G. B. PATTANAIK, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFF is the appellant against a reversing judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Puri, in a suit for specific performance of contract. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF alleged that as he was in need of money he incurred some loan from the defendant and for that purpose he executed a registered sale deed in favour of the defendant in respect of certain items of properties on 27-11-1970 (Ext. 1 ). It was agreed to between the parties that in the event the plaintiff pays back Rs. 1200/- to the defendant within a period of five years from the said date, then the defendant would re-convey the properties. This agreement was also executed on the selfsame day, namely on 27-11-1970, which is Ext. 2. Thereafter though the plaintiff offered to pay the amount on several dates, but the defendant avoided. Ultimately on 1-10-1975, the plaintiff issued a registered notice (Ext. 3/d) to the defendant. Even then the defendant did not agree to reconvey the land. The plaintiff then by way of a bank draft on 13-11-1976 (Ext. 4) sent the sum of Rs. 1200/- to the defendant, but the defendant refused to accept the said bank draft. The postal endorsement indicating the refusal by the defendant is Ext. 4/s. Ultimately finding no other way, the plaintiff filed the suit. ( 3 ) THE defendant in the written statement denied the allegations made in the plaint. According to him he has purchased the property under Ext. 1, but there has been no agreement between the parties to reconvey the land as alleged in the plaint. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff had failed to perform his part of the contract and, therefore, he was not entitled to a decree for specific performance. ( 4 ) ON these pleadings six issues were framed and the trial Court on consideration of the materials on record came to hold that the sale deed (Ext. 1) was executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant and simultaneously on that very day it was agreed between the parties that the plaintiff would repay Rs. 1200/- within a period of five years when the defendant would re-convey the properties under Ext. 1 in favour of the plaintiff and the said agreement was executed by the defendant under Ext. 2 and that agreement was enforceable. 1200/- within a period of five years when the defendant would re-convey the properties under Ext. 1 in favour of the plaintiff and the said agreement was executed by the defendant under Ext. 2 and that agreement was enforceable. On the question of plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, the trial Court came to hold that the plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in fact tendered the amount of Rs. 1200/- in time requiring the defendant to execute the deed of reconveyance, but the defendant did not receive the said amount. On these findings, the suit was decreed and the defendant was directed to accept Rs. 1200 /- from the plaintiff within a period of three months and to execute the sale deed for the properties in question in favour of the plaintiff, failing which the plaintiff would be entitled to move the Court for getting the sale deed executed through Court. ( 5 ) THE defendant carried an appeal. Before the Appellate Judge, the only contention that was raised by the defendant was that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was even ready and willing to perform his part of the contract subsequent to the filing of the suit. The lower appellate Court relying upon the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Kumar and Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1978 Patna 192, and considering the materials on record came to hold that it could not be concluded that after the filing of the suit, the plaintiff was also ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, even though there has been cognet evidence that prior to the filing of the suit the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. On this finding the lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and hence this second appeal. ( 6 ) MR. On this finding the lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and hence this second appeal. ( 6 ) MR. Padhi appearing for the plaintiff-appellant raises two contentions in assailing the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court: - (I) The lower appellate Court while recording a finding that there is no material to establish that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform, his part of the contract even subsequent to filing of the suit has failed to notice the admission of the defendant himself who was examined as D. W. 1 and such non-consideration has materially affected his ultimate conclusion; and (II) The question whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract has to be gathered taking into consideration the totality of the picture and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Chandick v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal (dead) by L. Rs. , AIR 1971 SC 1238 , and in view of the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract till the date of the suit, the lower appellate Court committed an error in dismissing the plaintiff's suit. Mr. Naidu appearing for the defendant-respondent, on the other hand, contends that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Mali Bewa v. Dhunda Samal, AIR 1970 Ori 161 , as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, AIR 1967 SC 868 and the decision of the Patna High Court in Kumar and Kumar's case, AIR 1978 Pat 192 , unless the Court finds that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract even subsequent to the filing of the suit, a decree for specific performance cannot be granted and, therefore, the ultimate conclusion of the lower appellate Court is unassailable. ( 7 ) COMING to the first contention of Mr. Padhi, I find sufficient force in the same. The defendant while being examined as D. W. 1 in his cross-examination has categorically stated :-"at present I am not prepared to carry out my part of the contract though plaintiff is ready to perform his part of the contract. ( 7 ) COMING to the first contention of Mr. Padhi, I find sufficient force in the same. The defendant while being examined as D. W. 1 in his cross-examination has categorically stated :-"at present I am not prepared to carry out my part of the contract though plaintiff is ready to perform his part of the contract. "this is an unequivocal admission on the part of the defendant on the date he was examined i.e. on 21-8-1978 that the plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff in his evidence has also stated that he was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in proof of the same, he has established the fact that he did tender the amount of Rs. 1200/- by way of a bank draft which was refused by the defendant. Undoubtedly, the lower appellate Court has not considered the admission of the defendant, referred to earlier. The ultimate conclusion, therefore, has been vitiated on account of such non-consideration of the admission of the defendant. In view of the admission of the defendant, as stated above, there cannot be any manner of doubt that the plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract even till the date on which the defendant was examined in Court and, therefore, a decree for specific performance cannot be denied to the plaintiff. On this ground alone, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are liable to be reversed. ( 8 ) EVEN on the second submission of Mr. Padhi, I find that the same is unassailable. In Mali Bewa's case, AIR 1970 Ori 161 , a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that it is mandatory that not only it should be averred in the plaint, but also should be stated in court during trial, otherwise readiness until the end of the trial cannot be indicated at the time of filing of the suit. This requirement has also been established in the present case as the plaintiff in his evidence during trial has stated about his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. To the same effect is the view taken by the Patna High Court in the decision reported in AIR 1978 Pat 192 . This requirement has also been established in the present case as the plaintiff in his evidence during trial has stated about his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. To the same effect is the view taken by the Patna High Court in the decision reported in AIR 1978 Pat 192 . The matter, however, seems to be concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra's case, AIR 1971 SC 1238 , wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held :-". . . . . Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a strait-jacket formula. These have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. In our judgment there was nothing to indicate that the appellants at any stage were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The High Court had taken another aspect of readiness and willingness into consideration, namely the possession of sufficient funds by the appellants at the material time for payment of the balance of the sale price. . . . . . . . "it was further held :-". . . . . There is no material or evidence to show that this amount had been expended or spent and that the statement of Romesh Chand was false on the point. Even if the version that Rs. 40,000/- in cash were lying at the house of the appellant is discarded at least an amount of Rs. 12,720/- must have been available at the material and relevant time. The appellants were carrying on business and there is nothing to indicate that they were not in a position to arrange for the remaining sum to make up the total of Rs. 15,000/ -. We are, therefore, unable to accept that the appellants, who had all along been trying their utmost to purchase the plot, did not have the necessary funds or could not arrange for them when the sale deed had to be executed and registered after the sanction had been obtained. "if the ratio of the aforesaid decision is applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff has established that he was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. "if the ratio of the aforesaid decision is applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff has established that he was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The conclusion to the contrary by the lower appellate Court cannot, therefore, be sustained. In the premises, as aforesaid, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court are affirmed. ( 9 ) THIS second appeal is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.