PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals, one by the accused and the other by the State, have common matrix. The heart-rending factual scenario as unfolded is a sad-reflection of the present day decadent and permissive society. Young life of a teen-aged girl full of potentialities has been lost, and another young brilliant student's future is in jeopardy because he is the accused. Background facts as depicted by the prosecution are tragic to the core. ( 2 ) ACCUSED, a brilliant student, recipient of National Merit Scholarship, was friendly with Amarendra Sahu (P. W. 1), brother of the deceased Nirupama. At the request of the family members of the deceased, the accused started giving her tuition. The platonic relationship of a teacher and a student did not remain so far long, and the relationship blossomed into a love affair. There was parental objection and tutorship was withdrawn. The accused objected, did not take it in good spirit, and threatened the deceased as well as the family members with dire consequences. On the fateful day, i. e. , 24-8-1989, the deceased had gone to a friend's house, while the accused was watching her movements from a nearby place. The father of the deceased on learning that the deceased had gone to the house of a friend named Lopamudra, sent Surendra Mohanty (P. W. 6) to bring her back as he had noticed that the accused was sitting near Lopamudra's house P. W. 6 brought back the deceased in his cycle from Lopamudra's house which is at a distance of 200 metres from house of the deceased. In the afternoon, when the deceased and her younger sister Kiranbala had gone near the tank known as Sanketpokhari to attend the call of nature the accused who was waiting in the house of one Jhumpa Dei (P. W. 3) came out and accosted the deceased and intended to talk to her. On the deceased not responding, he suddenly brought out a Dhujaii and inflicted indiscriminate blows on several parts of her body. This macabre act was witnessed by Kiranbala (P. W. 5) and Jhumpa Dei (P. W. 3 ). On hearing the cries of Kiranbala, who ran towards the house, several witnesses, viz; Amarendra (P. W. 1), Abhiram Sahu (P. W. 2), Surendra (P. W. 6), Rabindranath (P. W. 7) and some others rushed towards the spot. This macabre act was witnessed by Kiranbala (P. W. 5) and Jhumpa Dei (P. W. 3 ). On hearing the cries of Kiranbala, who ran towards the house, several witnesses, viz; Amarendra (P. W. 1), Abhiram Sahu (P. W. 2), Surendra (P. W. 6), Rabindranath (P. W. 7) and some others rushed towards the spot. They found the accused trying to run away, and when they tried to catch him, he brandished the weapon he was holding saying that he will finish everybody. Thereafter he escaped from the spot in the cycle of one Niranjan Ojha, a co-accused, whose appeal we shall separately deal with. In a very unstable stage, the deceased was removed to Jagatsinghpur Sub- divisional Hospital where the doctor attended to her immediately, tried to render all possible medical help and finding that the deceased, was sinking physically referred the matter to the S. C. B. Medical College Hospital, Cuttack. The doctor (P. W. 8) also recorded a dying declaration (Ext. 7) wherein the deceased clearly named the accused to be the assailant. In the injury report (Ext. 5), mention was made about this dying declaration. The doctors of the S. C. B. Medical College Hospital also tried their best to save the injured; but in spite of their best efforts Nirupama breathed her last on 2-9-1989. The inquest report is Ext. 2. From the injury report and the inquest report it appears that 23 injuries both external and internal existed on several parts of the body, the vital and vulnerable ones being the throat, chest, abdomen and face. The doctor have opined that the injuries were possible by a sharp cutting weapon like a Bhujali. In additon to the witnesses indicated above, several other witnesses including official witnesses, and witnesses who stated to have witnessed seizure of some material objects, to further the prosecution case were examined. ( 3 ) THE accused in his defence stated that being born in a poor family, he continued his study with great difficulty and notwithstanding financial handicaps was keen in his studies. ( 3 ) THE accused in his defence stated that being born in a poor family, he continued his study with great difficulty and notwithstanding financial handicaps was keen in his studies. But acute poverty stood in his way for prosecution of further studies, and he had to seek a job and in fact had been selected for appointment as a Junior Clerk-cum-Cashier in a bank having come out successful with flying colours in Banking Services Recruitment Examination; and because of pendency of the case he has not been able to join. His plea is one of false implication. It was suggested that the deceased was deeply in love with him and the parents objected to the relationship and confined her against will, with the tacit encouragement of P. W. 6 Surendra. With a view to malign him, the false implication as aforesaid has been made. ( 4 ) ON evaluation of evidence, both oral and documentary, the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, came to hold that the charge against accused Ashok Kumar Barik under Section 302, Indian Penal Code (in short 'ipc') was not sustainable. But the evidence according to him revealed that the accused committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304, Part 1, IPC. He concluded that the accused Ashok had no intention to cause the death of Nirupama, but had knowledge that his action in causing several multiple injuries would result in her death. With these conclusions he convicted accused Ashok and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/ -, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year more. It was also ordered that the amount of fine if realised was to be paid to the father of the deceased as compensation under Section 357, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code' ). Two other persons were tried for harbouring accused Ashok. One of the co- accused is the sister of accused Ashok, who is stated to be separately tried under the Juvenile Offenders Act. The other co-accused Niranjan was convicted and sentenced. As indicated above, we shall deal with his complicity in the appeal filed by him separately. Two other persons were tried for harbouring accused Ashok. One of the co- accused is the sister of accused Ashok, who is stated to be separately tried under the Juvenile Offenders Act. The other co-accused Niranjan was convicted and sentenced. As indicated above, we shall deal with his complicity in the appeal filed by him separately. ( 5 ) THE accused has assailed his conviction and sentence which is subject-matter of Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 1990, while the State also challenges both conviction and sentence on the ground that a case for conviction and sentence under Section 302, IPC was clearly established, and without any reason being indicated the learned Second Addl. Sessions Judge was not justified in holding that the case was one covered under Section 304, Part I, IPC and has sought for enhancement of the sentence. ( 6 ) WE shall ad seriatum deal with the contentions of the accused-appellant to find out if the prosecution has established his complicity with the alleged mishap. The justifiability of conviction and adequacy of sentence would be consequential. ( 7 ) ACCORDINGLY to the accused-appellant, the evidence is deficient, there is reason for believing that the prosecution has manufactured and fabricated documents. It is urged that the first-information-report (Ext. 1) is a suspicious document and the contents thereof are contrary to the statements made by the witnesses in Court. It is also submitted that same was reportedly lodged on 25-8-1989 at 7 a. m. . i. e. , long after the alleged incident, which afforded opportunity for manipulation and false implication. On perusal of Ext. 1, we find that the same was received at the outpost at 9-15 p. m. and was forwarded to Tirtol Police Station, where it was received on 25-8-1989. Therefore, it is not a case where it can be said that there was unusual delay in lodging the FIR. It is also stated that even if Ext. 1 was lodged as claimed, there being earlier information to the police by the doctors attached to the Jagatsinghpur Subdivisional Hospital, which was received prior to the time of lodging of FIR at the outpost, Ext. 1 cannot be strictly called the first information report. We find that only a station diary entry was registered at Jagatsinghpur Police Station on receipt of the casualty memo, which did not contain place of occurrence, time, name of accused etc. 1 cannot be strictly called the first information report. We find that only a station diary entry was registered at Jagatsinghpur Police Station on receipt of the casualty memo, which did not contain place of occurrence, time, name of accused etc. , from the doctor attached to Jagatsinghpur Subdivisional Hospital. When information of the commission of the same offence is given to the Police at two different places by different persons at different times not far separated both the reports can be construed to be independent first-information reports and the later in respect of time cannot be said to be a statement made in course of investigation. ( 8 ) THE authenticity of the dying declaration (Ext. 7) is also questioned. A criticism was levelled in respect of the dying declaration that the same was a document fabricated to suit the prosecution. Before dealing with this aspect, we may observe that there is a purported dying declaration as a part of the Bed-head ticket (Ext. 14 ). The same appears to be an incomplete document. No detail about this document was brought on record. Be that as it may, we find mention about dying declaration and Ext. 5, the injury report. The recording of statement has been sought to be proved by the two doctors attached to Jagatsinghpur Subdivisional Hospital. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept that this document is a fabricated one. It was sought to be stressed that the physical condition of the deceased was such that it was physically impossible to make a declaration as claimed. Reference to some Texts are made in this regard. We have not embarked upon an indepth analysis of this aspect, as in our view the case at hand can be decided, even keeping the document out of consideration. But even if the first-information-report (Ext. 1) and the dying declaration (Ext. 7) are kept out of consideration, the question is whether the evidence of eye-witnesses P. Ws. 3 and 5 is sufficient to fasten the crime on the accused. Undisputedly this was a case of homicidal death. What needs adjudication is who is author of the crime - whether the accused Ashok or anybodyelse. ( 9 ) WE have been referred to the evidence of several witnesses by the learned counsel for the accused to show that exaggerations abound; which according to him, corrode the credibility of the prosecution case. What needs adjudication is who is author of the crime - whether the accused Ashok or anybodyelse. ( 9 ) WE have been referred to the evidence of several witnesses by the learned counsel for the accused to show that exaggerations abound; which according to him, corrode the credibility of the prosecution case. P. W. 5 is the sister of the deceased who was accompanying her and P. W. 3 is an elderly lady. The evidence of the former has been characterised as tainted with interestedness, while the latter as uncredible due to absence of knowledge about her own age, and her failing eye-sight. We have scanned through their evidence with care and caution, particularly keeping in view the characterisation as made. With regard to falsehood stated or embellishments added, by the prosecution witnesses, it is well to remember that there is a tendency amongst witnesses in our country to back up a good case by false or exaggerated version. It is also experienced that invariably the witnesses add embroidery to prosecution story, perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved. But that is no ground to throw the case overboard, if true, in the main. If there is a ring of truth, the case should not be rejected. It is the duty of the Court to cull out the nuggets of truth from the evidence unless there is reason to believe that the inconsistencies of falsehood are so glaring as utterly to destroy confidence in the witnesses. The Privy Council had also occasion to observe in Bankim Bihari v. Matangini : AIR 1919 PC 157 that in Indian litigation it is not safe to assume that a case must be false if some of the evidence in support of it appears to be doubtful or is clearly untrue, since there is, on some occasions, a tendency amongst litigants to back up a good case by false or exaggerated evidence. In Abdul Gani v. State of Madhya Pradesh: AIR 1954 SC 31 : (1954 Cri LJ 323), the Supreme Court deprecated the tendency of courts to take an easy course of holding the evidence discrepant and discarding the whole case as untrue. There must be effort to disengage the truth from falsehood and to sift the grain from the chaff. In Abdul Gani v. State of Madhya Pradesh: AIR 1954 SC 31 : (1954 Cri LJ 323), the Supreme Court deprecated the tendency of courts to take an easy course of holding the evidence discrepant and discarding the whole case as untrue. There must be effort to disengage the truth from falsehood and to sift the grain from the chaff. As observed by one of us (Pasayat, J.) in Nabakishore Rout v. The State (1991) 71 Cut LT 272 : (1990) 2 Orissa 577, normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case while material discrepancies do so. Normal discrepancies are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Interestedness is a double- edged weapon. If it can be a motive for false implication, it can well be the foundation of the crime or the reason therefor. There can be no sweeping generalisation. When feelings run high, and if there is personal cause for enmity, a tendency to drag in an innocent person, against whom a witness has a grudge may exist. But foundation must be laid for such a criticism, as the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation for false implication, is often a sure guarantee of truth. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last person to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. ( 10 ) THE evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 5 has a ring of truth about it and we find no reason to discard the same. Their evidence is to a great extent corroborated by the evidence of immediate post-occurrence witnesses. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 5 is acceptable. It is urged that P. W. 3 is unreliable and she being obliged to the family of P. W. 2, her evidence should be discarded. She is characterised as a got up witness. Her failing eye-sight was also highlighted. On conspectus of her evidence, one thing is apparent, ie. , the straightforwardness of an elderly rustic woman. She has no axe to grind with the accused. She is characterised as a got up witness. Her failing eye-sight was also highlighted. On conspectus of her evidence, one thing is apparent, ie. , the straightforwardness of an elderly rustic woman. She has no axe to grind with the accused. If there would have been really attempt for bringing a got up witness, instead of P. W. 3, her son P. W. 10 could have been projected. The latter has deposed about the presence of the accused at his house till his departure in the afternoon. We do not accept the plea that P. W. 3 was a got up witness. It has not been shown that the eye-sight of P. W. 3 was so defective and/or deficient as to render identification or visibility impracticable. ( 11 ) THE residuary question is whether the case was one coming within the ambit of S. 302, IPC or was one covered by S. 304, Part I, IPC as held by the learned Second Addl. Sessions Judge. This is where the State's appeal is relevant. ( 12 ) IT is relevant to keep in mind that culpable homicide and murder belong to the species of unlawful homicide. Culpable homicide is defined and explained in Ss. 299 and 301. Murder is defined and explained in S. 300. Punishment for the former is indicated in S. 304, while for the latter in S. 302. Unlawful homicide is not to be compared with "culpable homicide" which expression is used in the Code in a technical sense as denoting the offence defined in S. 299. The distinction is apparent because an offence u/ S. 304-A is an unlawful homicide, but it does not amount to culpable homicide. Culpable homicide consists of three elements: (i) death of a human being; (ii) which is caused by the physical conduct of a person, and (iii) the mental attitude of that person towards the consequences of such conduct. The expression "with the intention of causing death" contains a significant word, i. e. , "intention". The same means the mental attitude of the man who decides to bring about a certain result. Every act is followed by consequences. The consequence necessary to constitute the offence of culpable homicide is death. A man expects the natural consequences of his acts and, in law, is presumed to intend them. Both first and second clauses of S. 299 require intention. Every act is followed by consequences. The consequence necessary to constitute the offence of culpable homicide is death. A man expects the natural consequences of his acts and, in law, is presumed to intend them. Both first and second clauses of S. 299 require intention. But the intention required by the two clauses are not the same. While in the first the intention is to cause death, in the second it is only to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Where the intention is to cause death the offence is murder unless the case falls under one of the exceptions mentioned in S. 300. If an exception does apply, the first part of S. 304 will regulate the punishment. Where the intention is to cause only bodily injury, it may, or may not, amount to murder. If the offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the punishment is still regulated by the first part of S. 304 to cover "if the act, by which the death is caused, is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. " The bodily injury intended to be caused must be such" as is likely to cause death". The difference between an intention to cause death and an intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death is a difference of degrees only. The latter is a degree lower in the scale of criminality than the former. If death is a likely result it is culpable homicide; and if death is a most probable result it is murder. An offence cannot amount to murder unless it falls within the definition of culpable homicide. ( 13 ) IT could not be shown to us as to how the case at hand was one, to which the excepted provisions of S. 300 apply. A feeble attempt was made to show that there was deprivation of power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation to bring it within the ambit of Exception I. The recital of the scenario given above clearly rules out the case of grave and sudden provocation. The accused came armed with a Bhujali. That being the case, the question of deprivation of power of self-control due to any provocation, much less sudden, does not arise. An attempt was also made to bring in the case within Exception 4. The accused came armed with a Bhujali. That being the case, the question of deprivation of power of self-control due to any provocation, much less sudden, does not arise. An attempt was also made to bring in the case within Exception 4. That has also no application because there was no sudden fight. There is not even an iota of evidence about a fight. Therefore, the question of the act being committed without premeditation in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel also does not arise. Though the term "fight" has not been defined in the Code, it is obvious that it takes two or more to make a fight : it implies mutual fight in which both parties participate, irrespective of how they fare in it. One-sided attack cannot constitute a fight. Exception 4 would not be attracted since there was no exchange of physical acts between the deceased, who was unarmed, and the accused; and the assault on the deceased by the accused was deliberate and pressed with determination when the deceased was fleeing for life. Our conclusion is countenanced by the view of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Mytheen Shahul Hameed v. State of Kerala AIR 1980 SC 108 : (1980 Cri LJ 192 ). ( 14 ) THE very fact that nearly two dozen of injuries were inflicted, and some of them were on the vital parts of the body leaves no scope for any doubt that the injuries were caused with the full knowledge that the only result therefrom would be death. P. W. 13, the doctor had described several of those injuries, the possible result of each one of which was death. Where there are repeated blows on vital parts of the body, it could not be said that the accused committed an offence other than one u/ S. 302. The injuries found by the doctors and the evidence of eye-witnesses clearly disclosed that the assailant went on giving blows after blows with the sharp-edged weapon on the parts of the body where vital organs are situated, and ultimately the result achieved is the death of the deceased. In a similar circumstance, the Supreme Court held that the proper conviction is u/ S. 302, IPC. The inevitable conclusion is that the case is one covered u/ S. 300 and the punishment attracted is u/ S. 302, IPC. In a similar circumstance, the Supreme Court held that the proper conviction is u/ S. 302, IPC. The inevitable conclusion is that the case is one covered u/ S. 300 and the punishment attracted is u/ S. 302, IPC. ( 15 ) HAVING come to the conclusion that the case is punishable u/ S. 302, what is to be further adjudicated is whether the sentence should be one of death or imprisonment for life. In order that the sentences may be properly graded to fit the degree of gravity of each case, it is necessary that the maximum sentence prescribed by law should be reserved for the rarest of rare cases which are of an exceptional nature. Unless the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender reveal that the criminal is a menace to the society, and the sentence of life imprisonment would be altogether inadequate, the Court should ordinarily impose the lesser punishment and not the extreme punishment of death which as indicated above should be reserved for exceptional cases only. The case at hand is resultant from frustration at love. There is no evidence of the accused being of criminal temperament. Judged in the background, the materials are not sufficient to bring the case within the category of the rarest of rare cases. We are, therefore, of the view that the lesser punishment of life imprisonment would be meet and proper. We are not inclined to impose any fine because having awarded the custodial sentence for life, there would be no possibility for awarding any default sentence in case of non-payment. We also do not propose to award any compensation in terms of S. 357 of the Code in view of what we propose to indicate later on. ( 16 ) BEFORE parting with the case, we would like to highlight certain features which have disturbed us. The modern penology stresses on reformation and on hating crime and not the criminal. The accused may be legally responsible for the heinous and bloodcurdling crime. We find that the parents allowed the relationship to blossom. Even in the Vedic times, the learned wisemen have said (in Sanskrit): "matra Swasra Duhitra Ba Na Bibikta Sano Bhabeet, Balaban Indriyagramo Bidwan Samapi Karsati". The accused may be legally responsible for the heinous and bloodcurdling crime. We find that the parents allowed the relationship to blossom. Even in the Vedic times, the learned wisemen have said (in Sanskrit): "matra Swasra Duhitra Ba Na Bibikta Sano Bhabeet, Balaban Indriyagramo Bidwan Samapi Karsati". Translated it means that do not sit at a lonely place even with your own mother, sister or daughter, because the Indriyas are so powerful that they can disturb even wisemen. The said classic also states; "sukhme Bhyopi Prasangebhya Striyo Rakhya Biseshata, Dwayokulahiyo. Sokambaheyur Rakhita". Translated it means, keep ladies away from even minimum of bad company, because if they go astray they bring disrepute to both the father and the husband's family. The family members of the deceased unmindful of the consequences allowed the deceased and the accused to have unguarded togetherness. They had time to soar high in the flights of fancy. The deceased described herself as "rini Simon" Virgin Mary" in her letters to the accused. An imaginative young mind was galloping gaily astride the unruly horse of youth. The consequences were expected, and it is not unnatural that there was emotional upheaval when the insolent parents suddenly woke up from their stupor, and tried to keep the deceased away from the company of the accused. Morally and ethically therefore, the members of the family are as much responsible for the tragedy as the accused. Law is deficient in this regard. It catches the man who pulls the trigger or wields a knife. The act of pulling the trigger or wielding a knife attracts culpability. But the man who creates a situation where the accused loses balance of mind and snatches a gun or a knife goes invariably unpunished. We are pained at the decadence that has set in, corroding the moral structure of the society. We hope that this case shall be an eye-opener to the insolent parents and families, who in the name of modernity of society, shut their eyes to the realities and consequences. As stated fore, a bright young life has been lost, and the merits and talents of another young person are likely to be wasted. Lost is our simplicity of times; the world abounds with laws, and teems with crimes. With readymade opinions one cannot judge of crime. Its philosophy is a little more complicated than people think. As stated fore, a bright young life has been lost, and the merits and talents of another young person are likely to be wasted. Lost is our simplicity of times; the world abounds with laws, and teems with crimes. With readymade opinions one cannot judge of crime. Its philosophy is a little more complicated than people think. It is acknowledged that neither convict prisons nor any system of hard labour ever cured a criminal. Law is intended to be punitive. It intends to act as a deterrent. The more heinous a crime, the more stringent is the statutory reprehension. In operating the sentencing system, the Court has a duty to adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. A vendetta may be the reason which appeared reasonable to a brilliant mind. But it is one which is cruel in its execution, and no amount of sentimental or mental background would justify the diabolic act. Revenge is a kind of wild justice, which the more men's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out. (Francis Bacon, Essays: Of Revenge ). Revenge, at first though sweet, Bitter ere long back on itself recoils. (Milton Paradise Lost ). Recompense to no man evil for evil (New Testament ). Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord (New Testament, Romans XII, 19, 20 ). At the same time society has a duty to prevent recurrence of such crimes. Therefore, while being conscious that we are dealing with an iron hand, which may lead to wastage of abundant talent of the accused, yet we have no hesitation in condemning the act albeit with a heavy heart. It is for the State to see what can be done for redemption of the accused or for utilisation of his talent. If dreaded dacoits can be rehabilitated for a change of heart, for furtherance of the call of reformation, there is no reason why the State shall falter in the case of accused Ashok. If bandit Ratnakar could become sage Valmiki, if classic De Profundis could be created inside the prison wall, the State should have no hesitation to utilise the talents of the accused. If bandit Ratnakar could become sage Valmiki, if classic De Profundis could be created inside the prison wall, the State should have no hesitation to utilise the talents of the accused. ( 17 ) IT flows from our conclusions that the appeal of the accused is to be dismissed, and that by the State is to be allowed by alteration of the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Judge described before to one u/ S. 302, IPC and imprisonment for life. We direct accordingly. The accused who is on bail is to surrender to custody forthwith. In case he does not surrender voluntarily, the trial Judge shall proceed in accordance with law for his apprehension. ( 18 ) S. C. MOHAPATRA, J. : I agree. Order accordingly.