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1991 DIGILAW 201 (BOM)

Vaishali Vinayak Chaudhary v. Dean, Government Medical College, Nagpur & another

1991-04-10

B.U.WAHANE, S.M.DAUD

body1991
JUDGMENT - DAUD S.M., J.:—The two questions arising for determination in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution pertain to the scope and ambit of certain Rules being part of Rules for Admission (1985-1986) to the Medical Colleges of the Government of Maharashtra. 2. The background facts necessary to be stated are thus:— The petitioner passed the qualifying examination i.e. the Higher Secondary Examination in March 1983 and the total number of marks secured by her at this examination in the Science subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Biology came to 252 out of 300. She applied for admission to the First Year M.B.B.S. course for the academic session 1985-1986. The form prescribed for recording various particulars included the additional marks claimed by candidates. Petitioner was allowed additional three marks on the ground that she had participated in Voluntary Health Service Scheme (VHS Scheme). Her assertion in this petition is that the rules as they stood in the academic year 1984-1985 permitted of the award of five additional marks for rendition of voluntary health services. The marks were reduced to three by an amendment to the rules effected on 21-12-1984. This was a breach of promise for she had participated in the V.H.S. Scheme on the understanding that she would be getting five additional marks. The change was therefore impermissible being arbitrary and in breach of a promise contained in the rules as they existed upto 21-12-1984. Next, the rules permitted for award of three additional marks for representing her institute by actual participation in an inter-institutional tournament/competition organised at the State level in between the period of passing of S.S.C. or equivalent examination and the qualifying examination. An approved game was that known as Ring Tennis or Tenicoit. She had participated in a State level tenicoit competition as member of an institution competing in the said competition. That institution won in the finals. Petitioner had been awarded a certificate to that effect and the Director of Sports and Youth Services had addressed a letter to the first respondent directing him to treat her as eligible for three additional marks. This request was turned down. The result was that petitioner was given only three additional marks raising her total from 252 to 255. She had thus been deprived of two additional marks for rendition of voluntary health services and three marks for participation in an inter-institutional State level tournament. This request was turned down. The result was that petitioner was given only three additional marks raising her total from 252 to 255. She had thus been deprived of two additional marks for rendition of voluntary health services and three marks for participation in an inter-institutional State level tournament. This had affected her eligibility to get admission. 3. The respondents in their return contended that petitioner's claim to two additional marks for participation in the V.H.S. Scheme was not permissible. The marking had to be done vide the Rules as at the time the application form was submitted and at that time only three additional marks could be awarded for taking part in the V.H.S. Scheme. Next, in the Tenicoit competition the petitioner had not represented her College viz. the Hislop College. Therefore the participation in the Tenicoit competition did not entitle her to get the additional three marks provided in the Rules. 4. The first question to which we address ourselves is about the quantum of marks awardable to the petitioner for having participated in the V.H.S. Scheme. Admittedly, till 21-12-1984 the marks awardable for such participation were five. The number was reduced to three by virtue of an amendment carried out on 21-12-1984. The matter is no longer res integra The same question arose for determination in (Writ Petition No. 2065 of 1985)1 where a Division Bench of this Court on October 25, 1985, applied the principle of promissory estoppel and held that a participant in the V.H.S. Scheme could not be deprived of two marks on the ground that on the date of presentation of his or her application the awardable marks were three and not five. This was because the candidate had proceeded to participate in the V.H.S. Scheme on the assumption that the marks awardable would not be reduced below that made in the representation at the start of the academic session. Here, for eligibility to additional marks by participation in the V.H.S. Scheme a candidate was allowed to avail of the benefit in two academic terms and the total number of days to be employed for the participation in the scheme had to be not less than 90 days. Here, for eligibility to additional marks by participation in the V.H.S. Scheme a candidate was allowed to avail of the benefit in two academic terms and the total number of days to be employed for the participation in the scheme had to be not less than 90 days. Having regard to the Certificates tendered by the petitioner which certificates are at Annexures 3(i) to 3(vi), we find that the petitioner had put in more than 90 days prescribed and was therefore entitled to an addition of five marks. Respondent No. 1 was in error in awarding only three marks for such participation. 5. This takes us to the petitioner's claim for three additional marks on the ground of having represented an institution by participating in an inter-institutional tournament organised at the State level. The rule in this connection, to the extent relevant, reads as follows :— “A candidate claiming the benefit of representing his institute and actually participating in an inter-institutional tournament/competition organised at State/National Level during the period.... Organised by the State Government or authorised State/National Organisation at a State/National level competition, will be given additional marks....” Petitioner was studying in the Hislop College and admittedly she did not represent the Hislop College while participating in the Tenicoit competition for which the certificate at Annexure 5 was awarded to her. But from Annexure 5 it is clear that she did represent an institution and that the said institution won in the finals against a rival team from another district. The stand taken by the respondents is that the rule reproduced above entitles a participant, at a competition to additional marks only if he or she represents an academic institution, the competition being confined to academic institutions. The words 'institute' and 'institution' are not defined in the Rules for Admission. The word 'institution' occurs at certain places in the Rules. In C.(6)(iv) the word institutions is placed in a context which limits the meaning of the word to academic institutions. This is because the word institutions occurs in this context— “any qualifying examination from institutions outside the Maharashtra State.” Next, the word occurs in D. (4)(iii)(a) and it is thus phrased— “Certificate of passing qualifying examination from an Institution outside India.” The word 'institution' is indisputably a reference to an academic institution. This is because the word institutions occurs in this context— “any qualifying examination from institutions outside the Maharashtra State.” Next, the word occurs in D. (4)(iii)(a) and it is thus phrased— “Certificate of passing qualifying examination from an Institution outside India.” The word 'institution' is indisputably a reference to an academic institution. Two rules below this, the word appears in Rule (v)(a) in this context- “and should have passed from one of the institutions situated in the border area as specified above.” This again is an indication of the institution being of academic origin. It is contended that the rule-makers having used institution as synonymous with an academic body, the same meaning should be given to the words 'institute' and 'inter-institutional' appearing in the rule under scrutiny. The reply of the petitioner's counsel to this contention is that the word institution occurring in the other rules acquires a narrower meaning because of the contextual positioning. Such is not the requirement of rule under scrutiny. This reply has to be accepted as correct. The rule under consideration when speaking of an institute and inter-institutional does not qualify these expressions by relating them to colleges or educational institutions. A broader meaning has to be ascribed to these expressions and specially so because in this rule these words came in as a replacement to the words college and inter-collegiate. Counsel for the respondents argues that petitioner's entitlement should be dealt with on the basis of the Rules for Admission 1984-1985 because she must have had those rules in view when she participated in Tenicoit inter-State Competition. To fortify this submission learned Counsel refers us to the view which we are taking in respect of the marks awardable for participation in the V.H.S. Scheme. There may appear an incongruity in that we appraise petitioner's claim for V.H.S. Scheme participation under the Rules of 1984-1985 but switch over to the Rules for Admission 1985-1986 when it comes to ascertaining marks awardable to her for participation in inter-State sport competitions. But the reason for this divergence in approach is that Whatever is beneficial to the candidate must be preferred over that which is disadvantageous to him or her. This takes us to the dictionary to find out the meaning of the words institute and institutional inasmuch as neither expression has been defined in the Rules. But the reason for this divergence in approach is that Whatever is beneficial to the candidate must be preferred over that which is disadvantageous to him or her. This takes us to the dictionary to find out the meaning of the words institute and institutional inasmuch as neither expression has been defined in the Rules. One of the meanings assigned to the word institute by the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary is a society or organisation established for some object. The word institutional has been given the meaning “pertaining to institution institutions or institutes”. From the certificate at Annexure 5 we get the information that petitioner represented an institution, that this institution sent in a team including the petitioner, that the team competed in Tenicoit and that the team of which the petitioner was a member was successful in routing the opponent team. The competition was sponsored by an authorised State level organisation and the competition was at State level. Petitioner therefore fulfilled the requirements for being awarded three additional marks as required by Rule F.(iii). 6. We now come to the question as to what relief the petitioner should be granted. Regard being had to the findings on two issues discussed above, petitioner's aggregate marks will go upto 260 out of 300. Her claim for admission was appraised on the assumption that she had acquired only a total of 255 out of 300 marks. Counsel for the petitioner contends that injustice has been done to his client and that the respondents should be directed to reserve one seat for her in the First Year M.B.B.S. course beginning in the academic session 1991-1992. In this connection he refers us to Rule E(2) which deals with the claims of candidates who are underage. The rule relied upon by learned Counsel reads thus :— “Admission will be valid only for the year in which the candidate is selected for admission except in the case of candidates who cannot, though eligible on merit, be admitted being underage as specified in Rule C. Such candidates will, however, be considered eligible for admission to the Medical Colleges concerned provided they apply for admission in the subsequent year when they first become eligible for admission on attaining the prescribed age. They will be admitted straightway irrespective of their position on the merit list during that particular year. They will be admitted straightway irrespective of their position on the merit list during that particular year. This concession will hold good only during the year in which the candidate first attains the requisite age. If the concession is not a vailed of in the particular year, it will lapse.” There is some substance in what learned counsel has to say. If restitution is offered to an underage candidate we see no reason why the same recompense should not be offered to a candidate who though entitled, has been deprived of admission because of a misconstruction of the rules by the authorities. In fact the claim of such a person is entitled to preferment over the claim of one who is underage. Counsel for the respondents contends that having regard to the passage of time, nothing but an academic interest survives in so far as the petition is concerned. He refers us to the (State of Maharashtra v. Minoo Noazer Kavarana others)2, 1989(3) Bom.C.R. 153 where the Supreme Court disapproved a direction of this Court for the creation of additional seats. The Supreme Court in the said judgment observed:— “The additional seats can be created only if the Indian Medical Council approves of such creation. In the instant case, the Indian Medical Council has vehemently opposed before us the creation of the additional seats. There is also the question of bearing the cost of creation of additional seats. The High Court, in our opinion, should not have directed the creation of additional seats. In exceptional circumstances and for ends of justice, the Court may direct the creation of one or two seats after giving the Indian Medical Council an opportunity of being heard, but surely the Court should not direct the creation of so many additional seats when neither the Government nor the Indian Medical Council consents to such creation. In exceptional circumstances and for ends of justice, the Court may direct the creation of one or two seats after giving the Indian Medical Council an opportunity of being heard, but surely the Court should not direct the creation of so many additional seats when neither the Government nor the Indian Medical Council consents to such creation. In the circumstances, it is difficult to sustain the impugned judgment of the High Court.” This passage has to be read in the background of (i) creation of additional seats for candidates who were not entitled to the same, (ii) the position of the Indian Medical Council to the creation of the additional seats, (iii) the High Court not taking into consideration the additional financial burden imposed on the Government consequent to the creation of additional seat and (iv) the additional seats created not being one or two but “so many”. That situation does not exist in the instant case. Here, the petitioner was entitled to admission for the academic session beginning 1985-1986. Her entitlement was misconstrued. If an additional seat is to be created this year, it will be by way of restitution to the petitioner who is the victim of a wrong done as far back as 1985. That the petition filed in 1985 has come up for hearing in 1991, is not a lapse attributable to her. The Indian Medical Council can surely not object to justice being done to the victim of an injustice. Next, the additional seat to be created will not be “so many” but only one. At one stage we were of the view that the creation of an additional seat for the petitioner should be subject to the approval of the Indian Medical Council. Having re-considered the matter we find that the approval of the Indian Medical Council is uncalled for in the circumstances mentioned above. The reliance placed by the respondents on the case of (Dr. Vishwambhar Purl Goswami others v. State of MP others)3, A.I.R. 1991 M.P. 25 carries them no further. Unlike the claimant in that case, petitioner before us is the victim of an injustice done six years ago and this injustice being the result of a misconstruction of the rules. The result is that the petition succeeds and hence the order. ORDER The rejection of petitioner's claim for a seat in the First year M.B.B.S. course is hereby quashed. Unlike the claimant in that case, petitioner before us is the victim of an injustice done six years ago and this injustice being the result of a misconstruction of the rules. The result is that the petition succeeds and hence the order. ORDER The rejection of petitioner's claim for a seat in the First year M.B.B.S. course is hereby quashed. Respondents shall consider afresh the claim of the petitioner by treating her as being the recipient of 260 out of 300 marks. Her claim will be considered in the background of that of the other claimants for the academic session beginning 1985 -1986. If petitioner is found otherwise eligible for admission, an additional seat win be created by the respondent and she will be given admission thereto for the academic session commencing 1991-1992. Rule in these terms is made absolute, with parties being left to bear their own costs. A steno copy of this judgment be supplied immediately to counsel representing the respondents. Petition allowed. -----