R. K. Manisana, J.— These 19 writ petitions are disposed of by a common judgment as the question of law and facts in all the cases are similar. 2. In summary court martial, the accused in this batch of 19 petitions were tried for the offence or offences under the Army Act alleged to have committed by the accused. On the trial, the summary court-martial convicted the accused and inflicted punishment on them - in some cases dismissal simipliciter, in some cases reduction in rank and dismissal and in some cases imprisonment, reduction in rank and dismissal. The accused were convicted and punishment were inflicted on them on the ground that accused pleaded "guilty" to the charge. 3. Mr. B.K. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners, has advanced the following submissions. Two sets of the rules have been made applicable to a rifleman. They are the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965,for short 'the Disciplinary Rules' and the Army Act, 1950. The Army Act is more drastic and prejudicial to the interest of a rifleman. If it is open to the authority to initiate a proceeding against an erring rifleman either under the Disciplinary Rules or under the Army Act read with the Army Rules, there being substantial difference in the protection to which a rifleman is entitled, a clear case of discrimination arises. Therefore, the order of selecting a prejudicial procedure under the Army Act read with the Army Rules, out of the two open for selection, is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 4. Mr.Das argued that, against two riflemen similarly situated, procee­dings may be initiated against one under the Disciplinary Rules and against the other under the Army Act and Rules made thereunder, The discretion vested in the authority whether to take action against an erring rifleman under the Disciplinary Rules or under the Army Act read with the Army Rules is unguided and uncanalised and, therefore, the exercise of discretion is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. To support his contention, Mr. Das has referred us to a decision of a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court reported as State of Orissa vs Dhirendranath, AIR 1961 SC 1715 . To support his contention, Mr. Das has referred us to a decision of a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court reported as State of Orissa vs Dhirendranath, AIR 1961 SC 1715 . In that case, so far as disciplinary proceedings were concerned, there were two sets of rules, viz, the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951 and the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1935. Under the Administrative Tribunal Rules the civil servant against whom penalty had been imposed had no right of appeal against the findings and recommendations of the Tribunal. In the context of the case, the Supreme Court has held % "If the two sets of rules were in operation at the material time when the enquiry was directed against the respondent and by order of the Governor, the enquiry was directed under the Tribunal Rules which are "more drastic" and prejudicial to the interests of the respondent, a clear case of discrimination arises and the order directing enquiry against the respondent and the subsequent proceedings are liable to be struck down as infringing Article 14 of the Constitution. We therefore dismiss the appeal. There will be no order as to costs" 5. Section 71 of the Army Act provides for the punishments that may be inflicted in respect of offences committed by persons subject to the Army Act and convicted by courts martial. The punishment that can be inflicted under secti* n 71 after conviction by court martial includes dismissal from the service apart from the death sentence, imprisonment, etc. The punishments are inflicted after trial by a court martial of the offence charged with. Therefore, merely because a rifleman can be dismissed from his services under section 71 after conviction by court martial it would not be a departmental or disciplinary proceeding or a proceeding disciplinary in character. In that view of the matter, the nature of proceeding which may be taken under the Disciplinary Rules against an erring rifleman is different from the nature of proceeding which may be taken against him under the provisions of the Army Act read with Army Rules, the former being the disciplinary in nature when the latter being clearly a penal. In that view of the matter, the nature of proceeding which may be taken under the Disciplinary Rules against an erring rifleman is different from the nature of proceeding which may be taken against him under the provisions of the Army Act read with Army Rules, the former being the disciplinary in nature when the latter being clearly a penal. For the reasons stated above, the punishment of dismissal in a proceeding taken under the Army Act and the Army Rules, or the prosecution under the Army Act and the Rules, against the riflemen is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The decisk.ii of the Supreme Court referred to above was in the nature of disciplinary proceedings simpliciter. Against a civil servant disciplinary proceeding at, well as criminal proceeding can be initiated if the misconduct of the civil servant amounts to an offence punishable under any law. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the present case. 6. Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 115 of the Army .Rules, 1984, :for short, 'the Rules' provides : "The accused person's plea-'Guilty' or 'Not quity' (or if he refused to plead, or does not plead intelligibly either one or the other, a plea of 'Not guilty')-shall be recorded on each charge"- (emphasis added) Sub-rule (2) of Rule 115 provides, inter alia, that, if an accused person pleads 'Guilty,' that plea shall be recorded as the finding of the Court. 7. Under sub-rule(l)of Rule 116,upon the record of the plae of 'Guilty', if there are other charges it the same charge-sheet to which the plea is 'Not guilty,' the trial shall first proceed with respect to the latter charges, and, after finding of those charges shall proceed with the charges on which a plea of 'Guilty' has been entered. 8. Pleading of 'guilty' means an admission of an accused having committed the offence with which he is charged. Under section 115(2) the plea of guilty shall be recorded as the finding of the Court. The use of expression 'does not plead intelligibly' in Rule 115(1) indicates that the plea must be clear and unambiguous. Whether the plea is clear and unambiguous, or, whether the accused pleads or doss not plead intelligibly, will depend on the words used by the accused. A -mere entering or recording the word 'guilty' may mean Court's own conclusion or interpretation. Whether the plea is clear and unambiguous, or, whether the accused pleads or doss not plead intelligibly, will depend on the words used by the accused. A -mere entering or recording the word 'guilty' may mean Court's own conclusion or interpretation. Therefore, the clause "if the accused pleads guilty, the plea shall be recorded as the finding of the Court" means that the Court shall record the plea in the words used by the accused, or, the Court shall record the plea as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused. Such a recording will enable the party seeking justice to know as well as the higher authority or the confirming authority to determinate whether the plea recorded really amounts to an admission of guilt. 9. Coming to the cases on hand, it appears that the accused persons pleaded guilty, but the Court has not recorded the plea in the words, or, as nearly as possible in the words, used by the accused. Therefore, there was procedural impropriety. The requirement of recording of the plea as stated above is mandatory and the violation of it will vitiate the trial, conviction or penalty. The view taken by us finds support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Mahanta Kaushalya Das vs. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 22 10. With regard to quantum of punishment, it has been held by the Supreme Court in a series of cases that, although the question of chcice and quantum of punishment, is within the jurisdiction of the court martial, the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. If any authority is required we may refer to the decision in Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 2386 . 11. For the foregoing reasons, the trial, conviction and sentences are set aside. The cases are sent back to the summary court martial for disposal of the matter afresh in the light of the observations made above. 12. With the aforesaid observations and direction the petitions are allowed and disposed of. No costs.