M. R. MALLICK, J. ( 1 ) THE F. A. No. 33/90 arises out of the judgment and decree passed in Ejectment Suit No. 400/81 and F. A. No. 34/90 arises out of the judgment and decree passed in Ejectment Suit No. 399/81. Both the ejectment suits have been tried analogously by the Ld. Judge 2nd Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta and a common judgment dated 7th December, 1988 has been delivered having taken up the hearing of both the suits analogously as the plaintiff in both the suits were same and the defendants were the two different premises tenant in the same premises No. 100a, Serpentine Lane, Calcutta. In Ejectment Suit No. 400/81 the grounds for ejectment are- (1) the plaintiff requires the suit premises for reasonable requirement on rebuilding the premises, (2) the defendant was guilty of conduct, which was nuisance and annoyance, to the plaintiff and neighbours and (3) the defendant was guilty of act of, waste or negligence or default resulting in material deterioration of the condition of the premises and has, thus violated the provision of Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of section 1018 of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 2 ) IN Ejectment Suit No. 399/81 the same grounds for eviction were taken. In both the suits the plaintiff has alleged that each of the appellant was occupying one shop room specifically described in the plaint at a monthly rental from the time of his predecessors Smt. Sova Rani Ghosh and two others from whom he purchased the same by an Indenture of Conveyance dated 4. 5. 78. Notice of ejectment through the Advocate Shri Chandidas Roy Chowdhury dated 27. 12. 80 was served upon the defendant asking the defendant to quit and vacate the premises with the expiry of the last date, of March, 1981. Thereafter, as the defendant did not vacate in terms of the notice these two ejectment suits were filed. Both the defendants contested the suit denying all the material allegations in the plaint. The learned Trial Judge on considering the evidence adduced by the parties had held that the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for the purpose of building and rebuilding for his own use and occupation. Both the defendants contested the suit denying all the material allegations in the plaint. The learned Trial Judge on considering the evidence adduced by the parties had held that the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for the purpose of building and rebuilding for his own use and occupation. He also granted the decree against the defendant of the ejectment suit No. 400/81 under Clause (b) of section 13 (1)of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act on the ground that he was guilty of violation of Clause 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved the defendant of each of the above ejectment suits has preferred these two appeals. As the two suits have been disposed of by the same judgment, both the appeals have been taken up together for bearing analogously for reasons of convenience. ( 4 ) THE Ld. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved the defendant of each of the above ejectment suits has preferred these two appeals. As the two suits have been disposed of by the same judgment, both the appeals have been taken up together for bearing analogously for reasons of convenience. ( 4 ) THE Ld. Advocate appearing for the appellant in F. A. No. 33/90 urges as follows :- (1) that the ejectment suit is hit by sub-section (3a) of section 13 of the Premises Tenancy Act because the plaintiff-respondent being the transferee-landlord he cannot file a suit for ejectment within a period of three years from the date of purchase, that the notice of suit, is sine quo non to the filing of the said ejectment suit and the notice having been issued and served upon the defendant before the expiry of three years from the date of purchase, the suit is bad and is liable to be dismissed being hit by sub-section (3a) of section 13 ; (2) The ground for ejectment being both under Clauses (f) and (ff) of section 13 (1) of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act, the learned Trial Judge did not comply with the provision of section 18a of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act and that there was also no satisfactory evidence that the plan for the building and re-building had been applied for and sanctioned and that the plaintiff had adequate means to make the building and rebuilding ; and (3) The learned Trial Judge should not have granted the decree for ejectment under Clause (b) of section 13 (1) of the W,b. Premises Tenancy Act for the alleged violation of section 108 (p) of the Transfer of Property Act because the platform which has been made for running the Chakki is in existence for a pretty long time and there is no question of the premises being in any way damaged by such platform being raised and that the said platform has been raised long before the present respondent purchased the property. ( 5 ) THE appellant in F. A. No. 34/90 against whom the decree for ejectment has been passed has1reiterated the ground Nos. 1 and Z taken by the learned Advocate appearing for the F. A. No. 33/90. ( 6 ) BOTH the appeals have been contested by the respondent-landlord. ( 5 ) THE appellant in F. A. No. 34/90 against whom the decree for ejectment has been passed has1reiterated the ground Nos. 1 and Z taken by the learned Advocate appearing for the F. A. No. 33/90. ( 6 ) BOTH the appeals have been contested by the respondent-landlord. ( 7 ) THE first point which requires decision is whether the two ejectment suits are liable to be dismissed on the ground that the notices of ejectment in each of the two suits was sent to the appellants of these two appeals on 27. 12. 80, that is, prior to the expiry of three years of the date of sale of the plaintiff-respondent. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocates of both the appellants have strenuously urged before us that in order that the sub-section (3a) of section 13 of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act is to be given effect to transferee-landlord has to wait till the expiry of three years from the date of purchase to initiate any suit for eviction against the tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation or for building and rebuilding, that the notice u/s. 16 (6) of the Act is a must before a suit can be instituted before a Court of Law under the provision of W. B. Premises Tenancy Act and in order to give proper effect to sub-section (3a) of the Act the notice of ejectment by the transferee-landlord must have to be issued after the expiry of three years and when in these two cases the notices were admittedly issued prior to the expiry of three years from the date of purchase by the plaintiff- respondent then both the suits are hit by sub-section (3a) of section 13 and is liable to be dismissed. It is also urged that it is now clearly settled by two Division Bench Decision of this Court namely Sudha Mukherjee v. Shankar Chatterjee, AIR 1982 Cal 407 and Inder Sengupta v. Prova Rani Chak- raborty, AIR 1985 Cal 208 that d transferee-landlord even instituting a suit on other grounds cannot on the expiry of the three years of the purchase amend the plaint to add ground of reasonable requirement. It is, therefore, contended that the fact that the three years have already expired would not validate the notice of ejectment which was issued prior to the expiry of three, years of the purchase by the plaintiff/respondent. ( 9 ) WE find that in this particular case admittedly the notice of ejectment was issued and served prior to the expiry of three year's from the date of purchase of the plaintiff/respondent. Admittedly the plaintiff/respondent has acquired the premises in suit by purchase by virtue of a Deed of Conveyance dated 4. 5. 78. Admittedly, however, both the ejectment suits have been filed after the expiry of three years of the purchase. It is urged on behalf of the respondent that sub-section (3a) only places an embargo on the transferee-landlord to file a suit for ejectment before the expiry of three years from the date of purchase. There is nothing either in sub-section (3a) or in sub-section (6) of section 13 to suggest that the transferee-landlord has also the obligation to cause service of notice for ejectment after the, expiry of three years, that regard being had to the Plain language of the above provision the contention of the appellant cannot be accepted and neither in sub-section (3a) nor in sub-section (6) of section 13 such an embargo can be read which was conspicuous by absent. It is also submitted that when the plain language of sub-section (3a) is that a transferee-landlord cannot file a suit for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement prior to the expiry of the three years from the date of the purchase and when these two suits have admittedly been filed after the expiry of three years from the date of purchase then none of these suits is hit by sub-section (3a) of section 13. Sub-section (3a) of section 13 reads as follows :-" (3a) Where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (f) or clause (ff) of subsection (1) shall be instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest : provided that a suit for the recovery of the possession of the premises may be instituted on the ground mentioned in clause (f) of sub-section (1) before the expiration of the said period of three years if the Controller, on the application of the landlord and after giving the tenant an opportunity of being heard, permits by order, the institution of the suit on the ground that the building or re-building or the additions or alterations, as the case may be are necessary to make the premises safe for human habitation". ( 10 ) IT is clear from the above provision that sub-section (3a) puts a bar upon the landlord acquiring his interest in the premises by transfer not to file a suit for recovery of possession of the premises on any grounds mentioned in Clause (f) or Clause (fl) of subjection (1) before the expiration of period of three years from the date of acquisition of such interest. The plain language of sub-section (3a) is that "no suit. . . . . . . . shall be instituted by the landlord". If we have to go by the plain language of the statute it cannot be read in sub-section (3a) the further embargo that the notice of ejectment u/s 13 (6) cannot also be issued upon the tenant before the expiry of the period of three years, when the statute on its plain reading does not put such an embargo to a transferee-landlord. ( 11 ) MR. Shakti Nath Mukherjee appearing for the respondent has drawn my attention to Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. pages 64-65 where it has been clearly observed that if the words of statute are themselves precis and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense and the words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver. pages 64-65 where it has been clearly observed that if the words of statute are themselves precis and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense and the words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver. The similar observation is found in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes Page 143. In this particular case also the clear and unambiguous expression of the Legislature con- tained in sub-section (3a) is to prohibit only filing a suit for eviction on the ground of Clause (f) or Clause (ff) of section 13 (1) of the Act prior to the expiry of three years. However, the embargo is not an absolute one. The proviso gives the right to such transferee-landlord to approach the Rent Controller praying for permission to institute such suit on the ground of building and re-building and the Rent Controller after giving the tenant an opportunity of being heard can give such permission. ( 12 ) IN view of the above, there can be no bar for a transferee-owner to issue the notice of ejectment even prior to the expiry of three years which is admittedly a sine qua non to the filing of an ejectment suit under the Act and thereafter immediately after expiry of three years to file a suit for ejectment. If the transferee-landlord has to issue the notice of ejectment only on expiry of three years from the date of the purchase then he cannot exercise his right to file a suit for ejectment immediately on expiry of three years and he has to wait some time more to file a suit for ejectment because a tenant has to give a notice for a period of at least one month with the expiry of the, month of tenancy before an ejectment suit under the Act can be filed against the tenant. ( 13 ) IN view of the above, we are unable to accept the contention of the appellants that both the suits filed by the respondent are hit by sub-section (3a) of section 13. When in this case both the suits have been filed after the expiry of three years from the date of purchase by the plaintiff-respondent, the suits on the ground of reasonable requirement against the appellants are quite maintainable. When in this case both the suits have been filed after the expiry of three years from the date of purchase by the plaintiff-respondent, the suits on the ground of reasonable requirement against the appellants are quite maintainable. ( 14 ) THE second ground taken by the appellants against the decree for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement is that the Ld. Trial Judge has not taken into consideration the well-settled principles for a land- lord to prove before obtaining a decree for eviction on the ground of building and re-building under Clause (f) of section 13 (1) of the W. B. Premises Tenancy Act. It is contended that the respondent has failed to prove that any plan for the building has yet been sanctioned or that he has adequate means to rebuild or that he is in a position to comply with the provision of section 18a of the Act. Our attention has been drawn to the decision of the Division Bench of our High Court reported in Saroshi Bala Roy v. Monorama Roy 90 CHN 588 = (1986) 1 CHN 253 . It is observed in the above decision that there is definitely the need of a sanction plan because section 13 (1) (f) is subject to section 18a of the, Act and the requirement for building and re-building should further show that after reconstruction the premises would afford reasonable facilities to the tenant to be restored to occupation back. It is, therefore, pointed out to that in view of this clear view of our Division Bench of our high Court the landlord in order to obtain a decree for ejectment on the ground of building and rebuilding has to produce before the Court a sanction plan in which there must be sufficient indication that after such building and re-building the evicted tenant could be restored back to possession in. compliance with the provision of section 18a of the Act. compliance with the provision of section 18a of the Act. It is consequently urged that when the plaintiff has only proved that a plan has been submitted with the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and there is no knowing as to whether the said plan would be sanctioned and when in such plan there, is no such proposal for restoration of the possession of the tenant sought to be evicted by these ejectment suit and when the landlord has also failed to prove his adequate means to support such story of building and re-building according to the plan submitted then the Ld. Trial Judge committed grave error in granting an eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for the purpose of building and re-building. ( 15 ) ON behalf of the respondent the above contention has been seriously refuted. Trial Judge committed grave error in granting an eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for the purpose of building and re-building. ( 15 ) ON behalf of the respondent the above contention has been seriously refuted. It is submitted that the requirement of the, plaintiff is not for building or re-building alone on the ground that the building having become dilapidated requires re-building, that the plaintiff has alleged and proved that he reasonably requires the premises for his own use and occupation and for the purposes of the members of their family both residential and business and to satisfy such need for personal occupation the landlord intends to re-build the suit premises so that he can, suitably use the said premises for his own use and occupation, that the combination of the ground for reasonable re- quirement for own use and occupation and for building and rebuilding can be made and when the respondent has clearly proved before the Trial Court that he reasonably requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation and that he did not have any other reasonable suitable accommodation elsewhere to satisfy his need then the ground for eviction not being alone under Clause (f) of section 13 (1) of the Act, the conditions for proving the sanction plan or means or the condition to comply with the section SA of Act is not necessary because on such re-building he has to use the premises for his own use and occupation and there is no scope for providing any occupation to the evicted tenants and that the plaintiff's requirement under Clause (ff) of section 13 (1) having adequately established before the Trial Court, the ejectment decrees passed against both the appellants for reasonable requirement for use and occupation and for building and re-building should not be disturbed. ( 16 ) WE find that in Krishnadas v. Bidhan Chandra Roy, 63 Calwn 29 the Division Bench of our High Court while considering a similar relief for eviction under 1950 Act that the plaintiff requires the premises for his own occupation by building and re-building thereon has held that the two classes of requirements were contemplated-one for building and re-building and the other for the landlord's own occupation and that there is nothing in the Act that the two classes of requirements could not be amalgamated. The Supreme Court in Ramniklal v. Indra Daman, AIR 1964 SC 1676 has also approved the above Division Bench decision of our High Court by holding that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation, he is entitled to recovery of possession irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the premises without making any altera- tion to them or after making the necessary alteration. The similar view has also been expressed of our High Court in Sukumar v. Naresh, AIR 1968 Cal 49 , Shankar v. Anukul, 71 Calwn 174 and Jogesh v. Kiranbala, AIR 1977 Cal 167 . In K. L. Banerjee v. Rajia Begum 90 Calwn 39 a Ld. Single Judge of our High court relying on the above decisions have held that when the ground for eviction for reasonable requirement for own use and occupation is proved then a suit for eviction cannot be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to produce the sanction plan or that he had adequate means even if for such own occupation the premises requires reconstruction. ( 17 ) ON considering all the decisions cited before us, we are of the view that in this case the plaintiff has proved before the Ld. Trial Judge satisfactorily and which has also not been seriously disputed by the present appellants that the plaintiff-respondent is occupying a rented premises which is completely inadequate for his need of occupation for self and for the members of his family. The report of the local inspection Commissioner who has measured the tenanted premises of the respondent also supports that the existing occupation of the respondent/landlord in his tenanted premises is absolutely inadequate to satisfy the respondent's need for requirement for self and for the members of his family. ( 18 ) THE two suit premises are admitted shop rooms and in order to satisfy the need of the landlord for his own use and occupation they have to be re-built to convert it in residential premises. ( 18 ) THE two suit premises are admitted shop rooms and in order to satisfy the need of the landlord for his own use and occupation they have to be re-built to convert it in residential premises. The respondent-landlord has in his evidence clearly indicated that he has submitted a plan which is for consideration of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation that even though the plan is for four-storeyed building, he now intends to build the five rooms in the ground floor according to the said plan and that he will be able to procure sufficient funds to do that. ( 19 ) THERE is no satisfactory evidence adduced on the side of the appellant to challenge the above statement of the respondent-landlord. If the landlord on obtaining the decree for eviction does not re-build the structures and use the premises for his own use and occupation but re-lets to some other person then he violates the provision of the Act and he has to restore back to possession of the premises to the tenant. Therefore, on getting the decree for eviction for his own use and occupation he has to occupy it and if necessary by building and re-building. When there was sufficient evidence that the landlord had proved reasonable requirement for his personal occupation of the premises for self and for the members of his family and that he did not have any other reasonable suitable accommodation to satisfy such need then only because the plan had not been sanctioned or that he had not clearly established the requirement of the fund for re-building the premises for his own use, and occupation then the ground for eviction being primarily for own use and occupation and for the purpose of own use and occupation to re-build the premises according to his choice to satisfy such need then the suits for such a landlord cannot be dismissed only on the ground that he has not procured a sanction plan or that he had not satisfied the requirement- of section 18a of the Act when the decree is sought for, for reasonable requirement for own use and occupation even if such requirement has to be satisfied by building and re-building, there is no obligation for such landlord to comply with section 18a of the Act. Section 18a of the Act has only to be complied when the suit for ejectment is only on the ground of Clause (f) of section 13 (1) of the Act. The case of Saroshibala Roy v. Monorama Roy (supra) was a case in which the landlord sought for eviction only on the ground of Clause (f) of section 13 (1 ). Therefore, principles laid down in the above decision of the Division Bench cannot be attracted in the facts of the present case. ( 20 ) IN the result we are unable to hold that the Ld. Trial Judge committed an illegality in granting a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of landlord for his use and occupation and for that purpose the building and re-building the same and there was no illegality in amalgamating these two purposes in these two suits for eviction. ( 21 ) THE appellant in F. A. No. 33/90 has also challenged the ground for eviction passed against him on the ground that he had raised a permanent Structures in the premises and has, thus, violated the Clause (p) of section 13 (1) of the Act. ( 22 ) IT is not alleged in the plaint of the Ejectment Suit No. 400/81 that the appellant-tenant had raised a platform as a construction of permanent nature without the consent of the landlord. In the plaint it was only alleged that he was guilty of the act of waste or negligence or default resulting in material deterioration of the condition of the premises. In the evidence also the respondent-landlord has not made any whisper that a pucca construction by way of platform have been erected by the tenant, Bindeshwari Prasad Gupta with out the written consent of the landlord. Therefore, no case was made out by the plaintiff that the defendant-appellant made any permanent construction of the platform without the consent of the landlord. The only allegation against him that he had caused damage to the premises by running the wheat grinding machine. The Commissioner found a platform on which the wheat grinding machine was found installed. Bindeshwari Prasad in his cross-exa- mination has stated that he had erected the said platform to fix his wheat grinding machine and for that he did not take any consent of the landlord. The Commissioner found a platform on which the wheat grinding machine was found installed. Bindeshwari Prasad in his cross-exa- mination has stated that he had erected the said platform to fix his wheat grinding machine and for that he did not take any consent of the landlord. ( 23 ) ONLY on the basis of such admission of the tenant the Ld. Trial Judge appears to have granted the decree on the ground that the tenant has violated the provision of Clause (p) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. But when that was not the case of the appellant and when no such ground was specifically taken we are of the view that when such construction was there for a pretty long time and from before the present respondent became the owner of the property then the original landlords were fully aware that the said wheat grinding machine was there on a permanent platform which was necessary for running such machine, then the original owners must have acquiesced to such permanent platform made. Therefore, when no such case was made out by the transferee-landlord then only because the tenant in his cross-examination admitted that he did not take any Permission from the landlord before making such cement concrete platform in taking tenancy in 1966. The ejectment decree on the above ground ought not to have been made. Therefore, the decree for eviction on the ground that the appellant, Bindeshwari Prasad Gupta violated Clause (p) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be affirmed. ( 24 ) HOWEVER, as the decree has been passed against him also on the ground of reasonable requirement of the, landlord for his own use and occupation and for building and re-building of the premises then the decree for eviction against him has also to be confirmed. ( 25 ) IN the result both the appeals fail and are dismissed on contest with costs. The appellants are given two months time to vacate the premises failing which the decree shall be executable. M. N. Roy, I. , I agree. Appeal dismissed.