ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) SINCE a common point relating to propriety of orders passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Banpur dispensing with personal attendance of opp. party accused u/s. 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'code') is involved, both cases are taken up together and this judgment will govern them. Fact situation is almost identical in both the cases. ( 2 ) IN Criminal Revision No. 170 of 1989 order dated 21-1-1989 in I. CC Case No. 27 of 1988 is impugned; whereas in Criminal Revision No. 501 of 1989 order dated 12-6-1989 in I. CC Case No. 46 of 1988 is impugned. Both the cases were instituted on the basis of complaint filed by present petitioner. Cognizance u/s. 420/294 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the 'ipc') in the former, and u/s. 379, IPC in the latter case has been taken. On receipt of summons, accused-opposite party prayed for dispensing with his personal attendance and to permit appearance by his pleader. It was inter alia stated in the applications that he is Manager of a Nationalised Bank, and was required to be present in office for transacting various banking activities in such capacity and was required to attend to several time bound programs of the Government. in the matter of extending facilities to applicants for financial assistance. The reasons found favour with the learned Magistrate, and while dispensing with personal attendance, accused-opposite party was permitted to be represented by his Advocate. In both the cases similar orders were passed, which have been assailed. ( 3 ) MAIN plank of argument of learned counsel for petitioner is that accused would not have been prejudiced had he personally appeared in court and, therefore, learned Magistrate was not justified in dispensing with his personal attendance. Learned counsel for opp. party, however, submits that power u/s. 205 of the Code has been judicially exercised and there being no perversity in the orders impugned, there is no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction. ( 4 ) FOR resolution of dispute, a conspectus of S. 205 of the Code is necessary. It empowers a Magistrate, whenever he issues a summons, to dispense with personal attendance of accused and permit him to appear by a Pleader. Term 'pleader' is defined in S. 2 (a) of the Code. ( 4 ) FOR resolution of dispute, a conspectus of S. 205 of the Code is necessary. It empowers a Magistrate, whenever he issues a summons, to dispense with personal attendance of accused and permit him to appear by a Pleader. Term 'pleader' is defined in S. 2 (a) of the Code. According to said definition, 'pleader' when used with reference to any proceeding in any Court means a person authorised by or under any law for the time being in force, to practice in such Court and includes any other person appointed with permission of the Court to act in such proceeding. Both sections 205 (1) and 273 of the Code provide for exemption of an accused from personal attendance; but they refer to different stages of the proceedings. While S. 205 deals with initial appearance of accused before the Magistrate who issues summons, S. 273 deals with presence of accused at trial and empowers the Presiding Officer to dispense with personal attendance of accused at trial. As words "if he sees reason so to do" indicate power conferred by Sec. 205 (1) is discretionary, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The question as to when such discretion has to be exercised has to be considered after giving due consideration in the attendant circumstances. No sweeping generalisation can be made. Courts should be generous in exempting accused persons from personal appearance. Such appearance is the rule in criminal cases of a serious nature, involving moral turpitude, and punishable with imprisonment for some length of time. Court should consider the nature of aberration alleged, prima facie material for acceptance of such allegation, possibility of mala fide allegation, prejudice if any likely to be caused if personal attendance is not made. Court has to weigh inconvenience likely to be caused to accused if he is required to be absent from his vacation, profession, trade, occupation and calling for attendance in Court, against prejudice likely to be caused if he does not appear in Court. Whenever personal attendance is insisted upon, there is undubitably some harassment to the accused, and the Courts have to see that this harassment is not out of proportion to the seriousness of the allegation, the severity of possible punishment on conviction, nature of allegations as they stand out prima facie. Whenever personal attendance is insisted upon, there is undubitably some harassment to the accused, and the Courts have to see that this harassment is not out of proportion to the seriousness of the allegation, the severity of possible punishment on conviction, nature of allegations as they stand out prima facie. As indicated above, no hard and fast rule can be laid down but the Court is expected to exercise its discretion after seeing full picture. In my view, Court should normally dispense with personal appearance when it concerns with a purdanashin woman, high placed public functionary, a busy captain of an industry, and persons rendering public service. In 1961 (1) Cri LJ 819 (MP); Sushila Devi v. Sharada Devi, AIR 1969 Mysore 96 : (1969 Cri LJ 423), Jagadguru Sachidananda Shankarabharati Swami of Sri Kudli Sringeri Mutt v. State of Mysore and (1988) 65 CLT 335 : ( 1988 0 Crlj 1573 ) Raghunath Das v. Hari Mohan Pani similar view has been expressed. Sub-s. (2) of S. 205 empowers a Magistrate to direct personal attendance of the accused, if necessary, at a later stage. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate has elaborately dealt with various facts of the case, and has accepted the plea for dispensing with personal attendance. His conclusions are not perverse, and on the other hand, appear to have been arrived at after due consideration of material aspects. The learned Magistrate has considered that the accused was Manager of a Nationalised Bank, was a busy functionary who was required to attend to various official works. There is no scope for interference with his order while exercising revisional jurisdiction. It has not been shown before the learned Magistrate or before me as to how any prejudice is likely to be caused if accused does not personally appear. As section 205 itself provides where Court has allowed an accused to appear by a Pleader, at any subsequent stage personal appearance of accused may be ordered when it is deemed necessary or desirable. If the learned Magistrate at any subsequent stage finds that it is so desirable, he may direct personal attendance of the accused. The impugned orders suffer from no infirmity and no interference is called for. ( 5 ) SUBJECT to the above observations, both the revision applications are dismissed. Revisions dismissed.