Judgment :- Somasundaram, J. This appeal has been preferred by the Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Coimbatore, against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Sub Coimbatore in M.C.O.P. No.200 of 1981. Respondents 1 to 5 herein are the claimants M.C.O.P. No.200 of 1981. The sixth respondent and the seventh respondents herein who the owner and driver respectively of the Vehicle involved in the accident, were respondents and 2 in M.C.O.P. No.200 of 1981 and the appellant-insurance company was the respondent therein. Respondents 1 to 5 filed M.C.O.P. No.200 of 1981, under Sec.110 the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) against respondents 6 and the appellant herein claiming payment of compensation in a sum of one lakh of rupees respect of the death of one Purushothaman, the husband of the first respondent, son second respondent and father of minor respondents 3 to 5 in a motor accident that place on 6.3.1980 at about 7 p.m. on the Coimbatore Sathy Road, opposite to Velan Theatre. According to the case of respondents 1 to 5 deceased Purushothaman, at the time accident, was proceeding from the east to West on cycle keeping to the left side of the and his younger brother Balakrishnan was also proceeding on another cycle. At that according to the case of respondents 1 to 5, the lorry bearing registration No.TNY belonging to the sixth respondent and driven rashly and negligently by the respondent came from east to west and dashed against Purushothaman and hit him lorry ran over the cyclist crushing his head and resulting in his instantaneous death. deceased, according to respondents 1 to 5 was aged about 32 years at the time of his and was working in Gopalakrishna Mills, Ganapathy, Coimbatore, drawing a salary of per month, besides an annual bonus of Rs.2,000 claiming that deceased Purushothaman hale and healthy and he would have lived for another 40 years and also worked in the till the completion of 58 years, but for the accident, respondents 1 to 5 prayed compensation in a sum of one lakh of rupees should be awarded to them. 2. The seventh respondent remained ex parte before the Tribunal. 2. The seventh respondent remained ex parte before the Tribunal. In his counter, the respondent put forward the plea that the ownership of the lorry bearing registration 4629, which was involved in the accident, had been transferred to the seventh respondent as far back as 5.10.1979 and no liability for compensation in respect of the accident took place on 6.3.1980 could be fastened on him. It was also the further plea of the respondent that deceased Purushothaman lost his balance while riding his cycle account of that, the accident had taken place and he had thus contributed to the The sixth respondent also contended that the quantum of compensation claimed respondents 1 to 5 was excessive. In its first counter, the appellant-insurance resisted the claim of respondents 1 to 5 contending that the vehicle bearing registration No.TNY 4629 was not insured with it. In its additional counter the appellant pleaded sixth respondent had sold the lorry TNY 4629 to the seventh respondent on 5.10.1979, prior to the accident that took place on 6.3.1980, and the transfer was not intimated insurance company either by the sixth respondent or even by the seventh respondent on the date of the accident, the sixth respondent did not have any insurable interest vehicle which was involved in the accident so as to make the appellant liable therefor. appellant also put forward the plea that the policy issued by it in favour of the respondent covering the vehicle in question was a personal contract of indemnity, lapsed upon the transfer of the lorry by the sixth respondent to the seventh respondent and the seventh respondent alone would be liable to answer the claim for compensation made respondents 1 to 5. 3. On a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the Tribunal that the accident that took place on 6.3.1980 resulting in the death of Purushothaman on account of the rash and negligent driving of the lorry TNY 4629 by the seventh respondent and respondents 1 to 5 were entitled to be paid compensation in a sum of lakh of rupees, after disbelieving the case of transfer of the vehicle TNY 4629 on 5.10.1979 by the sixth respondent in favour of the seventh respondent. Ultimately, the Tribunal passed an award in favour of respondents 1 to 5 and against respondents 6 and 7 the appellant payment of compensation in a sum of one lakh of rupees with interest at 6% per from the date of the claim petition till the date of payment. Aggrieved by the award Tribunal holding that the appellant insurance company is also liable to pay the compensation amount to respondents 1 to 5, this appeal has been preferred by the insurance company questioning its liability to pay the compensation to respondents 1 to 5. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the sixth respondent had sold delivered possession of the lorry TNY 4629 to the seventh respondent on 5.10.1979, prior to the accident that took place on 6.3.1980, and the transfer of the vehicle had been intimated to the appellant and as a result thereof, on transfer of the vehicle, the issued by the appellant-insurance company under Ex.B-1 lapsed and no liability for payment of compensation could be fixed on the appellant-insurance company. Learned counsel submitted that the sale of the lorry by the sixth respondent to the seventh respondent governed by the provisions of sale of Goods Act and the sale was completed the delivery of possession of the lorry was effected and inasmuch as the lorry was sold delivered by the sixth respondent to the seventh respondent on 5.10.1979 itself, the lapsed on that date and the insurance company was not liable to pay compensation respect of the accident which had taken place subsequently on 6.3.1980. On the other learned counsel for the contesting respondents attempted to sustain the award Tribunal fastening liability on the appellant-insurance company also by contending that benefit of insurance cover issued by the appellant-insurance company would continue available and that would justify the passing of the award in the manner done Tribunal. 5. Whether there was a sale of the vehicle TNY 4629 by the sixth respondent to the respondent on 5.10.1979 itself has to be first considered. 5. Whether there was a sale of the vehicle TNY 4629 by the sixth respondent to the respondent on 5.10.1979 itself has to be first considered. The case of the sixth respondent and the appellant insurance company was that even on 5.10.1979, the sixth respondent sold the lorry to the seventh respondent and as possession of the lorry was also delivered the seventh respondent by the sixth respondent on that day itself, the policy of insurance issued by the appellant-insurance company to the sixth respondent lapsed upon the of the lorry by the sixth respondent to the seventh respondent on 5.10.1979 and the of the policy was no longer available, especially when no notice of transfer had been given the appellant-insurance company either by the sixth respondent or by the respondent regarding the transfer of the vehicle. The sixth respondent had been examined as R.W.1. He had stated in his evidence that on 5.10.1979, he sold the lorry TNY 4629 the seventh respondent for a sum of Rs.43,500 under the agreement Ex.B-2 and that date of sale, he received Rs.11,500 from the seventh respondent and delivered possession of the lorry TNY 4629 to the seventh respondent. R.W.1 further stated that on the same the seventh respondent signed and passed on a delivery-note Ex.B-3 to the effect 5.10.1979, he had purchased and taken delivery of the lorry TNY 4629 on 5.10.1979 R.W.1 had also deposed that under Ex.B-4, the seventh respondent had paid the balance the sale price of Rs.5,000 after making the other adjustments, on 10.12.1979 and handed over all the documents relating to the lorry to the seventh respondent 10.12.1979. The categoric evidence of R.W.1 is to the effect that on the date of the accident, he was not the owner of the lorry TNY 4629, as he had sold it even on 5.10.1979. A of Ex.B-2 shows that on 5.10.1979, the sixth respondent had sold the lorry TNY 4629 seventh respondent for Rs.43,500 after receiving cash of Rs.11,500 on that date and directing the seventh respondent to discharge a Rs.27,000 outstanding on hire purchase agreement and agreeing to receive the balance Rs.5,000 within two months from the date of Ex.B-2. Ex.B2 has also referred to the delivery of the lorry TNY 4629 by the seventh respondent in a satisfactory condition. Ex.B2 has also referred to the delivery of the lorry TNY 4629 by the seventh respondent in a satisfactory condition. delivery-note marked as Ex.B-3 signed by the seventh respondent shows that he had delivery of the lorry on 5.10.1979 itself. The endorsement on the back of Ex.B-2, marked Ex.B-4, shows that on 10.12.1979, the seventh respondent had paid to the sixth respondent the balance of Rs.5,000 payable under Ex.B-2 and had also received all the documents relating to the lorry TNY 4629 and the necessary forms duly signed for effecting a transfer the relevant documents in the name of the seventh respondent. No evidence which throw any doubt about the genuineness of Exs.B-2 to B-4 was brought to the notice Court. In its absence, on the basis of Exs.B-2 to B-4 and the testimony of R.W.1, it has held that even on 5.10.1979, the sixth respondent had sold and delivered the lorry 4629 of the seventh respondent and ownership of the lorry had passed to the respondent and also delivery of possession of the lorry was taken by him from the respondent on 5.10.1979. The Tribunal had taken the view that Exs.B-2 to B-4 had brought into existence by the sixth respondent with a view to avoid his liability compensation. Earlier it had been pointed out that our attention had not been drawn evidence to doubt the genuineness of Exs.B-2 to B-4 and on the available evidence, Tribunal was in error in arriving at the conclusion that Exs.B-2 to B-4 had been about by the sixth respondent. The Tribunal had also found fault with Exs.B-2 to B ground that the details found therein had not been specifically set out in the counter the sixth respondent. On a reference to paragraph 3 of the counter filed by the respondent in M.C.O.P. No.200 of 1981, it is seen that it had been clearly stated therein the lorry TNY 4629 had been transferred to the seventh respondent herein as 5.10.1979 and, therefore the sixth respondent cannot be held liable in respect accident that took place on 6.3.1980. On a reference to paragraph 3 of the counter filed by the respondent in M.C.O.P. No.200 of 1981, it is seen that it had been clearly stated therein the lorry TNY 4629 had been transferred to the seventh respondent herein as 5.10.1979 and, therefore the sixth respondent cannot be held liable in respect accident that took place on 6.3.1980. The plea regarding the non liability of the respondent by reason of the transfer of ownership of the vehicle even on 5.10.1979 favour of the seventh respondent had been pointedly raised and it was unnecessary stage for the sixth respondent to make any reference to the details of the evidence on such a plea had been raised. In the course of the proceedings before the Tribunal, respondent had relied upon Exs.B-2 to B-4 to establish his case that there had transfer of ownership in the vehicle TNY 4629 even on 5.10.1979. A plea to the effect there had been an earlier transfer even on 5.10.1979 having been already raised, respondent, by Exs.B-2 to B-4 had only made an attempt to substantiate the plea raised it was unnecessary for the sixth respondent even at the stage of filing his counter to detailed reference to the evidence on the basis of which he sought to support the raised. The Tribunal, therefore, was in error in brushing aside Exs.B-2 to B-4 on the that the details found therein had not been mentioned in the counter to M.C.O.P. No.200 1981 filed by the sixth respondent. Again, the view taken by the Tribunal that because Registration Certificate of the lorry TNY 4629 continued to stand in the name of respondent on the date of accident, the sixth and the seventh respondents would be liable, not quite correct, as, change of registration under Sec.31 of the Act is not a condition precedent for transfer of ownership. A Division Bench of this court in Hema Ramaswami Valrance Panjani, (1981)1 M.L.J. 182 : 94 L.W. 144, laid down that change of registry under Sec.31 of the Act was not a condition precedent for the transfer of ownership of the vehicle, but that provision merely imposed an obligation on the transfer or and the transferee of vehicle to notify the transfer, the non-compliance with which will not invalidate the transfer as such, which had already taken place. In view of Exs.B-2 to B-4 and the evidence of R.W.I it has to be held that even on 5.10.1979, long prior to the date of the accident on 6.3.1980, the sixth respondent had sold and delivered possession of the lorry TNY cash of Rs.11,500 on that date and directing the seventh respondent to discharge a Rs.27,000 outstanding on hire purchase agreement and agreeing to receive the balance Rs.5,000 within two months from the date of Ex.B-2. Ex.B2 has also referred to the delivery of the lorry TNY 4629 by the seventh respondent in a satisfactory condition. delivery-note marked as Ex.B-3 signed by the seventh respondent shows that he had delivery of the lorry on 5.10.1979 itself. The endorsement on the back of Ex.B-2, marked Ex.B-4, shows that on 10.12.1979, the seventh respondent had paid to the sixth respondent the balance of Rs.5,000 payable under Ex.B-2 and had also received all the documents relating to the lorry TNY 4629 and the necessary forms duly signed for effecting a transfer the relevant documents in the name of the seventh respondent. No evidence which throw any doubt about the genuineness of Exs.B-2 to B-4 was brought to the notice Court. In its absence, on the basis of Exs.B-2 to B-4 and the testimony of R.W.1, it has held that even on 5.10.1979, the sixth respondent had sold and delivered the lorry TNY of the seventh respondent and ownership of the lorry had passed to the seventh respondent and also delivery of possession of the lorry was taken by him from the sixth respondent 5.10.1979. The Tribunal had taken the view that Exs.B-2 to B-4 had been brought existence by the sixth respondent with a view to avoid his liability to pay compensation. Earlier it had been pointed out that our attention had not been drawn to any evidence doubt the genuineness of Exs.B-2 to B-4 and on the available evidence, the Tribunal error in arriving at the conclusion that Exs.B-2 to B-4 had been brought about by the respondent. The Tribunal had also found fault with Exs.B-2 to B-4 on the ground that details found therein had not been specifically set out in the counter filed by the respondent. The Tribunal had also found fault with Exs.B-2 to B-4 on the ground that details found therein had not been specifically set out in the counter filed by the respondent. On a reference to paragraph 3 of the counter filed by the sixth respondent M.C.O.P. No.200 of 1981, it is seen that it had been clearly stated therein that the lorry 4629 had been transferred to the seventh respondent herein as early as 5.10.1979 therefore the sixth respondent cannot be held liable in respect of the accident that took on 6.3.1980. The plea regarding the non liability of the sixth respondent by reason transfer of ownership of the vehicle even on 5.10.1979 in favour of the seventh respondent had been pointedly raised and it was unnecessary at that stage for the sixth respondent make any reference to the details of the evidence on which such a plea had been raised the course of the proceedings before the Tribunal, the sixth respondent had relied Exs.B-2 to B-4 to establish his case that there had been a transfer of ownership vehicle TNY 4629 even on 5.10.1979. A plea to the effect that there had been an transfer even on 5.10.1979 having been already raised, the sixth respondent, by Exs.B B-4 had only made an attempt to substantiate the plea raised and it was unnecessary sixth respondent even at the stage of filing his counter to make a detailed reference 4629 to the seventh respondent and the moment possession of the lorry was delivered by the sixth respondent and taken by the seventh respondent, the sale was complete and the ownership in the lorry passed from the sixth respondent to the seventh respondent. The resulting position, therefore, is that on the date when the accident took place, viz., 6.3.1980, the seventh respondent was the owner of the lorry. 6. It is not in dispute that the appellant insurance company had issued a policy covering the lorry TNY 4629, when it was owned by the sixth respondent. Equally, it is common ground that the transfer of the ownership of the Vehicle TNY 4629 was not intimated either by the sixth respondent or even by the seventh respondent to the appellant-insurance company. It is in the background of the transfer of the lorry TNY 4629 even on 5.10.1979, long prior to the accident on 6.3.80 the inability of the appellant-insurance company has to be considered.. It is in the background of the transfer of the lorry TNY 4629 even on 5.10.1979, long prior to the accident on 6.3.80 the inability of the appellant-insurance company has to be considered.. Admittedly, no policy of insurance was issued by the appellant company covering the lorry TNY 4629 owned by the seventh respondent. The only policy of insurance issued by the appellant insurance company was under Ex.B-1 and that too in favour of the sixth respondent, when he was the owner of the lorry TNY 4629. In support of the contention that the transfer of the vehicle was not intimated to the appellant insurance company and that brought about a lapse of the policy under Ex.B-1 and in the absence of the issue of a fresh policy of insurance by the appellant-insurance company in favour of the seventh respondent, no liability could be fastened upon the appellant-insurance company, learned counsel relied upon the decisions reported in Bhoopa-thy v. Vijayalakshmi, (1965)2 M.L.J. 466 : 78 L.W. 643, Queensland Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajalakshmi Ammal, (1970) 1 M.L.J. 151 .-83 L.W.65, Hema Ramaswami v. Valrance Panjani, (1981)1 M.L.J. 182 :94 L. W. 144 and Rangasamyv. Periam-mal, (1990)1 L.W. 453 . Reliance was placed by learned counsel for the contesting respondents upon the decision in Dharman v. N.C.Srinivasan, (1989)1 L.W. 315 . 7. A brief reference to the decisions to which attention has been drawn may now be made. In Bhoopathy v. Vijayalakshmi, (1965)2 M.L.J. 466 : 79 L.W. 643, the question arose regarding the effect of the transfer of a vehicle on the policy issued with reference to that vehicle by the insured. In that case, the accident took place after the transfer of a motor vehicle, about which the insurance company was not intimated and the policy was also not renewed in name of the transferee. The claim preferred against the insurance company was resisted the ground that the policy taken by the transfer had lapsed and in the absence of a fresh policy, the insurance company could not be held liable. It was pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court that in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary in the policy, the moment the insured parts with his car, the policy relating to its lapses because the car the subject-matter or the foundation of the contract of insurance. It was pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court that in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary in the policy, the moment the insured parts with his car, the policy relating to its lapses because the car the subject-matter or the foundation of the contract of insurance. The Division Bench also further held that neither Sec.96(1) of the Act nor the conditions specified in Sec.96(2) of Act would bring about the result that a policy of a motor insurance will continue to operate and be effective and not lapse, notwithstanding the fact that the insured, during the currency of the policy, had parted with the ownership of the car to which the insurance related another division Bench of this court, in Queensland Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajalakshmi Ammal, (1970)1 M.L.J. 151 : 83 L.W. 65, took the view that an insurance policy is a contract of personal indemnity and the insurer cannot be compelled to accept responsibility in respect of a third party quite unknown to him and as the insurance company had not issued a policy to the then owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident, it is not precluded from raising plea in defence, other than those mentioned in Sec.96(2) of the Act. The policy issued to original owner, according to the Division Bench, lapsed on his parting with the property in vehicle to the transferee. In Hema Ramaswami v. Valrance Panjani, (1981)1 M.L.J. 182 :94 L.W. 144, dealing with the identical question, another Division Bench of this court held follows: ".....We are, therefore of the view that in this case, the vehicle having been transferred long before the accident, the transferor and the Insurance Company with which the vehicle been insured by the first respondent, cannot be made liable in respect of the accident which admittedly took place long after the transfer while the vehicle was in possession and custody of the second respondent and the second respondent ’ s driver who caused the accident by his rashness and negligence driving the vehicle. We have to therefore, sustain the dismissal of the claim as against first and the third respondents by the Tribunal.” Recently, in Rangaswamy v. Periammal, (1990)1 L.W. 453 , the question whether, transfer of a vehicle without intimating the insurance company, the insurance company issued the policy of insurance to the transferor, is liable for an accident to a third party, to be considered and it was observed as follows: “.....A contract of insurance in relation to a vehicle is one of personal indemnity confined the owner and the liability of the insurance company is determined by the terms conditions of the policy by which the risk is covered. The liability under such a cover reference to a specified vehicle owned by the policy holder and to cover the risk arising of its use. Ordinarily, the cover is effective only so long as the person in whose favour cover is issued retains the interest in the vehicle covered by the policy and on the of such interest, the cover ceases to be effective. It is not the case of the appellant there was any provision in the policy for transfer. On a transfer of the vehicle, there substitution of the transferee, as the beneficiary of the personal indemnity. Under provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act also, there is no statutory novation, as it were, of transfer of a vehicle. When a vehicle under cover is sold by the then owner concerned insurance company is not informed about it or even requested to transfer benefits of the cover in favour of the transferee, the insurance company is entitled that it knows nothing about the transferee, as he was not on its books and, therefore, as the insurance company is concerned, he is uninsured and there is no policy at all the vehicle in the name of the transferee. It is in this context that Sec.103-A of the Vehicles Act is relevant. It is in this context that Sec.103-A of the Vehicles Act is relevant. Thereunder the procedure for transfer of the policy of relating to a vehicle on its sale is laid down and according to that, the transferor apply to the insurance company for the transfer of the certificate of insurance and the in favour of the person to whom the vehicle is proposed to be transferred and if the fails to intimate the insured or such other person within 15 days of the receipt application by the insurer, his refusal to transfer the certificate of insurance and the other person, the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate be deemed to have been transferred in favour of the person to whom the transferred effective from the date of its transfer. Under Sec.103-A(2) the insurer such an application is made by the transferor may refuse to transfer the certificate insurance and the policy under certain conditions. Sec.l03-A(3) further provides that event of the refusal of the insurer to transfer the certificate of insurance and the favour of the transferee to whom the vehicle has been transferred, the insurer is refund to such transferee, the amount, if any, under the terms of the policy, the would have had to refund to the insured, for the unexpired term of such policy aforesaid provision outlining the procedure for securing the benefits of a policy favour of the transferor clearly recognises the principle that a new assured cannot on the insurance company against its will except, therefore, in cases where an application has been made by the transferor for transfer of the certificate of insurance and the and the insurer has not intimated his refusal to transfer the certificate of insurance policy to the transferee within 15 days, the transfer of the certificate of insurance policy could be effected only by the insurance company agreeing to such a transfer, has also an option to refuse a transfer on the grounds specified in Sec.l03-A(2) of the Vehicles Act. To generally view the transfer of a vehicle as carrying with it the benefit certificate of insurance and the policy would not be proper, as, in such an event, insurance company should be regarded as having issued two policies agreeing to indemnify under one, the transferor with reference to a particular vehicle, under another wholly irrespective of the ownership of any vehicle.... “Again, at Page 460, it was observed as follows:” ----- “ Where the subsistence of a contract of insurance is itself questioned, it would a case contemplated by Sec.96(2) at all, for, as pointed out earlier, those provisions on the basis of the subsistence of a valid cover and the ground available to the company for avoiding its liability under such a cover. There is no question of avoidance liability by the insurance company under a contract on one or more of the enumerated under Sec.96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, when there is no subsisting at all..... ” It is thus seen that the consistent view taken in a long line of decisions of Division this court is to the effect that on transfer of the vehicle, the policy of insurance already in favour of the transferor lapsed and the insurance company cannot be with liability. It becomes necessary now to refer to the decision in Dharman N.C.Srinivasan, (1989)1 L.W. 315 , which, at first sight, may appear to support contention of learned counsel for the contesting respondents. However, a closer the ratio as well as the decisions on which the ratio is based, would clearly establish decision had not only been rendered without reference to the several earlier Bench of this court, but also on a misunderstanding as well as misapplication of the two decisions the Supreme Court. The decision in Dharman v. N.C.Srinivasan, (1989)1 L.W. proceeded to hold that the defence of lapse of a policy on transfer of the vehicle, raised within the framework of Sec.96(2) of the Act. In so holding, apart from the to refer to the earlier Bench decisions, reliance had been placed upon two decisions Supreme Court which in our considered view, do not have any application whatever a situation relating to transfer of the vehicle and its effect on the policy of insurance, the transfer is not intimated and the insurance company had not issued any fresh favour of the transferee of the vehicle. In British India General Insurance Company Singh, A.I.R. 1959 S.C 1331, the Supreme Court did not have any occasion to consider case of a transfer of a vehicle and its effect on the rights of the transferee of the under the terms of the policy issued by the insurance company in favour of the decision had been rendered on the footing that the owner of the cars in those cases validly insured against third party risks and this is clear from the opening paragraph judgment. The question that arose was, whether the insurers, subsequently defendants in an action for damages, could be permitted to raise defences falling Sec.96(2) of the Act. In other words, there were valid and operative policies for the at the time of the accident, but the attempt of the insurer to raise defences falling Sec.96(2) of the Act, was not permitted by the Supreme Court. The Supreme pointed out that the insurance company cannot be permitted to raise defences liability, except on the grounds provided under Sec.96(2) of the Act. This decision therefore, to be understood as clearly postulating the subsistence of an insurance the avoidance of liability by the insurance company on the grounds enumerated in (b) of the Act and cannot be pressed into service to claim compensation from the company, even when there is no policy or cover. Again, in New Asiatic Insurance Company Pessumal, A.I.R 1964 S.C, 1736, the question as to what should happen to the transfer of the vehicle was not considered, but the decision turned upon the provisions policies regarding the liability of the insurance company. That decision, therefore, deal with a situation as in this case where the seventh respondent, who was the owner vehicle on the date of the accident, had not been issued a policy at all by the company. It may be pointed out that where the subsistence of a contract of insurance questioned, it would not be a case contemplated by Sec.96(2) of the Act, at all, pointed out earlier, those provisions proceed on the basis of the subsistence of a valid and the grounds available to the insurance company for avoiding its liability under cover. It may be pointed out that where the subsistence of a contract of insurance questioned, it would not be a case contemplated by Sec.96(2) of the Act, at all, pointed out earlier, those provisions proceed on the basis of the subsistence of a valid and the grounds available to the insurance company for avoiding its liability under cover. On the fact and circumstances of this case, there is no question of avoidance liability by the insurance company or one or more of the grounds set out in Sec.96(2) of the Act, when, according to it, there is no contract of insurance Considering the consistent and preponderant judicial opinion expressed in the decisions this court referred to earlier the decision in Dharman v. N.C.Srinivasan, (1989)1 L. cannot be applied to the facts of this case. In view of the aforesaid well settled legal and the factual situation that the lorry TNY 4629 had been transferred by the respondent to the seventh respondent even on 5.10.1979, long prior to the date accident, and the transfer was not intimated either by the transferor or by the transferee the appellant-insurance company, the policy issued by the appellant-insurance company the sixth respondent lapsed, on the transfer of the vehicle, and thereafter no liability be fastened upon the appellant insurance company on the basis of such a lapsed Under those circumstances, the award of the Tribunal directing the appellant company to pay compensation to respondents 1 to 5 cannot be sustained and the liability pay compensation would only be that of the owner of the vehicle on the date of the viz., the seventh respondent. Accordingly, the civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed award of the tribunal is modified in that respondents 1 to 5 will be entitled to recover compensation amount with interest as awarded by the Tribunal from the seventh respondent and the claim petition against the appellant insurance company and the sixth respondent stand dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 8. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 8. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant-insurance company had deposited entire compensation amount together with interest, etc., pursuant to order passed court in C.M.P.No.7757 of 1985 on 1.7.1985 and later, by the final orders passed same petition on 19.1.1987, the amounts deposited by the insurance company were to be kept in fixed deposit with Canara Bank, Nungambakkam Branch, Madras, for of three years or till the disposal of the appeal, whichever is later. Since the appeal by the insurance company has now been allowed, it follows that the appellant company will be entitled to be paid back the amounts deposited by it pursuant to passed earlier. Appeal allowed.