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1991 DIGILAW 174 (RAJ)

Mahesh Chand Tak v. State of Rajasthan.

1991-02-12

R.S.KEJRIWAL

body1991
JUDGMENT 1. - This revision has been directed against the order dated 7.12.1990, passed by learned Additional-District Judge No.1, Ajmer, by which he rejected the application of the petitioner dated 1.12.1990. 2. The relevants facts of the case are that the plaintiff- petitioner was suspended by the Government vide order dated 26.9.1990, and he was informed on the same day by letter and also by publication of the same in the news-papers. Another person was appointed on the post of the petitioner. Later on, on 5.10.1990, the plaintiff filed a suit for injunction against the non- petitioners. Alongwith the plaint, he also filed an application for temporary injunction. The non-petitioners filed reply to the said application on 6.10.1990, and contested the application. The trial court vide its order dated 7.11.1990, allowed the application for temporary injunction and directed the non- petitioners not to disturb the petitioner where he was already serving before his suspension. Against this order of learned trial court, the non-petitioners filed a miscellaneous appeal before the learned District Judge, Amer, on 8.11.1990. The memo of appeal was signed by the officer-in-charge, appointed by the Government in this connection. The appeal was presented in the court of District Judge, Ajmer, by Shri Basant Vijayvargia, who was Public Prosecutor/Government Advocate on that day. The petitioner on 1.12.1990, submitted an application that the appeal was presented by Shri Basant Vijayvargia, without any Vakalatnama or power as required by Order 3 Rule 4 C.P.C, and as such the learned lower court should have rejected the appeal only on this short ground. The learned District Judge, vide its order dated 7.12.1990, rejected the said application. Being aggrieved with the said order, the plaintiff-petitioner has come in revision. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record of the case and the authorities cited by them. it has been argued by Shri Samdaria, learned counsel for the petitioner that the appeal presented by Shri Vijayvargia, without any Vakalatnama or authority-letter from the Govt. was not competent and should have been rejected only on this ground. In support of his argument, Shri Samdaria, placed reliance on a judgment of this court in Firm Mohanlal Ramchandra,v. The Union of India, AIR 1972 Raj. 152 . 4. On the other hand Shri Garg, learned Government Advocate argued that the Government vide order dated 17.7.1990, appointed Shri Vijayvargia as Public Prosecutor/Government Advocate for Ajmer. In support of his argument, Shri Samdaria, placed reliance on a judgment of this court in Firm Mohanlal Ramchandra,v. The Union of India, AIR 1972 Raj. 152 . 4. On the other hand Shri Garg, learned Government Advocate argued that the Government vide order dated 17.7.1990, appointed Shri Vijayvargia as Public Prosecutor/Government Advocate for Ajmer. He argued that Shri Vijayvargia was appointed Govt. Advocate for Ajmer, as such he was competent to file the appeal. He further argued that the appellant also admitted this fact before the learned lower appellate court and the court also mentioned this fact but the learned lower court misread the order dated 17.7.1990, by observing that both the parties admit that Shri Vijayvargia was working as Public Prosecutor on the said date. Shri Vijayvargia was not only working as a Public Prosecutor but also Govt. Advocate as is apparent from the order of the Government dated 17.7.1990. He argued that later on the appeal was transferred to the court of Additional District Judge No.1, Ajmer, On 9.11.90 the Collector, Ajmer, appointed Shri J.S.Rana and Shri D.D. Khan to conduct the cases of Forest Department. The petitioner concerns with the Forest Department and as such these two advocates were appointed to conduct the appeal. He has drawn my attention to Section 2(7) of Civil Procedure Code, which defines the word 'Government Pleader'. According to this Section, 'Government Pleader' includes any officer appointed by the State Government to perform all or any of the functions expressly imposed by this code on the Government Pleader and also any pleader acting under the directions of the Government Pleader.He also drew my attention to the Provisions of order XXVII R.2 which provides that persons being ex officio or otherwise authorised to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding, shall be deemed to be recognised agents by whom appearances, acts and applications under this Code may be made or done on behalf of the Government. Rule 4 of Order 27 provides that the Government pleader in any Court shall be the agent of the Government for the purpose of receiving processes against the Government issued by such Court. Rule 4 of Order 27 provides that the Government pleader in any Court shall be the agent of the Government for the purpose of receiving processes against the Government issued by such Court. Rule 8 B(c) of Order 27 provides that in this Order (Unless otherwise expressly provided) "Government" and "Government pleader" mean respectively in relation to any suit by or against a State Government or against a public officer in the service of a State, the State Government and the Government pleader as defined in clause (7) of Section 2 or such other pleader as the State Government appoint, whether generally or specially, for the purposes of this order. He argued that Shri Vijayvargia was specifically appointed as Govt. Advocate for Ajmer by the Government, vide order dated 17.7.1990, and as such, was quite competent to file the appeal. He was recognised agent of the Government within the definition of Rule 2 of order 27 and as such the appeal presented by Shri Vijayvarigia was competent. In support of his argument, he placed reliance on a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Uttar Pradesh and another v. M/s Janki Saran kailash Chandra and another, (2) AIR 1973 SC 2071 State of M.P. v. Yatendra Prasad Sharma, (3) AIR 1963 MP 127 and Kaliyur M. Srinivas v. The Chairman Taxation Appeals Committee Corporation of Madras (4) AIR Mad. 235 . Mr.Garg argued that the case reported in AIR 1972 Raj. 152 (supra) is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the alternative, he argued that non-filing of document or Vakalatnama of Shri Vijayvargia is only an irregularity, which is curable and on that ground appeal can not be rejected. Lastly, he argued that the application has been moved with the ulterior motive to prolong the litigation so that the order passed by the trial court in the injunction application may continue and the appeal may not be decided at an early date. 5. In the case reported in AIR 1972 (Raj.),152, the memo of appeal was presented by Shri Raj Narain, who was then Assistant Government Advocate in the High Court of Rajasthan, alongwith a Vakalatnama, which was signed by Shri Narula, who authorised Shri Raj Narain to act as well as to plead by this Vakalatnama. 5. In the case reported in AIR 1972 (Raj.),152, the memo of appeal was presented by Shri Raj Narain, who was then Assistant Government Advocate in the High Court of Rajasthan, alongwith a Vakalatnama, which was signed by Shri Narula, who authorised Shri Raj Narain to act as well as to plead by this Vakalatnama. The argument was that Shri Raj Narain was not duly authorised to act on behalf of Union of India. The contention on behalf of the Union of India was that the Government Advocate was appointed as Govt. Pleader under Rule 8 B of Order 27 and that rule applies to every rule in Order 27 he should be deemed to have been authorised to act under Rule 2 of the order 27 on behalf of the Central Government. This argument of Union of India was not accepted by this Court. It was held by this Court that expression "Government Pleader" does not occur in rule 2. Therefore, it cannot be argued that every Government pleader who is authorised to appear on behalf of the Central Government is also authorised to act for the Central Government without any express authority in that behalf. In the present case Shri Vijayvargia was expressly authorised by order dated 17.7.1990, which has not been denied by the opposite side. The lower court misread this authority. When Mr. Vijayvargia was appointed Govt. Advocate for Ajmer, he was quite competent to file the appeal on behalf of the Government being a recognised agent of the Government. 6. In Janki Saran's case (supra) the facts were that the plaintiff filed a suit against the State of Uttar Pradesh. Summons in the suit issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh were served on the District Government Pleader, who put his appearance and prayed for time for filing written statement. Later on he submitted an application under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act for staying the proceedings of the suit as there was arbitration clause in the agreement entered into between the parties. The trial court allowed the application submitted under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and stayed the suit. Later on he submitted an application under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act for staying the proceedings of the suit as there was arbitration clause in the agreement entered into between the parties. The trial court allowed the application submitted under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and stayed the suit. Against this order, the plaintiff filed an appeal which was allowed by the High Court, holding that action of the District Government Counsel in applying for time to file the written statement amounted to taking a step in the proceedings within the meaning of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The matter went to the Supreme Court where it was argued that the Government Pleader was not authorised to seek adjournment for filing written statement as he had no Vakalatnama. It was held by Hon. Supreme Court as under:- "A copy of the plaint, therefore, must be held to have been duly served on the District Government Counsel who under 0. 27 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was authorised to act for the Government and was deemed to be the recognised agent by whom appearances, acts and applications could be made or done on behalf of the Government. The District Government Counsel in the present case was thus fully empowered to appear and act for and on behalf of the Government and also to make applications on its behalf. 7. I am bound by the above decision of the Highest Court of this Country and of the view that Shri Vijayvargia, who was appointed Government Advocate for Ajmer was competent to file appeal on behalf of the Govt. being a recognised agent of the Government. The petitioner filed two other revisions for dismissing the appeal on various grounds with a view to prolong the order passed by the trial court on 7.11.1990. The application submitted by the petitioner and this revision, to my mind are malafide and appear to have been filed with a view to prolong the litigation. Consequently, they are dismissed with costs of Rs.500/-.Revision Dismissed. *******