This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Dibrugarh in Title Suit No. 3 of 1980. 2. The plaintiff instituted the suit against the defendants for eviction from the suit premises described in Schedules A and B and for recovery of Rs. l,595/-as arrears of rent and for recovery of Rs, 4,111/- as compensation for illegal occupation of the suit premises. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff Parsuram Prasad was the Karta of a Mitakskhara Joint Hindu family, M/s Krishna Prasad and Sons. The joint family has dissolved by mutual arrangement and by a registered deed dated 2. 4. 67, and the properties were amicably partitioned among the co-parceners. Ti e suit properties described in Schedules A and B to the plaint fell into the share of one of the co-parceners Shri Narsingh Prasad Verma. Afterwards Narsingh Prasad transferred the suit properties to the plaintiff Parasuram Prasad in exchange for his share by a registered deed dated 13. 8. 67 whereby the plaintiff became the owner of the suit properties. After the partition the plaintiff has been the Karta of his line of joint Hindu family, M/s Parasuram Prasad and Sons. The defendant-1 Shri Sudhir Chandra Deb and his father Debendra Chandra Deb (defendant-2) were carrying Business in the name and style of M/s Deben and Sons (defendant-2). They were monthly tenant under M/s Krishna Prasad & Sons in respect of the premises described in Schedule A on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 55/- according to English calendar. The proforma defendant Sri Dayal Chandra Paul was the sub-tenant of the defendants 1 and 2. The defendants were duly informed about the partition and exchange of the properties and the plaintiff's becoming the absolute owner of the. suit pro­perties. As regards the suit premises described in Schedule 3 the defendants-1 and 2 in collusion with defendant-4 forcibly occupied the premises. In respect of the premises described in Schedule A the house is in very dilapidated condition requiring immediate reconstruction. The defendants were defaulters. The defendants had not paid rent with effect from 1. 6. 70. 3. The defendant Sudhir Chandra Deb resisted the suit on behalf of himself and M/s Deben and Sons. The defendant denied all allegations made by the plaintiff and asserted that. The defendants were defaulters. The defendants had not paid rent with effect from 1. 6. 70. 3. The defendant Sudhir Chandra Deb resisted the suit on behalf of himself and M/s Deben and Sons. The defendant denied all allegations made by the plaintiff and asserted that. if it was found that the plaintiff ever did any matter or thing regarding the premises, or made any collection of the house rent thereof, it was an agent or representative of the co-sharers of the properties including the suit premises. He also denied that the house is in dilapidated condition. He had however stated that he had been a tenant of the suit premises under the sons of Krishna Prasad as a sole proprietor of M/s Deben and Sons and had been paying rent regularly. 4. The trial Judge decreed the suit holding that the defendants were tenants under the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises and were defaulters since 1. 6. 70. Hence this appeal by the defendants-1 and 3. 5. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is t .at the appellants are not defaulters. 6. Although the main contention of the appellant is that they are not defaulters and the trial Court has held that the defendants were tenants under the plaintiff, for my own satisfaction, I have perused the evidence on records. Exts. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 are the inner counter foils of the, receipts of payment of rent issued by the plaintiff Parasuram Prasad. The signatures marked as Exts. 14 (1), 15 (1), 16 (I), 17 (1) and 18 (!) on the receipts have been proved that they are the signatures of Parasuram Prasad, and the signatures marked as Exts. 14 (2), 15(2), 16(2), 17 (2) and 18 (2) on the receipts have been proved that they are the signatures of Shri Sudhir Chandra Deb. These receipts indicate that the defendant-appellants paid rent to the plaintiff as their landlord, i. e. the appellant were the tenants under the plaintiff. DW-5 Sudhir Chandra Deb defendant-1 has stated in his deposition that he paid rent to the plaintiff and the receipts were issued in the name of M/s Parasuram Prasad and Sons after family partition. The findings of trial Court is based on evidence so far as the suit premises described in Schedule A is concerned. 7. DW-5 Sudhir Chandra Deb defendant-1 has stated in his deposition that he paid rent to the plaintiff and the receipts were issued in the name of M/s Parasuram Prasad and Sons after family partition. The findings of trial Court is based on evidence so far as the suit premises described in Schedule A is concerned. 7. As regards the default, the trial Court has held that the appellants are defaulters, as already stated. In order to prove, that the defendant-appellants were not defaulters, the records of proceeding of the deposit of rent from the Court were called for. "Ext 'Cha' (1)" is the application made on 13. 7. 70 for allowing to deposit rent for the months of June, July and August of 1970 filed by defendant-appellants. Ext "Chha (1)", the Treasury Chaltan, show that the defendant-appellants deposited rent for the said months on 22. 7. 70. The order of the Court shows that the defendant-appellants did not take steps and therefore, the petition was dismissed on 22. 8. 70. 8. The question which, therefore, arise.) for consideration is whether the dismissal or rejection of application for deposit of rent amounts to deposit as is provided under section 5 (4) of the Assam Urban Arenas Rent Control Act, 1972, for short 'the Act'. Section 5 (4) states : "Where the landlord refused to accept the lawful rent offered by his tenant, the tenant nay, within a fortnight of its becoming due, deposit in Court the amount of such rent together with process fees for service of notice upon the landlord, and on receiving such deposit, the Court shall cause a notice of the receipt of such deposit to be served on the landlord, and the amount of the deposit may thereafter be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Court in that behalf. A tenant who has made such deposit shall not be treated as a defaulter under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of this section." Under section 5 (4) notice of the receipt of the deposit is to be served on the landlord, and on receipt of the notice the landlord may withdraw the deposited rent. If no step is taken and, therefore, no notice is issued the landlord shall have no knowledge about the deposit. If no step is taken and, therefore, no notice is issued the landlord shall have no knowledge about the deposit. The deposit is to be made where the landlord refused to accept the lawful rent offered by his tenant. The object of the enactment is that, on the refusal to accept the lawful rent offered by his tenant, if the deposit is made as provided therein it, would be deemed that the rent has been duly paid to the landlord by operation of law. Therefore, if the rent is not deposited in terms o: section 5 (4), it cannot be said that the tenant has paid the rent, i.e. the tenant is a defaulter, la that view of the matter, the appellants were defaulters and as . such, the statutory ground for eviction existed in so far as premises described in Schedule A is concerned. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the case of the plaintiff is that the defendants had forcibly occupied the suit premises described in Schedule B and, therefore, the suit in respect of Schedule B cannot be combined with the eviction suit under the Rent Control Act, 10. The question which therefore assess is whether there is mis-joinder of causes of action. 11. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties, 1 consider it necessary to examine the scheme of the Act. The Act contains 12 sections only. Section 1 relates to short, title, extent and commencement of the Act. Section 2 is the definition section. Sections 3 and 4 are in respect of fair rent and procedure for determination of fair rent. Section 5 provides statutory grounds for eviction of a tenant by the landlord. Section 5-A is with regard to special provisions for recovery of possession of house to members of Armed Forces of the Union or a member of the family of a deceased member of such forces. Section 5-AA is in connection with the special provision for recovery of possession of any house to a retired Government servant or a member of the family of a deceased Government servant. The duties of the landlord for repairing etc are provided under sections 6 and 7. Section 8 is a provision for appeal. Section 9 confers power on the State Government to make rules. Section 10 is the repealing and saving section. 12. The duties of the landlord for repairing etc are provided under sections 6 and 7. Section 8 is a provision for appeal. Section 9 confers power on the State Government to make rules. Section 10 is the repealing and saving section. 12. Section 2(a) defines : “Court' means the Court of Ordinary Civil Jurisdiction in the area in which a house is situated which would be competent to pass a decree for the eviction of a tenant from that house." Under section 2(a) the Court in whose jurisdiction the house from which the tenant is to be evicted is situated, is the only Court to pass a decree for eviction of a tenant, and no other Court. 13. Section 6 provides £ “A landlord or a tenant aggrieved by any decision or order of the Court under the provisions of Sections 4,5 and 7(2) of this Act shall have a right of appeal against the same as if such decision or order were a decree in a suit for ejectment of the tenant from the house am.' such appellate Court's decision shall be final." 14. Under section 8, the decision or order of a Court under the provi­sions of sections 4,5 and 7^2) of the Act is to be deemed to be a decree in a suit for the purpose of appeal and the decision of the appellate Court shall be final. But, a second appeal shall lie from a decree of eviction of a trespasser in some cases except as otherwise provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Act is a special Act concerning landlord and tenant only, and in the case of eviction of a tenant what is to be decided is whether any of the statutory grounds fur eviction provided under section 5 exists or not. Therefore, the causes of action joined in the suit are of a different character. In that view of the matter, there has been mis-joinder of causes of action in respect of premises descried in Schedule B in one suit. 15. Therefore, the causes of action joined in the suit are of a different character. In that view of the matter, there has been mis-joinder of causes of action in respect of premises descried in Schedule B in one suit. 15. As regards the mis joinder of causes of action, under O 2, R 6, CPC, where it appears to the Court that a joinder of causes of action in one suit may embarrass or delay the trial or is otherwise inconvenient, the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expe­dient in the interest of justice. O 2, R 7, CPC provides that all objections on the ground of mis joinder of causes of action shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen and any such objection aot so taken shall be deemed to have been waived. Section 99, CPC provides that no decree shall be reversed or subsequently varied, nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or ir/egularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. 16- The trial Court had the juris iicuon to entertain the suit for eviction of a trespasser in exercise of his ordinary civil jurisdiction. But the trial Court should have, in the present case, ordered for separate trials or other­wise as provided under O 2, R 6, CPC as a second appeal lies from such a decree under section 100, CPC in some cases. The suit was instituted in the year 1973. The trial Court framed an issue as to whether the defen­dant-appellants forcibly occupied the premises described in Schedule B. But the trial Court has, in view of his finding that the defendant-appellants were tenants under the plaintiff, held that the issue was redundant. 17. Under Order 2, Rule 6, the Court may order separate triads. But separate trials do not mean that separate plaints are to be filed. Separate trials may be called sub-suits under the title and suit number of the principal suit out of which they arise. 17. Under Order 2, Rule 6, the Court may order separate triads. But separate trials do not mean that separate plaints are to be filed. Separate trials may be called sub-suits under the title and suit number of the principal suit out of which they arise. It is only to separate the issue which has been mis-joined in one suit and try it separately and pass a separate decree. The trial Court should have tried the issue separately, and pass decree separately. But the question of mis-jonder has been raised for the first time in this appeal. Therefore, the; objection not taken at the earliest possible opportunity shall be deemed to have been waived. However. I have perused the evidence. I do not find any material to interfere with the decree. The evidence of PWs 1 and 2 clearly indicate that the appellants are trespassers. 18. For the reasons stated, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.