K. L. ISSRANI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition against the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Katni, in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 130 of 1991 (Rewachand son of Sadrangmal v. Rewachand son of Udharam Sindhi), passed on 11-12-1991, by which proceedings under S. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were started and after passing a preliminary order of attachment, the case is fixed for evidence of the parties. Without filing criminal revision before the Sessions Court it has been filed before this Court. ( 2 ) ADMITTEDLY, the shop in dispute belongs to the Municipal Corporation, Katni and the non-applicant No. 2 Rewachand son of Sadrangmal is the lessee of the Municipal Corporation, Katni. On 8-11-1985, one Mohandas son of Shri Meghraj, Rewachand son of Sadrangmal and Rewachand Lohani (the applicant) executed a deed of partnership, which was for a fixed period of five years. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, it is alleged by the applicant that on 22-11-1985, the non-applicant No. 2 delivered the possession of the disputed shop to the applicant on tenancy basis on a rent of Rs. 750/- per month. Since then he is in peaceful possession of the shop known as Barrack No. 78. It is further submitted that on 24-11-1985, the applicant entered into a partnership agreement separately with one Mohandas and partnership concern named and styled as M/s Shree Narayan Tel Bhandar, Katni. Thereafter, the applicant and Mohandas, both, were in possession of the suit shop under their own partnership agreement between them. They used to pay the taxes. According to the agreement between them, this partnership firm was dissolved on 1-4-1989. The applicant used to pay monthly rent of Rs. 750/- regularly to the non-applicant No. 2 but since the non-applicant No. 2 wanted to get the shop vacated, he filed an application under S. 145, Cr. P. C. on 23-1-1991. On 25-1-1991, the disputed shop was attached under S. 146, Cr. P. C. The applicant challenged this order before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Katni, which was registered as Criminal Revision No. 5 of 1991. The learned Additional Session Judge, Katni, on 8-2-1991, set aside the attachment order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Katni, dated 25-1-1991 and remanded the case back to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Katni, to decide it afresh according to law. The learned Additional Session Judge, Katni, on 8-2-1991, set aside the attachment order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Katni, dated 25-1-1991 and remanded the case back to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Katni, to decide it afresh according to law. Thereafter, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Katni, on 11-2-1991, passed a preliminary order under S. 145 (1), Cr. P. C. and the property has been attached under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. by order dated 11-2-1991, which is the impugned order under challenge before this Court. ( 4 ) THE submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that now since a civil suit for injunction has already been filed along with an application for temporary injunction by the applicant against the non-applicant No. 2 and the matter is seized by the Civil Court, the criminal Court has no jurisdiction. The police of Katni, on the strength of the impugned order dated 11-2-1991, has not only attached the shop but also seized the cash amount of Rs. 58,636/- from the counter and also a stock worth Rs. 1,02,163/- and so also furniture worth Rs. 8845/- which are not immovable property and hence not liable to be attached under the provisions of S. 145, Cr. P. C. The applicant has prayed for setting aside the impugned order and the proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The counsel for the applicant has relied on the principles laid down in Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U. P. , AIR 1985 Supreme Court 472 : (1985) Cri LJ 752. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 2 has vehemently opposed the contentions of the counsel for the applicant. He has supported the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. According to him, the partnership deed dated 8-11-1985 was executed for a fixed period of five years between Mahandas son Meghraj, the present applicant and the non-applicant No. 2, which period expired by efflux of time in November, 1990. Thereafter, there was a settlement between the parties. On 20-1-1991, the applicant entered into an agreement with the non-applicant No. 2, whereby the applicant had shifted his stock and the non-applicant No. 2 came into exclusive possession of the shop premises of the place of business with all fittings and furniture. Thereafter, there was a settlement between the parties. On 20-1-1991, the applicant entered into an agreement with the non-applicant No. 2, whereby the applicant had shifted his stock and the non-applicant No. 2 came into exclusive possession of the shop premises of the place of business with all fittings and furniture. As such, on 20-1-1991, it was the non-applicant No. 2 alone, who was in exclusive actual physical possession of the suit shop but it was on 21-1-1991 that the applicant tried to dispossess the non-applicant No. 2. Therefore, a report in the police to that effect was lodged. On 23-1-1991, an application under S. 145, Cr. P. C. was filed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Katni, on which the order of attachment was passed on 25-1-1991. It is only after the order was passed that the applicant had filed a civil suit. The applicant had also filed a revision against the order dated 25-1-1991, which was allowed on 8-2-1991 and the matter was remanded back to the Court of S. D. M. Katni to decide the matter according to law and for passing a fresh order. The fresh order dated 11-2-1991 is a composite order under Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. which is passed after hearing both the parties. It is thus conclusive and final till the matter is decided by the Civil Court. In the Civil Court, the applicant never tried to thrash any ground for ex parte temporary injunction etc. According to him the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Katni, under Ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), Cr. P. C. are correct and call for no interference in criminal revision before this Court. Learned counsel for the applicant has relied on Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 960 : (1959 Cri LJ 1223) Jhunamal v. State of M. P. , AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1973 : (1989 Cri. LJ 82) and Ram Kunwar v. Ramswaroop, (1986) 1 MPWN 118. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant has admitted execution of the partnership deed dated 8-11-1985 between Mohandas, applicant and the non-applicant No. 2 but submits that it was never acted upon. He also does not dispute the execution of the documents of the final settlement and agreement dated 20-1-1991 arrived at between the parties but stated that it was obtained by fraud or coercion. He also does not dispute the execution of the documents of the final settlement and agreement dated 20-1-1991 arrived at between the parties but stated that it was obtained by fraud or coercion. The originals of these two documents are also shown by the non-applicant No. 2 for perusal of this Court. Signatures thereon are admitted except the above pleas of the applicant. The applicant has nowhere challenged the execution of the annexure R-2 on the basis of fraud and coercion. He has not made any report to the police to that effect. In his civil suit for permanent injunction also, he had not challenged the same by stating that the deed was obtained by fraud and coercion. He has also not stated in the plaint (Annexure R-5) that the documenti. e the partnership deed (agreement) between Mohandas, himself and the non-applicant No. 2 on 8-11-1985 was neither executed nor acted upon. In para 4 of the above Annexure R-5, he only states that from 22-11-1985, the plaintiff and Mohandas started their whole-sale business in partnership. The applicant has nowhere stated or argued that now there is no apprehension of breach of peace. In such a case, it is to be seen whether the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Katni, was within the jurisdiction to continue the proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. or they stand terminated by filing of the Civil suit by the applicant against whom the order was passed after hearing both the parties. Proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. are started under emergency and in case of breach of peace amongst the parties. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate has not to see and undergo a question of title of the parties but has only to see and undergo a question of title to who was in actual physical possession of the disputed shop on 20-1-1991 or on the date of passing of the preliminary order. From the final settlement deed of agreement dated 20-1-1991, as it stands today, it is very much clear that one Mohandas, the applicant and the non-applicant No. 2 had earlier on 8-11-1985 entered into a partnership deed for a fixed period of five years, which period expired on 7-11-1990 and on that date, the applicant had shifted his stock and the non-applicant No. 2 came into exclusive possession of the suit premises and the place of business along with fittings and furnitures. On the police report, the application under S. 145, Cr. P. C. and other material on record, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate came to the conclusion that there is an apprehension of breach of peace in the dispute of possession over the disputed shop. He, therefore, had the jurisdiction to entertain and pass a preliminary order and an order for attachment. ( 7 ) REGARDING the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the criminal Court under S. 145, Cr. P. C. has no jurisdiction to attach the movable property and the order on this count is also bad, the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant has also no force. No doubt, the magistrate acting under S. 145, Cr. P. C. has no jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment specifically with respect to movable property but where an order is passed in respect of immovable property, which may incidentally include movable property, which is either pertaining to or lying in the immovable property, the order cannot be said to be suffering from any such infirmity. I am fortified with the view taken in Sidiq Khan v. Ghulam Qudir Khan, AIR 1963 J and K 2 : (1963 (1) Cri LJ 52 ). ( 8 ) NOW the only question remains to be answered is whether after filing of the civil suit by the applicant after the order dated 25-1-1991 was passed by the magistrate under Sections 145 and 146, Cr. P. C. the jurisdiction still remains with him to decide the application under S. 145, Cr. P. C. In this case, the applicant has not yet been able to seek an order from the Civil Court. He had also not stated that now there remains no apprehension of breach of peace between the parties. However, the applicant is free to move the magistrate showing such circumstances; and the magistrate will be free to consider either to drop the proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. or not. However, his order under S. 146, Cr. P. C. attaching the property will continue till the matter is finally decided by the Civil Court, as held in Ram Kunwar's case (1986 (1) MPWN 118) (supra ). ( 9 ) THUS there is no merit in the present revision petition and it is, therefore, dismissed. Petition dismissed. .