" under sub-rule (3). It is a cardinal principle of administering justice that no party shall suffer because of a mistake of the court. Sub-section (8) is attracted only when the landlord fails to deposit the amount "in accordance with the directions" of the Tribunal. When no direction fixing the time for payment is given by the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the landlord has failed to comply with it. The Court's duty is to give effect to the language of S.22 if it is clear and unambiguous. No fountain of justice can seek to be higher than the stream of law that feeds it. It is not as if the legislature has ordained that the landlord should get only 30 days to make the deposit in all cases. Sub-section (3) is a clear indication that the time can be extended in appropriate cases, and that the deadline in R.ll is not always the landlord undoing, when the legislature itself is disposed to show such benign consideration, the court should be slow to deny it to the landlord by placing at his door its own mistake". The principle stated in the above quote certainly relates to the Tribunal and Rule ll(2) but we feel that the same principle is applicable in the case of appellate authority in view of the mandate in Rule ll (3) of the Rules. The principle stated in the above quote certainly relates to the Tribunal and Rule ll(2) but we feel that the same principle is applicable in the case of appellate authority in view of the mandate in Rule ll (3) of the Rules. It is significant to note that His Lordship Justice M.P. Menon thought that sub-section (3) of S.22 manifests a benign consideration of the legislature and that the court should be slow to deny it to the landlord by "placing at his door its own mistake". We feel that the observations quoted above would fortify the position we have already taken in regard to the power of the Tribunal to extend the time. Further, it has to be noted that the order extending time to deposit the amount by the Tribunal was not separately challenged by the tenant. According to us, the said order can only at the worst be an order which is liable to be treated as a wrong order and it cannot be treated as an order passed with total lack of jurisdiction. Both the lower authorities concurrently found that the order of resumption is executable. In view of the above discussions, we hold that there is no merit in this Civil Revision Petition and it is only to be dismissed. We do so.