JUDGMENT : D.M. Patnaik J. 1. The petitioners in both the cases assail the order dated 17-12-1976 of the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Bhubaneswar in imposing penalty of Rs. 1000/- on petitioner No. 2 in each case for violation of the provisions u/s 133 of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short the 'Act'). The penalty has been imposed as prescribed u/s 117 of the Act. 2. Facts in brief. Petitioner No. 1 is the Paradip Port Trust and petitioner No. 2 Shri B.D. Naygandhi (in O.J.C. No. 91/77) at the relevant time, was the Traffic Manager whose normal duty was to allot berths U the vessels coming to the Port and petitioner No. 2 Shri V.L. Choudhury (in O.J.C. No. 155/77) was the Deputy Conservator of the Port. The Vessel M.V. JAGDARSHAN arrived at the Port on 29-3-1976. The Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise, having received information that the vessel was being used as a conveyance for disposal of foreign imported prohibited articles, exercised his power u/s 110 of the Act and at the same time on 7-4-1976 started rummaging operation which continued up to 4 p.m. on that day. On the same day he issued notice to the Master of the Vessel with the copies to both the petitioners. Petitioner V.L. Choudhury was further informed that he should ensure that no clearance was given from his side unless the Port clearance was granted by the Superintendent of Customs, Paradip Port. A copy of the notice was also sent to the petitioner B.D. Naygandhi for the purpose of information. The notice mentioned that during the rummaging operation on 7-4j1976, the Assistant Collector of Customs had recovered goods of foreign origin worth Rs. 40,000/- as per the list attached to the notice. By the notice the Master of the Vessel was directed not to sail the vessel from the port except with the previous permission of the competent customs authority. It is alleged that both the petitioners, in spite of such direction, shifted the vessel towards the deep sea which obstructed the rummaging operation and thereby facilitated the smugglers in disposing of the smuggled goods either by throwing them into the sea or otherwise. It is alleged that both the petitioners, in spite of such direction, shifted the vessel towards the deep sea which obstructed the rummaging operation and thereby facilitated the smugglers in disposing of the smuggled goods either by throwing them into the sea or otherwise. Since this act of the petitioners amounted to an offence as defined in Section 133 and punishable u/s 117 of the Act, the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Bhubaneswar issued a show cause notice to the petitioners for appropriate action under the provisions of the Act as mentioned above. 3. Both the aforesaid petitioners in their reply to show cause took the stand that under the Paradip Port Trust Act, they were competent authority to make such shifting for the purpose of convenient placement of the vessels at the appropriate berths. In the Daily Traffic Review Meeting held on 7-4-1976 and 8-4-1976 it was decided that to avoid congestion in the berth allotted to the above vessels, the same should be shifted to the Iron Ore Berth for the purpose of 'double banking' along with another vessel namely M.V. OGDON AMAZON. Their further case was that the Collector of Customs and Central Excise had no jurisdiction to deal with such matter of punishment inasmuch as, according to them, they were not. officers as prescribed u/s 151 of the Act obliged to assist any Customs officers in the operation. They claimed to be the Officers of the Paradip Port Trust. Their further case was that u/s 133 of the Act, the authority to punish is the Common Court of law and not the Collector Customs and, therefore, the latter had no jurisdiction to impose any penalty. The opposite party, by his impugned order, imposed penalty as stated above and, therefore, the petitioners, being aggrieved by the order, filed the petition before this Court which was disposed of by this Court by judgment dated 3-7-1980. The opposite party, by his impugned order, imposed penalty as stated above and, therefore, the petitioners, being aggrieved by the order, filed the petition before this Court which was disposed of by this Court by judgment dated 3-7-1980. This court allowed the petition holding :- (a) that the Collector of Customs and Central Excise had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order since he was not authorised to do so as provided u/s 133 of the Act which left the matter for decision by the competent court of law as prescribed thereunder, and (b) the petitioner could not be said to be the officers as defined in Section 151 of the Act to assist the Customs Officers and, therefore, imposition of penalty was improper. Aggrieved by the order of this Court, the Collector of Customs and Central Excise moved the Supreme Court by a special leave in Civil Appeal Petition No. 6247-48 of 1983. The Supreme Court by their judgment dated 8-8-1990 held that the order of the Collector of Customs itself was passed ex facie under the provisions of Section 117 of the Act and on perusal of the impugned judgment of this Court, their Lordships did not find any discussion as to the fact of obstruction, if any, caused by the petitioners and, therefore, their Lordships thought it appropriate to remand the case for a fresh disposal in accordance with law in the light of the observations made by their Lordships in the Judgment and this is how the matter is again before this Court. 4. Mr. P.K. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners, during the course of his argument submitted the same argument that the imposition of penalty on the petitioners by Collector of Customs is illegal and is not sustainable in the eye of law. He urged the same argument as was done previously that the provisions of Section 133 of the Act provide that such a punishment can be imposed only by a common court of law and not by the Collector of Customs. He urged the same argument as was done previously that the provisions of Section 133 of the Act provide that such a punishment can be imposed only by a common court of law and not by the Collector of Customs. His second contention was that, the petitioners could not have been construed as officers coming within any of the clauses from (a) to (e) of Section 151 of the Act and thus were not obliged under those provisions to assist the customs officers in exercising their powers under the Act and, therefore, they should not have been saddled with the penalty imposed. Mr. A.K. Mohanty, learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government, on the other hand, supported the finding recorded by the Collector of Customs and the decision in imposing penalty on the petitioners as correct and proper. His further submission was that the impugned order of the Collector of Customs does not suffer from any infirmity since based on proper appreciation of facts of the case. It was further contended by Mr. Mohanty that in view of the fact that the petitioners were not only personally heard but also allowed to be represented by their Advocate and, therefore, the petitioners having been given all opportunities for hearing in the matter, there has been no violation of the principle of natural justice and, therefore, this Court should be slow in interfering with the decision taken by the Collector. The respective contentions of the learned counsel along with the observations of the Supreme Court need careful examination. 5. As is evident from the order of remand by the apex Court, the finding of this Court that the petitioners could not be said to be officers as prescribed u/s 151 of the Act who were obliged under that section to assist the customs officers was not pressed from the side of the applicant before the Supreme Court. This point was also not urged before us and, therefore, we hold that the petitioners in their admitted capacity as officers of the port were bound to assist the customs officers in the operation of rummaging. This point was also not urged before us and, therefore, we hold that the petitioners in their admitted capacity as officers of the port were bound to assist the customs officers in the operation of rummaging. The other finding of this Court that the punishing authority as prescribed under 133 of the Act only referred to a Court and not the Collector of Customs and, therefore, the imposition of penalty by the said Collector was without any jurisdiction, conspicuously drew the attention of the apex Court. This led their Lordships to analyse the provisions of various sections enumerated in Chapter XIV and XVI of the Act. While discussing the implication of Sections 132 to 140A of the Act and while quoting from the section the words 'without prejudice to any action that may be taken under this Act '(as provided in Section 151) their Lordships observed that these provisions envisage that action can be taken under other provisions of the Act 'over and above the prosecution and punishment provided u/s 135'. While discussing the provisions under Sections 111 to 127 under Chapter XIV (which sections deal with confiscation of goods, imposition of penalties, adjudication with regard to confiscation etc.) their Lordships held that there will be no double jeopardy if for the 'same transaction, act or occurrence' there is an order of confiscation or award of penalty under the relevant provisions of the Act and also infraction of any of the provisions of any section under Chapter XVI of the Act or any other law. In respect of Section 117 of the Act (the section under which the petitioners were made liable to pay penalty) their Lordships held that in a proper case of infraction of any of the provisions of the Act where no express penalty has been provided for such act or omission, a penalty upto Rs. 1000/- can be imposed under this section. Thus their Lordships held that for the same act which constitutes an offence under Chapter XIV and at the same time constitutes a contravention, abetment of contravention, failure to perform any duty prescribed under the Act and non-compliance of any provision of Act, there 'will be possibility' of prosecution and punishment under Chapter XVI of the Act or any other provisions of law and at the same time confiscation and penalty provided under Chapter XIV of the Act. 6. 6. With regard to the competency of the customs officers to carry on the rummaging work for the purpose of detecting the smuggling operation, the apex Court held that it was well within the competency of those customs officers to detain the vessel and carry on the rummaging operation and also to seize the suspected goods. Thus, having come to the finding that the petitioners were obliged to assist the customs officers in the rummaging operation and the customs officers were competent to order detention of the vessel and the Collector of Customs and Central Excise was competent to impose penalty, the Court directed a fresh hearing of the matter the scope of which is limited in respect of the case as to whether the allegation against the petitioners for obstructing the rummaging work was proved since, according to their Lordships, the judgment of this Court did not indicate any discussion on this point. 7. The question of the petitioners in both the cases obstructing the customs officers in discharging their duty in the rummaging operation be taken up now. The Apex Court in their judgment at page 8 after quoting Section 133 held that 'there may be scope for holding that there was intentional obstruction on the part of the second respondent if the allegations are proved'. On this point their Lordships referred to the decision reported in Santosh Kumar Jain Vs. The State Union Of India (Intervener), where it was held that in case of 'an order for seizure it would amount to obstruction u/s 186 I.P.C. if the goods were allowed to be removed'. Relying on this decision as well as on the authority of Kinchiffe v. Shelton (1955) 1 WIR 1207 their Lordships observed that 'it can be said that obstruction is not confined to physical obstruction and it includes anything which makes it more difficult for the police or public servant to carry out their duties'. According to their Lordships, in the present case, the question is whether it also amounted to abetment of contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or there was, any abetment to alleged smuggling of goods seized. In the light of this observation it has to be seen whether petitioners either directly or indirectly caused such obstruction to the customs officers in discharging their duties. 8. In the light of this observation it has to be seen whether petitioners either directly or indirectly caused such obstruction to the customs officers in discharging their duties. 8. In this regard it will be profitable to go through some portions of the writ application with regard to the admitted case of both the petitioners. In the writ petitions they admitted that on 7th April, 1976 the Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise forwarded the copy of his order on that day which was addressed to the Master of the Vessel M.V. JAG DARSHAN stating therein that there was contravention of the provisions u/s 115 of the Act since it was used as a means of conveyance and for concealing certain contraband goods of foreign origin and that the vessel was being rummaged by the customs officers on the same day upto 4 p.m. and certain goods of foreign origin were recovered. This notice, copy of which was admittedly received by the petitioners, has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure-2. The notice by the Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise (Annexure-2) clearly indicates that rummaging operation had commenced on 7-4-1976 upto 4 p.m. and goods of foreign origin worth Rs. 40,000/- had by then been recovered as per the list attached to this annexure. It was further indicated that notice was also served on the Master of the vessel directing him not to cause the vessel to sail from the Paradip Port except with the previous permission of the competent customs authority. Thus it is admitted by both the petitioners that they were duly informed that the vessel in question was already under rummaging operation and contraband foreign articles worth Rs. 40,000/- had already been recovered and that the vessel had already been detained u/s 110 of the Act with a further direction to the Master of the vessel not to cause the vessel to sail from the port except with the previous permission of the competent authority. 40,000/- had already been recovered and that the vessel had already been detained u/s 110 of the Act with a further direction to the Master of the vessel not to cause the vessel to sail from the port except with the previous permission of the competent authority. The explanation for shifting of the vessel was that as the rummaging operation could have affected the traffic at the port resulting in huge loss to the port and to a number of vessels waiting to be berthed, in the Daily Traffic Review Meeting held on the 8th April, 1976 it was decided to shift the said vessel M.V. JAG DARSHAN from the Cargo Berth to the Iron Ore Berth for 'double banking' the same along with another ship M.V. OGDON AMAZON which was then occupying the Iron Ore Berth. It is further stated by the petitioners that at about 9 a.m. on 8th April, 1976 they went to the port and directed double banking as stated above at the Iron Ore Berth. But when this was done, the Master of the vessel M.V. OGDON AMAZON, objected to this double banking. On the face of such objection, the case of the petitioners is that the vessel M.V. JAG DARSHAN had to be shifted to a place technically called as 'roads' which is a part of the port area as defined in the notification of the Government of India prescribing the territorial limit of the port. To such explanation of the petitioners, the Collector of Customs at page 10 of his impugned order has mentioned that no doubt in the Daily Traffic Review Meeting held on 8th and 9th April, 1976 it was decided that this vessel in question should be put for double banking along with M.V. OGDON AMAZON, at the Iron Ore Berth of the port, but according to the Collector, quite contrary to this decision, the vessel M.V. JAGDARSHAN, all of a sudden was shifted from the dock area to the fair-way anchorage of the port in deep sea which was not accessible from the dock except by a sailing vessel. The Collector of Customs rightly held that this shifting was at the instance of both the petitioners and this was done when both the petitioners had been intimated that the vessel had already been subjected to a rummaging operation and smuggled articles had already been recovered and that the rummaging operation was still to continue. The two petitioners could have possibly thrown the entire burden on the Master of the vessel. But in their reply to show-cause both of them admitted that for convenient placing of the vessel in the appropriate berths, it was within their competency, as the port authorities, to shift the vessel. They have assumed this responsibility by admitting that they were the persons competent to direct the shifting. But the crux of the point, that is, the bona fides of the two petitioners in shifting the vessel can hardly be accepted. So far as mere placing of the vessel M.V. JAG DARSHAN for the purpose of double banking with the vessel M.V. OGDON AMAZON at the Iron Ore Berth was concerned, the action could have been said to be a bona fide one, but shifting the vessel from that berth to a place deep into the sea which was accessible only by a sailing vessel amounted to obstruction to the rummaging operation already undertaken. When the customs officers were performing their statutory duty in detecting smuggling operation and recovering smuggled goods, shifting of the vessel into the deep sea cannot be said to have been done with a bona fide intention but this amounted to direct obstruction caused to the customs officers in discharging their duty. It it clear from the writ petition [vide para 5, sub-para (f)] wherein the petitioners have admitted that all facilities such as supply of lunch etc. were promised to them. This itself is clear that the vessel was shifted to such a distant place for which a sailing vessel was necessary to reach for the purpose of carrying on the rummaging operation. There is no infirmity in the reasoning given by the Collector in his impugned order particularly on the admitted facts of the case that the two petitioners were in fact responsible for the shifting. 9. There is no infirmity in the reasoning given by the Collector in his impugned order particularly on the admitted facts of the case that the two petitioners were in fact responsible for the shifting. 9. To add to this, we would like to mention that when the statutory authorities under the Act were discharging their duties, it was none of-the business of the two petitioners to shift the vessel from the dock to a distant place irrespective of the fact as to whether there was inconvenience to other vessel or to make available berths to other waiting vessels. The explanations offered by them in justifying their act of shifting the vessel cannot be accepted on the face of their own admission that it was at their instance that the vessel was shifted. There is nothing wrong in the order of the Collector and hence there is no reason to interfere with the order. 10. In the result both the writ petitions are dismissed having no merit, but without any costs. Final Result : Dismissed