JUDGMENT Ghosh, J. 1. The plaintiff In T.S. No. 60 of 1979 made a prayer for partition, for receiver, for accounts etc. The defendants did not dispute the plaintiff's share in the suit property. The learned trial Court granted a decree for partition in preliminary form and also a decree for accounts. 2. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned first appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree regarding partition but vacated the decree for accounts. 3. This second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court. The original plaintiff, Sri Madan Mohan Dey, died during the pendency of the second appeal and his heirs were substituted in his place in this second appeal. 4. The facts now lie within a short compass and mainly undisputed. It is not disputed that the original plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 group each had half shares in the land, which was the suit property. The plaintiff purchased the undivided half share by a kobala, Ext 1. The defendants purchased by another kobala, of which Ext. A is the certified copy. Both groups thus acquired undivided half shares in the suit property. As that point was not 'disputed by the defendants, we need not focus our attention on that aspect any more. Admittedly, the parties of each group had half shares in the suit property. Certain structures were raised on plot No. 1129. The main bone of contention was with regard to the structures raised on 1129. The defendants claimed that they raised the structures with their own money and the plaintiff had nothing to do. The claim of the original plaintiff was that the structures were raised with contribution made by him also and thus he had asserted his right in the structures too. Now by the two findings of facts of the trial court and of the first appellate court, it has come out and established that the structures belong to the defendants. In view of the situation, the only question is whether the learned trial Court could grant a decree for accounts and whether that decree could be vacated by the learned first appellate court when no appeal was preferred by the defendants. 5. We feel that the law on the point is clear and there is little scope for confusion. In view of the situation, the only question is whether the learned trial Court could grant a decree for accounts and whether that decree could be vacated by the learned first appellate court when no appeal was preferred by the defendants. 5. We feel that the law on the point is clear and there is little scope for confusion. If the structures belong to the defendants exclusively, they are not liable to render accounts in respect of their own properties, notwithstanding that their exclusive properties stand on joint land. It is axiomatic that a co-sharer can use every inch of a joint property in any way he likes provided thereby he does not interfere with or infringe the right of the other co-sharers. Here, the defendants built structures on a small portion of the land and the rest are used as but. There is no case of ouster of the plaintiff by the defendants. Therefore, the defendants were perfectly within their rights to raise structures. Of course, if the plaintiff felt inconvenienced, be might have made a prayer for restraining the defendants from raising the structures, but that was not done and the defendants used a part of the joint property in the way they thought suitable. Now the plaintiff or his" heirs cannot make grievance and cannot claim anything in the exclusive properties of the defendants. 6. Mr. Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellants, has sought to support the decree of the trial Court on the basis of some decisions referred to. He has relied upon the decision in the (1) Debendra Narayan's case (23 CWN 900). We find that the case cited is of no assistance to Mr. Banerjee. It rather supports the contrary view. It is observed that when there is an actual turning out or keeping excluded the party entitled to the possession there is ouster. We have already observed that no such case has been introduced here. It is further observed that a tenant in common cannot be held liable to his co-tenant for damages for use and occupation of the joint property unless there has been waste or ouster. That precisely has been observed here too. Mr. Banerjee has also relied upon the Privy Council's decision in the case of (2) The Midnapore Zamindary Co. (29 CWN 34). That precisely has been observed here too. Mr. Banerjee has also relied upon the Privy Council's decision in the case of (2) The Midnapore Zamindary Co. (29 CWN 34). We find that the decision cited, does no, in any way apply to the facts of this case. That was a case of purchase of jote rights in land held in common by the co-sharers. It was held that such a purchase would in law be held to have been a purchase for the benefit of all the co-sharers. We are not concerned with such situation. 7. So, we find, that the learned trial Court was not justified in granting a decree for accounts and the same decree was against the law. The learned first appellate Court was quite justified, according to law, in setting aside that decree for accounts. 8. In connection with that, however, another question comes in and it is that although the decree of the trial Court was against law, whether the learned first appellate Court could vacate that decree, as there was no appeal by the defendants or no cross objection even filed. 9. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Advocate for the respondents, has contended that the Court has ample power to rectify an error of law under Order 41, Rule 33 of the C.P.C. Mr. Banerjee, on the other hand, has relied upon the decision in (3) Nirmala Bala’s case ( AIR 1965 SC 1874 ) for the proposition that Order 41, Rule 33 of the C.P.C. does not confer unregulated jurisdiction upon the Court for granting relief. It is true that in that decision, it is observed that no unrestricted right, however, has been conferred by the Rule to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate court does not agree with the opinion of the court appealed from. But after Nirmala Bala's case, there has been a serious amendment of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33, C.P.C. By the Amendment Act of 1976, it has been added, "and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are, passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees". That is to say, even if otherwise the decree of the court below becomes final, as soon as the matter comes up before the appellate court, that court can grant appropriate relief, even though there might not have been filed any appeal from one decree or any cross objection relating to that decree. We are of the view that after the amendment of Order 44, Rule 33 of the C.P.C., the appellate court can grant the appropriate relief, even though the party granted the relief, has not appealed. Even after Nirmala Bala's case, the Supreme Court in (4) Koksingh v. Deokabai ( AIR 1976 SC 634 ) has held that the appellate court may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require. Thus, it is observed, under Order 41 Rule 33, C.P.C., the High Court is competent to pass a decree for the enforcement of a charge in favour of the respondent notwithstanding the fact that the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree. 10. Mr. Banerjee has referred to the decision in (5) Tummalla's case ( AIR 1978 SC 725 ) to convince that in spite of the amendment, the appellate court cannot grant a relief under Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC, if the party concerned has not preferred any appeal. We are of the view that this decision does not support the contention of Mr. Banerjee because, firstly, the effect of the amendment was not considered in that decision, and, secondly, in that case, a cross objection was filed, but the objector did not attack the decree of the trial court making him liable to return Rs. 13,000/- before he could get back possession from the defendant. In that context, the Supreme Court observed that without a specific ground in the cross objection and without payment of Court fees on the same amount, he was not entitled to get any relief by the court under Order 41, Rule 33 of the C.P.C. It is quite obvious that in that case, a cross objection was filed but the specific ground was not taken. That means, the parties were not mindful to agitate that ground. Moreover, there was question of payment of Court fees. On these grounds, the Supreme Court observed that relief under Order 41, Rule 33 of the C.P.C. could not be granted. That means, the parties were not mindful to agitate that ground. Moreover, there was question of payment of Court fees. On these grounds, the Supreme Court observed that relief under Order 41, Rule 33 of the C.P.C. could not be granted. The case cited is quite distinguishable. 11. We reiterate that the learned first appellate court was within its power under Order 41, Rule 33 of the C.P.C. to vacate the judgment and decree of the learned trial court relating to accounts, which were found to be against law. The judgment and decree of the learned first appellate court are quite sound and we find no ground to interfere. The appeal falls. The judgment and decree of the learned first appellate court are hereby affirmed. We extend the time for making amicable partition by the parties by three months more and three month will be counted from the date of the arrival or the lower court, record in that court. We make no order as to costs of this appeal. Sengupta, J.: I agree