ORDER L. Manoharan, J. 1. The first counter petitioner tenant in R. C. P. No. 15 of 1979 is the revision petitioner. The first respondent who was the petitioner in the said R C. P. instituted the proceedings under S.11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act') for eviction. Trial court allowed eviction under S.11(2)(b) and refused the prayer under S.11(3) of the Act. First respondent preferred R. C. A. No. 5/1983 before the Appellate Authority, the Subordinate Judge. The appeal was allowed. Revision petitioner tenant filed revision before the District Judge; that was dismissed. Against the order of the District Judge the revision petitioner filed revision under S.115 C. P. C. before this court as C. R. P. No. 1719 of 1985-G. One of us (Kalliath, J.) allowed the revision set aside the order of the District Judge and remanded the matter to the trial court. 2. After remand PW 2 was examined and Exts. C1 and C2 were marked on the first respondent's side; and the revision petitioner - tenant was examined as CPW 1. Rent Controller dismissed the petition. Against the said dismissal the first respondent preferred R. C. A. No. 40 of 1989 before the District Judge, Kollam; that was allowed. This revision is directed against the said order of the District Judge. 3. The property in which the petition schedule shed is situated was obtained by respondents 1 and 2 as per a partition in 1959. Second respondent is the mother of the first respondent. She executed Ext. A5 settlement by which she released her right in favour of the first respondent. First respondent's husband let out the petition schedule shed to the deceased husband the revision petitioner as per Ext. A1 rent deed. The petitioner alleged that rent was paid only up to September 1976. She also contended, the shed has been demolished for the convenience and security of her residence. Revision petitioner denied the allegation of arrears of rent from October 1976 and maintained that rent till December 1978 was paid to the second respondent the mother of the first respondent. She also contended that her deceased husband obtained lease of the land for constructing shed and constructed the same; she claimed benefit under S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1/1964). She denied the need alleged by the first respondent. She also contended that her deceased husband obtained lease of the land for constructing shed and constructed the same; she claimed benefit under S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1/1964). She denied the need alleged by the first respondent. Second respondent, mother of the first respondent in her objection questioned the validity of Ext. A5. She maintained that Ext. A5 did not take effect and denied the need alleged by the petitioner. 4. As regards the claim under S.106 of Act 1/64, before remand the Rent Controller passed an order referring the said question to the Land Tribunal for adjudication. The first respondent preferred R. C. A. 13/1980, before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kollam. The order appealed against was set aside. It will be noted that under S.106 of Act 1/1964 the lease of the land must be for commercial or industrial purpose and the tenant should have constructed building for such commercial or industrial purpose before the 20th May 1967. The genuineness of Ext. A1 rent deed is not denied by the revision petitioner. Ext. A1 rent deed is dated 21-4-1969 and the same is with respect to the building. Therefore, evidently the revision petitioner cannot claim the benefit under S.106 of Act 1/1964. Apart from the same, the remand judgment of this court would show that the only ground that survived for consideration after the remand was the one under S.11(3) of the Act. In judgment in R. C. A. 5/1983 it is stated that the order under S.11(2)(b) was got vacated by the tenant as per S.11(2)(c) of the Act. 5. Now the question for consideration is whether the first respondent is entitled to an order of eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. After remand the jurisdiction of the court would be circumscribed and limited by the remand judgment. As has already noted, a revision under S.20 of the Act before the District Judge against the judgment in R. C. A. No. 5/1983 which allowed eviction under S.11(3) of the Act was dismissed. The order of the District Judge was set aside by this court by the order in C. R P. No. 1719 of 1985-G and the matter was remitted. The order of the District Judge was set aside by this court by the order in C. R P. No. 1719 of 1985-G and the matter was remitted. In the light of the decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai ( AIR 1987 SC 203 ) which held that that revision under S.115 CPC against an order under S.20 of the Act is not maintainable the question that would arise is whether the said order is void as one rendered without jurisdiction. If it is void the judgment in R. C. A. 5/1983 allowing the prayer of the landlord under S.11(3) of the Act which was confirmed by the District Judge in the order in revision would be effective. 6. So long as the court has got jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter there would be no inherent lack of jurisdiction; consequently an order rendered by the court would not be void. In this context it is necessary to read Para.24 of the judgment in Aundal Ammal's case ( AIR 1987 SC 203 ). Therein it is observed: "It must, however, be emphasised that we are not dealing in this appeal with the constitutional powers of the High Court under. Art.227 of the Constitution nor are we concerned with the powers of the High Court regulating appeals under the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. We are concerned in this case whether the High Court, in view of the scheme of the Act, had jurisdiction to interfere under S.115 of the Cods of Civil Procedure." The same question as to the jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115 CPC. to revise an order passed under S.20 of the Act again arose for consideration in the decision in M/s. Jetha Bai and Sons. Cochin v. M/s. Sundardas Rathenai ( AIR 1988 SC 812 ). The question that arose was whether there was a conflict between the views expressed in Aundal Ammal's case ( AIR 1987 SC 203 ) and the decision in Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. F. Bhat ( AIR 1987 SC 2323 ). The later decision arose under Karnataka Rent Control Act wherein it was held that an order of the District Judge under S.50 (2) of the said Act is open to challenge before the High Court under S.115 of the CPC. The later decision arose under Karnataka Rent Control Act wherein it was held that an order of the District Judge under S.50 (2) of the said Act is open to challenge before the High Court under S.115 of the CPC. M/s. Jetha Bai's case ( AIR 1988 SC 812 ) reaffirmed Aundal Ammal's case ( AIR 1987 SC 203 ) holding that there is no conflict between the decisions in Aundal Ammal's case ( AIR 1987 SC 203 ) and Shyamaraju Hegde's case ( AIR 1987 SC 2323 ). In Para.17 of the judgment it is observed: "Incidentally, we may also point out that the Legislature has not taken away and indeed it cannot take away the power of superintendence of the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution over ail courts and Tribunals which are within the territories' in relation to which the High Court exercises its jurisdiction". The point to be noted is, it is not a case where the High Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person. Under Art.227 of the Constitution the High Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and person and consequently the order of remand is not void particularly when the parties have participated in the proceedings after remand. In the decision in M/s. Sigma Agencies (P) Ltd. v. P. V. Thomas (AIR 1991 Kerala 102) it is held that an order passed under S.115 CPC against an order under S.20 of the Act is not void. 7. After remand PW 2, the Commissioner filed Ext. C1 report and Ext. C2 mahazar. What is alleged in para 4 of the petition is that the shed has to be demolished for the security and convenience of the residence of the first respondent in the building situated in the property. Under S.20 of the Act though reappreciation of the evidence as such is not called for, the pleadings and evidence have to be examined to satisfy the legality, regularity or propriety of the order of the lower authorities It will be necessary in this context to note the location of the petition schedule shed and also the building. Ext. A5 settlement describes the property in which the shed is situated to measure 10 cents and 463 Sq. links. In Ext. Ext. A5 settlement describes the property in which the shed is situated to measure 10 cents and 463 Sq. links. In Ext. C2 mahazar the commissioner gives the details as to the location and relative position of the petition schedule shed and the building in which the first respondent resides. National High way is on the north of the said plot and Kottappuram High School Road is on the west. The petition schedule shed is situated in the north and faces the Kottappuram High School Road, In Para.3 of Ext. C2 it is stated that immediately on the north of the shed there is an 'erumadam' shop of one Lalu, son of Kunju Panickan, and on the north of the petitioner's house is Bhima Hotel. Ext. C2 states that the house in which the petitioner resides is situated about 9 feet away from the south eastern corner of the shed. The nature of the shed also is described by the Commissioner. He states that, the three side of the shed is enclosed by the wooden planks and the western side which faces the road is having folding shutters. 8. Ext. A1 rent deed would show that the shed was taken on lease for the purpose of conducting cycle repairing. Commissioner also noted that the work of electro plating was being conducted. In the objection by the revision petitioner she maintained that, even after the death of her husband cycle repairing is being conducted. CPW 1 the revision petitioner would swear that the cycle repairing has not been stepped. The first respondent instituted Ext. A6 suit for injunction against the revision petitioner alleging that the revision petitioner was using the premises for purposes other than for which it was let cut and she is attempting to induct strangers. Trial court dismissed the suit. Appeal by the first respondent was partly allowed. Ext. A6 is the copy of the judgment in A. S.58/1985. The court held, positive covenant to carry on a business does not carry with it a negative covenant not to carry on business of any other kind. The injunction was granted only against sub letting, and altering the building, Thus the revision petitioner uses the premises only for lawful purposes. A6 is the copy of the judgment in A. S.58/1985. The court held, positive covenant to carry on a business does not carry with it a negative covenant not to carry on business of any other kind. The injunction was granted only against sub letting, and altering the building, Thus the revision petitioner uses the premises only for lawful purposes. There is no allegation to the effect that the conduct of the revision petitioner is such that the same constitutes a threat to the peaceful residence of the lust respondent. In fact there is absolutely no allegation as to how the existence of the shed or its user by the revision petitioner would infringe on the security or the residence of the first respondent and her family. All that is alleged is, for the convenience and the security of the residence of the first respondent demolition of the shed is necessary. Even PW 1, the husband of the first respondent did not give any ground or detail as to how the existence of the shed is a security risk so far as the residence of the first respondent is concerned. PW 1 only said that for the convenient residence of his family the shed has to be demolished. Ext. A2 is the copy of the notice issued by the second respondent to the revision petitioner. She is entitled to receive one half of the rent as per Ext. A5. Ext. A4 is the copy of notice issued by the first respondent. Ext. A2 calls upon the revision petitioner to surrender the building on the ground that she has kept arrears and that she wants to demolish the shed for constructing a new building in modern fashion, whereas in Ext. A4 notice sent by the first respondent what is stated is, the shed has to be demolished for the convenience and security of the residence of the first respondent. In testing the bona fides of the need of the first respondent the inconsistency in Exts. A2 and A4 as to the purpose for which demolition is required is of importance. This is particularly so as even PW does not say, the basis for alleged apprehension of the first respondent. 9. In testing the bona fides of the need of the first respondent the inconsistency in Exts. A2 and A4 as to the purpose for which demolition is required is of importance. This is particularly so as even PW does not say, the basis for alleged apprehension of the first respondent. 9. What is suggested is, a boundary well is to be constructed on the north and the west of the plot wherein the said shed and residential building of the first respondent is located and for that purpose the shed has to be demolished. According to the first respondent traffic has increased and there is" risk in keeping the plot open. There is no data in the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2, and Ext. C2 to support such a claim. Ext. C2 mentions fence seen erected in a portion. The ground urged should not be a ruse for eviction. The need should be genuine. It is not as if boundary wall cannot be raised without demolishing the shed. 10. One other important aspect to be noted in this connection is, as per Ext. A5 the second respondent is entitled to reside in the house and also is entitled to receive one half rent. PW 1 admits that the second respondent is residing along with them in the house. The second respondent in her objection said, there is no need to demolish the shed for the convenience or security of the residence in the building. In assessing the bona fides of the first respondent as to the alleged need the objection by the second respondent is of paramount importance since she is entitled to reside in the building and is admittedly residing in the building. The contention by the second respondent that there is no need to demolish the shed oh the ground alleged by the first respondent would thus go against the bona fides of the first respondent. In this connection it is not of little importance to note that demolition of the shed for the alleged purpose would defeat the right of the 2nd respondent to receive one half of the rent. 11. The other circumstances also do not support the alleged need. In Ext. C2 the Commissioner notes immediately on the north of the petition schedule building there is an erumadam shop of Lalu, son of Kunju Panickan and another building, Bhima Hotel. 11. The other circumstances also do not support the alleged need. In Ext. C2 the Commissioner notes immediately on the north of the petition schedule building there is an erumadam shop of Lalu, son of Kunju Panickan and another building, Bhima Hotel. Though it was asserted by the learned counsel for the first respondent that Bhima Hotel has already been surrendered, there is nothing in evidence to support the same. The Commissioner visited the property on 14-1-1987 and he noted the existence of Bhima Hotel in Ext. C2. On 14-1-1987 when the Commissioner visited the property ha saw the erumadam shop of Lalu; he mentioned the shop in Ext. C2. In the cross examination of CPW 1 suggestion is to the effect one Sreedharan trespassed into a portion of the property and constructed an erumadam shop, that for recovery the first respondent instituted O. S. 327 of 1979 and that the same was delivered over in 1984. CPW 1 pleaded ignorance of the same. What is to, be noted is, the suggestion is with respect to the alleged trespass by one Sreedharan, construction of shed by him and his eviction in 1984. On 14-1-1987 when the Commissioner visited the property he noted an erumadam shop of Lalu, son of Kunju Panickan. Evidently the decree and the delivery with respect to which reference was made in the cross examination of CPW 1 cannot be in relation to the erumadam shop noted by PW 2 in Ext. C2. There is nothing in evidence to show that any step was taken for eviction of Lalu and Bhima Hotel. That also is a circumstance which has to be taken into account in assessing the bona fides of the alleged need. 12. Mere desire or wish cannot be equated with the "need" mentioned in S.11(3) of the Act. Bona fides being a condition of mind may not be capable of direct evidence and hence should be a matter for inference from attending circumstances. The circumstances not only do not bring out any need, but would go against the alleged need. 13. Certain aspects and circumstances adverted to by us have certainly escaped the consideration of the appellate authority. Bona fides being a condition of mind may not be capable of direct evidence and hence should be a matter for inference from attending circumstances. The circumstances not only do not bring out any need, but would go against the alleged need. 13. Certain aspects and circumstances adverted to by us have certainly escaped the consideration of the appellate authority. The further question is whether we should interfere with the judgment of the appellate authority exercising the power granted to this Court under S.20 of the Act.The width and scope of S.20 of the Act need not be discussed here, since it is now well settled in law that this Court has got the power to examine the findings of fact of the lower authorities to satisfy ourselves whether the impugned judgment suffers from the vice of illegality irregularity or impropriety envisaged under S.20 of the Act. The word 'propriety' has not been defined in the Act. It is capable of variety of meanings. In the Oxford English Dictionary, it has been stated to mean 'fitness; appropriateness; aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstance or conditions; conformity with requirements, rules, or principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy." 14. In AIR 1960 SC 655 (Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and others) Gajendragadkar, J. observed when dealing with the question of revisional power of the High Court under S.15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (3 of 1949) a provision similar to S.20 of the Act thus:- "Mr. Bindra has argued that the High Court was in error in coming to its own conclusion as to whether the requirement of S.13(3)(a)(iii) has been satisfied. As we have already pointed out the finding of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority was that the claim made by respondent 1 that he required the shop for the purpose of reconstruction was not bona fide. The High Court has reversed this conclusion and Mr. Bindra challenges the correctness or the propriety of the said conclusion. The revisional power conferred upon the High Court under S.15(5) is wider than that conferred by S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court has reversed this conclusion and Mr. Bindra challenges the correctness or the propriety of the said conclusion. The revisional power conferred upon the High Court under S.15(5) is wider than that conferred by S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under S.15(5) the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the propriety or the legality of the finding made by the authorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord under S.13(3)(a)(iii). The High Court no doubt has accepted the appellant's argument that the requirement in question must be bona fide but it has observed that there was no legal evidence on which it could be said that the landlord's requirement was not bona fide". The implication of the word 'propriety' has been considered by the Supreme Court in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. Govt. of Madras (AIR 1965 SC 463). Referring to the decisions reported in AIR 1960 SC 655 and AIR 1956 SC 463 , the Madras High Court in the decision reported in AIR 1968 Madras 152 (Ching Chong Sine v. Puttay Gowder) observed that the revision court has power to come to a conclusion different from that arrived at by the subordinate court on the same set of circumstances. In the case at hand, we have already said that certain important circumstances and aspects have not been considered at all and we feel that we are also fully justified in taking a different conclusion from the facts adverted to by the appellate authority in regard to the question of bona fides required under S.11(3) of the Act. We are of opinion that it will result in failure of justice, if we allow the decision to stand holding that we; have no jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment after finding that the decision of the appellate authority is neither appropriate nor suitable to the circumstances surfaced from the evidence in the case. Further, we feel that the judgment lack justness and accuracy. 15. We have no hesitation to hold that the first respondent is not successful in proving her case of bona fide need. Consequently the order of the appellate authority is liable to be set aside and the revision is to be allowed. Further, we feel that the judgment lack justness and accuracy. 15. We have no hesitation to hold that the first respondent is not successful in proving her case of bona fide need. Consequently the order of the appellate authority is liable to be set aside and the revision is to be allowed. In the result the revision is allowed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.