ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition for the issue of a writ of certiorarified Mandamus to quash the order of the second respondent dated July 25, 1986 and dismissing the petitioner from the service of the first respondent Corporation and to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and backwages and other attendant benefits. 2. The petitioner joined the services of the first respondent Corporation as an Accountant, on May 9, 1979. The second respondent by the impugned order dated July 25, 1986 found that the acts of misconduct alleged against the petitioner and enumerated in the charge memos No. 2, 5 and 6 dated October 18, 1985, May 7, 1986, and June 23, 1986 respectively and referred to in the impugned order are established and consequently dismissed the petitioner from service. The acts of misconduct alleged in the charge memo No. 2 dated October 18, 1985 are as follows :- 1. That he had stayed away from the appointed place of duty from May 15, 1984. 2. That he had disobeyed the orders of his superiors. 3. That he had not followed the official rules in force. 3. In the charge memo No. 5 dated May 7, 1986, referred to in the impugned order, the following charges were framed against the petitioner :- 1. That he had failed to submit the accounts of Poompuhar Sales Showroom, Vellore, for the year 1984-85, till May 7, 1986. 2. That by the above act of omission, he had displayed gross negligence and default in the performance of his duties. 4. In the charge memo No. 6 dated June 23, 1986, the following charges were frame against the petitioner :- That he had not taken action promptly on internal audit reports during his tenure as Accountant in Poompuhar Design Centre from April 10, 1981 to June 6, 1982, resulting in pendency of 690 paras for over three months as on June 3, 1982, and during his tenure in Poompuhar Sales Showroom, Vellore, when he was also in charge of the defunct units Rosewood Carving Centre and Woollen Carpet Weaving Centre, since January 3, 1986, resulting in pendency of 173, 47 and 10 paras respectively for over three months as on June 23, 1986, as shown below : Period of audit Total paras raised Paras pending P.D.C., Madras. 1-5-78 to 31-3-81. 690 690 P.S.S.R., Vellore. 1-5-78 to 31-3-81. 690 690 P.S.S.R., Vellore. 1-4-77 to 31-3-85. 173 173 R.W.C.C., Vellore (Defunct). 1-12-81 to 30-11-83. 79 47 W.C.W.C., Wallajapet, (Defunct). 1-8-78 to 31-3-83. 61 10 5. The petitioner did not submit his explanation to any of the charge memos referred above. By the letter dated July 4, 1986, the petitioner was informed that the charges listed in the various charge memos will be head in person by the second respondent at 11 a.m. on July 15, 1986. The petitioner did not appear for the personal hearing fixed on July 15, 1986. In the above circumstances, the second respondent held that a formal enquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner was not called for and the requirements regarding enquiry were fully met by the charge memoranda and the hearing offered to the petitioner on July 15, 1986. The second respondent came to the conclusion that the failures relating to the performance of the employee's duties are clearly brought out by records and passed the impugned order dated July 25, 1986, dismissing the petitioner from services, holding that the charges framed against the petitioner in the charge memos 2, 5 and 6 referred above are established. 6. Ms. R. Viduthalai, the learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the case of the second respondent being that the service of the petitioner was dispensed with on a charge of misconduct, it could be done only with the support of a satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for the purpose and in the instant case, it is not the case of the second respondent that there was an enquiry conducted wherein any evidence was recorded, in support of the charge of misconduct. The learned counsel further submitted that Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules of the Tamil Nadu Handicrafts Development Corporation Ltd., hereinafter called the Service Rules, is mandatory in nature and whether the employee demanded an enquiry or not, whether the employee admitted the guilt or not and whether the employee participated in the enquiry or not, the employer if he wants to dispense with the service of the employee on a charge of misconduct, it must have the support of satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for that purpose. The learned counsel again submitted that the impugned order passed by the second respondent without conducting an enquiry as contemplated in Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules, is invalid and liable to be quashed. There is substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules reads as follows :- "No employer shall dispense with the service of a person employed continuously for a period of not less than 6 months except for reasonable cause and without giving such person atleast one month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice, provided however that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such person are dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for the purpose." In this case the service of the petitioner was dispensed with by the second respondent on a charge of misconduct. The Management of Viduthalai v. J. Dravida Arasu (1970) I.M.L.N. 3, Ismail J (as he then was) who had occasion to consider the scope and implication of Section 41(1) of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, which provision is similar to Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules, held that whether the employee admits the misconduct or not, the employer must conduct an enquiry to substantiate the misconduct on the basis of which the employer dispensed with the services of the employee, and in the absence of such an enquiry, the order of dismissal would be invalid. The learned Judge dealt with the point in the following language : "Here again, admittedly, no enquiry was conducted by the petitioner and no evidence was recorded to support the misconduct at such an enquiry. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that when the employee has admitted the misconduct, such an enquiry and recording of evidence is unnecessary. As the statute stands at present, I do not think that there is any scope for such an argument. Whether the employee admits the misconduct or not, the employer must conduct an enquiry and evidence must be recorded at the enquiry to substantiate the misconduct on the basis of which the employer dispensed with the services of the employee. As the statute stands at present, I do not think that there is any scope for such an argument. Whether the employee admits the misconduct or not, the employer must conduct an enquiry and evidence must be recorded at the enquiry to substantiate the misconduct on the basis of which the employer dispensed with the services of the employee. On the terms of the statute, in my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no such enquiry is necessary simply because the first-respondent had admitted his misconduct cannot stand." 8. In S.K. Raman Vs. The Management of Kundah Rural Cooperative Agricultural Society Ltd. and Another, (1987) 1 LLJ 487 , Nainarsundaram. J, following the principles laid down in 1970 I.M.L.J 3, held that enquiry should be held even if the employee admits the misconduct in the interview and gives a statement admitting the misconduct. Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules provides that when the services of an employee is dispensed with on a charge of misconduct it could be done only on the basis of satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for that purpose. In the instant case, in Paragraph 8 of the impugned order, the second respondent has observed as follows :- "The charges are based on records and a formal enquiry to bring the facts on record was not called for in any case. The requirements regarding an enquiry were therefore fully met by the charge memoranda and the hearing offered to him on July 15, 1986. In the absence of even a statement of his case by way of explanation there is no evidence to be brought on record." 9. The above observations of the second respondent in the impugned order clearly go to show that no enquiry was conducted by the second respondent with regard to the charges framed against the petitioner and that no evidence was recorded to prove the charge of misconduct against the petitioner as contemplated in Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules. Even in the counter-affidavit, it is not stated that evidence was recorded by the second respondent as contemplated in Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules. No doubt the petitioner has not submitted his explanation to any one of the charge memos and he failed to appear for the personal hearing on July 15, 1986. Even in the counter-affidavit, it is not stated that evidence was recorded by the second respondent as contemplated in Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules. No doubt the petitioner has not submitted his explanation to any one of the charge memos and he failed to appear for the personal hearing on July 15, 1986. Even when the petitioner failed to appear for the hearing on July 15, 1986, the second respondent should have conducted an enquiry by recording all the evidence available ex parte. In The Imperial Tobacco Company of India Ltd. Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1962 SC 1348 while dealing with the question, whether the enquiry officer can close the enquiry and pass an order of punishment when the workman withdraws from the enquiry, held as follows (pp. 415-416) : "Even though Akhileshwar Prasad (Workman) had withdrawn from the enquiry - whether rightly or wrongly - the enquiry should have been completed and all evidence should have been taken ex parte. Thereafter it was the duty of the Branch Manager to appraise that evidence and record his conclusion as to what misconduct had been proved and also to decide what punishment he intended to inflict." 10. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules is mandatory in nature and whether the employee demanded an enquiry or not, or whether the employee participated in the enquiry or not, if the employer wants to dispense with the services of the employee on a charge of misconduct, it must have the support of satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for that purpose. In the instant case, admittedly no evidence was recorded at an enquiry to prove the acts of misconduct alleged against the petitioner. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the findings of the second respondent are based only on the statements contained in the charge memos and on the materials available on record. The finding that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct cannot be based on mere charge memos which contain only certain accusations made against the petitioner, in the absence of satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for that purpose to substantiate the statements contained in the charge memos. The finding that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct cannot be based on mere charge memos which contain only certain accusations made against the petitioner, in the absence of satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for that purpose to substantiate the statements contained in the charge memos. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the impugned order passed by the second respondent on a consideration of the available records is valid, cannot be accepted because what is required by Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules is that the charge of misconduct alleged against the petitioner must be supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for that purpose. Further, the second respondent has not referred to the actual materials nor he has given any details of such materials on the basis of which the second respondent came to the conclusion that the various charges framed against the petitioner are proved. Again, the charges framed against the petitioner are elaborate and they required substantiation by evidence to be recorded at the enquiry. The reasoning of the second respondent in paragraph 8 of the impugned order that the requirements regarding an enquiry were fully met by the charge memoranda and the hearing offered to the petitioner on July 15, 1986 is clearly erroneous. 11. The second respondent has not followed Rule 5.4.5 of the Service Rules and the principles governing the case where the employer puts forth the of dispensing with the services of an employee on charges of misconduct and therefore the entire disciplinary action which culminated in the dismissal of the petitioner stood vitiated and the order challenged in this writ petition is liable to be set aside. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as against the order challenged in the writ petition, the petitioner has a right of appeal provided under Rule 5.5.1 of the Service Rules and the writ petition filed against the impugned order without exhausting the alternate remedy provided under Rule 5.5.1 of the Service Rules is not maintainable. As far as the petitioner is concerned, as per Rule 5.5.1 of the Service Rules, the appointing authority as well as the disciplinary authority is the Managing Director and the appellate authority is the Board, which is presided over by Chairman. As far as the petitioner is concerned, as per Rule 5.5.1 of the Service Rules, the appointing authority as well as the disciplinary authority is the Managing Director and the appellate authority is the Board, which is presided over by Chairman. The impugned order was passed by the Chairman himself under Rule 5.3.1 of the Service Rules which empowers any authority higher than the appointing authority to impose the penalties. It is stated in paragraph 2 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that the first respondent Corporation is managed by the Board of Directors, who are appointed by the Government of Tamil Nadu and the Board of Directors is headed by a Chairman, who is an officer of the Indian Administrative Service. The above averments in paragraph 2 of the affidavit is admitted as correct in paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit. In view of the fact that the Chairman himself has passed the impugned order, the appeal to the Board presided over by the Chairman himself, cannot be considered as an effective alternate remedy and the above reason given by the petitioner for not filing an appeal before the Board under Rule 5.5.1 of the Service Rules is a valid reason and it deserves acceptance. Even otherwise as the present writ petition which was admitted, had been kept pending for nearly five years and which was full argued on merits, it would not be proper to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of existence of alternate remedy. 13. Another objection raised in the counter affidavit is that the first respondent Corporation, being a company registered under the Companies Act is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is admitted that the first respondent Corporation, which is a company incorporated as per the provisions of the Companies Act 1956, is wholly owned by the Government of Tamil Nadu. The Articles of Association shows that the first respondent Corporation apart from being fully owned by the Government of Tamil Nadu is subject to the complete control of the State Government. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the first respondent Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. This view of mine derives support from the decision of this court in R. Eucharista Vs. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the first respondent Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. This view of mine derives support from the decision of this court in R. Eucharista Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (1980) 2 LLJ 363 . 14. The above discussion of mine obliges me to interfere with the impugned order in writ jurisdiction. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed, the order terminating the services of the petitioner is quashed and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of services, backwages and other attendant benefits. No costs.