Judgment :- 1. A.S. No. 951 of 1977 is by the plaintiff Muthusamy against the dismissal of his suit O.S. No. 155 of 1975 on the file of Sub Court, Salem. The said suit filed on 14.3.1975 is for specific performance of sale agreement dated 13.2.1975 executed by the 1st defendant Angammal alias Kullammal (hereinafter referred to ‘Angammal’) and her step grandson Danapal the 2nd defendant (hereinafter referred to as ‘Danapal’) agreeing to sell the suit lands to the plaintiff Muthusamy (hereinafter referred to as ‘Muthusamy’). A.S. No. 442 of 1983, by the above said Angammal is against the dismissal of her suit O.S. No. 105 of 1976, which was filed earlier on 28.2.1975. The said suit is for a declaration of the said Angammals right to enjoy the suit lands and for consequential injunction. The suit, lands are same in both the suits. By a common judgment, both the suits were disposed of, as stated above, on 31.8.1977. (Defendants 1 to 6 in O.S. No. 155 of 1975 are also parties in O.S. No. 105 of 1976 but Muthusamy who is plaintiff in O.S. No. 155 of 1975 is not a party in O.S. No. 105 of 1976 and the 6th defendant Pappannan in O.S. No. 105 of 1976 alleged to be the tenant of the suit lands (hereinafter referred to as ‘Pappannan’) is not a party in O.S. No. 155 of 1975.) 2. Certain undisputed facts are:—The suit lands originally belonged to one Alagirisamy Chettiar who is said to have died pending A.S. No. 951 of 1977. His son Arimuthu Chettiars third wife is the above said Angammal. His said son died long back on 8.9.1940. The said Arimuthu Chettiars daughter Gowrammal (through his predeceased second wife) was married to one Subramania Chettiar and their only son is the above said Danapal. Gowrammal also died on 19.4.1953 and her husband Subramania Chetty also died on 30.7.1971. 3. The case in the plaint in O.S. No. 155 of 1975 is as follows: Alagirisamy Chettiar executed a settlement deed dated 17.10.1940 (Ex. A.2) reserving for himself a life interest in the suit lands and providingfor a monthly maintenance of Rs. 5/- to the said Angammal to be paid by the said Arimuthu and himself. Subsequently on 13.6.1945 (Ex. A.3) he cancelled the earlier settlement and executed another settlement deed (Ex. A.2) reserving for himself a life interest in the suit lands and providingfor a monthly maintenance of Rs. 5/- to the said Angammal to be paid by the said Arimuthu and himself. Subsequently on 13.6.1945 (Ex. A.3) he cancelled the earlier settlement and executed another settlement deed (Ex. A.4 dated 13.6.1945) reserving for himself life interest in the suit property and providing for life interest thereof for the said Gowrammal and Subramania Chettiar also and giving absolute right thereof to then son Danapal. By the said deed he also provided that the said Gowrammal and Subramania Chettiar should pay Rs. 6/p.m. to Angammal. Later on, at the request of Angammal for enhancing the maintenance, Gowrammal and Subramania Chettiar executed, for themselves and as guardian for their minor daughter, a maintenance deed (Ex. A.5) dated 21.1.1946 by which Angammal was given the suit property to be enjoyed by her for life time, in lieu of maintenance, without right of alienation and providing for reverting back of the property after the life time of Angammal as mentioned in the prior deed. As per the settlement deed dated 13.6.1945, the property should vest with Danapal after the lifetime of Angammal. Angammal was in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. While so, Angammal and Danapal entered in to a registered safe agreement (Ex. B.1) dated 13.2.1975 with Muthusamy to sell the suit lands to him for Rs. 16,250/per acre. Muthusamy was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. While so, the 3rd defendant Ramasamy Goundar a close associate of Angammal and Danapal being aware of the agreement dated 13.2.1975 and colluding together had prevailed upon Danapal to execute a sale deed in favour of himself and defendants 4 to 6 on 21.2.1975 and immediately thereafter Muthusamy went to the Registrars office and informed defendants 3 and 4 of the agreement in his favour and asked them not to take any sale deed. But they did not pay any heed. The sale deed in favour of Defendants 3 to 6 are, therefore, not valid and binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff had been requesting Angammal and Danapal to measure the suit lands, take the money and execute the sale deed. But they have been evading. Muthusamy caused a notice dated 6.3.1975 to be sent to the defendants. The sale deed in favour of Defendants 3 to 6 are, therefore, not valid and binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff had been requesting Angammal and Danapal to measure the suit lands, take the money and execute the sale deed. But they have been evading. Muthusamy caused a notice dated 6.3.1975 to be sent to the defendants. But they did not send any reply nor measure the property and execute the sale deed. Hence the suit for specific performance. 4. Angammal, in her written statement, pleaded as follows: As per the settlement deed dated 17.10.1940 (Ex. A.2) she had been provided a monthly maintenance with a condition that she could take possession of the suit property if there is default in payment. By subsequent arrangement, the suit properties were given to her for her life time in lieu of maintenance. Accordingly she is in possession. According to the registered agreement dated 13.2.1975 she and Danapal agreed to sell the suit properties to Muthusamy. She is ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. But at the instigation and influence of the 3rd defendant, Danapal was made to execute the sale deeds in favour of defendants 3 to 6 (hereinafter referred to as ‘contesting defendants’). They are not valid 5. Danapal adopted the written statement of the contesting defendants therein and pleaded as followings: The sale deeds in favour of the contesting defendants, all dated 21.2.1975 (Ex. B.25 to B.28) are in pursuance of an earlier agreement dated 8.5.1974 (Ex. B.24 in favour of 5th defendant-Mani is executed by Danapal himself agreeing to sell the suit properties to the 5th defendant at Rs. 15,000/per acre). Angammal is not entitled to the property. She was aware of the said agreement dated 8.5.1974. Muthusamy who is a neighbour also knows about the execution of the said agreement as and when it was executed. Muthusamy used the influence of Angammal over Danapal and made the latter sign the agreement dated 13.2.1975 representing to him that Angammal had a right in the property. The agreement in favour of Muthusamy (Ex. B.1) is not a true one but nominal one. Subsequently Danapal came to understand that the agreement dated 13.2.1975 was not valid and the agreement dated 8.5.1974 alone was valid. So he executed the above said 4 sale deeds on 212.1975 in favour of the contesting defendants. The agreement in favour of Muthusamy (Ex. B.1) is not a true one but nominal one. Subsequently Danapal came to understand that the agreement dated 13.2.1975 was not valid and the agreement dated 8.5.1974 alone was valid. So he executed the above said 4 sale deeds on 212.1975 in favour of the contesting defendants. It is said that the 3rd defendant died pending appeal and defendants 4 to 6 are his children. 6. The written statement of contesting defendants ran as follows: Danapal became the absolute owner of the suit property on the death Gowrammal and Subramaniam, Angammal had no interest in the property and she has not been in possession of the same. Subramaniam alone was in possession of the suit property and he leased the same to the above said Papannan, who continues to be the tenant. Danapal executed the abovesaid agreement on 8.5.1974 in favour of the 5th defendant R. Mani, and the plaintiff being aware of the said agreement concocted the alleged agreement dated 13.2.1975. The sale deeds in favour of the contesting defendants were duly executed and registered. The plaintiff did not come to the registrar office and object to the registration of the sale deeds. 7. In O.S. No. 105 of 1976 (which was originally O.S. No. 250 of 1975) Angammal is the plaintiff and she pleaded as follows:The suit lands had been given to her for enjoyment for life, in lieu of main tenance under the registered document dated 21.1.1946 (Ex. A.5). That deed itself is in renewal of pre-existing right of maintenance, given by his father-in-law Alagirisamy. Only after the death of Angammal, the suit lands have to revert back to the male heirs of the settlors. As per the settlement deed she is in possessionof the same, by cultivat ing the property with the help of servants. The other pleas are more or less same as here plea in the other suit. 8. Likewise the contesting defendants in this suit have also set up practically the same pleas as in the other suit. Danapal also has taken the same pleaf as in the other suit. Papannan contends that he is a tenant under Subramaniam Chetty, the father of the 1st defendant, for over 20 years and that Angammal owns no interest in the property nor she is in possession of the property. 9. Danapal also has taken the same pleaf as in the other suit. Papannan contends that he is a tenant under Subramaniam Chetty, the father of the 1st defendant, for over 20 years and that Angammal owns no interest in the property nor she is in possession of the property. 9. On these pleadings, the Court below has come to the following conclusions: 1. The registered sale agreement, Ex. B.1 dated 13.2.1975 in favour of Muthusamy is true and valid. But only after the sale agreement Ex. B.24 dated 83.1974 in favour of 5th defendant-R. Mani, Ex. B.1 was executed and that too under the circumstances stated by Danapal in O.S. No. 155 of 1975. 2. Angammal is not entitled to suit property and she is also not in possession of the same. 3. The sale deeds Exs. B.25 to B.28 all dated 21.2.1975 in favour of the contesting defendants are valid and they are bona fide purchasers for value in pursuance of the sale agreement dated 8.5.1974, Ex. B.24. 4. So the plaintiff in O.S. No. 155 of 1975 is not entitled to the relief of specific performance and Angammal is not entitled to the declaration and injunction prayed for by her. 5. The claim of 6th defendant in O.S. No. 105 of 1976 that he is the cultivating tenant cannot be gone into in this action though he is in possession of the suit property., So, O.S. No. 155 of 1975 and 105 of 1976 were both dismissed. 9. A. These appeals were heard earlier by a Bench of this Court and it was then felt that the Court below had not satisfactorily disposed of the cases. Hence the matter was remanded back to the trial Court by judgment dated 26.4.1984. However, against the said remand order, the contesting defendants preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 1326 and 1327 of 1988 and the Supreme Court by its judgment dated 8.4.1988 has held that this Court should have disposed of the appeals itself on merits instead of remanding the cases back to the trial Court. Hence these appeals are heard afresh and this common judgment is rendered. 10. One main question argued in extenso in these appeals is whether the above said Angammal has absolute title to the suit property which she along with Danapal agreed to convey under Ex. Hence these appeals are heard afresh and this common judgment is rendered. 10. One main question argued in extenso in these appeals is whether the above said Angammal has absolute title to the suit property which she along with Danapal agreed to convey under Ex. B.1 registered sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff. If Angammal alone has absolute title to the suit property and not Danapal, then the sale agreement Ex. B.24 dated 8.5.1974 and the subsequent sale deeds Exs. B.25 to B.28, all dated 21.2.1975 in favour of the contesting defendants (all executed by Danapal alone) will have no validity. So, on this question the learned Counsel for Muthusamy and the learned Counsel for Angammal contend that the said Angammal has been given the suit lands under Ex. A.5 dated 21.1.1946 in lieu of her pre-existing right of maintenance and that hence after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, under Section 14(1) thereof she has become the absolute owner and that though this ground was not raised specifically in the plaint, the necessary averments had been made to that effect. 11. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for Danapal and contesting defendants contends that the abovesaid ground under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Acr (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) cannot be raised because there was no plea to that effect in the plaint in O.S. No. 155 of 1975 and that even otherwise the said ground cannot be validly sustained by Muthusamy as the present case will not fall under Section 14(1) of the Act and that hence the said Angammal will not become the absolute owne r of the suit property. The learned Counsel for Danapal and contesting defendants further explains that the suit lands were the separate and absolute properties of Alagirisamy Chettiar, that the right of maintenance was not available to Angammal under any law on the date of death of her husband, viz., 8.9.1940 and that prior to her husbands death there was no joint family consisting of father Alagirisamy Chettiar and son Arimuthu Chettiar, since her husband the said Arimuthu Chettiar left the family and carried on separate and independant business as seen from Exs. A.2 to A.6. He also points out that as per Ex. A.2 to A.6. He also points out that as per Ex. A.6 receipt dated 11.9.1940 after the death of Arimuthu Chettiar there was a panchayat regarding the dispute between the father-in-law Alagirisamy Chettiar and daughter-in-law Angammal and as per the verdict of the panchayatdars, Alagirisamy Chettiar received consideration to the extent of Rs. 1,478/-from Angammal in connection with the separate business carried on by the deceased son Arimuthu Chettiar and in lieu thereof Alagirisamy Chettiar agreed to pay certain cash maintenance to Angammal. So according to the said Counsel, the father-in-law agreed to pay maintenance, only in accordance with the decision of the panchayatdars and not in recognition of any pre-existing right of hers, as against the joint family or joint family properties and said right of maintenance is based only on the above said panchayat settlement. Further the said counsel also points out that Angammal was not put in possession of the suit property in lieu of maintenance under those documents. Therefore, according to him, Section 14 (1) of the Act will not come into play. Further, he points out that, from the perusal of Ex. A.4 dated 13.6.1945 the settlees Subramaniya Chetty and his wife who were given only life interest do not have any right to create life interest, in favour of Angammal, that the grant of such a right in favour of Angammal by them under Ex. A.5 dated 21.1.1946 is contrary to the specific recitals in Ex. A.4 and that therefore, Ex. A.5 is not valid. Further, according to the said Counsel, Angammal has not established her possession from 21.1.1946 pursuant to Ex. A.5 until the date of the suit. He also points out that Exs. B.8 to B.23 kist receipts stand in the name of Subramaniya Chetti from 7.6.1951 to 7. 2.1961. Further he points out that Exs. B.40, B.41 and B.42 the adangal account establish enjoyment of the suit property by the tenant only. 12. So far as the question whether the above said ground under Section 14(1) of the Act could be raised at all in this appeal A.S. No. 951 of 1977, we may set out the relevant plea in the plaint O.S. 155 of 1975. “According to the settlement deed dated 13.6.1945 the property vests in the 2nd defendant after the life time of the 1st defendant as provided in the settlement deed dated 21.6.1946. “According to the settlement deed dated 13.6.1945 the property vests in the 2nd defendant after the life time of the 1st defendant as provided in the settlement deed dated 21.6.1946. The 1st defendant is now in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance.” (The above referred to settlement deed dated is Ex. A 4 and the settlement deed dated is Ex. A5). It is contended by the learned Counsel for respondents that after stating that “according to the settlement deed the property vests in Danapal after the life time of the 1st defendant”, a contrary plea cannot be now set up to the effect that the property vests with Angammal herself pursuant to Sec. 14(1) of the Act. We are not inclined to accept this contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents sin ce the above said plea only narrates what is contained in the relevant settlement deed and since there is plea that Angammal is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Therefore we cannot take it that a contrary plea is now set up, if the law allows Angammal and consequently the plaintiff in O.S. No. 155 of 1975 to invoke Section 14(1) of the Act. We also find that the 5th defendant also has pleaded that Angammal is not in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance and that the trial Court has also observed that Angammal is not claiming the property was “exclusively belonging to her, either by virtue of the execution of the documents mentioned above or under any of provisions of the Hindu Succession Act” Taking all these factors into account it cannot be said that the parties went to trial with the knowledge that the said question was in issue. So, the said question, we think, can be agitated in this appeal No. 951 of 1977. We also find that the said legal plea has been specific ally raised in the memorandum of appeal, and even at the time of the original hearing of these appeals by this Court in 1984, before the matter went to the Supreme Court and got remanded, this argument was entertained by this Court. 13. However, we are unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants in both the appeals that the case would come under Section 14(1) of the Act. 13. However, we are unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants in both the appeals that the case would come under Section 14(1) of the Act. In this regard we have to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents for the following reasons:— 14. Section 14 of the Act runs as follows:— “Properly of a female Hindu to be her absolute property:?. Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation. In this sub-section “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or areas of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other mannerwhatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.” 2. Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gifts or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.” The Supreme Court in the case reported in Eramma v. Veerupana 1, has pointed out the object of this Section follows: “The object of the section is toextinguish the estate called ‘limited estates’ or ‘widows estates’ in Hindu Law and to make a Hindu woman, who under the old law would have been only a limited owner a full owner” (Emphasis supplied) Further in Badri Pershad v. Kanso Devi 2, also it has been observed as follows:— “The Madras High Court was right in the observations made in Rangaswaml Nakker v. Chlnnammar 3, that sub-section (2) made it clear that the object of Section 14 was only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc., by virtue of which a womans right was restricted.” (Emphasis supplied) The Supreme Court further observed therein as follows:— “The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the court should first look sub-s.(2) and if the case does not fall within its ambit and scope then alone sub-s.(1) will become applicable. This manner of reading of the section is not warranted either on principle or authority. The section has to be read as a whole and it would depend on the facts of each case whether the same is covered by the first sub-section or sub-s.(2). The critical words in sub-s.(1) are “possessed” and “acquired”. The word “possessed” has been used in its widest connotation and it may either be actual or constructive or in arty form recognised by law. In the context in which it has been used in S. 14 it means the estate (state-Ed.) of owning or having in ones hand or power.” While so, in the present case it cannot be said that Angammal was a “limited owner” to the suit properties “under the old law”. On the other hand all that is claimed is that under Ex. A.5 she became the limited owner of the suit properties. 15. On the other hand all that is claimed is that under Ex. A.5 she became the limited owner of the suit properties. 15. In this context the following observation of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh 1, is also significant. “It appears from the language of the sub-section that a restricted estate created by will gift, decree, award or any other instrument prior to the commencement of the Act shall not be enlarged into full ownership under sub-s.(1). A plain reading of the sub-section shows that its provisions are attracted if two things exist, namely, (i) that right of the female to the property is created by an instrument in writing and (ii) that it contains such terms as create restricted estate. If any of the above Ingredients Is missing from the instrument, then subsec.(2) will not apply.” (emphasis supplied) So, the present case if at all would only fall under Section 14(2) of the Act, Since even according to appellants Angammal, got right in the suit property only under the instrument, Ex. A.5, which contained terms as creating restricted estate. So, none of the above said two ingredients is missing, but both exist in the present case. So, Section 14(2) will apply and not Section 14(1) in the present case. 16. It is also argued that Angammal became the limited owner of the suit property pursuant to her pre-existing right of maintenance. But, in the present case Angammal had no preexisting right of maintenance under the Hindu Law with refer ence to the family of Alagirisamy Chettiar. On and prior to her husbands death, there was no joint family consisting of the father Alagirisamy Chet tiar and the son Arimuthu Chettiar (her husband). It was disrupted and her husband Arimuthu Chet tiar left the family and carried on separate and independent business in cloth. It is also not in dispute that the suit property was the separate and absolute property or Alagirisamy Chettiar. These facts are borne out by documents Exs. A.6, A.2, A.1 and A.4. Ex. A.6 is dated 11.9.1940 that is just three days after the death of Arimuthu Chettiar. It is a receipt given by Alagirisamy Chettiar pur suant to the verdict of the panchayatdars, in the dispute between the father-in-law Alagirisamy Chettiar and the daughter-in-law Angammal. These facts are borne out by documents Exs. A.6, A.2, A.1 and A.4. Ex. A.6 is dated 11.9.1940 that is just three days after the death of Arimuthu Chettiar. It is a receipt given by Alagirisamy Chettiar pur suant to the verdict of the panchayatdars, in the dispute between the father-in-law Alagirisamy Chettiar and the daughter-in-law Angammal. The receipt was given in connection with the business carried on by the deceased son Arimuthu Chettiar and it was given by Alagirisamy Chettiar for having received Rs. 1478/and odd from Angammal. It also recites that as per the verdict of the panchayatdars Alagirisamy Chettiar agrees to pay cash maintenance at the rate of Rs. 60/per year to Angammal and that if he fails to create a charge of his properties for due payment of the same, within 15 days thereof he would give back to her the above said sum of Rs. 1478/and odd received from her. In that context, it is also stated therein that his son Arimuthu Chettiar left his family about 6 years earlier and he was doing business separately for the said period and that even otherwise in the family affairs also he was living separately with his wife for the said period. This shows that he has gone away from the joint family even 6 years prior to his death and was carrying on separate business. 17. Ex. A.2 is the settlement deed executed by Alagirisamy Chettiar and his wife in favour of Angammal on 17.10.1940, that is, about a month after the death of Arimuthu Chettiar. There also it is stated that because Alagirisamy Chettiar and his wife have taken the above said sum of Rs. 1478/- and odd, which was earned by Arimuthu Chettiar in his own textile business , the said Alagirisamy Chettiar and his wife were liable to give the above referred to Rs. 60/per year towards Angammals maintenance and that in lieu thereof the suit lands (Item No. 1 in the schedule to Ex. A.2) were created as charge, pursuant to the above referred to panchayat verdict. The said suit lands were described as the lands belonging to Alagirisamy Chettiar and his wife and it is stated there in that if there was any failure of payment of the above said maintenance, the possession of said suit properties should be handed over to Angammal. It is also specified in Ex. The said suit lands were described as the lands belonging to Alagirisamy Chettiar and his wife and it is stated there in that if there was any failure of payment of the above said maintenance, the possession of said suit properties should be handed over to Angammal. It is also specified in Ex. A.2 that with reference to another house property (not the suit property) Angammal was entitled to live in the said property till her life time. In Ex A.2 there was also some other stipulation regarding certain other jewels. 18. So, it is clear from the recitals in Ex. A.6 and A.2 that the source of Angarnmals above said maintenance-right sprang only from the above said settlement reached m the panchayat in the above-said circumstances and not under “old Hindu Law 19. Only with reference to such a maintenance right, the above said charge over the suit properties is said to be created in her favour. It is only because she was deprived of the above said sum of Rs. 1,478/and odd, Alagirisamy Chettiar agreed to give Angammal the above said maintenance. It also appears from Ex. A.2 that if Angammal is not so paid she can proceed against the suit properties. But as per Ex. A.2, Angammal did not get possession of the suit property. In Ex. A.2, it is only stated that in case of failure of payment of maintenance, possession of the suit properties shall be given to her. But under Ex. A.2, she was not given possession of the suit properties , but given possession of only another house property which is item No. 2 of the schedule under Ex. A.2. That apart, under ExA3 dated 13.6.1945, Ex. A.2 itself has been cancelled by Alagirisamy Chettiar. 20. However, it should also be noted that the suit properties were described as the properties belonging to Alagirisamy Chettiar, not only in Ex. A.2 but also in two other documents, Exs. A.1 and A.4. In both Ex. A.1 dated 7.10.1937 and Ex. A.4 dated 13.6.1945, the suit properties are described as self acquired and exclusive properties of Alagirisamy Chettiar. So, with reference to the suit properties, the said Angammal had no preexisting right of maintenance under the Hindu Law. 21. Even under Ex. A.5 dated 21.1.1946, what is stated by Subramaniya Chettiar and Gowrammal is that Angammal got maintenance from Alagirisamy Chettiar as per Ex. So, with reference to the suit properties, the said Angammal had no preexisting right of maintenance under the Hindu Law. 21. Even under Ex. A.5 dated 21.1.1946, what is stated by Subramaniya Chettiar and Gowrammal is that Angammal got maintenance from Alagirisamy Chettiar as per Ex. A.4 settlement dated 13.6.1945 and another settlement dated 26.7.1945, both executed by Alagirisamy Chettiar. Only Ex. A.5 purports to give Angammal, for the first time, a life interest in the suit lands. That was by Subramania Chettiar and his wife Gowrammal and his daughter Selvarani. In the above circumstances, the said life interest, even assuming it is valid, will not certainly enlarge itself into an absolute interest, under Section 14(1) of the Act. 22. Further, it should be noted that the settlors under Ex. A.5 themselves had only life interest in the suit lands, which was given to them by Alagirisamy Chettiar under Ex. A.4. Of those settlors Gowrammal died on 19.4.1953 itself prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. No doubt, Subramania Chettiar died after the said Act, on 30.7.1971. (The above said Selvarani was not given any interest in the said lands under Ex. A.5). Under Ex. A.4, the said Gowrammal and Subramania Chettiar have been prohibited from making any alienation of the said properties given to them for their life. So, Ex. A.5, in so far as it purports to give life interest to Angammal, is not valid. So also, there is no scope for application of Section 14(1) of the Act. 23. Another question is, whether Angammal came into possession of the suit lands pursuant to Ex. A.5 and continues to possess the same, we think this question can be answered in the affirmative, in view of the following factors:— (a) Ex. A.5 itself recites that Angammal should enjoy the usufructs from the suit lands during her life time and pay the kists on those lands. (b) The boundary recitals in Ex. B.30 dated 28.5.1967, which is a sale deed in favour of D.W.4 executed by Subramania Chettiar and his children Danapal and Selvarani. (c) Exs. A.7 to A.13 kist receipts for the period between 1963 and 1976. (No doubt for certain periods from 1951 to 1967, the kist receipts Exs. B.8 to B.23 are in the name of Subramania Chettiar). (d) Adangal extracts Exs. (c) Exs. A.7 to A.13 kist receipts for the period between 1963 and 1976. (No doubt for certain periods from 1951 to 1967, the kist receipts Exs. B.8 to B.23 are in the name of Subramania Chettiar). (d) Adangal extracts Exs. A.15 to A.23 for fash 1374 to 1382 and the levy notice Ex. A.24 issued to her. Only in Ex. A.25 adangal for flash 1384 and in Exs. B.40 to B.42 for fash 1383 to 1385 Pappannans name is noted as tenant. (e) Further, Pappannan, the alleged tenant of the suit lands, has not produced any tenancy agreement or receipt for payment of lease to Subramania Chettiar or Danapal or the contesting defendants. The alleged lessors also have not produced any accounts for the receipt of the lease amount from Pappannan for any period. (f) Further, in the cross-examination of Pappannan as D.W.5 he admitted that he did not know the exact extent of the suit lands and the survey numbers thereof. (g) P.Ws.2 and 3 deposed that the lands were not leased to Pappannan and he was not cultivating them. On this, there was no cross-examination by Pappannan at all. 24. But Angammals possession of the suit lands pursuant to Ex. A.5 will not help her, because as already stated Ex. A.5 itself, in so far as it purports to give life interest to her, is not valid. Further, she did not come into possession 6f the suit lands, under Ex. A.5, pursuant to her pre-existing right for maintenance under Hindu Law. No doubt, in view of the preexisting right for maintenance, Gowrammal and Subramania Chettiar executed Ex. A.5. But that pre-existing right of Angammal was not under the old Hindu Law as referred to in the above referred to A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1879. But the said pre-existing right was only pursuant to the above referred to panchayat-ver-diet after the death of her husband in connection with the above referred to dispute between her and her father-in-law Alagmsamy Chettiar. In the above circumstances, looking from any angle, Section 14(1) of the Act will not apply at all to the Eresent case and Angammal cannot be said to have become an absolute owner of the suit lands on the date when the Act came into force in 1956. In the above circumstances, looking from any angle, Section 14(1) of the Act will not apply at all to the Eresent case and Angammal cannot be said to have become an absolute owner of the suit lands on the date when the Act came into force in 1956. On the other hand, as already indicated, Angammal does not acquire any life interest in the suit properties in view of the fact that the executants of Ex. A.5, (under which Angammal claims to have secured life interest in the suit properties) themselves were life interest holders under Ex. A.4 and Ex. A.4 inter alia prohibits them from making any alienation whatsoever. So, under Ex. A.5 Angammal does not acquire life interest in the suit properties. No doubt, we have held that she came into possession of the suit properties pursuant to Ex. A.5. But, mere possession without acquiring the right of life interest in the said properties, will not help her. More than having a charge over the suit properties in view of what is stated in Ex. A.2, she does not get any interest in them. Therefore, the dismissal of her suit O.S. No. 105 of 1976 does not call for any interference and hence A.S. No. 442 of 1983 is liable to be dismissed. 25. In view of the above position, Muthusamy does not secure from Angammal any right with reference to the suit properties under Ex. B.1 sale agreement. 26. Then, it has to be seen whether Ex. B.1 could be enforced by Muthusamy against Danapal who is the other executant under Ex. B.1, when the latter has executed another sale agreement Ex. B.24 in favour of the 5th defendant in O.S. No. 155 of 1975 (4th defendant in O.S. 105 of 1976) and the consequent registered sale deeds Exs. B.25 to B.28 in favour of the contesting defendants. In this connection, we find that Danapals right over the suit properties springs from Ex A.4, dated 13.6.1945. It is a settlement deed executed by Alagirisamy Chettiar, wherebyhe, while reserving life interest in the suit properties to himself, also gives such interest to Gowrammal and Sub-ramaniam and creates a remainder absolute interest in favour of the male heirs of the said Gowrammal and Subramaniam. It is a settlement deed executed by Alagirisamy Chettiar, wherebyhe, while reserving life interest in the suit properties to himself, also gives such interest to Gowrammal and Sub-ramaniam and creates a remainder absolute interest in favour of the male heirs of the said Gowrammal and Subramaniam. The only male heir to Gowrammal and Subramaniam is none other than the said Danapal and so, Danapal gets absolute interest in the suit properties under Ex. A.4 after the life time of Alaginsamy Chettiar and his said parents. Since the above said life interest holders are no more, after 30.7.1971 the date of death of his father Subramaniam, the last of the surviving life interest holders, on and after 30.7.1971, Danapal can also take possession of the suit properties for his absolute enjoyment thereof. 27. Then we have to decide whether Ex. B.24 was actually earlier to Ex. B.1. If so, the law is that Muthusamy, the agreement holder in the sub sequent Ex. B.1 sale agreement cannot claim specific performance of Ex. B.1. It has been so held in more than one decision. In Sampat Ram v. Baboo Lal 1, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has held that where there is an agree ment to sell immovable property, executed in favour of A prior to the agreement to sell in favour of B in respect of the same property, B can claim no equities against A ana cannot enforce his agreement and that the fact that B had no knowledge of the prior agreement would hardly make any difference. In Balaprasad Asaram v. Asmabi 2 , also a Division Bench of Nagpur High Court has held as follows:— “In view of the fact that the sale deed Exhibit P-1 executed on 28.11.1947 was in pursuance of an agreement of 30.5.1947, the plaintiff has a prior title to that of defendant 3 who took the sale deed dated 24.8.1948 under the agreement dated 12.9.1947. Section 27(b), Specific Relief Act, has therefore, no application here plaintiffs title must prevail over that of defendant 3.” The above said Section 27(b) of the old Specific Relief Act, 1877 corresponds to the present Section 19(b) of the present Specific Relief Act, 1963. 28. The learned Counsel for Muthusamy however argues that Ex. B.24 was not realty earlier to Ex. 28. The learned Counsel for Muthusamy however argues that Ex. B.24 was not realty earlier to Ex. B.1 and that if really it was earlier, Danapal would have normally revealed it to Muthusamy. He also argues that Muthusamy had no knowledge about the existence of Ex. B.24 and the contesting defendants also did not let in any evidence to prove that Muthusamy had prior knowledge of Ex. B.24 except putting suggestions to Angammal, (P.W.1) and Muthusamy, (who was examined as P.W.4). He further argues that his client came to know of Ex. B.24 only when the written statement was filed by the contesting defendants and that is why Ex. B.24 was not challenged in the plaint in O.S. No. 155 of 1975. But this submission of the said Counsel cannot be accepted in view of the following facts: Actually speaking O.S. No. 105 of 1976 was filed as early as 28.2.1975 by Angammal. Then only, O.S. No. 155 of 1975 was filed by Muthusamy on 14.3.1975. Along with the plaint in O.S. No. 105 of 1976 registration copies of sale deeds dated 21.2.1975, namely Exs. B.25 to B.28 have been filed. Those sale deeds recite about the prior sale agreement Ex. B.24 dated 8.5.1974. That means even prior to the filing of O.S. No. 105 of 1976 on 28.2.1975 Angammal was aware of Ex. B.24 sale agreement. Yet, either in her plaint in the suit O.S No. 105 of 1976 or in her written statement in O.S. No. 155 of 1975 there is no attack of Ex. B.24 agreement at all saying that it is antedated or concocted, though the sale deeds Exs. B.25 to B.28 have been challenged. Further, to the suit notice Ex. B.2 dated 6.3.1975 issued by Muthusamy, Danapal has sent a reply Ex. B.3 dated 15.4.1975 wherein also he speaks about the prior sale agreement Ex. B.24 dated 8.5.1974. Likewise, in Ex. B.4 the reply by the contesting defendants also, reference is made to Ex. B.24 dated 8.5.1974. No doubt even before the receipt of Exs. B.3 and B.4. Muthusamy has filed his suit on 14.3.1975 itself. If really Ex. B.24 was not earlier to Ex. B.1, but was antedated or concocted Muthusamy would have taken steps to amend his plaint to include the said plea also. Further Danapal and contesting defendants have established by overwhelming evidence, the due execution of Ex. B.24. B.3 and B.4. Muthusamy has filed his suit on 14.3.1975 itself. If really Ex. B.24 was not earlier to Ex. B.1, but was antedated or concocted Muthusamy would have taken steps to amend his plaint to include the said plea also. Further Danapal and contesting defendants have established by overwhelming evidence, the due execution of Ex. B.24. All persons connected with the said document, viz. D.W.I (Danapal), D.W.6 (the above said Mani one of the defendants and the promises under Ex. B.24) and D.W.S. (the attestor to Ex. B.24) were examined with regard to the execution of Ex. B.24 and the payment of advance sum of Rs. 5,000/towards the sale consideration thereof. Further, D.W.7 the clerk who has made the entry in Ex. B.32 the Day Book of the 3rd defendant Ramasamy Goundar in O.S. No. 155 of 1975 has been examined evidencing the above said payment of advance amount or Rs. 5,000/-. The relevant entry therein has been marked as Ex. B.33 dated 83.1974. There is no suspicious circumstance to disbelieve or discredit these defence witnesses. There is also the admission of Danapal that he first executed Ex. B.24 and subsequently Ex. B.1. 29. So, for all these reasons, we concur with the trial Court in holding that only after the execution of Ex. B.24, Ex. B.1 was executed. If that is so, a decision on the other question whether Muthusamy had knowledge of Ex. B. 24 when he executed Ex. B.1, becomes immaterial, as has been held in the above said two decisions of Allahabad and Nagpur High Courts, with which we concur. Though arguments were advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents, based on Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and Chinna Varum v. Alamelu 1, and Vimala Ammal v. Suseela and others 2, there is no necessity to go into that question since as stated in the above referred to Nagpur decision, Section 19(b) will be inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the dismissal of O.S. No. 155 of 1975 also by the trial Court. 30. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.