JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - Right to use a road is fundamental and denial thereof would be denial of life as understood in its richness and fullness by the ambit of the Constitution, assert the petitioners and plea that violation of an order of injunction, if any albeit unwittingly, by using a road does not attract the punitive action under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code'). 2. The facts are few. The issues in controversy are fewer still. But certain interesting points arise in this revision application. Considering the fact that similar pleas are raised and may be raised in future, it is necessary to refer to the dispute in some detail, though facts need be stated in brief. 3. The petitioners are the defendants in a suit for permanent injunction containing prayers inter alia that they be retrained from interfering in the suit land and from changing the nature and character thereof. The opposite parties as plaintiffs filed the aforesaid suit along with a petition under Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code. The prayer therein was, to restrain the defendants from entering upon the suit land, and from damaging the boundaries thereof, and from changing the nature of the suit land till disposal of the suit. An objection was held to such petition. By order dated 16.11.1983, the order of restraint was passed and had interim injunction granted on 7.10.1983 was made absolute. The relevant portion of the order which forms the pivot for the dispute at hand reads as follows: The defendants are hereby restrained to enter into the suit land or to cause damages to the rights. A petition for taking appropriate action for violation of the said order of injunction was filed by the plaintiffs under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code inter alia alleging that the present petitioners not only violated the order of injunction passed but also constructed a path over the suit land and divided the same into two parts. It was their specific case that on 8.2.1984 the petitioners entered upon the suit land, and constructed the aforesaid path. The prayer was to detain the contraveners in civil prison, and to attach their land as mentioned in Schedule 'B' to the petition for violation of the order. It was their specific case that on 8.2.1984 the petitioners entered upon the suit land, and constructed the aforesaid path. The prayer was to detain the contraveners in civil prison, and to attach their land as mentioned in Schedule 'B' to the petition for violation of the order. The present petitioners filed an objection to the aforesaid petition inter alia contending that there was no violation as alleged and the path which was claimed to have been laid was to existence prior to filing of the suit and there was no violation as alleged. They denied the allegations altogether. 4. The learned Additional Munsif, Bhadrak held that there was no violation, but the lower appellate court reversed the conclusion and directed attachment of property for a period of one year. 5; The main plank of the petitioners' argument is that by the order of injunction an impossibility was being asked to be performed; a right to use a road is a part of right to life and therefore, deprivation thereof was unconscionable, constitutionally not sustainable, and deserved to be ignored, which the petitioners rightly did. The Courts below having found that there was no path which was laid, mere entering upon the suit land to go to their respective houses, the land in question being the only source of access to their houses, the land in question being the only source of access to their houses, did not attract any culpability much less the punitive order of attachment as passed by the appellate court. It was submitted that one of the ingredients which the court is required to take into consideration, before passing an order of injunction is the possibility of carrying out that order and non-consideration of this material aspect rendered the order void. Illustratively it is stated that if an order of injunction is passed not to breathe, the same is to be ignored, being impossible of performance. It is pleaded that the case at hand is a parallel one. The opposite parties, however, submit that in view of the categorical admission that the petitioners went upon the suit land, the further pleas as advanced now do not stand to reason and the order of the lower appellate court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference by exercise of powers u/s 115 of the Code. 6. The opposite parties, however, submit that in view of the categorical admission that the petitioners went upon the suit land, the further pleas as advanced now do not stand to reason and the order of the lower appellate court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference by exercise of powers u/s 115 of the Code. 6. At the outset I must indicate that the pleas now advanced were not raised before the courts below. Normally on that ground I would not have entertained this application. But I gave full opportunity to the parties to address me since interesting questions are involved which are of seminal importance. The prima question is whether the order of injunction put an impossible condition for performance. In determining whether or not a breach has been committed, regard is had to the circumstances in which and the object for which injunction was obtained. There may be cases where some trifling acts are done in the ordinary course of business, which do not have the effect of any real mischief. Such acts should be ignored and will not necessarily be treated as a breach. On the other hand, if a person attempts to disregard the injunction so as to frustrate the purpose for which it was granted he may have to pay the price for doing so. An injunction is violated by performance of the acts prohibited thereby, regardless of the means employed by the restrained party to accomplish the violation (See Locrasto v. State: 173 H.E. 456 and Walden v. Siecbert 128 A 702). In determining the question the order of injunction is to be construed with reference to the nature of the proceedings and the purpose thereof. In Thomson v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 48 N.J.E.Q. 105, it was held that where the injunction prohibits the doing of certain act except in extraordinary emergencies, the burden is thrown on the defendant of showing that the act done was excused by the special circumstances. He cannot set up his opinion to the meaning of the injunction against the court's opinion, but if he has any doubt as to what he may do without violating the injunction, he should ask for modification of the injunction or a construction of as terms (Also see Shirkey Coy 141 Md. 301). He cannot set up his opinion to the meaning of the injunction against the court's opinion, but if he has any doubt as to what he may do without violating the injunction, he should ask for modification of the injunction or a construction of as terms (Also see Shirkey Coy 141 Md. 301). Apparently here the order of injunction was unambiguous, clear plain and there was no scope for the understanding the purpose and intent thereof. 7. As observed by the Supreme Court in The State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, the question whether a party has understood an order in a particular manner and has conducted himself in accordance with such construction is primarily one of fact, and where the materials before the court do not support such a state of affairs, the court cannot attribute an innocent intention based on presumptions, for the only reason, that ingenuity of counsel can discover equivocation in the order which is the subject of enforcement. It is not the case of the petitioners that they misunderstood the context of the order. On the other hand, their plea is that notwithstanding the clear understanding and acceptance of the position, they went over the land in question, which was condonable because they had right to do so. Impossibility of performance which seems to be core theme of the petitioners' case has a gulf of difference with inconvenience. If the petitioners were inconvenienced by the order of injunction by being deprived of the access to their house, nothing prevented them from asking for modification of the order of injunction, bringing that feet to the notice of the court granting injunction. As observed in Hilton v. Hilton 89 N.J.E.Q. 417 Thomsons case (supra), a breach of injunction cannot be justified by reason of difficulty in complying with the provisions. Although it seems that impossibility of performance may constitute a defence, a party asserting impossibility of performance has to establish that the performance was impossible and therefore, there was difficulty in obeying the order of injunction. The order granting injunction might have been erroneous or granted improvidently, or obtained irregularly; that will not excuse the person violating it. (See Narain Singh Vs. S. Hardayal Singh Harika, Executive Officer, Municipal Committee, Patiala, The party enjoined is bound by it from the time of pronouncement. It is not open to him to question it by disobedience. The order granting injunction might have been erroneous or granted improvidently, or obtained irregularly; that will not excuse the person violating it. (See Narain Singh Vs. S. Hardayal Singh Harika, Executive Officer, Municipal Committee, Patiala, The party enjoined is bound by it from the time of pronouncement. It is not open to him to question it by disobedience. He can do so only by taking legal steps to set it aside, and so long as it is in existence it must be obeyed to the letter. (See Russel v. East Anglian Railway Co. 3 Mac and G. 104; Spokes v. Banburry Local Board of Health L.R. 35 SJ Ch. 105). 8. I have perused the objection filed by the present petitioners, to the original application for injunction before the learned Munsif, Bhadrak, Misc. No. 188 of 1983. There is no whisper about the alleged difficulty in having access to their houses if the injunction is granted. The specific plea was that the land in question is a paddy land. Even if it is accepted that the land constituted the access to their houses, it has not been shown as to why no modification of the order of injunction was sought for in the appropriate court. The plea that the performance was an impossibility and therefore, the order had no sanctity in law and can be ignored, can be accepted with a pinch of suit. 9. It is also pleaded that the petitioners acted bona fide as is evident from the finding of the both the courts below that no new path was constructed as alleged and therefore, there is no violation of the order of injunction. This plea is equally untenable. The order of injunction specifically restrained the defendants from entering upon the suit land, and therefore, the act complained of clearly attracted the consequences as enumerated in Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code. The plea that there was no motive to violate the order of injunction has also not been substantiated, and as indicated by the Supreme Court in the absence of any ambiguity in the order such a plea though usually raised as a camouflage to get over the conclusion, deserves rejection. 10. Before grant of injunction, a court has to weigh the possibility of performance. 10. Before grant of injunction, a court has to weigh the possibility of performance. But defence of impossibility of performance is not available to a party after an order of injunction has been passed considering the relevant aspect. If aggrieved by an order of injunction, the affected party is not remediless. It can assail the legality, propriety and validity of the order before the appropriate forum which is provided in law. It would be negation of rule of law if a party is permitted to make its own interpretation and to judge the justifiability of the order without seeking interference by an appropriate higher forum. 11. Strong reliance is placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and Another Vs. Umed Ram Sharma and Others to contend that access to road is access to life itself and the order of injunction tantamounted to denial of access to life. The observation was made in a contextually different set up. It is needless to repeat the oft quoted truism of Lord Halsburry that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what may seem to follow logically from it. The decision in particular cases are not to be treated as words of statute. (See Amar Nath Om Prakash and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others. There is always a peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of the particular case. (See Herrington v. British Rys Board (1972) 2 WLR 537 . Even accepting the additional features which were placed for consideration, there is no scope for taking a view other than that taken by the lower appellate court. The appellate order passed is, therefore, affirmed. The Civil Revision is dismissed; but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed