Judgment :- The sole defendant in a suit for partition instituted by the respondent is the appellant in this appeal against the preliminary decree for partition. 2. Plaintiff has claimed half share in the plaint schedule property on the basis of Ext.A2 sale deed dated 6-6-1981. The title so claimed by the plaintiff was disputed by the defendant on various grounds. Rejecting all contentions raised by the defendant, suit was decreed for partition of the property into two shares and allotting one share each to the plaintiff and defendant. The main question raised in the appeal is the validity of the claim for half right in the plaint schedule property on the basis-of Ext. A2 sale deed. 3. The facts necessary for appreciating the points raised for consideration arc thus: According to plaintiff, the plaint schedule property belonged to one Ramakrishna Pai and C. Mahamood. Both of them are no more now. Half right of Ramakrishna Pai over the property devolved upon his widow and six daughters. Later the widow also died. Her rights also devolved upon her six daughters. Thereafter, one of six daughters of Ramakrishna Pai, namely, Laxmi Bai executed Ext.A2 sale deed dated 6-6-1981 assigning her own right as well as the rights of her 5 sisters acting as their power holder to plaintiff. The undivided half share of C. Mahamood is claimed by the defendant, his daughter on the basis of a gift deed said to have been executed by C. Mahamood. Plaintiff has instituted the suit claiming hal f share in the property on the basis of Ext. A2 sale deed. 4. All material allegation in the plaint are disputed and denied by the defendant. It was contended that plaintiff has not obtained any right, title or interest in the property in question based on Ext.A2 sale deed. The vendors who executed Ext. A2 sale deed arc not the legal representatives of deceased Ramakrishna Pai. Further it was contended that Ext.A2 is not line and genuine and is vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation. Defendant also contended that all the legal representatives of deceased Ramakrishna Pai have not joined in the execution of Ext.A2. A pica of adverse possession and limitation also was raised. A2 sale deed arc not the legal representatives of deceased Ramakrishna Pai. Further it was contended that Ext.A2 is not line and genuine and is vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation. Defendant also contended that all the legal representatives of deceased Ramakrishna Pai have not joined in the execution of Ext.A2. A pica of adverse possession and limitation also was raised. A further plea that defendant has got a right of pre-emption to purchase the half share belonging to Ramakrishna Pai on the basis of Ext.Bl agreement entered into between Ramakrishna Pai and C. Mahamood was also raised in the written statement. On the basis of the above contentions and others specifically raised in the written statement suit was resisted by the defendant. 5. In support of the title put forward, plaintiff produced the certified copy of sale deed executed in the name of Ramakrishna Pai and C. Mahamood. The sale deed executed in-favour of plaintiff by Laxnii Bai, one of the admitted daughters of Ramakrishna Pai, was also produced as Ext. A2. Ext. A3 is the power of attorney alleged to have been executed by the 5 daughters of Ramakrishna Pai in favour of Laxmi Bai who actually executed Ext.A2 on her own behalf as well as on behalf of her co-owners. Apart from plaintiff, P.W.2, son of one of the daughters of Ramakrishna Pai, was examined to prove that all the legal heirs of Ramakrishna Pai have executed Ext. A2 sale deed. On behalf of the defendant her husband was examined as D. W.1. 6. On a detailed consideration of the pleadings and evidence, the trial court rejected all the contentions of the defendant and decreed the suit. It was found that Laxmi Bai one of the legal heirs of Ramakrishna Pai was competent to execute Ext. A2 sale deed on behalf of the other co-owners also in view of Ext.A13 power of attorney alleged to have been executed by the other 5 co-owners. Ext. A2 sale deed was found to be a valid sale deed conveying half share-in the property to plaintiff. Plea of fraud and misrepresentation raised against the validity of Exi.A2 was also found against specifically. So also the plea of adverse possession and limitation. Ext. A2 sale deed was found to be a valid sale deed conveying half share-in the property to plaintiff. Plea of fraud and misrepresentation raised against the validity of Exi.A2 was also found against specifically. So also the plea of adverse possession and limitation. The learned judge found that even if there is any invalidity in the execution of Ext.A2 sale deed, Ext.A2 can be challenged only by the legal heirs of deceased Ramakrishna Pai and the defendant who has admittedly got only one half share in the property cannot challenge the validity of the sale deed so long as her half right in the property is admitted in the plaint itself. 7. In this appeal though the correctness of all the findings in the suit have been challenged, the learned counsel has only canvassed the correctness of a few of them. Thus the learned counsel very seriously challenged the correctness of the finding regarding the title of the plaintiff to claim half share in the property. However, it has to be pointed out that the challenge now raised against the finding was not on any of the grounds specifically raised in the written statement and argued before the court below or even on the basis of the grounds specifically raised in the original memorandum of appeal. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant has filed C.M.P.No.33160 of 1989 for allowing him to raise an additional ground in the memorandum of appeal which is to the following effect: "Trial Court ought to have held that Ext. A2 sale deed executed by Laxmi Bai in favour of the plaintiff in her individual capacity and as power of attorney of her 5 sisters on the basis of Ext.A13 power of attorney whether it is dated 25-1-1981 or 25-3-1981 is invalid and illegal since Ext.A13 is an unregistered power of attorney and that the plaintiff did not get any title to the alleged shares of the sisters of Laxmi Bai in plaint A schedule property under Ext. A2. Trial Court ought to have held that registered power of attorney is essential for a valid transfer of immovable property". As the ground sought to be raised mainly deals with a question of law, I have allowed the same after hearing the counsel on both sides. 8. A2. Trial Court ought to have held that registered power of attorney is essential for a valid transfer of immovable property". As the ground sought to be raised mainly deals with a question of law, I have allowed the same after hearing the counsel on both sides. 8. The learned counsel has argued that as per the recitals in Ext.A2, the power of attorney on the basis of which Ext.A2 is stated to have been executed is dated 25-1-1981 and the power of attorney actually produced, marked and relied upon in the case as authority for Laxmi Bai to execute Ext. A2, is Ext. A13 dated 25-3-1981. In the circumstances, it was contended that there is no evidence regarding the power of attorney referred to in Ext.A2 as the authority on the basis of which Laxmi Bai has executed Ext.A2 sale deed, on behalf of all her sisters and as such Ext.A2 cannot be accepted as a valid sale deed. The learned judge has proceeded on the basis that Ext. A13 is the power of attorney on the basis of which Ext. A2 sale deed was executed by Laxmi Bai. The learned judge has also noted the date of Ext. A13 as 25-3-1981 itself, though in the index the date of Ext. A13 has been noted as 25-1-1981. As already indicated it would appear that no contention was seriously raised against the validity of the sale deed on the basis of the difference in the date of power of attorney mentioned in Ext. A2 sale deed and that seen in Ext. A13. In fact it would appear that the parties have proceeded on the basis that Ext.A13 is the actual power of attorney referred to in Ext.A2 and relied upon as authority for executing Ext.A2. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that Ext.A13 is really the power of attorney on the strength of which Ext.A2 was executed and even if there was an earlier power of attorney Ext.A13 being a power of ' attorney of a later date would prevail over the earlier and the same being earlier to Ext.A2, must be considered as a valid and effective authority for Laxmi Bai to execute Ext.A2. Ext.A2 is a sale deed executed on 6-6-1981 long after Ext.A13 was executed in favour of Laxmi Bai by all other co-owners giving her full authority "to sell, convey, assign, execute, lease to mortgage immovable properties belonging to them", among various other powers specifically mentioned in Ext.A13. The learned counsel for the appellant has no case that Ext.A13 is invalid or that it docs not confer power on Laxmi Bai to execute sale deeds on behalf of her five sisters. In the light of the express power of sale conferred on Laxmi Bai as per Ext. A13 by all the vendors in Ext. A2 and Laxmi Bai has really purported to act upon a power of attorney given to her and has executed Ext.A2, sale deed on her behalf and on behalf of the executants of Ext. A13,1 am inclined to take the view that Ext.A13 can be treated as sufficient authority for Laxmi Bai to execute Ext.A2 sale deed even if there was any previous authority executed in her favour on 25-1-1981. The case of the plaintiff is that Ext. A13 is really the power of attorney and the date 25-1-1981 shown in Ext. A2 is only a mistake. Even if there was another power of attorney executed on25-1-1981 in the light of the recitals in Ext.A13 the power exercised by Laxmi Bai while executing Ext. A2 can reasonably be referred to the power conferred as per Ext.A13. In this view I find that the finding of the learned judge that Laxmi Bai was competent to execute Ext.A2 is justifiable and do not call for any interference. 9. The further contention raised as per the additional ground that Ext. A2 is invalid and ineffective as far as the rights of 5 sisters of Laxmi Bai is concerned since Ext. A13 is an unregistered power of attorney cannot also be upheld. Though such a contention was raised as per the additional ground, the learned counsel has fairly conceded that such a contention may not stand as there is no legal requirement that a power of attorney authorising sale of immovable property should be registered. 10. A13 is an unregistered power of attorney cannot also be upheld. Though such a contention was raised as per the additional ground, the learned counsel has fairly conceded that such a contention may not stand as there is no legal requirement that a power of attorney authorising sale of immovable property should be registered. 10. The learned counsel has then advanced a very ingenious argument that even accepting Ext.A13 as the real power of attorney still, so long as it is not a power of attorney executed before and authenticated by the concerned Registrar or Sub Registrar as required by S.33 of the Indian Registration Act (for short 'the act); Ext. A2is invalid in as much as registration of Ext.A2 was done in violation of the requirements of S.34 of the Act read along with S.33. According to the learned counsel the five sisters of Laxmi Bai the executants of Ext.A2 have never appeared before the Registrar for the purpose of admitting the execution of Ext. A2 either in person or through an agent having a properly authenticated power of attorney as required by S.33 of the Act. As such Ext. A2 cannot be treated as a properly registered sale deed. Registration in violation of the requirements of S.34 is invalid and inoperative. This contention raised for the first time during the arguments and permitted to be taken as it is a pure question of law requires a closer scrutiny with reference to Ss.32,33 and 34 of the Act. S.32 to 35 (both inclusive) contained in Chapter VI of the Act deal with the presentation of the documents for registration and appearance of parties before the concerned Registrar or Sub Registrar for admitting execution of the documents and the various other requirements to be complied with before the document is really registered, whether compulsorily registerable or not. S.32 provides that a document may be presented for registration by the person executing it or by' the person in whose favour it is executed or by the agent of such person duly authorised by the power of attorney. Section 33 of the Act T" ' specifically deals with the legal requirements to be satisfied by a power of attorney before it can be recognized as a proper authority for qualifying a person to present the document for registration. Section 33 of the Act T" ' specifically deals with the legal requirements to be satisfied by a power of attorney before it can be recognized as a proper authority for qualifying a person to present the document for registration. Presentation of a document by a person for registration who does not hold a power of attorney registered in the manner provided in S.33 of the Act is not proper presentation. and the registration done on the basis of such improper presentation becomes illegal and void. (See AIR 1961 Cal.540). Section 34 of the Act provides for a distinct requirement of law, namely, appearance of 'persons executing' the document before the Registrar or Sub Registrar for admitting execution of the document. It provides that no document shall be registered under the Act unless the person executing such document or their representatives assigns or agents authorised as aforesaid, appear before, the Registering Officer within the time allowed for presentation. Relying upon the words 'authorised as aforesaid' used in S.34 of the Act, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that when an agent appears and admits execution, the agent must have a power of attorney authenticated in accordance with the requirements of S.33 of the Act. In this case, Laxmi Bai who alone appeared before the Registering Officer as an agent of her five sisters was not having a power of attorney as required by S.33 of the Act and as such she was not a properly authorised agent who could have appeared and admitted execution of the document for the purposes of S.34 of the Act. As such the registration done on the basis of her admission is void in law. 11. This argument of the learned counsel also cannot be sustained. In this case it was Laxmi Bai who has actually signed the document as one of the executants and as the agent of the other five executants. Her appearance and admission before the Registrar of the execution of the document, in the circumstances, has to be treated as not as an agent but as the person who has actually executed the document on her behalf and on behalf of her five sisters as their agent. Her appearance and admission before the Registrar of the execution of the document, in the circumstances, has to be treated as not as an agent but as the person who has actually executed the document on her behalf and on behalf of her five sisters as their agent. When she is the person who has actually signed the document in her own capacity as well as in her capacity as the agent for the others she becomes a person 'executing the document' forthe purposes of S.34 of the Act and gets automatically full authority to appear and admit execution in her capacity as the person who has actually signed and thus executed the document. On a plain reading of Section itself it is clear that the word 'persons executing' in S.34 of the Act would certainly take in a person who actually signs the document. Privy Council has as early as in Puranchand v. Manmotho Nath (AIR 1928 P.C. 38) explained that the words'persons executing' include not only the person who actually executes or signs the document but any person who by valid execution enters into an obligation under the instrument. In Puran Chand's case (AIR 1928 P.C. 38) 'A' gave a power of attorney to' B' to execute a conveyance on his behalf and the conveyance was actually executed by 'B' on the basis of the power of attorney. 'A' then gave another power of attorney to 'C' to appear and admit execution before the Registering Officer and 'C' appeared and admitted execution. It was argued before their Lordships of the Privy Council that only 'B' the person whose hand had signed the conveyance could appear as one of the persons executing it so as to make the registration valid and that the appearance and admission by ' C' or even by 'A' himself would not suffice for a valid admission of execution of the conveyance before the Registering Officer. But this argument was not accepted and it was held that the registration was valid. In the course of the judgment Their Lordships said thus: "....The appellant contends that in these words executing means and means only * actually signing. Their Lordships cannot accept this. A document is executed when those who take benefits and obligations under it have put or have caused to be put their names to it. In the course of the judgment Their Lordships said thus: "....The appellant contends that in these words executing means and means only * actually signing. Their Lordships cannot accept this. A document is executed when those who take benefits and obligations under it have put or have caused to be put their names to it. Personal signature is not required, and another person, duly authorised, may, by writing the name of the party executing, bring about his valid execution, and put him under the obligations involved. Hence the words v person executing' in the Act cannot be read merely as x person signing'. They mean something more, namely, the person, who by a valid execution enters into obligation under the instrument. When the appearance referred to is for the purpose of admitting the execution already accomplished, there is nothing to prevent the executing person appearing either in person or by any authorized and competent attorney in order to make a valid admission. Their Lordships have failed to find in the scheme of the Act anything repugnant to this construction. Any other would involve risk of confusion and might even defeat the statutory procedure by multiplying the persons, who have to be traced and induced to attend, either by themselves or by some representative". The above discussion by Their Lordships of the Privy Council would clearly show that in any case the person whose hand had signed a document whether as a party or as an agent would definitely be a person entitled to appear before the Registering Officer and to admit the execution of the document on behalf of himself if he is also a party to the document in his personal capacity and also on behalf of all others whom he represented while signing the document and to get it registered. The decision reported in Gopeswar v. Hemachandra (57 Indian Cases 226) is a direct authority for the proposition that if a document is executed by one of two parties on behalf of himself and another it is sufficient that the party executing appears before the Registering Officer for the purpose of admitting the execution of the document by both. The decision reported in Gopeswar v. Hemachandra (57 Indian Cases 226) is a direct authority for the proposition that if a document is executed by one of two parties on behalf of himself and another it is sufficient that the party executing appears before the Registering Officer for the purpose of admitting the execution of the document by both. In this case admittedly Laxmi Bai has actually signed the document on her behalf and on behalf of all her sisters on the basis of the power of attorney and it is Laxmi Bai who appeared before the Registrar and admitted the execution of the document. When a person duly authorised to execute a document on behalf of a principal and who has actually signed and executed the document, appears and admits execution of the document he need not produce any further authority from that principal authorising him to appear and admit execution as provided in S.33 of the Act. Such an authority is necessary as per S.34 of the Act only when a person other than a party who actually signed the document is appointed specifically as an agent for the purpose of appearing and admitting execution of the document by the person who has actually executed the document. In the light of the principles discussed above, I do not find any merit in the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 12. The learned counsel has advanced a further contention that the right of the plaintiff, if any, is barred by adverse possession and limitation. In this connection it has to be noted that admittedly the property belonged originally to Ramakrishna Pai, the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff and the defendant's predecessor, C. Mahamood. Plaintiff has produced Exts.A14 and A15 to prove that defendant's predecessor was admittedly in possession for and on behalf of the other co-owner, Ramakrishna Pai and after his death on behalf of the widow and children of Ramakrishna Pai. Ext.A15 is a certified copy of the written statement filed by the defendant in O.S.No.147 of 1967, before the Munsiff's court, Kasaragod with reference to the plaint schedule property. In para. 10 of Ext. A15 defendant had clearly stated that the suit property was originally obtained by the defendant's father and Ramakrishna Pai and the defendant's father has- been in possession and enjoyment of the property on behalf of both of them. In para. 10 of Ext. A15 defendant had clearly stated that the suit property was originally obtained by the defendant's father and Ramakrishna Pai and the defendant's father has- been in possession and enjoyment of the property on behalf of both of them. Further the evidence tendered by the defendant himself as D.W.I would go to show that defendant was paying half share of income to the widow of deceased Ramakrishna Pai till her death. As against the above evidence what has been attempted to be proved is that the defendant was paying tax for the buildings situated in the land in the plaint schedule property as per Exts.B6 (a) to B6A(p) series of tax receipts. In the light of the admitted fact that the property originally belonged to the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff and defendant and in view of the evidence furnished by Exts.As14 and A15 documents, the payment of tax for the buildings alone cannot be accepted as sufficient evidence to uphold the contention of the-defendant that the plaintiff's right as a co-owner of the property has been lost by adverse possession and limitation. The learned judge has in detail discussed the entire aspects of the case with reference to the documents produced by the parties and relevant legal authorities on the point. In .these circumstances, I do not find any merit in the said contention also. 13. Lastly, the learned counsel argued that defendant has got a right of preemption in respect of the right of Ramakrishna Pai over the plaint schedule property. The contention is based upon certain recitals contained in Ext.Bl agreement entered into between Ramakrishna Pai and C.Mahamood. The relevant clause is to the effect that if both Ramakrishna Pai and C. Mahamood agreed to dispose of the property, the amount should be shared equally. If one of them dislikes to dispose of the property for the amount offered by the purchaser he can get release of the right of other who likes to dispose of the property by paying half of the amount offered by the purchaser. Further the clause provided that if both of them failed to comply with the above mentioned conditions the person who. disobeys the condition will be liable to pay the loss to the other. Further the clause provided that if both of them failed to comply with the above mentioned conditions the person who. disobeys the condition will be liable to pay the loss to the other. Considering the relevant stipulations contained in Ext.B 1 agreement, the learned judge has taken the view that the relevant clauses contained in Ext.B 1 agreements insufficient to constitute a right of pre-emption in favour of the defendant. On going through the provisions, I do not find any justification to dis-agree with the above view taken by the learned Judge. Taking into consideration the entire recitals contained in Ext.B 1 as a whole, it is difficult to find that the relevant provision was intended to create a right of pre-emption in favour of one or the other of the parties to the document so as to be binding on their legal representatives also. In the circumstances, I reject the said contention also. No other contentions were seriously pressed in the appeal and the appeal is dismissed as devoid of any merit, with costs.