Judgment 1. The writ application is directed against the order dated 23-11-1983 passed by Shri V. Balasubrahmanyan, Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, Patna in case No. 329 of 1983 by which he declined to entertain the revision application of the petitioner on the sole ground that the petitioner had not deposited 40% of the certificate dues at the time of filing of the application. A certificate proceeding was initiated on 13-11-1976 against the petitioner. During the pendency of the certificate proceeding before the Certificate Officer, an amendment was inserted in the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 by Bihar Public Demands Recovery (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Bihar Act 46 of 1982). The above mentioned amendment reads as follows. "Provided that no revision petition shall be entertained by any authority unless the certificate debtor deposits 40% of the certificate dues at the time of its filing :- " 2 The certificate officer passed his order on 19-12-1982. Aggrieved by the order of the certificate officer, the petitioner filed revision application first in the court of District Magistrate and Collector, Gridih and subsequently, before the Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar vide Annexures-2 and 3 respectively. Both of which were rejected on the preliminary ground that as the petitioner had not deposited 40% of the certificate dues, his application was not maintainable. The aforesaid writ petition has been filed on the sole ground that as the certificate proceeding was initiated before the Amended Act came into force, as such the petitioner was not required to deposit 40% of the certificate dues before filing of the revision application. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1953 SC 221 (Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh) as well as a judgment of this court reported in 1988 BBCJ (HC) 767. Both the judgments have at length discussed as to what would be the effect of an amendment which is brought during the pendency of a case. It has been held that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an inferior court to a superior court becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in and before a decision is given by, the inferior court. It has been held that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an inferior court to a superior court becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in and before a decision is given by, the inferior court. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifest by express words or necessary implication. 3. A reliance is also made on the case reported in AIR 1960 SC 980 (State of Bombay V/s. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case have held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. 4. Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of member, Board of Revenue, also conceded that right of revision is a statutory right of a citizen and it cannot be impaired with retrospective effect by an amendment in the statute unless it is so expressly said in the statute. Admittedly, in the present case, the certificate case was instituted as back as 13-11-1976. The Amendment Act 46 of 1982 was inserted in S. 62 of Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act much after the initiation of the certificate proceeding against the petitioner. As such, the right of appeal had vested in the petitioner on 13-11-1976 itself. So far the reasons given above, I am of the view that the petitioners revision should not have been dismissed by the District Magistrate and Collector, Gridih and by the Member, Board of Revenue, Patna vide Annexures-2 and 3 respectively only on the ground that the petitioner had not deposited 40% of the dues and as such the application is allowed, Annexures-2 and 3 are quashed and the case is remanded back to the Respondent No. 4, the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih, who shall now dispose of the case on merits in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.