P. N. S. CHOUHAN, J. ( 1 ) ON 12-5-84 at about 15. 00 hours Jasodabai (PW 1) was going to her work at the "marathi" near Jawar Jod. She had a bucket in her hand. A metador No. MBI 9072 came from the side of Metwara and after crushing Jasodabai broke down the barbed wire fencing of the road-side planatation damaged the plants and stuck in the ditch. The incident was reported in P. S. Sonkatch by Murlidas at 16-30 hours, the same day vide F. I. R. Ex. P-1. He had taken Jasodabai also in another metador to Sonkatch P. S. She was removed to Dewas and then to M. Y. Hospital, Indore where she succumbed to her injuries on 14-5-84. The scene of occurrence being within the jurisdiction of Jawar P. S. in Sehore district the papers were transferred to that P. S. by Sonkatch police. Inquest was held and post mortem of the dead body was conducted by Dr. Riaz Hussain whose report is Ex. P-4, which is an admitted document. If is not in dispute that Jasodabai died of injuries sustained in the said accident. The respondent-accused denied his presence in the vehicle at the time of accident though his driving license was amongst the document that were seized from the metador. He also denied his arrest vide Ex. P 12. On 21-5-1983 the respondent was arrested by A. S. I. Shri D. S. Patil (P. W. 9) at Metwara outpost vide memorandum Ex. P-12. ( 2 ) THE learned trial Magistrate held that the vehicle in question was being driven by the accused at the pertinent time could not be proved. Therefore, he did not consider it necessary to record a finding on the other point of rash and negligent driving and acquitted the accused which has been challenged in this appeal by the State. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent after concluding his arguments sought leave to give a list of citations the next day. Instead of a list of citations he has presented a detailed written arguments. Nor a commendable practice indeed. ( 4 ) SHRI V. N. Shukla (PW 10) the then station house officer Jawar has stated that he seized registration, fitness certificate, insurance and driving license of the vehicle involved in the accident vide seizure memo Ex. P-8. Instead of a list of citations he has presented a detailed written arguments. Nor a commendable practice indeed. ( 4 ) SHRI V. N. Shukla (PW 10) the then station house officer Jawar has stated that he seized registration, fitness certificate, insurance and driving license of the vehicle involved in the accident vide seizure memo Ex. P-8. In absence of cross examination on this point the arguments that Ex. P-8 should not be held duly proved because Shri Sanjay Prabhakar from whose possession the documents are alleged to have been seized and the independent witnesses of seizure have not been examined, deserves to be rejected. There is no reason whatsoever to assume that Shri Shukla has prepared this false document. The evidence of police officer has to be judged like evidence ofany other witness, on its intrinsic worth on prima facie presumption of his honestly and conscientiousness. There is no reason for presuming him to be a highly interested witness (Khima v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 : (1956 Cri LJ 421 ). Ex. P. 8, therefore is not liable to be assailed as not duly proved which shows that inter alia respondent's driving license was seized from the possession of Shri Sanjay Prabhakar who was present on the spot when Shri Shukla reached there after getting unconfirmed in formation of the incident. In para 3 of his statement Shri Shukla has clarified that Sanjay Prabhakar and Parasmal Sindhi were detained by the crowd on the spot who informed him that the driver had run away. Thus it is clear that though respondent's license was found alongwith other documents in the possession of Sanjay Prabhakar soon after the incident the respondent himself was not present there. Sanjay Prabhakar was one of the occupants of the vehicle involved in the accident. This is proved by Ex. P-7 showing seizure of the said metador from his possession. From the particulars of Sanjay Prabhakar given in Ex. p_6 and 7 it is clear that he is resident of Nasik. This vehicle also beongs to an industrial unit of Nasik. Therefore, it is clear that Sanjay Prabhakar was one of the occupants of this vehicle. There was no other driving license amongst the papers seized. The respondent as also the vehicle do not come from the area where the accident took place. This vehicle also beongs to an industrial unit of Nasik. Therefore, it is clear that Sanjay Prabhakar was one of the occupants of this vehicle. There was no other driving license amongst the papers seized. The respondent as also the vehicle do not come from the area where the accident took place. In these circumstances the fact as to how his driving license came to be amongst the documents of this vehicle in his absence being within the exclusive knowledge of the respondent he was expected to explain the same u/s 106 of Evidence Act. No such explanation is forthcoming. There is sufficient evidence to show that the driver had run away in the statements of Murlidhar (PW 1) Babulal (PW 2) Moolchand (PW 5) and Madanlal (PW 6), therefore, even if the statement of Shri Shukla that this fact was conveyed to him by Sanjay and Parasmal is to be excluded from consideration being hit u/s 162, Cr. P. C. the fact that the driver of the vehicle managed to excape after the accident stands fully proved. ( 5 ) ANOTHER crucial document is Ex. P-12. The arrest memorandum of respondent proved by Shri D. S. Patil (PW 9) A. S. I. police outpost Metwara. He has stated that he arrested the respondent on his voluntary surrender on 21-5-84 vide Ex. P-12 at Metware Police outpost. The fact that the respondent voluntarily surrendered has been assailed on the ground that this fact was not put to him u/s 313, Cr. P. C. The criticism is misconceived. The respondent has been asked in question No. 24 that he was arrested vide Ex. P-12 and he denied the fact of such arrest. As such the omission to put specifically that such arrest was on his voluntary surrender appears to be inconsequential. There is no reason to take his denial of arrest seriously because Shri Patil has not been cross-examined on this point. The evidence of Shri Patil proves not only the fact of arrest but also the voluntary surrender by the respondent to the police. Ex. P-12 bears the signature of the respondent. His signature is there is Ex. P-2 an admitted document acknowledging the return of the vehicle to Manohar Digamber Bagool on 21-5. 84. Evidence shows that this vehicle belonged to Khandwa branch of Dant Manjan Udyog of Nasik. Ex. P-12 bears the signature of the respondent. His signature is there is Ex. P-2 an admitted document acknowledging the return of the vehicle to Manohar Digamber Bagool on 21-5. 84. Evidence shows that this vehicle belonged to Khandwa branch of Dant Manjan Udyog of Nasik. Thus it is seen that on 21-5-84 when the vehicle was to be received back from the police custody the respondent had come along with the said Begool and had surrendered before A. S. I. Shri Patil. There is no conceivable reason to doubt the veracity of Shri Patil in his behalf. The learned trial magistrate rejected this clinching evidence on the erroneous ground that Shri Patil has not disclosed what was stated by the respondent at the time of surrender. Whatever the respondent might have said being self incriminatory, would have amounted to confession and would be inadmissible in view of the bar u/s 25 of the Evidence Act. Even otherwise the evidence on the point of surrender had no linkage with what the respondent stated before the police at the time of surrender and therefore, the above said reason for rejecting the said evidence is wholly untenable. ( 6 ) SEIZURE of respondent's driving license immediately after the incident along with other documents of the vehicle, the evidence that the driver had run away, absence of the respondent near the scene of occurrence when the vehicle and its documents were seized, absence of any other driving license amongst the documents of the vehicle coupled with the voluntary surrender of the respondent on 21-5-84 on which date the metador was released from police custody lead to one and only reasonable inference that the respondent was driving the metador and had run away after the incident. It is common knowledge that the observations of onlookers of a road accident are more often than not confusing. Therefore, even if the witnesses have not been able to give a consistent account of the happenings, there was no justification for the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove the driving of the metador by the respondent at the pertinent time. It is true that if two views of the evidence are likely the appellate court is not expected to interfere because the presumption of innocence is in no way be shaken by a finding of not guilty recorded during the trial. It is true that if two views of the evidence are likely the appellate court is not expected to interfere because the presumption of innocence is in no way be shaken by a finding of not guilty recorded during the trial. But in this case as shown above the discrepant ocular evidence notwithstanding the facts and circumstances proved, leave no reasonable doubt that the metador being driven by the respondent. Appreciation of evidence is a difficult art and demands a meticulous analytic eye capable of seeing the parts as also the whole picture in one simultaneous process in absence whereof the most likely casualty in justice. Thus, the evidence on record fully establishes the fact that the vehicle in question was being driven by the respondent and none else. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent relied on Suleman Rahiman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 : (1968 Cri LJ 1013), in support of his contention that in view of the negative finding by the trial magistrate on rash and negligent driving the respondent is not liable to be convicted u/s 304-A, I. P. C. This argument is not well founded. The learned trial Judge has not discussed the issue of rash and negligent driving on his finding that the respondent could not be proved to have driven the vehicle in question at the pertinent time. The case of Suleman Rahiman (supra) is distinguishable on facts. In that case the prosecution had not produced any evidence to show as to how the accident took place and the question for consideration, was whether driving a jeep on public road by a person who did not know driving and was consequently unable to control the vehicle was rash and negligent act as contemplated by S. 304-A, I. P. C. Therefore, the respondent cannot derive any succour from Suleman's above case. ( 8 ) ON the question of rash and negligent driving the learned trial magistrate has failed to give his finding. However this shortcoming is not insurmountable as the same can be done by this Court. From the evidence of Murlidhar (PW 1) husband of the deceased, Babulal (PW 2), Moolchand (PW 5) and Madanlal (PW 6) the picture that emerges is that deceased Jasoda was going with the bucket in her hand to fetch water. She was on her left side of the road. From the evidence of Murlidhar (PW 1) husband of the deceased, Babulal (PW 2), Moolchand (PW 5) and Madanlal (PW 6) the picture that emerges is that deceased Jasoda was going with the bucket in her hand to fetch water. She was on her left side of the road. The metador in question came at a high speed from the side of Motwara and after hitting Jasoda went off the road breaking down the fencing of road-side plantation and got stuck up in the ditch. From this evidence it is clear that in absence of any explanation from the respondent as to how it all happended, the maxim res ipsa loquitur (the facts speak for themselves) is liable to be invoked and it can safely be concluded that the incident took place as a result of the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. ( 9 ) IN result the appeal succeeds. Setting aside the acquittal of the respondent u. s 304-A I. P. C. he is convicted of the said charge. Considering the conduct of the respondent in claiming an innocent life by his rash and negligent driving and then running away to escape justice he is sentence to R. I. for 1 year and a fine of Rs. One thousand, in default R. I. for 6 months. The entire amount of fine on recovery be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased as compensation. Appeal allowed. .