Jagadish Das v. Chief Manager, Bank of India & On — 1991 DIGILAW 175 (CAL)

ORDER: The subject matter of challenge in the instant writ application is the charge-Sheet dated 24th June, 1989, issued to the petitioner by the Chief Manager, Bank of India, Calcutta Main Branch, in his capacity as the Disciplinary Authority. The gist of the said charge-sheet, which has been made Annexure "H" to the writ application, is that in the course of his duties as Cash-clerk at the Bank's Calcutta Main Branch, the petitioner allegedly derived wrongful pecuniary advantage to himself through deceitful means by wilfully misutilising the housing loan sanctioned to him at a confessional rate of interest, to the, detriment of the Bank's interests. It was alleged that the petitioner's acts, if proved, would amount to gross misconduct of "doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank" within the meaning of paragraph 19 5(j) of the Bipartite Agreement arrived at between certain Banking companies and their workmen, 'Which was applicable to the respondent Bank and its employees. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner is employed as a Staff. Cash Clerk in the Despatch Department of the Calcutta Main Branch of the Bank of India, hereinafter referred to as the "Bank", and that he joined such service on 18th April, 1979. The services of the petitioner are' governed by the Bipartite Settlement of 1966 and certain amendments adopted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1970. Pursuant to a scheme for grant of house building loans to its employees, the petitioner applied to the Bank in 1985 for a house building loan of Rs. 18,445/- for purchasing land and constructing a building thereon. The said loan was duly sanctioned and at periodic intervals the petitioner received certain sums, amounting to a total sum of Rs. 61,600/-. The same was to be repaid by the petitioner to the Bank in installments of Rs. 365/- per month, with interest at the rate of 5% per annum, Pursuant to the above the Bank began deducting a sum of Rs, 365/- per month from the petitioner's salary since 1985. On receiving the initial sum of Rs. 61,600/-. The same was to be repaid by the petitioner to the Bank in installments of Rs. 365/- per month, with interest at the rate of 5% per annum, Pursuant to the above the Bank began deducting a sum of Rs, 365/- per month from the petitioner's salary since 1985. On receiving the initial sum of Rs. 25.601/-, the petitioner purchased a plot of land measuring about 2 cottahs in Mouza-Bahera, under Uttarpara Police Station, in the district of Hooghly, and deposited the sale receipt with the Bank for the purpose of hypothecation, in keeping with the terms and conditions for grant of the house building loan. After purchasing the said land, the petitioner took further installments from the Bank on the basis of the loan sanctioned in his favour. Owing to compelling circumstances, the petitioner sold the aforesaid land with some constructions thereon to one Shri Bhupati Ranjan Mishra on 18th April. 1968. for a sum of Rs. 25,000/-. After such sale, the said Bhupati Ranjan Mishra filed a complaint case against the petitioner before the Sub Divisional judicial Magistrate, Serampore, alleging that the petitioner had committed offences under ss. 419/420/120B Indian Penal Code. Simultaneously with the said complaint, the said Bhupati Ranjan Mishra also filed a suit against the petitioner in the 1st Court of Munsif, Serampore, for declaration and injunction and the Bank was also made a party therein: 3. On 28th November, 1988, the petitioner was served with a letter dated 29th October, 1988, written by the Chief Manager of the Bank, informing the petitioner that as the land, which was a security against the loan granted to the petitioner, had been sold by the petitioner, one Shri Malay Kumar Mahinta, a Staff Officer, had been appointed as Investigating Officer to carry out an investigation into the matter. The petitioner by his reply dated 30th November, 1988, expressed surprise over the matter and asked the Chief Manager of the Bank to disclose the basis on which such letter had been issued. By a letter dated 20th December, 1988, the petitioner was informed that the investigation had been ordered on the basis of a letter dated 13th June, 1988, written by Shri Bhupati Ranjan Mishra, complaining of the fact that the petitioner had sold him the land which was Security for the loan granted to the petitioner. By a letter dated 20th December, 1988, the petitioner was informed that the investigation had been ordered on the basis of a letter dated 13th June, 1988, written by Shri Bhupati Ranjan Mishra, complaining of the fact that the petitioner had sold him the land which was Security for the loan granted to the petitioner. The petitioner was, thereafter, directed by the Investigating Officer to appear before him. The petitioner apparently did not attend the enquiry claiming that the matter was sub-judice. Subsequently, by a letter dated 26th April, 1989, the Chief Manager of the Bank informed the petitioner that because of his misuse of the lean sanctioned to him, it had been decided to take administrative action against the petitioner under the Bank's rules and to charge interest at the commercial rate of 16.5% on the outstanding balance of the House-building loan granted to the petitioner. Soon, thereafter, despite the petitioner's written protests, the Chief Manager of the Bank by his letter dated 2nd June, 1989 informed the petitioner of his decision to recall the entire outstanding balance of the petitioners house-building loan account, together with interest thereon at commercial rates. The petitioner was also directed to repay 'the entire outstanding amount with interest within 30 days from the date of receipt of the letter, failing which the Bank would be compelled to take such steps as were deemed necessary for recovery of the entire amount. On 24th June, 1989, the Chief Manager of the Bank, in his capacity as Disciplinary Authority, ordered a departmental enquiry against the petitioner for acts of misconduct alleged to have been committed by him while availing of the housing loan facility A charge-sheet was enclosed with the letter dated 24th June, 1989, addressed to the petitioner in respect of the said allegations. It was mentioned in the charge-sheet that the allegations against the petitioner, if proved, would amount to the gross misconduct of doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank within the meaning of paragraph 19.5(j) of the Bipartite Agreement between the Bank and its employee. On receipt of the said letter and charge-sheet, the petitioner by his letter dated 12th July, 1989, raised vorious objections, including the fact that the matter was sub-judice and was an offence covered by the Indian Penal Code, and asked for production of documents and list of witnesses. On receipt of the said letter and charge-sheet, the petitioner by his letter dated 12th July, 1989, raised vorious objections, including the fact that the matter was sub-judice and was an offence covered by the Indian Penal Code, and asked for production of documents and list of witnesses. The petitioner sought permission to have the assistance of a lawyer and also objected to the appointment of the Presenting Officer on the ground that the same was not provided for in the bipartite Agreement. The petitioner took further objection to the appointment of one Shri S.N. Chaudhury as the Enquiry Officer allegedly on the ground that he would not be impartial. The petitioner has challenged the initiation of the disciplinary' proceedings and the charge-sheet as being wholly arbitrary illegal, mala fide and without jurisdiction. 4. Appearing in support of the writ petition, Mr. Sunit Dutt, learned Advocate, submitted that the disciplinary proceedings had been illegally initiated and that the charge-sheet had been arbitrarily issued as the same was without jurisdiction., The main contention of Mr. Dutt was that the charge-sheet related to violation of the Housing Loan Rules of the Bank. If at all any offence had been committed by the petitioner the same could at best be said to be in violation of the Housing Loan Rules. The same could not be said to be a misconduct within the meaning of paragraph 19.5 of the Bipartite Agreement, inasmuch as, violation of the Homing Loan Rules has not been enumerated in the said paragraph as a misconduct. According to Mr. Dutt, if the Disciplinary Authority at all had the right to initiate disciplinary proceedings in respect of the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, the same should have beep on the basis of paragraphs 192 and 193 of the Bipartite Agreement and not in terms of paragraph 19.5(j) thereof. Mr. According to Mr. Dutt, if the Disciplinary Authority at all had the right to initiate disciplinary proceedings in respect of the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, the same should have beep on the basis of paragraphs 192 and 193 of the Bipartite Agreement and not in terms of paragraph 19.5(j) thereof. Mr. Dutt further submitted that the Housing Loan Rules of the Bank prescribed the procedure for grant of loans, repayment and recovery of such loans, if there was any breach of the said Rules, and the petitioner could not be placed in double jeopardy by having the entire loon recalled with interest payable at the commercial rates and at the same time being subjected to disciplinary proceedings also, despite the fact that violation of the Housing Lone Rules had not been specified as a "misconduct" in paragraph 195 of the Bipartite Settlement. 5 At this juncture it will be pertinent to refer to the provisions of paragraph 195 of the Bipartite Settlement, which sets out the acts and omissions on the part of an employee which are to be construed as "gross misconduct". In the present writ application we are only concerned with the provisions of clause (j) which have been sought to be invoked by the Bank in drawing up disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The provision of 19.5(j) are as follows :- "By the expression "gross misconduct" shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee: (j) doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss" . 6. Mr. Dutt has contended that the wording of the aforesaid clause is completely vague and cannot be taken advantage of to include a specific charge relating to violation of the Housing Loan Rules. According to Mr. Dutt, the Housing Loan Rules was a complete code by itself containing instructions not only in matters of granting loan but also for recovery of such loans. Moreover, by recalling the entire loan and charging commercial interest thereupon, the Bank had already taken recourse to the said Rules and had imposed penalties, as provided therein. In support of his aforesaid contentions, Mr. Moreover, by recalling the entire loan and charging commercial interest thereupon, the Bank had already taken recourse to the said Rules and had imposed penalties, as provided therein. In support of his aforesaid contentions, Mr. Dutt relied on the case of A.L Kalra vs. The Project & Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. reported in AIR 1984 SC at page 1361, Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & anr. reported in A.I.R 1985 S.C at page 504. and also the case of M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court, Meerut & ors.. reported in A.I.R 1984 S.C. at page 505. In the case of A.L. Kalra, an employee of a public sector corporation was charged of not refunding the advance taken by him for Home Building Advance He was also charged with failure to return within the stipulated time advance taken for purchasing a motor cycle. He was removed from service after enquiry on the ground that the violation of the Rules for the grant of House Building Advance amounted to not maintaining absolute integrity which amounted to misconduct. He then moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court at Delhi, but the same was dismissed in limine. The matter thereafter went up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Among other things, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Rules granting advance themselves provided the consequence of breach of the said Rules. There was, therefore, no ground for initiating disciplinal enquiry as the breach of the said Rules did not amount to misconduct. While arriving at the said conclusion the Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that what in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective valuation. Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. Similar observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Glaxo Laboratories case. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that everything which is required to be prescribed had to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. Similar observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Glaxo Laboratories case. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that everything which is required to be prescribed had to be prescribed with precision and no argument can be entertained that something not prescribed can yet be taken into account as varying what is prescribed. In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission, nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order, is nonetheless a misconduct Dot strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. 7. In the case of Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation & Anr. the Hon'ble Supreme Court, following its earlier observations in the Glaxo Laboratories case, held that it is well-settled that unless either in the Certified Standing Order or in the service regulations an act or omission is prescribed as misconduct, it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct as misconduct and punish the workman even though alleged misconduct would not be comprehended in any of the enumerated misconducts. 8. Mr. Dutt emphasized the fact that in the instant case also, violation of the House Building Loan Rules was not enumerated as a misconduct in paragraph 195 of the Bipartite Settlement, and hence the disciplinary proceeding sought to be initiated against the petitioner was illegal and without jurisdiction. 9. Appearing on behalf of the Bank, Mr. Dipak Kumar Ghosh, learned Advocate, submitted that the charge-sheet against the petitioner had to be construed in a reasonable manner He contended that the House Building Loan Rules themselves provided for initiation of disciplinary proceedings apart from other action which the Bank might take for violation and/or misuse of the loan facility by the concerned employee, In this context, Mr. Ghosh referred to Rule 16(x) of the Bank's rules relating to Housing Loans, which reads as :- "16(X). Ghosh referred to Rule 16(x) of the Bank's rules relating to Housing Loans, which reads as :- "16(X). Without prejudice to Bank's right to take disciplinary action, the Award staff shall pay interest at the commercial rate as prescribed by the Bank from time to time from the date of intimation by the Bank to that effect on all outstanding balances in individual loan accounts/portion of loan outstanding in Society Loan Account(s) for purchase of house/flat by the concerned award staff and the entire loan together with interest payable thereon shall become forthwith due and payable in any one or more of the following events not withstanding that the loan is repayable in installments. (a) The award staff/society wilfully furnishes to the Bank wrong or false or misleading information or certificates or documents required for the loan. (b) The loan facility is willfully misused or abused by the award staff/ society. (c) Any, wilful default or breach is made in compliance with any of the provisions of these rules or in any undertaking/documents or letters of authorities executed including wilful refusal/default in execution of such undertakings/documents/letters of authorities pursuant to these rules by the award staff society." According to Mr. Ghosh, the aforesaid provisions clearly empowered the Bank to penalise an employee in the manner provided for and to also take disciplinary action against him. 10. In this context Mr. Ghosh also referred to provisions of Rule 16(ii) of the aforesaid Rules which reads as follows :- "16(ii) No award staff who has already availed of a housing loan shall sell, transfer, assign or otherwise deal with or dispose of or mortgage charge or in any way encumber or alienate the house/flat and his rights title and interest therein during the pendency of the loan there against without the prior permission of the Bank" 11. Mr. Ghosh argued that by alienating the land purchased by him with the Housing Loan advanced to him, the petitioner had violated the provisions of Rule 16(ii) of the Housing Loan Rules, which brought the petitioner within the purview of Rule 16(x) of the said Rules. Mr. Ghosh contended that the acts of the petitioner attracted all the three sub-clauses of clause X of Rule 16 of the aforesaid Rules. Mr. Mr. Ghosh contended that the acts of the petitioner attracted all the three sub-clauses of clause X of Rule 16 of the aforesaid Rules. Mr. Ghosh submitted that not only bad the petitioner sold the land which had been purchased by him out of the loan granted to him without the permission of the Bank, but the petitioner had also wilfully furnished false and misleading information to the Bank to obtain advances against the loan sanctioned to him. Mr. Ghosh referred to sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 5 and paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in opposition affirmed on behalf of the Bank in support of his argument. From the averments in the said paragraphs it appears that the petitioner submitted an application along with related expense bills and cash memos for disbursement of a sum of Rs. 22,000/- out of the total loan sanctioned to the petitioner, for construction of building upto lintel level. It appears that on 11th November, 1956; the petitioner made another application for Rs. 10,000/- for finishing the house annexing bills for labour charges, building materials, furniture etc. On investigation it, however, transpired that no construction work whatsoever had been undertaken by the petitioner on the aforesaid land and false receipts and cash memos were submitted by him for obtaining advances against the loan sanctioned to him. In addition to the above, Mr. Ghosh submitted that the loan facility had been wilfully misused and abused by the petitioner and his actions were prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and had also involved the bank in serious loss bringing the petitioner within the ambit of paragraph 19.5(j) of the Bipartite Agreement which was enumerated as a gross misconduct. According to Mr. Ghosh the Bank was, therefore, within its rights to not only subject the petitioner to the penalties provided for under Rule 16(x) of the Housing Loan Rules, but also to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him under paragraph 19.5(j) of the Bipartite Agreement which reads as follow :- "19.5. By the expression "gross misconduct" shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee............... (j) doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss. " 12. Mr. By the expression "gross misconduct" shall be meant any of the following acts and omissions on the part of an employee............... (j) doing any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss. " 12. Mr. Ghosh submitted that by his acts and conduct the petitioner had acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and that the facts of this case could not be treated in paria materia with the facts involved in the three cases cited on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. Ghosh pointed out that in Kalra's case, the only liability fixed on the employee in case of violation of the Housing Loan was to refund the entire amount of loan with interest or penal interest. In the instant case, however, there were express provisions in the Housing Loan Rules itself to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee, along with the imposition of penalties contemplated under the said Rules. Moreover, in Kalra's case no false bills or cash memos had been produced, as in the instant case. In that case, the concerned employee had not utilised the loan advanced to him and he had not submitted any documents. 13. The next branch of Mr. Ghosh's submissions was that the courts should not interfere at the threshold of a disciplinary enquiry, when only a notice to show cause had been issued against the concerned employee. The very purpose of issuing a show-cause notice was to afford the employee an opportunity of hearing, and once cause was shown, it was open to the employer, to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the employee and to take a final decision in the matter. In support of his contention, Mr. Ghosh referred to the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shri Brahm Dutt Sharma, reported in AIR 1987 SC at page 943. In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when a show-cause notice is issued to a Government servant under a statutory provision, the Government servant must ordinarily place his case before the authority concerned, and the courts should be reluctant to Interfere with the notice at that Stage, unless the notice is shown to have been palpably without any authority of law. Mr. Mr. Ghosh argued that in view of the above observations of the Supreme Court, the instant writ application was liable to be dismissed. 14. Expanding his argument that the charge-sheet against the petitioner should be construed in a reasonable manner, Mr. Ghosh relied on the case Doom Dooma Tea Company v. Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, reported in 1960(II) CLJ at page 56 and the case of The Collector of Customs & Ors. v. Biswanath Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1972 Calcutta at page 401. In the first case an employee was dismissed from service on being found guilty of having struck a superior Officer. Prior to his dismissal the employee was served with a charge sheet. It was contended on behalf of the employee that the notice issued to him showed that a decision had already been taken to dismiss him. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that though the words used in the notice were capable of such construction, the notice if read as a whole did not lead to such assumption. The notice, having been drafted by a person who was not familiar with legal terminology, it must be considered as a whole and should be construed in a reasonable manner. In the latter case, a Division Bench of this court observed that the proper way of interpreting a charge sheet in disciplinary proceedings is not to be technically and legalistically strict as in the case of a charge-sheet in criminal proceedings. 15. Mr. Ghosh concluded his arguments by submitting that there were many distinguishing features between the present case and the cases relied upon on behalf of the petitioner, and the Bank had acted within its powers in initiating disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, besides imposing other penalties contemplated in the Housing Loan Rules for misuse of the loan facilities granted to him and for having willfully submitted false information to the Bank to obtain advances against the loan sanctioned in his favour. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no interference was called for and the writ application was liable to be dismissed. 16. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no interference was called for and the writ application was liable to be dismissed. 16. From the respective contentions of the parties, the only point which emerges for decision in this case is whether the acts of the petitioner, as disclosed; would amount to "gross misconduct" within, the meaning of paragraph 19 5(j) of the Bipartite Agreement and whether the Bank was entitled to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner under the said provisions in addition to imposition of penalties under Rule 16 x) of the Housing Loan Rules. 17. In order to arrive at a decision on the aforesaid point, it is necessary to look into some of the other provisions of tae aforesaid Agreement. As pointed out by Mr. Dutt, paragraphs 19.2, 193 and 194 of the Bipartite Agreement make elaborate provision for dealing with cases involving moral turpitude for which an employee is liable to conviction and sentence under any provision of law. Paragraph 193(a) empowers the Bank to prosecute an employee or to get him prosecuted, if in the opinion of the management such employee had committed an offence involving moral turpitude, and in such case to also place him under suspension. If an employee is convicted, paragraph 19.3(b) also empowers the Bank to dismiss him with effect from the date of his conviction, or to give him a lesser punishment as contemplated in paragraph 196 of the said agreement. Paragraph 194 provides that if an employee is prosecuted, and he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the Bank would be at liberty to proceed against the employee as if he had committed an act of "gross misconduct" or of "minor misconduct". The said paragraph also provides that if the prosecuting agency did not choose to commence prosecution or came to a conclusion that there was no case for prosecution, it would be open to the management to proceed against the employee under paragraphs 19.11 and 19.12 which makes provision for disciplinary action to be taken against an employee in each caste. 18. From the above it will be clear that ample provision has been made in the Bipartite Agreement for appropriate action to be taken against an employee who commits any offence involving moral turpitude. 18. From the above it will be clear that ample provision has been made in the Bipartite Agreement for appropriate action to be taken against an employee who commits any offence involving moral turpitude. Apart from the said provisions, certain definite acts and omission have been enumerated in paragraphs 195 and 196 of the agreement as constituting "gross misconduct" and "minor misconduct". Violation of the provisions of the Housing Loan Rules is not enumerated in paragraph 19.5 and 19.6 as either as "gross misconduct" or "minor misconduct". The acts and omission mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 16 (x) of the Housing Loan Rules have not also been specified as "gross misconduct" or "minor misconduct". It is now being sought to be contended on behalf of the Hank that the provisions of paragraph 195(j) are sufficiently wide to cover the acts and omissions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rule l6(x) of the aforesaid Rules. Let us now test the submissions of Mr. Ghosh in the light of the principles laid down in the several cases cited on behalf of the parties. 19. According to Mr. Ghosh, learned Advocate for the Bank, the acts and omissions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 16(x) of the Housing Loan Rules are of such a nature, that the commission and/or omission of such acts would amount to doing an act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and would involve the Bank 10 severe loss, which is enumerated as a "gross misconduct in clause (j) of paragraph 19.5. Mr. Ghosh, has submitted that the facts of Kalra's case and the case of Glaxo Laboratories are distinguishable from the facts of this case, since the allegations against the petitioner are specifically enumerated as "gross misconduct" in paragraph 19.5(j) of the Bipartite Agreement. 20. I am unable to agree with the contentions of Mr. Ghosh, since, in my view, the facts in question in this case have many striking similarities with the facts of Kalra's case. 20. I am unable to agree with the contentions of Mr. Ghosh, since, in my view, the facts in question in this case have many striking similarities with the facts of Kalra's case. The question before us is not whether the writ petitioner misused the Bank's Housing Loan facilities or committed fraud in respect thereof, but whether such acts on the part of the petitioner can be said to be gross misconduct within the meaning of paragraph 19.5 of the Bipartite Agreement so as to enable the Bank to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner for the same, in addition to taking action under the Housing Loan Rules. The question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court both in Kalra's case and in the Glaxo Laboratories case was of a similar nature leading the Hon'ble Supreme Court to observe that where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on the employer to specify and to define such misconduct with precision and accuracy so that any ex-post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged as misconduct. The language of clause (j) of paragraph 19.5 is vague and does not specify as to what would constitute an act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. This was precisely what the Hon'ble Supreme Court appears to have had in mind while observing that it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. As an Kalra's case, even if the allegations against the petitioner are proved, that would not constitute "gross misconduct" as specified in paragraph 19.5 of the Bipartite Agreement. On the other hand, the Bank can, if so advised, proceed against the petitioner in terms of paragraphs 19.2, 193, 19.4, 19.11, and 19.12 of the said Agreement. In my view, the Bank was not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner under paragraph 19.5(j) of the Bipartite Agreement in respect of the charges against the petitioner as mentioned in the impugned charge-sheet. 21. The two cases relied upon by Mr. Ghosh to meet the submissions of Mr. Dutt on this point, are not really germane. In my view, the Bank was not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner under paragraph 19.5(j) of the Bipartite Agreement in respect of the charges against the petitioner as mentioned in the impugned charge-sheet. 21. The two cases relied upon by Mr. Ghosh to meet the submissions of Mr. Dutt on this point, are not really germane. In this case we are not required to consider whether the charge-sheet against the petitioner is to be interpreted and/or construed in a technically or legalistically strict manner. As mentioned earlier, the moot question in this case, is whether the Bank could initiate disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner for charges not specifically enumerated as "gross misconduct" in the Bipartite Agreement. 22. The other branch of Mr. Ghosh's submissions regarding the courts powers to entertain the writ petition at the threshold of the disciplinary proceedings would have been of assistance to Mr. Ghosh's submissions in an appropriate case. While it is true that the courts should exercise caution in interfering at the stage of the disciplinary proceedings when simply a show-cause notice had been issued, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the courts are not powerless to intervene when an authority proceeds without jurisdiction and the facts relating to the same have been laid bare before the court. The position has been made clear by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the very ca e relied upon by Mr. Ghosh. In the case of Uttar Pradesh vs. Shri Brahm Dutt Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "When a show cause notice is issued to a Government, servant under a statutory provision, ordinarily the Government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law." (Emphasis supplied by me.) Since I have held that the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner under paragraph 19.5 (j) of the Bipartite Agreement was without jurisdiction, the submissions of Mr. Ghosh on this core must fail also. 23. It is not necessary for me to deal with the other point urged by Mr. Ghosh on this core must fail also. 23. It is not necessary for me to deal with the other point urged by Mr. Dutt, involving the question of double jeopardy, in view of my finding that the Bank was not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner under paragraph 19.5(j) of the Bipartite Agreement in respect of the acts of omission and commission referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 16(x) of the Housing Loan Rules. 24. In view of my above findings, the writ application must succeed. The impugned charge-sheet dated 24th June, 1989, being Annexure 'H' to the writ petition, and all action taken on the basis thereof, are hereby quashed. I, however, make it clear that this will not prevent the Bank from proceeding against the petitioner under any relevant provision of the Bipartite Agreement or under any other relevant provision of law in respect of the allegations contained in the aforesaid Charge-sheet. 25. The writ application is thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. Operation of this order will remain stayed for a period of two weeks from date. Let Xerox copies of this judgment be made available to the parties on their usual undertaking to apply for and to obtain certified copies of the same. Writ petition allowed; charge-sheet and all actions taken on that basis, quashed.