JUDGMENT 1. - These six Special Appeals have been filed against the order dated August 22, 1990, passed by the learned Single Judge, by which, respondents Ramkishore Sharma & Ashok Kumar Saxena have been held to be regular employees of the Rajasthan Scheduled Caste Development Co-operative Corporation Ltd. (for brevity, 'Development Corporation') and their termination orders have been set aside. The termination order of respondent Vinay Kumar Audichya has also been set aside and a direction has been given to give him an opportunity to appear in the Efficiency Test. All these special appeals are disposed of by this single order, since common question has been raised. The Nos. of Anxs. mentioned hereunder have been mentioned as given in the writ petition filed by respondent Ram Kishore. 2. It may be briefly stated that respondents Ashok Kumar, Ramkishore Sharma & Vinay Kumar were appointed as LDCs. temporarily on ad-hoc basis by the Development Corporation vide order dated May 31, 1985 (Anx.1). The term of appointment of each of the above named respondents was extended from time to time. By order dated August 31, 1985 (Anx. 3), the respondents were called upon to give option either to appear in Type Test or in Efficiency Test. Respondents Ramkishore and Ashok Kumar gave option to a pear in Type Test, whereas, respondent - Vinay Kumar gave option to appear in Efficiency Test. However, admittedly, no Efficiency Test was held by the appellant. The above-mentioned two respondents, who gave option to appear in Type Test, were called upon to appear in the same vide order dated December 5, 1985 (Anx.4), in which it was clearly stated that services of both these respondents shall not be regularised, unless they pass the Type Test. Both of them appeared in the Type Test and passed the same. Thereafter, an order dated February 13, 1986 (Anx.5) was issued, wherein it was mentioned that English type speed of respondent Ramkishore Sharma was found to be satisfactory and he was declared to have passed the said type test. However, in the case of respondent Ashok Kumar, no specific order was issued, but perusal of Anx. Thereafter, an order dated February 13, 1986 (Anx.5) was issued, wherein it was mentioned that English type speed of respondent Ramkishore Sharma was found to be satisfactory and he was declared to have passed the said type test. However, in the case of respondent Ashok Kumar, no specific order was issued, but perusal of Anx. 5 in his writ petition shows that the person, who was deputed to hold the type test, reported that he has passed Hindi type test, since his speed was found to be 27.7 words per minute, whereas in the order of Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan, speed of 20 wpm is required. It may also be mentioned that when the above-mentioned three respondents were appointed as LDCs. On temporary ad-hoc basis, it seems that there were no Service Rules in the Development Corporation, which may govern the conditions of service. However, vide order dated June 4, 1987 (Anx. 4), in Writ Petition No. 5177/89, the Probation period of all the three respondents was ex,tended for a period of two months. Thereafter, all the three respondents were discharged from service by the Development Corporation by separate but similar order passed on July 31, 1987 (Anx. 6) in Writ Petition No. 2436/89, with immediate effect. It was mentioned in the said order that the respondents were dis,charged from service, keeping in view the proviso to (1) (d) of the Explanation appended to Rule 28 (A) and Rule 29 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Officers Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957. This order was challenged by each of the respondents by filing three separate writ petitions in this Court, bearing DBCWP Nos. 1927/87, 1946/87 and 1947/87. A Division Bench of this Court set aside the order (Anx. 6) and the respondents continued to be in service. The aforesaid three writ petitions were allowed primarily on the ground that the discharge of the respondents was in contravention of the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, (for short, 'the ID Act'), 1947. It was, however, clarified in the said order that the respondent-appellants will be at liberty to terminate the services of the petitioner-respondents, after making compliance of the provisions of the ID Act and any other relevant law having bearing on the same. Thereafter, vide separate orders dated June 22, 1989 (Anx. It was, however, clarified in the said order that the respondent-appellants will be at liberty to terminate the services of the petitioner-respondents, after making compliance of the provisions of the ID Act and any other relevant law having bearing on the same. Thereafter, vide separate orders dated June 22, 1989 (Anx. 15), services of each of the respondents were terminated, after complying with the provisions of Section 25 of the ID Act. It may further be mentioned that during the pendency of the earlier writ petitions filed by the respondents before the Division Bench of this Court, it seems that the services of each of the respondents were transferred to respondent No. 2 Rajasthan Handloom Development Corporation (for brevity, 'Handloom Corporation'), because some centres, which were earlier under the Development Corporation, were transferred to the Handloom Corporation and a decision for transfer of the staff was also taken. When the impugned order discharging each of the respondents from service was passed, they were working in the Handloom Corporation. 3. It is submitted by Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the appellant-Development Corporation, that it is clear from the order dated February 6, 1989 (Anx.6), by which, the earlier writ petitions filed by the respondents were allowed, that the appointment was held to be on temporary & ad-hoc basis and liberty was given to the Development Corporation to terminate their services as per provisions of Section 25F of the Act and other relevant law. Thus, it is evident that contentions raised by the respondent-petitioners in their earlier writ petitions regarding the regularisation of their services did not find favour with this Court and this controversy, therefore, could not be re-agitated in the present petitions. This aspect of the matter could not be considered by the learned Single Judge and the principle of res-judicata/constructive res-judicata applies with full force. It is further submitted that the respondent- petitioner had raised two grounds in the earlier writ petitions that they are permanent and alternatively, it was also submitted that provisions of Section 25-F of the ID Act had not been complied with. It is further submitted that the respondent- petitioner had raised two grounds in the earlier writ petitions that they are permanent and alternatively, it was also submitted that provisions of Section 25-F of the ID Act had not been complied with. Reference was made to Direct Recruit Class II 'Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 , in which, while discussing the principles of constructive res-judicata, it was held by the Apex Court that where High Court dismisses a writ petition on merits, a subsequent writ petition in Supreme Court on the same facts and for the same reliefs by the same parties would be barred. It was further stated that a judgement of High Court under Article 226 passed after hearing on merits must, therefore, bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided in the Constitution and cannot be permitted to circumvent by a petition under Article 32. 4. It is submitted by Mr. K.K. Sharma and Mr. Virendra Lodha, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioners that, admittedly, several pleas were raised in the earlier writ petitions, but the petitions were disposed of only on one of the grounds raised regarding ignoring the provisions of Section 25F of the ID Act. It is pointed out that no-where in the order dated February 6, 1989 (Anx. 14), a finding has been given to the effect whether the services of the respondent-petitioners were permanent or temporary. Since no finding on this aspect of the matter was given, therefore, principles of res judicata or for that matter, even constructive res judicata cannot be made applicable. It is also contended that provisions of Section 25-F apply not only to temporary, but even to permanent employees. 5. It will be necessary to refer to definition of workman as given in Section 2(s) of the ID Act to decide the controversy whether the provisions of Section 25-F are applicable to only temporary employees. Section 2(s), inter alia, provides that "workman" means any persons (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward and includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched. Chapter V-A of the ID Act deals with lay-off and retrenchment. Section 2(s), inter alia, provides that "workman" means any persons (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward and includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched. Chapter V-A of the ID Act deals with lay-off and retrenchment. Section 25 lays down the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen, who have been in continuous service for not less than one year. Thus, it is evident that Section 25F will be applicable to all such persons, who come within the definition of "workman" as defined in Section 2(s) mentioned above. There is no mention in Section 25-F that it shall be applicable to temporary or permanent workmen/employees. This Section will apply to all workmen, irrespective of their being temporary or permanent in their job.In Chief Engineer (Irrigation), Chepauk and another v. N. Natesan, 1973 (2) LLJ 446 , a Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed that the ID Act does not appear to make a distinction, especially Section 25F, between a permanent workman and a temporary workman for purposes of retrenchment compensation. It was held that awarding a temporary workman retrenchment compensation in addition to a month's notice or one month's wages in lieu of notice is correct. In Hutchian v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation 1983 (2) LLJ 446 , a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, while considering the provisions of Section 2(oo), 2 (s) and 25-F, held that the definition of the word "workman" given in Section 2(s), without causing the least violence to the language used, is susceptible of only one meaning that every person employed in an industry irrespective of his status-temporary, permanent or probationary would be a workman and before discharging them from service, the condition precedent prescribed in section 25F should have been complied with. Therefore, it cannot be said that merely because the Division Bench of this Court in its decision dated February 6, 1989 (Anx.I4) directed that the respondent petitioners could not have been terminated, without observing the provisions of Section 25F of the Act, a finding was given that the respondent-petitioners were holding a temporary/ad hoc appointment. We have carefully gone through this order and we do not find any such finding in the same. We have carefully gone through this order and we do not find any such finding in the same. Merely because it was clarified in the said order that the appellants will be at liberty to terminate the services of the petitioners, after complying with the provisions of the ID Act and any other relevant law, having bearing, does not mean that the respondent-petitioners were held to be in temporary/ad-hoc employment. Therefore, evidently, the principles of res judicata or for that matter, constructive res judicata cannot be made applicable, since there was no finding as asserted by the lean-red counsel for the appellants. When writ petition is filed on more than one grounds and a particular ground is not specifically decided in the same, it cannot be said that the Court had applied its mind to that particular ground. The principles of res judicata, therefore, cannot be applied in subsequent proceedings on the plea that the decision of that ground was implicit in another question, which was actually decided in the writ petition. In Narain Dass and others v. The Improvement Trust, Amritsar and another AIR 1972 SC 865 , while considering the applicability of the principles of res judicata in proceedings under Article 226, it was held by the Apex Court that when in previous writ proceedings by a petition against the failure of the Government to exempt the orchard land of the petitioner from acquisition under the Scheme framed under Punjab Town Improvement Act the High Court merely directed giving of full opportunity of hearing regarding his case of exemption but did not decide any controversial point, such a decision would not be binding on the parties in subsequent writ petition by the same petitioner against the rejection of his application under Section 56 of the Act. The same view was taken by a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Union of India v. Sharmanand Ramlal 1972 Lab. I.C 791 .It was also urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that when the writ petition is dismissed on one of the grounds, the respondent-petitioners could have gone in appeal against the decision on the same ground, but since no appeal was filed by the petitioner-respondents against the order dated February 6, 1989 (Anx. 14), they are barred from raising this ground in a subsequent writ petition filed by them. 14), they are barred from raising this ground in a subsequent writ petition filed by them. We have already discussed in detail that no finding was given vide order Anx. 14, regarding petitioner-respondents being in permanent employment. Therefore, it cannot be said that this ground urged by the petitioner-respondents in their earlier writ petitions was considered and rejected so as to entitle them or give them an opportunity to go in appeal against the same. There,fore, evidently, principles of res judicata or for that matter, constructive res judicata cannot be made applicable to the writ petitions filed by the respondents. 6. It is further urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Type Test was taken from respondents Ashok Kumar & Ramkishore only to continue them in temporary/ad-hoc appointment. It is pointed out that it is clearly mentioned in the order dated May 31, 1985 (Anx.l ), by which, all the three petitioner-respondents were appointed temporarily on as-hod basis, that they will be required to clear either Type Test or Efficiency Test to be conducted by the Development Corporation, failing which, their temporary services were liable to be terminated, without formal notice, at the end of the period. Thereafter, respondent Ramkishore was declared to have passed his Type Test in English vide order dated February 13, 1986 (Anx.5). So far as respondent - Ashok Kumar is concerned, he appeared in the Type Test in Hindi, but his result was not declared, as is evident from Anx. 5 in his petition. Therefore, these tests were evidently taken for continuing them in employment on ad-hoc basis. Sofar as Vinay Kumar respondent is concerned, no Efficiency Test was held and direction of the learned Single Judge to hold such a test and if he passes out, to confirm him in the employment on permanent basis, is not accordance with law, since even if he passes out the Efficiency Test, that has to be held only for his continuing in temporary employment. It is also submitted that the Board of Directors of the Development Corporation took a decision in its meeting dated July 7, 1987, by which, the procedure for direct recruitment was laid down. The selection was to be made from the eligible candidates on the basis of written test followed by interview or practical test, as may be necessary. It is also submitted that the Board of Directors of the Development Corporation took a decision in its meeting dated July 7, 1987, by which, the procedure for direct recruitment was laid down. The selection was to be made from the eligible candidates on the basis of written test followed by interview or practical test, as may be necessary. It is pointed out that none of the respondent-petitioners appeared when the test for direct recruitment was held. Therefore, they are not entitled to be retained in service. 7. It may be pointed out that in office order dated July 31, 1987 (Anx.7), it was mentioned that the respondent- petitioners are discharged from service in view of Rule 29 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Officers Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957 (for short, "the Rules, 1957"). It is pointed out by the learned counsel that this has been wrongly mentioned and these Rules are not applicable to the respondent-petitioners. It is evident that the initial appointment of the respondent-petitioners was not in accordance with the Rules, 1957, but, since no Rules were framed by the Development Corporation, the Appointing Authority was well within its rights to have placed any of the employees on Probation, even if they were in the beginning appointed on temporary/ad-hoc basis. The office order dated June 4, 1987 (Anx. 4) in writ petition No. 5176/89, shows that the period of Probation of all the three respondent- petitioners was extended upto 31.5.89. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that this was done inadvertently, has no meaning, since the order itself speaks and has been issued under the signature of the General Manager. Apart from this, in the office order dated December 5, 1985 (Anx.4), it is clearly mentioned that the services of the respondent- petitioners Ashok Kumar & Ramkishore shall be regularised only after they pass the type test. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that this was also inadvertently mentioned and this type test was held only for approving them on temporary/ad-hoc appointment. We do not find any force in this contention when it is clearly mentioned that in Anx. 4 that their services shall be regularised only when they pass out the type test. The employee is placed on Probation only when he is to be confirmed, after the completion of period of Probation. We do not find any force in this contention when it is clearly mentioned that in Anx. 4 that their services shall be regularised only when they pass out the type test. The employee is placed on Probation only when he is to be confirmed, after the completion of period of Probation. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that regular tests for selection were held twice, but only Ramkishore petitioner appeared and he was declared fail. The other two petitioners did not even appear, therefore, are now not entitled to be retained in the service. It may be pointed out that from Rule 25 and sub-rules (6) & (7), it is clear that even when persons, who were appointed in the year, 1985, as LDCs. under the orders of the Government from time to time, but they appeared in the examination held by the RPSC for recruitment and passed in the said examination, they will be regularised. Ramkishore petitioner, admittedly, passed the examination of RPSC and was appointed in the year, 1985 and continued to remain on this post. Thus, there is no reason why he should not have been treated as having being regularly appointed. Apart from this, as mentioned in para 14 of writ petition No. 2436/89, father of the petitioner Ramkishore requested the Managing Director Shri Shyam S. Agrawal to permanently absorb the petitioner in the service of Handloom Corporation and he was assured that if the petitioner submits an application and appears in the test to be held for recruitment, he shall be absorbed. Therefore, acting on this assurance, he appeared in the test, but was declared failed. Admittedly, even according to the Resolution/Rules framed by the Hand loom Corporation, no advertisement was issued in any newspaper, regarding the recruitment. despondent Vinay Kumar was transferred to Bhilwara and respondent Ashok Kumar to Churu, therefore, they could not come to know about the said recruitment, even though, the notice of recruitment is said to have been affixed on the Notice Board in the Head Office at Jaipur. Since the petitioner Ramkishore was posted at Jaipur, he came to know about the said recruitment and appeared in the same. Since the petitioner Ramkishore was posted at Jaipur, he came to know about the said recruitment and appeared in the same. The applications were also not called from the Employment Exchange, even though, it would not have given opportunity to these respondent-petitioners to have applied for recruitment, since their names could not have been on the rolls of the Employment Exchange. It was only necessary that these petitioner-respondents should have been informed of the recruitment test, which was held twice, so that, they had opportunity to appear in the same. Thus, they have been deprived of their right of competing with other persons from the open market, which is in violation of the principles enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. As already stated, petitioner-respondent Ashok Kumar appeared in the test and vide Anx. 5 in Writ Petition No. 5177/90, his speed was 27.7 words per minute, whereas the requirement was 20 wpm & it was stated that he may be declared to have passed the test. Sofar as petitioner Ramkishore is concerned, in Writ Petition No. 2436/89, it is mentioned in the older dated February 13, 1986 (Anx.5) that his speed in type test has been found to be satisfactory and he is declared to have passed the same. Thus, it is evident that both these petitioners were successful in the type test, even though, no formal order was issued in case of petitioner respondent Ashok Kumar. Therefore, as per the condition laid down, both these petitioner respondents should have been regularised, since they passed the type test, therefore, there is no reason why should they not be taken to have been regularised soon after they pass the type test. 8. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that the petitioner-respondents continued to be in employment of Development Corporation, even though, their services were transferred to Handloom Corporation, since the salary of the petitioner-respondents was paid by the Development Corporation, therefore, they had the administrative control over them also. It is submitted that the employees, who were transferred to Handloom Corporation, were given option to be absorbed in the said Corporation, but the respondent-petitioners did not give any such option and, therefore, continued to be in employment of the Handloom Corporation. It is submitted that the employees, who were transferred to Handloom Corporation, were given option to be absorbed in the said Corporation, but the respondent-petitioners did not give any such option and, therefore, continued to be in employment of the Handloom Corporation. The learned counsel further submitted that the Development Corporation will abide by any decision of this Court and the order of the learned Single Judge, by which both the Corporations have been made liable, has created peculiar situation, as there is no conflict between both the Corporation and the direction of the learned Single Judge making both the Corporations liable for payment of arrears etc. to the petitioner-appellants should be confined to the development Corporation alone. The office order dated January 13, 1988 (Anx.8) in Writ Petition No. 2436/89 mentions that" apart from the staff that has been employed on purely ad-hoc, temporary, daily wage basis, the services of following persons stands automatically transferred w.e.f. February 1, 1988". In the list of employees, the name of petitioner Vinay Kumar Audichya appears at S.No. 4. Similarly, in reference to this order, another office order dated March 28, 1989 (Anx.8) in, Writ Petition No. 5177/89, the name of petitioner-respondent Ashok Kumar Saxena appears at S.N. 3. This also shows that both these petitioner-respondents were treated to be permanent employees. Sofar as the question of liability on both the Corporations is concerned, as pointed out by Mr. M.I. Khan, learned counsel for Handloom Corporation, a person cannot be in regular employment of both the Corporations. It was also pointed out that merely because development Corporation transferred the petitioner- respondents to Handloom Corporation, it does not mean that their services were terminated and, thereafter, permanently employed by Handloom Corporation. The services of the petitioner - respondents were terminated by the Development Corporation and the salary is also paid by this Corporation to the petitioner- respondents. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the petitioner-respondents continued to be in employment of the Development Corporation. 9. So far as the other three special appeals filed by the Handloom Corporation are concerned, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed, requesting for condoning the delay. it was submitted by Mr. M.I. Khan, learned counsel, that the appeals have been filed after delay of 68 days. 9. So far as the other three special appeals filed by the Handloom Corporation are concerned, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed, requesting for condoning the delay. it was submitted by Mr. M.I. Khan, learned counsel, that the appeals have been filed after delay of 68 days. The appellant, for the first time, came to know about the adverse order passed by the learned Single Judge when the contempt notice was received by the Chairman on November 17, 1990. The appellant immediately participated in the contempt Proceedings and the special appeals pending before this Bench. Thereafter, a photostat copy of the order was collected from the Development Corporation and on receipt of the same, it was decided to file special appeals, which is filed within thirty days from the date of knowledge acquired by the appellant - Handloom Corporation. It is also submitted that three other special appeals have been also filed by the Development Corporation against the same order, therefore, no prejudice will be caused to the respondents, since the appeals is reserved after hearing. 10. It is submitted by Mr. K.K. Sharma and Mr. Virendra Lodha, learned counsel for the respondents that the Handloom Corporation was party to the proceedings before the learned Single Judge also. They did not choose to file any reply, nor participated in the proceedings. Therefore, they did have the knowledge of the proceedings pending before the learned Single Judge. In fact, the appellant - Handloom Corporation realised the gravity of the situation only when the notice of contempt proceedings was served on its Chairman. This shows that they were careless and negligent in properly appearing and participating in the proceedings before the learned Single Judge. It is also submitted that not even a certified copy of the order of the learned Single Judge has been filed. 11. From the facts mentioned above, it is clear that the handloom Corporation had full knowledge of the proceedings pending before the learned Single Judge. It was also party in the proceedings, but it did not choose to file any reply, nor participated in the proceedings. We do not find any sufficient cause for this negligent behaviour of the Handloom Corporation. We, therefore, do not find any ground, which may be termed to be sufficient for condoning the delay for filing the special appeals by the Handloom Corporation. We do not find any sufficient cause for this negligent behaviour of the Handloom Corporation. We, therefore, do not find any ground, which may be termed to be sufficient for condoning the delay for filing the special appeals by the Handloom Corporation. The application is, therefore, dismissed and three special appeals filed by the Handloom Corporation are dis,missed on this ground. 12. In the result, the impugned order is modified to the extent that the petitioner-respondents shall be treated continued to be in employment of the Development Corporation and the Handloom Corporation shall not be responsible, in any way, solar as the services of the respondents are concerned or the implimination of the order of the learned Single Judge is concerned. The order of the learned Single Judge is upheld in alt other respects. The three Special Appeals filed by the Handloom Corporation arc, therefore, dismissed, as time-barred. There will be no order as to costs.Appeals Dismissed as time barred, Impugned order, however, modified. *******