V. T. KRISHNAMOORTHY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1991 DIGILAW 200 (KAR)

S. MOHAN, C. J. ( 1 ) THE short facts leading to this writ petition are as follows: - the property in question which is a building, is sought to be acquired for public purpose, to wit, for construction of hmt Ltd. Corporate head office administrative building and multi storeyed building for administrative office for the vysya bank Ltd. The acquisition is under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' ). Preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) of the act was issued on 19-6-1982 and was published in Karnataka gazette on 1-7-1982. During the statutory enquiry under Section 5-a, the objection was that the khatedar and' anubhavdar as notified in Section 4 (1) notification as v. t. padmanabhan mudaliar had died on 22-7-1980, and therefore the said notification was bad. This objection was overruled. Equally the other objection opposing the acquisition was also overruled. Thereafter the declaration under Section 6 (1) of the act was made on 19-2-1983 and was published in the gazette on 24-2-1983. The special land acquisition officer, thereafter, issued notice to the petitioners for filing the statement of claim, on 14-3-19s3. Without prejudice to the petitioner's rights a common statement of claim was filed on 31-3-1983. When the claim statement of the petitioners was pending consideration, the owner of the adjoining premises bearing No. 21, m. g. road, Bangalore, preferred writ petition No. 8356/1983 challenging both the preliminary and final notifications dated 19-6-1982 and 19-2-1983 respectively. In that writ petition, Rule nisi was issued and a stay was granted on 22-4-1983. The petitioners were under the bona fide impression that in view of the Rule nisi and the stay Order, further acquisition proceedings could not be gone into. While the matter stood thus, the special l. a. o. issued notice on 20-7-1983 to the petitioners, convening a meeting on 22-7-1983. During that meeting, the l. a. o. was apprised thai having regard to the pendency of W. P. No. 8356/1983 the further proceedings should not lake place; all the more so because, W. P. Nos. While the matter stood thus, the special l. a. o. issued notice on 20-7-1983 to the petitioners, convening a meeting on 22-7-1983. During that meeting, the l. a. o. was apprised thai having regard to the pendency of W. P. No. 8356/1983 the further proceedings should not lake place; all the more so because, W. P. Nos. 8430 to 8434/1983 have come to be filed by the petitioners themselves challenging the acquisition of the front portion of no, 22, m. g. road, under the urban land (ceiling and regulations) Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as ceiling act), which had resulted in the issue of Rule nisi and interim stay, and even from this point of view the acquisition proceedings should not be continued. Though for some time no action was taken, the third respondent-the special l. a. o.- called upon respondents 4 and 5 to deposit funds with him for finalisation of acquisition proceedings. It is under these circumstances, the present writ petition No. 22444/1983 has come to be preferred as this would be detrimental to the interests of the petitioners. ( 2 ) THE grounds urged in support of this writpetition are: the acquisition is for a company and therefore the mandatory requirements of part-vii of the act and the Provisions of the land acquisition (companies) rules, 1973, ought to have been followed. In the absence of that, the impugned notifications are bad in law. Section 39 of the act lays down that the Provisions of sections 6 to 37 shall not be put in force to acquire land for companies unless the company executes an agreement as required to in the subsequent section. Before such an agreement is entered into, the government must give its previous consent for acquisition. Earlier to giving that consent an enquiry must be held under Section 40, and thereafter the agreement must be entered into. That agreement requires to be published under Section 42. To the best of the information of the petitioners, no such enquiry was held, nor has there been any publication of the agreement in the gazette. Therefore, for non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of sections 40 and 42 of the Act, the acquisition is vitiated and invalid in law. Under rule-4 of the aforementioned rules, an elaborate enquiry into specified matters is required to be conducted. Therefore, for non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of sections 40 and 42 of the Act, the acquisition is vitiated and invalid in law. Under rule-4 of the aforementioned rules, an elaborate enquiry into specified matters is required to be conducted. Thereafter a report should be submitted, which is a condition precedent to the declaration under Section 6. That has not been followed in this case. No public purpose is served by acquiring the property in question. As a result, the protection afforded to the petitioners under Article 300-a of the Constitution is nullified. ( 3 ) IN the statement of objections filed by the state, the stand taken is that the fourth respondent is a company owned by the government of India. Part-vii of the act applies only to companies registered under the Companies Act and it does not apply to the government controlled companies. The Supreme Court has held that the company rules would not apply if there is government's contribution to the acquisition. Therefore there is no flaw in the acquisition. ( 4 ) RESPONDENT-4 in its statement of objections,would state that the company has been requesting the government of Karnataka from 1972 for granting suitable land for its corporate office. The government offered one acre of land in sankey road. The company paid a sum of Rs. 9,68,000/- towards the same on 1-4-1977. Subsequently the said offer was withdrawn by the government on the ground that it was a residential area. Further, the land was required by the government itself for building houses for ministers. It agreed to give suitable alternate land elsewhere. Therefore, the government is bound by the agreement to provide land for this company. The fact is evidenced by the first respondent's notice of meeting dated 4-1-1982 and the proceedings of the meeting dated 6-1-1982. The company itself made numerous efforts to acquire land but it was unsuccessful. The assumption of the petitioners that the acquisition should be under part-vii of the act is without any basis. Respondent-4 has further stated in its statement of objections thus:-"this respondent is a government company wholly owned by the central government and the government of Karnataka only after satisfying itself the public purpose has issued the declaration. The assumption of the petitioners that the acquisition should be under part-vii of the act is without any basis. Respondent-4 has further stated in its statement of objections thus:-"this respondent is a government company wholly owned by the central government and the government of Karnataka only after satisfying itself the public purpose has issued the declaration. This respondent is one of the leading public sector undertakings in the country with 16 manufacturing units and 20 product divisions spread over in 10 different states in the country, besides it is also having many subsidiary, associate and assisted companies. And it is exporting its products to about 70 different countries in the world. And its corporate head offices are at present located in 6 different rented buildings spread over in different parts of the city of Bangalore and co-ordination of its activity is very cumbersome and uneconomical at the moment, therefore it is absolutely necessary that its corporate offices are located under a single roof, hence the lands including the petitioners' land have been acquired by the government. " ( 5 ) RESPONDENT-5-THE vysya bank - in its statement of objections, contends as follows:-"it is true that under a notification No. Laq (iii) sr 17 (1981-82), dated 19th June under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act published in the Karnataka gazette dated 1-7-1982, portion of premises no, 22, mahatma gandhi road and adjoining premises were proposed to be acquired. The name of the anubhavdar and khatedar it is ascertained was mentioned as mentioned in the registers as v. t. padmanabha mudaliar the eldest brother of petitioners 1 and 2 who appears to have been the manager of the family. The properties appears to have stood in his name in the corporation register. . . . . . It is admitted that a final notification under Section 6 was published on 24th february, 1983. The legal representatives of padmanabha mudaliar participated in the proceedings and all the persons concerned and who were the owners were parties. There is no misleading or misstatement. . . . . . . . . It is true that this respondent have been called upon to deposit funds with the third respondent for finalisation of the acquisition has deposited Rs. There is no misleading or misstatement. . . . . . . . . It is true that this respondent have been called upon to deposit funds with the third respondent for finalisation of the acquisition has deposited Rs. , it is denied that there is any violation of any of the Provisions of the Karnataka land acquisition Companies Rules or that the proceedings are illegal and not in conformity with the Provisions of law. It is not true that petitioners are being deprived of their undivided share of property arbitrarily and unlawfully in gross violation of any guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution or that any constitutional right protected under Article 300-a is violated. . . " ( 6 ) THOUGH, as stated above, several ground shave been urged in support of the writ petition, before us Mr. S. g. sundaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioners, would confine himself to only two questions namely: - (I) acquisition being one essentially for the companies, procedure under part-vii must have been followed; and (ii) reckoned from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the act i. e. , 24-2-1983, the award had come to be passed beyond two years stipulated under the proviso to Section 11-a of the act. Therefore the acquisition is bad. ( 7 ) MR, sundaraswamy contended that as the acquisition is one essentially for companies, the procedure under part-vii of the act must have been followed, and failure to follow the same will vitiate the acquisition. It is not the stand of the state government that this procedure was followed, and therefore, on this short ground the acquisition is liable to be set aside. Even otherwise, this is a case in which there is a gross violation of section 11-a of the act. That Section had come to be introduced by amending act No. 68/1984. The object of that Section is to cut down the delay in matters of this kind. Therefore, the Section specifically provides that if no award is made within two years from the date of the publication of Section 6 declaration the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. In the instant case, the declaration under Section 6 was published on 24-2-1983. The period of two years has to be reckoned only from that date. So done, it is barred by limitation. In the instant case, the declaration under Section 6 was published on 24-2-1983. The period of two years has to be reckoned only from that date. So done, it is barred by limitation. Therefore, the entire proceedings shall lapse. Nor again, in this case, the explanation to Section 11-a of the act could be invoked by the respondents because the interim order granted by this court on 20-12-1983 is only in relation to dispossession though, of course, the prayer was couched in wider language so as to include both Section 4 (1) and Section 6 (1), notifications. A memo was filed on 30-12-1983 intimating the grant of stay, and the same was received by the l. a. o. on the same day. The interim order of stay was received by the respondents on 2-1- 1984. The draft award came to be passed on 9-5-1983. I. a. No. I was prepared on 9-9-1985 for vacating the stay and that came to be filed on 20-9-1985. Therefore, it cannot be urged that the stay will come into play. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on AIR 1991 guj. 12 , kikabhai ukabhai patel v state. In that case, further action pursuant to Section 6 declaration was stayed. But here there was no impediment to pass the award. In AIR 1987 SC 1161 , gokak patel volkart Ltd. V collector of central excise, belgaum, the high court had directed stay of collection only. Therefore there was no bar for issue of notice or levy of duty. Consequently, the benefit of Section 11-a of the central excise and salt act was held not available. As to how an explanation is to be construed, could be gathered from AIR 1985 SC 582 ,s. Sundaram v v. r. pattabhiraman. Posing the question as to what is the scope of a proviso and the ambit of an explanation it is answered in para-45 that the explanation is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term. It is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which might have crept in the statutory provision. In fact, para-52 brings out fully the object of an explanation. So construed, it cannot be said that by reason of the explanation contained in Section 11-a the government could have longer period. It is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which might have crept in the statutory provision. In fact, para-52 brings out fully the object of an explanation. So construed, it cannot be said that by reason of the explanation contained in Section 11-a the government could have longer period. Again in AIR 1977 SC 915 ,d. g. mahajan v State of maharashtra the same principle is reiterated at page 928. In AIR 1969 SC 30 , jang bahadur singh v baijnath which was a case relating to contempt of court, it was held that where a domestic enquiry into the misconduct of an employee was held during the pendency of parallel enquiry before court, in the absence of a stay order it would not constitute contempt. Likewise, in this case there was no bar for passing of the award. In AIR 1968 SC 1050 , t. g. gaokar v r. n, shukla, it was held that during the pendency of the criminal prosecution of a person in connection with the smuggling of gold, should the customs officer in good faith initiate penalty proceedings against him on the same set of facts it would not amount to contempt. In AIR 1974 SC 642 , k. t. chandy v m. r. zade it was held that where pending a civil suit filed by the employee challenging the employer's notice to terminate the contract of service, no interim injunction was asked for, and the employer issued a second notice terminating the services, the employer's act would not constitute contempt of court, similar is the position here. The learned counsel also cites AIR 1974 SC 1692 , a. p. co-operative bank v c. p. co-operative l. m. bank in this behalf. Then AIR 1975 SC 2065 superintendent of taxes v o. n. trust is cited and reliance is placed on paragraph-17. That case deals with a situation where the power of the state to issue notice under Section 7 of the Assam taxation act remained unaffected by court proceedings. Reliance is also placed on v. g. ramachandran's law of land acquisition, 7th edition, page 406. Learned counsel also cites AIR 1980 KAR. 22 , jammada aivappa v State in which it was held that where there was no stay for the issue of Section 6 declaration, mere pendency of the proceedings will be no bar for issuing such a declaration. Learned counsel also cites AIR 1980 KAR. 22 , jammada aivappa v State in which it was held that where there was no stay for the issue of Section 6 declaration, mere pendency of the proceedings will be no bar for issuing such a declaration. Lastly the learned counsel cites AIR 1988 Kerala 280, 5. Bavaijan sahib v State in support of his arguments. ( 8 ) THE learned advocate-general would submitthat passing of award under Section 11 of the act itself would mean an enquiry with reference to the measurements made under Section 8 and into the value of the land and the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation. The award is to be made with reference to true area of the land, and then the apportionment of compensation. Where, therefore, any one of the actions in relation to this is stayed, that will be good enough to bring in the operation of explanation to Section 11-a. 'action' has been construed to have wide signification and 'an/ other proceedings in which the rights are determined. Therefore, if that action is stayed, the explanation to Section 11-a would enure to the benefit of the state. The word 'any1 is defined in page 92 of "words and phrases legally defined" butterworths, third edition, vol. I, as a word of very wide meaning and prima facie the use of it excludes limitation. Likewise, 'proceedings' covers any proceedings of legal nature or an enquiry in which evidence has been given. In the explanation it is not staled that the period of two years is to be excluded only if the further proceeding pursuant to the declaration under Section 6 is stayed. But what has been stated is "the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded. " Therefore, the words 'action or proceeding' relate to the declaration made under Section 6. Entering upon a land for the purpose of measurement and taking possession of the land are also 'action' to be taken pursuant to the declaration made under Section 6 (1 ). " Therefore, the words 'action or proceeding' relate to the declaration made under Section 6. Entering upon a land for the purpose of measurement and taking possession of the land are also 'action' to be taken pursuant to the declaration made under Section 6 (1 ). When there is an interim order granted by this court on 20-12-1983 staying dispossession, as long as that interim order is in existence that period is to be excluded in computing the period of two years referred to in Section 11-a. ( 9 ) MR. R. N. narasimha murthy, learned counsel appearing for respondcnt-4, would submit that Section 11 -a of the act should not be considered in isolation. This must be construed along with Section 9 which talks of notice to persons interested, intending to take possession of the land. When this is read in conjunction with Section 17 it will be clearly seen that Section 17 came to be modified only on 24-9-1984 because of the deletion of the words "waste or arable". On that date if they wanted to issue a notification that had been interdicted by reason of the stay granted on 20-12-1983. Therefore, merely contending that only stay of dispossession has been granted and there was no impediment to pass the award, is not correct. The explanation is very wide in its scope; it talks of any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration. Section 6 (1) explanation again uses the words 'action or proceeding'. Section 6 (3) says that after making of the such declaration the government may acquire the land. Therefore, 'acquire' is the action, and 'proceeding' is in relation to compensation. Consequently, if action or proceeding is stayed by the court, definitely it would enure to the benefit of the government. Mr. Narasimha murthy relied on AIR 1973 SC 1034 , Hiralal Ratanlal v S. T. O. T. S. III, kanpur and laid stress on paragraphs 21 and 24 wherein it has been held that courts have to find out the true intention of the legislature, and if an explanation has widened the scope of the main Section it should be so construed.- thus it is submitted that Section 11-a of the act is to be understood in the context in which it appears. ( 10 ) MR. ( 10 ) MR. H. b. datar, learned counsel appearing for rcspondent-5, adopts the arguments of the learned advocate-general and of Mr. Narasimha murthy. As regards public purpose, he relies on 1988 (3) KAR. Lj. 34, narayan raju v State of kamataka, and submits that that case fully explains the scope of public purpose, and it squarely applies to this case. Against this decision, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court and leave was refused. ( 11 ) WE will now take up the two points - oneby one - urged by Mr. Sundaraswamy. Point No. 1: the definite stand of the state is that this is a case of acquisition under part-ii of the act because there is contribution from the public revenue. Therefore, part-vii of the act does not apply. Having regard to this, it is impossible for the petitioners to contend that the Provisions of part-vii ought to have been followed. It is well settled in law that even if the acquisition is for a company, so long as there is contribution from the public revenue, and if the government is satisfied that the acquisition is for a public purpose, that is enough compliance with the requirement of law. In this case, Section 6 (1) declaration is final and conclusive. In AIR 1984 SC 120 , manubhai v State of gujarat it was held in para-3 thus:-". . . . . THE first contention canvassed by him on behalf of the appellants is that the gujarat state road transport corporation is a company within the meaning of the expression in the Companies Act as well as in part vii of the Land Acquisition Act and this being an acquisition for a company it was obligatory to comply with the Provisions contained in part vii as well as company acquisition rules and that admittedly having not been done, the acquisition is contrary to law, illegal and invalid. Land is indisputably acquired for the benefit of gujarat state road transport corporation which is a company. Even where land is acquired for a company, the state government has the power to acquire land for a public purpose from the revenue of the state. In other words, this is an acquisition for public purpose with contribution from the state revenue. The state is acquiring land to carry out public purpose with the instrumentality of the gujarat state road transport corporation. In other words, this is an acquisition for public purpose with contribution from the state revenue. The state is acquiring land to carry out public purpose with the instrumentality of the gujarat state road transport corporation. It is not an acquisition for a company with the funds exclusively provided by the company which would attract part vii of the Land Acquisition Act. In our opinion, the high court is right in reaching the conclusion that neither part vii of the Land Acquisition Act nor the company acquisition rules would be attracted. Therefore, we are in agreement with the conclusions reached by the high court. "it cannot be denied that the acquisition is for a public purpose. The scope of 'public purpose' has come to be laid down in narayana raju's case, 1988 (3) KAR. Lj. 34 : ILR 1989 KAR. 376. We may also note that leave to appeal against this decision has been rejected by the Supreme Court as seen in page 8 of the said citation. This case, therefore, fully supports the view that the acquisition is for a public purpose. Hence we reject this point. ( 12 ) POINT No. 2;coming to point No. 2, we will now extract Section 11-a of the act:-"11-A. The collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the land acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation: in computing the period of two years referred to in this Section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded. "this Section came to be introduced by Section 9 of the land acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (no. 68 of 1984 ). The said amending act came into force on 24-9-1984. As already stated, the draft award was passed on 9-5-1983 and that was forwarded to the government with a letter on 17-9-1983. The writ petition came to be filed on 19-12-1983. 68 of 1984 ). The said amending act came into force on 24-9-1984. As already stated, the draft award was passed on 9-5-1983 and that was forwarded to the government with a letter on 17-9-1983. The writ petition came to be filed on 19-12-1983. Rule nisi and interim order of stay of dispossession was issued on 20-12-1983. i. a. i. was filed for vacating the interim Order, on 20-9-1985. The object of Section 11-a, as we could see, is to speed up the acquisition proceedings since the delay will affect the parties to a great extent. The main Section 11-a imposes an obligation to make the award within a period of two years from the date of publication of Section 6 (1) declaration. Not only there is an obligation, but as to what will be the consequence of not carrying with that obligation is also talked of under this section. It says that if the award is not made within that period the entire acquisition proceedings would lapse. However, what is important for our purpose is the scope of the explanation. In this case, admittedly there was an interim order of stay of dispossession on 20-12-1983. According to Mr. Sundaraswamy this does not prevent the passing of the award in so far as what was in June ted was taking possession. The question is whether that construction is correct. It has to be carefully noted that the explanation is very comprehensively worded. It says: "the period during which any action or proceeding to e taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed. . . . " First and foremost we have got to ascertain the meaning of the words "any action or proceeding". The same kind of explanation is found in Section 6 as well, and that explanation was also inserted by the amending act 68/1984 one case which directly deals with explanation to section 11-a is AIR 1988 Kerala 280, bavajan sahib v state. Paragraph-7 of the said judgment reads:-"7. The explanation states that in computing the period of two years aforesaid the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of the court shall be excluded. Paragraph-7 of the said judgment reads:-"7. The explanation states that in computing the period of two years aforesaid the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of the court shall be excluded. The period of two years is prescribed for the passing of award under Section 11-a. The action or proceeding contemplated by the explanation is therefore any action or proceeding to be taken after the making of the declaration under Section 6 and before the passing of the award under Section 11. Such actions are those contemplated by sections 7 to 10. The question of taking possession of the land arises only when the award is passed, under Section 16 of the Act, except in case of urgency covered by Section 17. This is not a case in respect of which Section 17 has been invoked. Therefore the position is that unless there was a stay of the proceedings contemplated by sections 7 to 10 or of further proceedings pursuant to the declaration under Section 6 the explanation will not operate so as to extend the period of two years prescribed by Section 11-a. The order from this court was only against proceedings for taking possession of the petitioner's land, which is only a post-award operation. There was therefore nothing standing in the way of the land acquisition officer from taking further proceedings pursuant to the declaration under Section 6 and passed the award under Section 11 within two years. The explanation to Section 11-a cannot therefore avail the 4th respondent to gel extension of the period of two years prescribed by Section 11-a. "this case is very much relied on by Mr. Sundaraswamy. But, we are clearly of the view, as rightly contended by Mr. Narasimha murthy, that this explanation cannot be read in isolation. One must have regard to Section 9 of the act which talks of public notice manifesting the intention of the government to take possession of the land. Having regard to the fact that in Section 17 (1) of the act the words 'waste or arable had come to be omitted only by the amending act 68/1984 w. e. f. 24-9-1984, it was well open to the government to have issued a notice under sec tion 17 and then proceed to take possession. Having regard to the fact that in Section 17 (1) of the act the words 'waste or arable had come to be omitted only by the amending act 68/1984 w. e. f. 24-9-1984, it was well open to the government to have issued a notice under sec tion 17 and then proceed to take possession. That has been prevented by the stay order of this, court. Besides, as we have just now mentioned, in explanation to Section 6 (1) the same language is found in relation to grant of stay by the court. Here what is important is the explanation talks of 'action or proceeding' in pursuance of the said declaration. That means, the entire gamut of the statutory Provisions after Section 6 will come into play. In this regard, it requires to be noted that Section 6 (3) states as follows:" (3) the said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be, and, after making such declaration the appropriate government may require the land in manner hereinafter appearing. "therefore, if after making the declaration the government is unable to acquire the land, the question would arise, what exactly is meant by 'action' and what exactly meant by 'proceeding'. There is a disjunctive clause in the explanation: "action or proceeding". The meaning of 'action' cannot be anything else excepting acquisition which is enabled under Section 6 (3 ). 'proceeding' means proceeding relating to compensation. Therefore, we feel that in construing the explanation regard must be had to this background. More importantly, if the construction placed by Mr. Sundaraswamy is to be accepted, the language would have been 'in relation to making the award' instead of "any action or proceeding in pursuance of such declaration". It is this narrow construction on the comprehensive language used in the explanation that is sought to be advanced. We are unable to agree. As to what is the meaning of explanation, we could gather from 2 important rulings. In AIR 1985 SC 582 , S. Sundaram v v. r. pattabhiraman it is stated thus in paragraphs 45 to 47:-"45. We have now to consider as to what is the impact of the explanation on the proviso which deals with the question of willful default. In AIR 1985 SC 582 , S. Sundaram v v. r. pattabhiraman it is stated thus in paragraphs 45 to 47:-"45. We have now to consider as to what is the impact of the explanation on the proviso which deals with the question of willful default. Before, however, we embark on an enquiry into this difficult and delicate question, we must appreciate the intent, purpose and legal effect of an explanation. It is now well settled that an explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the word itself shows it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory provision. Sarathi in 'interpretation of statutes' while dwelling on the various aspects of an explanation observes as follows: " (a) the object of an explanation is to understand the act in the light of the explanation. (b) it does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original Section which it explains, but only makes the meaning clear beyond dispute. "46. Swarup in 'legislation and interpretation' very aptly sums up the scope and effect of an explanation thus: 'sometimes an explanation is appended to stress upon a particular thing which ordinarily would not appear clearly from the provision of the section. The proper function of an explanation is to make plain or elucidate what is enacted in the substantive provision and not to add or subtract from it. Thus an explanation docs not either restrict or extend the enacting part; it does not enlarge or narrow down the scope of the original Section that it is supposed to explain. . . The explanation must be interpreted according to its own tenor; that it is meant tp explain and not vice versa. 47. Bindra in 'interpretation of statutes' (5th edition) at page 67 states thus: 'an explanation does not enlarge the scope of the original Section that it is supposed to explain. It is axiomatic that an explanation only explains and does not expand or add to the scope of the original section. . . . . The purpose of an explanation is however not to limit the scope of the main provision. . . It is axiomatic that an explanation only explains and does not expand or add to the scope of the original section. . . . . The purpose of an explanation is however not to limit the scope of the main provision. . . The construction of the explanation must depend upon its terms, and no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used. An explanation must be interpreted according to its own tenor. ' then again ultimately it is concluded in para- graph-56 as follows: "if we analyse the various concomitants of the explanation, the position seems to be that- (a) there should be default to pay or lender rent; (b) the default should continue even after the landlord has issued two months notice claiming the arrears of rent; (c) if, despite notice, the arrears are not paid the tenant is said to have committed a willful default and consequently liable to be evicted forthwith. "but, we are of the view that the true intention of the parliament must be had in mind. If we look at AIR 1973 SC 1034 Hiralal Ratanlal v S. T. O. , S. III, Kanpur in paragraph-21 it was held as follows:"21. It was next urged that on a true construction of explanation II to Section 3-d, no charge can be said to have been treated on the purchases of split of processed pulses. It was firstly contended that an explanation cannot extend scope of the main Section, it can only explain that section. In construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost Rule of construction is the literary construction. All that we have to see at the very outset is what does this provision say? If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision, the legislative intent is not clear, we need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear. Ordinarily a proviso to a Section is intended to take out a part of the main Section for special treatment. It is not expected to enlarge the scope of the main section. The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear. Ordinarily a proviso to a Section is intended to take out a part of the main Section for special treatment. It is not expected to enlarge the scope of the main section. But cases have arisen in which this court has held that despite the fact that a provision is called proviso, it is really a separate provision and the so called proviso has substantially altered the main section. . . . . "again paragraph-24 it was held thus:"on the basis of the language of the explanation this court held that it did not widen the scope of clause (c ). But from what has been said in the case, it is clear that if on a true reading of an explanation it appears that it has widened the scope of the main Section, effect must be given to legislative intent not with standing the fact that the legislature named that provision as an explanation. In all these matters the court have to find out the true intention of the legislature. "therefore, the explanation is not to be construed in the narrow manner in which the petitioners would want to have it. Nor again the petitioners could take advantage of the stay and complain that the award had not been passed within the stipulated time. It is one of the settled principles of law that an act of court shall prejudice no man: actus curiae neminem gravabit. Having regard to comprehensive words viz. "any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration" used in the explanation and having regard to the fact that the explanation cannot be considered in isolation, we cannot hold thai what has "been stayed by this court is only taking of possession and that the government was free to pass the award. It is at this stage the reliance placed by the learned advocate-general on the me: rung of 'action', 'any, 'proceeding' becomes relevant. In 'words and phrases - legally defined (but- terworths) third edition, vol. I, page 31, it is said:"action means any civil proceedings commenced by writ or in any other manner prescribed by rules of court. It is at this stage the reliance placed by the learned advocate-general on the me: rung of 'action', 'any, 'proceeding' becomes relevant. In 'words and phrases - legally defined (but- terworths) third edition, vol. I, page 31, it is said:"action means any civil proceedings commenced by writ or in any other manner prescribed by rules of court. It has wide signification as including any method prescribed by those rules of invoking the court's jurisdiction for the adjudication or determination of a lis or legal right or claim or any justiciable issue, question or contest arising between two or more persons or affecting the status of one of them. In its natural meaning 'action' refers to any proceeding in the nature of a litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant. It includes any civil proceedings in which there is a plaintiff who sues and a defendant who is sued, in respect of some cause of action, as contrasted with proceedings, such as statutory proceedings which are embraced in the word 'matter' (37 halsbury"s laws (4th edition), para 17. ")AGAIN in page-33 it is stated:". . . . 'action' in the sense of a judicial proceedings includes recoupment, counterclaim, set-off, suit in equity and any other proceedings in which rights are determined. " In page-92, the word 'any' has been defined: " 'any' is a word of very wide meaning and prima facie the use of it excludes limitation. Clarke-jervoise v scutt, 1920 (1) ch. 382 at 387, 388, per eve, J. "in page 430 (vol. 3) it is said:"civil proceedings the fact that a proceeding has elements of inquiry or inquisition and that the public interest is involved are not at all inconsistent with describing the proceeding as civil. These features are present to some degree in many cases concerning, for instance, paternity, custody or guardianship - proceedings which are clearly civil. Pallin v department of social welfare, 7983 NZLR 266 at 269, ca, per Cooke, J. Legal proceedings 'legal proceedings' means any civil or criminal proceeding or inquiry in which evidence is or may be given, and includes an arbitration. Pallin v department of social welfare, 7983 NZLR 266 at 269, ca, per Cooke, J. Legal proceedings 'legal proceedings' means any civil or criminal proceeding or inquiry in which evidence is or may be given, and includes an arbitration. (bankers' books Evidence Act, 1879.)"in AIR 1987 SC 1161 , gokak patei volkart Ltd. V collector, central excise, belgaum it was stated in paragraph-5 as follows: -"the high court having directed slay of collection had, therefore, not given any interim direction in the matter of issue of notice or levy of the duty. The explanation in clear terms refers to stay of service of notice. The order of the high court did not at all refer to service of notice. Therefore, there is force in the submission of the appellant that the benefit of the explanation is not available in the facts of the case. "that was a case of stay of mere collection of excise duty and the proceedings under Section 11-a of the central excise and salt act could go on. Air 1969 SC 30 , jang bahadur singh v baijanath is a case relating to contempt; likewise AIR 1968 SC 1050 . In AIR 1974 SC 642 , k. t. chandy v m. r. zade headnote reads as follows:"where pending a civil suit filed by the employee challenging the employer's notice to terminate the contract of service, no interim injunction was asked for, and the employer-defendant issued second notice terminating the services, the employer's act would not constitute contempt of court. "in AIR 1975 SC 2065 , superintendent of taxes v o. n. trust, paragraphs 63 to 65 are to the following effect:-"63-64. If it shocks one's conscience to think that the mere fact that the high court's orders prohibiting the commissioner from proceeding under the act should completely frustrates the intentions of a statute which was ultimately found by this court to be quite valid and existing for the relevant period in the eye of law, it should disturb one's equanimity no less that those who represented or advised the taxing authorities of the state should not have brought to the notice of the high court the great loss to the exchequer of the state and the possible automatic victory which the respondents may secure by mere lapse of time. The high court would, I have no doubt, have suitably modified its orders to meet the requirements of law and Justice in such cases if the possible consequences of its orders had been brought to its notice, 65. In agreement with my lord the chief justice, 1 do not think that taxing authorities of the state were faced with a situation which could approximate to one. Where the "act of god" had robbed them of the power to act or that they could not possibly have done anything at all within the time affixed by Section 7, sub-section (2) of the act. I fully share the view that the taxing authorities were inexcusably non-chalant or unconcerned about the possible consequences of their neglect or inactivity upon the revenues of the state. It was at least the duty of the party adversely affected to have brought the relevant Provisions of the law to the notice of the court before it issued the injunctions, or, at any rate, even afterwards but within the time prescribed for the notice under Section 7 (2) of the act. A party affected cannot go to sleep over its rights and then attempt to shift the blame on to the court for the consequences which flow from the orders passed so that it may be able to plead "actus curiae neminem gravabit" (an act of the court shall prejudice no man)". Such a plea appears to me to be disingenuous it cannot apply to a case where the damage done to the powers of the taxing authorities was attributable to their own remisness or to that of their legal advisers. " All these cases relate to totally different situations unlike what we have on hand. One other factor which we cannot lose sight of is, the award in this case was signed on 9-5-1983. This means the award had been made. " All these cases relate to totally different situations unlike what we have on hand. One other factor which we cannot lose sight of is, the award in this case was signed on 9-5-1983. This means the award had been made. As to what is the meaning of making the award' has come to be laid down in AIR 1989 SC 239 , kaliyappan v State of Kerala in which it is stated in paragraph-"5 as follows:"under Section 11-a of the act the collector is empowered to make an award before the expiry of the period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the act and in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the land acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 before the expiry of the period of two years from the date of its commencement. If an award is not made within the prescribed period of two years in either case, it is open to the person interested in the land to approach the collector and tell him that the acquisition proceedings should be dropped unless the collector is able to produce before him an award made by him within the period of two years. He may also in such a case question the continuance of the acquisition proceeding in court. Thus no prejudice will be caused to the person interested in the land. At the same time it would not be open to a person interested in the land to get rid of the acquisition of proceeding by avoiding service of notice issued by the collector within the prescribed period. We are of the view that under Section 11-a of the act the words "the collector shall make an award. . . Within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration" mean that the collector is empowered to make an award till the expiry of the last date of the period of two years irrespective of the date of which the notice of the award is served upon the persons interested in the land to make an award' in this Section means 'sign the award. ' that is the ordinary meaning to be ascribed to the words to make an award. ' that is the ordinary meaning to be ascribed to the words to make an award. An extending or a different meaning assigned to the words 'the date of the a ward by this court in raja harish chandra's case, AIR 1961 SC 1500 cannot be applied in this case since such an extended or different meaning is neither warranted by equity nor will it advance the object of the statute. . . " (emphasis supplied) now we come to AIR 1980 KAR. 22 , jammada aivappa v state. In paragraph-5 of the said decision, it is stated as follows:"5. The last contention of Sri Hegde, the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the preliminary notification also cannot be sustained in view of the fact that there will be a lapse of more than 3 years from the date of publication of the preliminary notification and to the date on which, the final notification will be issued. His submission was that there was no interim order of injuction or stay issued during the period from the date of preliminary notification issued under Section 4 of the act till the publication of the final notification under Section 6 of the act. This submission of Sri Hegde also deserves to be accepted. The relevant portion of Section 6 (1-a) of the act reads as follows:- "6 (1-a ). . . . . . . . . . (a)to (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 published after the commencement of the land acquisition (Karnataka amendment and validation) Act, 1967 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication. Explanation:- in computing the period of 3 years specified in this sub-section, any period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 is held up on account of stay or injunction by order of a court shall be excluded. Explanation:- in computing the period of 3 years specified in this sub-section, any period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 is held up on account of stay or injunction by order of a court shall be excluded. " as per Section 6 (1-a) of the Act, no declaration under Section 6 of the act in respect of any land included in the preliminary notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the act be published after the commencement of the Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1961 after the expiry of 3 years from the date of preliminary notification. The explanation to the said subsection provides as to how the period of 3 years is to be computed. As per the aforesaid explanation, the period during which an action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the act is held up on account of stay or injuction by an order of the court shall have to be excluded in computing the period of 3 years. In the instant case there was no such interim order subsequent to the publication of the preliminary notification. Thus it is clear that if the acquisition proceeding is to continue on the basis of the preliminary notification issued on 6-8-1975, the final notification to be issued will be beyond the period of 3 years. Thus, it will be hit by Section 6 (1-a) of the act. Consequently the preliminary notification in the instant case consequent on the quashing of the final notification cannot be sustained. Sri Puranik, the learned additional high court government Advocate submitted that this point was not at all raised in the writ petition and it was urged only at the time of hearing, therefore it should not be allowed. It is to be noted in this connection that the petitioner has prayed for quashing the preliminary notification as well as the final notification. It is to be noted in this connection that the petitioner has prayed for quashing the preliminary notification as well as the final notification. Whether the preliminary notification is to be retained or not having regard to the aforesaid facts of this case, a mere reading of Section 6 of the act will make it clear that the preliminary notification cannot be sustained, therefore, it cannot be said that any prejudice is caused to the state government by allowing the petitioner to urge the aforesaid ground and also by quashing the preliminary notification on that ground". it is seen from the above that there was no inteihn order in that case. But here there is an order of stay dated 20-12-1983. Hence, the said decision is also of no assistance to the petitioners. ( 13 ) THERE is one other aspect which has a bearing. Admittedly, the petitioners filed the claim statement on 31-3-1983 and the writ petition was filed on 19-12-1983. We have held in writ appeal No. 781/1989 (disposed of on 6th november, 1989) as follows;,"this is clearly a case in which writ petition itself is not maintainable because admittedly he had filed an application claiming compensation for the land in question. It is well settled law that where a person asked for compensation he cannot maintain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, vide 70 Calcutta weekly notes, p. 1100. Therefore, we agree with the view taken by the learned single judge and dismiss the writ appeal. "therefore, the writ petition itself is not main- tainable. However, what is cited is AIR 1978 SC 1244 , central excise superintendent v pratap rai this case merely deals with the meaning of the phrase "without prejudice'. But having regard to our categoric decision, one cannot approbate and reprobate. Finally we hold that explanation to Section 11-a of the act squarely applies to the facts of this case. Accordingly, we reject point No. 2 also. ( 14 ) IN the result, we dismiss this writ petition. There shall be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .