Judgment :- MISHRA, J. ( 1 ) ALTHOUGH several contentions are raised and most of them have been effectively replied in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the detaining authority, in the instant case we find that the petitioners detention under Section 3 (i) of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 is not sustainable. The detenu, it appears, is a habitual criminal. The grounds of detention show that in three cases, that is to say, D-3 Ice House Police-station Crime No. 1186/89, D-1 Triplicane Police Station Crime No. 2838189 and E-4 Abhiramapuram Police Station Crime No. 1495 of 1989, he has been charged with the offences under Sections 380, 511,380 and 75,457 and 380 I. P. C. respectively and is on bail granted by the Court. There are nine more cases alleged against him including E-4 Abhiramapuram Police Station Crime No. 15091 89, E-4 Abhiramapuram Police Station Crime No. 1515 of 1989,12 Adayar Police Station Crime No. 136 of 1990, J2 Adayar Police-station Crime No. 150/90. F-3 Nungambakkam Police-Station Crime No. 5 16/90. K. 6, Chatram Police-Station Crimp No. 561/90. J. 2 Adayur Police-Station Crime No. 190/90, K. 4 Annu Nagar Police-Station Crime NO. 583/90 and D-1 Triplicane Police-Station Crime No. 866190. In these cases, it is said that he has been remanded to prison except ea Abhiramapuram Police-station Crime No 1115/90 in which case it is stated that he has been released on bail. It does not appear, however, how when he was a remand prisoner in Abhiramapuram Police-Station Crime No. 1509 of 1998. after his arrest in connection. with Abhiramapuram Police-Station Crime No. 1515 of 89, he was found committing offences in April, 1990 and thereafter in the cases cited above being Adayar Police-station Crime No. 136190, Adayar Police-Station Crime No. 150/90, F-3 Nungambakkam Police Station Crime No. 516/90, K. 6, Chatram Police-Station Crime No. 561190, J. 2 Adayar Police-Station Crime No. 190/90, KA Annanagar Police Station Crime No. 583/90 and D-1 Triplicane Police Station Crime No. 866/90. These arc all cases relating to the offences committed either in April, 1990 and thereafter. It appears, however, from the ground case in which on 18. 7. 1990 at about 18 hours, it is said that the petitioner committed certain offences and was arrested on 18. 7. These arc all cases relating to the offences committed either in April, 1990 and thereafter. It appears, however, from the ground case in which on 18. 7. 1990 at about 18 hours, it is said that the petitioner committed certain offences and was arrested on 18. 7. 1990 and in most of the cases aforementioned he was remanded only after his arrest except Abhiramapuram Police-station Crime No. 1509189 in which case he was shown remanded to judicial custody after his arrest in Abhiramapuram Police-Station crime No. 1515 of 1989. There is no mention anywhere in the grounds that he had been released on bail in Abhiramapuram. Police-Station Crime NO. 1509189 although it is said that he was released on bail in Abhiramapuram Police-Station Crime No. 1515 of 89. In the ground case, the story is typical of a thief chased and arrest it, a story almost common in most of the ground cases of arrest and detention under Section 3 (i) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. ( 2 ) ONE Dayalan, it is stated, was staying in Room No. 1 of S. A. A. Mansion, Triplicane occasionally on 18/7/1990 at about 18. 00 hours he went ID the Vinayagar Temple, opposite to the mansion. When he came out of the Temple and while entering into the mansion, he noticed that his loom was kept open and the lock was broken act that somebody was inside the room. He rushed into the room and found the petitioner committing theft of a wrist watch kept on the table and a silver kolusu and a small silver plate kept in the table drawer. Immediately, he questioned (mailer in other language) and rushed to catch the petitioner at the spot. The petitioner used his first and hit Dayalan on his face and chest with his right hand Dayalan fell down on the floor. However he got up and raised alarm. The petitioner succeeded in coming out of the mansion. Shanmugham and Arumugham, two persons, who were near the spot joined Dayalan in his pursuit to apprehend the petitioner. The petitioner, however, turned back and demonstrated a sharp rod and exhorted (matter in other (anguage) Dayalan and the two other persons, however, surrounded the petitioner. The petitioner succeeded in coming out of the mansion. Shanmugham and Arumugham, two persons, who were near the spot joined Dayalan in his pursuit to apprehend the petitioner. The petitioner, however, turned back and demonstrated a sharp rod and exhorted (matter in other (anguage) Dayalan and the two other persons, however, surrounded the petitioner. The petitioner then dropped the iron rod and rushed to a nearby shop of one Ramesh, picked up two soda water bottles and hurled them on the road side. It is stated thereafter the soda water bottle fell on the road side, and broke into pieces. The splinters scattered on all directions. The public who were standing nearby the shops, the public who came for shopping and who were taking tea at the nearby tea-stall, noticed the atrocious activities of the petitioner and they ran helter-skelter for safety. The auto-rickshaw drivers who were standing there with their autos feared danger to their life and property and left the spot with their autos. The hotel, tea shop owners, and the nearby shop owners closed down their shops and suspended their business. The public who came out from the nearby Star theatre, noticed the atrocious activities and ran inside the free flow of traffic in that area was dislocated. However, Dayalan and others tried to catch the culprit. Jesuraj and Gopalakrishnan and police personnel who were on beat duty noticed this and surrounded the culprit and also caught hold of him at the spot with the assistance of the witnesses. Dayalan took out the silver plate, kolusu and the wrist watch from the petitioners pant pocket. Dayalan identified the iron rod. The iron rod was picked up by the police from the spot, from where it was thrown. Later, the properties and ignored used to attack the public were taken to D-1 Triplicane Police-Station with the petitioner by Dayalan and others. Dayalan lodged a complaint in this regard to the Inspector of Police-D-1 Crimes. Sivaraman, Inspector of Police, Crimes, D-1 Police-Station registered a case in C-I Cr. No. 1031190 under sections 392 read with 397, 394, 336,426 and 506 (ii) I. P. C. ( 3 ) IT is said that the petitioner confessed to have committed the said offence and other offences also. Sivaraman, Inspector of Police, Crimes, D-1 Police-Station registered a case in C-I Cr. No. 1031190 under sections 392 read with 397, 394, 336,426 and 506 (ii) I. P. C. ( 3 ) IT is said that the petitioner confessed to have committed the said offence and other offences also. The detaining authority had added: I am aware that Thiru Kannan alias Kannappan alias Great Kannan is in remand and there is imminent possibility that he may come out on bail for the offences under Sections 392 read with 397, 394, 336, 426 and 506 (ii) I. P. D. , by filing bail application in the Court. If he comes out on bail, he will indulge in further activities which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Further, the recourse to normal criminal law would not have the decried effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in such activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. ( 4 ) IN catena of decision, this Court as well as the Supreme Court has held and pointed out that every disorder is not disturbance to public order. The statement of law in the case of Ram Manohar Lohie v. State of Bihar1 by the Supreme Court has been so often quoted and repeated by the Courts that it will be difficult for any person to suggest that this approach of the Court is not known. Detaining authority, in particular, is expected to know when to take recourse to preventive detention law as an exception to the guarantee of freedom under Article 21 of the Constitution of India read with Articles 22 (1) and, (2) thereof. In Ram Manohar Lohie v. State of Bihar (supra), the law has been stated thus: disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression public order take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish public order from law and order because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public Order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards. quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. The answer to this serves to distinguish public order from law and order because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public Order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards. quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on be ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined: The contravention of law, always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder. is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. . ( 5 ) THE said statement of law has once again been repeated by the Supreme Court in :devakis case. It is a case, in our opinion, in which before deciding to detain the petitioner, the detaining authority could have bestowed some more consideration to this aspect of the law. We; however, find serious infirmities which go to the root of the detention order. Admittedly, the petitioner was a remand prisoner on the date of detention order. He was a remand prisoner not only in the ground case but in several other cases. In Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, dealing with a case under the prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the Supreme Court considered the scope of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India and stated:the decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention: and (ii) that there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression compelling reasons in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. ( 6 ) THE above statement of law by the Supreme Court is a reiteration of similar statements of law made in the case of Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate. Etah, and series of other cases including the case of Meera Rani v. Government of Tamil Nadu5, as well as the case of Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate. Burdwan in which the Constitution Bench of the supreme Court has stated:as an abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Section 3 (1) (a) docs not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person in jail. Take, for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from jail at the end one period of the sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, again the considerations of proximity of time w ill not be irrelevant. In dealing with this question, again the considerations of proximity of time w ill not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the Authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority is bona fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is likely to be released. ( 7 ) IN the light of the above, when we advert to the facts of the instant case, what we notice is that the petitioner has been taken into custody in connection with the ground case which is stated to be for offences punishable under Sections 392, read with 394, 397, 336, 426 and 506 (ii) I. P. C. The antecedent cases also show the offences punishable under Sections 457, 380 and 511 I. P. C. , to say the least. Besides the ground case, the petitioner has been remanded in several other cases. How could then the detaining authority thank that the petitioner was likely to be released on bail. He seems to be oblivious of the fact that howsoever liberty a Court of law may be in granting bail it is always required to take notice of the seriousness of the offence and the antecedent of the culprit. No order of bail is issued without giving an opportunity to the State of being heard unless the detaining authority and the respondents were sure of the case that they had registered against the petitioner that they had no reason to think that the Court of law would not take notice of the seriousness of the offence committed by the petitioner and his antecedent and release him without any consideration given to this aspect of the case. There is no reason to think that the detaining authority was unaware of the fact that the petitioner was a remand prisoner not only in the ground case but in several other cases. There is no reason to think that the detaining authority was unaware of the fact that the petitioner was a remand prisoner not only in the ground case but in several other cases. The only consideration given by him in the grounds related to likely release of the petitioner on bail in the ground case and not in, the other cases in which also he is a remand prisoner. This Court has followed the above stated law laid down by the Supreme Court in more than one case including W. P. No. 9877 of 1990 dated 26th November, 1990 Rajendran alias Gin v. State of Tamil Nadu and held on similar facts that the detention order under Section 3 (i) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 is not sustainable. In sum, the order of detention-vide memo No. 52 BDFGIS/90 dated 25/7/1990 issued by the 2nd respondent is fit to be quashed the writ petition is accordingly allowed. The said order of detention is quashed and the respondents are directed to release the detenu forthwith, if not wanted in connection with any other case. Petition allowed.