J.M.Srivastava, J- By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks payment of salary as Development Officer with effect from 1.5.87, and to be allowed to work in the said post under the respondents 1 to 4, the authorities of the National Insurance Company Ltd. hereinafter referred as the `company'. 2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner after having successfully completed three months' training in General Insurance Marketing and by order dated 6.3.86 (Annexure 1) was appointed on probation. The period of probation was 12 months. During the period of probation she was to get Rs. 500/- per month. The other terms of appointment were also stated in the aforesaid letter of appointment. The petitioner joined and worked. She proceeded on leave on 28.9.87. The petitioner reported for duty on 6.3.88. She was not allowed to work. She received emolument of Rs. 500/- per month until 30.9.87. 3. The petitioner's case is that after completion of the period of probation of 12 months she was confirmed by letter dated 19.5.87 with effect from 1.5.87, but was allowed to draw Rs. 500/- per month only, that she could not draw pay in the pay scale of Development Officer. The petitioner was married on 13.8.87. After she had proceeded on leave on 28.9.87, from time to time she had sought extension of leave. However, she reported for duty on 6.3.88, but she was not allowed to work. The petitioner made representa­tions but without any effect. Hence the petition. 4. The respondents have resisted the petition and pleaded that the petitioner was not confirmed in service and that in view of the term of appointment that in case she was not confirmed or her probationary period was not extended there would be automatic termination of service, her service stood terminated and accordingly she was not allowed to work. It was also pleaded that her works was not satisfactory and accordingly she …..as not confirmed. She was not entitled to pay to the pay scale of the Development Officer. 5. We have heard Sri N. M. Lahiri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A. R. Banerjee, learned counsel for the respondents and considered the submissions and materials on record. 6. The respondents have raised a preliminary objection that this petition is not maintainable. She was not entitled to pay to the pay scale of the Development Officer. 5. We have heard Sri N. M. Lahiri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A. R. Banerjee, learned counsel for the respondents and considered the submissions and materials on record. 6. The respondents have raised a preliminary objection that this petition is not maintainable. The contention is that the petitioner was a `workman' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred as the Act and therefore alternative remedy being available under the Act, this petition under Article 2.6 of the Constitution did not lie. Sri A. R. Banerjee, learned counsel for the respondents cited S. K. Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) 4 SCC 214 where it was held the designation or name of the post was not decisive and that Development Officer of LIC were `workman' within the meaning of section 2 (5) of the Act, and Dinesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar, 1984(3) SLR 658 (Full Bench) where it was held that alternative remedy of statutory reference under section 10 of the Act which was an adequate and efficacious legal remedy not having been exhausted a writ was not maintainable. 7. Shri N. M. Lahiri, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that in the facts of the case the proper remedy is by petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that mere existence of an alternative remedy does not affect the petition. 8. We have considered the submission. This petition was filed on 26.9.1989. This Court issued Rule on 27.9.89. The respondents took this plca in an additional affidavit filed later on 12.8.91. We think it shall not be proper in the facts of the present case and after more than two years to now throw out the application on the ground that alternative remedy was available, because the impugned stand of the respondents in regard to termination is not sustainable on facts on record. Besides any restriction on exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, has to be found in the said provision itself or in rules of convenience and discretion evolved. The rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is one such rule of convenience rather than a rule of law and does not oust the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is one such rule of convenience rather than a rule of law and does not oust the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, in the facts of this case, where the respon­dents have taken the plea of automatic termination of service, without issue of any order or formal record to that effect, we think the alternative remedy could not be adequate or of any substantial assistance to the petitioner. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the preliminary objection. 9. On merit, Annexure 1 with the petition is the letter of appointment dated 6th March 1986. Its clause 3 provided that initially the petitioner was to be on probation for a period of twelve months which the company might at its discretion extend by a further period not exceeding 12 months. Its clause 5 provided that "unless letter of confirmation or extension of probationary period was issued the services shall stand automatically terminated after expiry of the period of probation." (emphasis; supplied). The petitioner has contended that she was confirmed in the post of Development Officer by letter dated 19th, May, 1987 (Annexure 2). This letter in its para 2 stated that "considering your performance, we are pleased to confirm .you as Development Officer from 1.5.87". This letter was signed by the Regional Manager of the company. The petitioner's contention on the basis of Annexure 2 is that she had been confirmed in service with effect from 1.5.87. The respondents' contention is that while the Regional Manager had sent the letter to the Divisional Manager the same was not actually issued to the petitioner because in the meanwhile it was found that the material on the basis of which the earlier recommendation for confirmation of the petitioner had been made were not correct and required re-appraisal and accordingly the aforesaid letter Ann­exure 2 was not actually issued to the petitioner, but she had later obtained the same. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, submitted that the Divisional Manager had earlier recommended confirmation of the petitioner but subsequently because the petitioner had not obliged the Divisional Manager difficulties had been created by the Divisional Office. 10. On careful consideration of the submissions, we are inclined to think that the respondents' contention in regard to the issue of the letter Annexure 2 appears to be correct. 10. On careful consideration of the submissions, we are inclined to think that the respondents' contention in regard to the issue of the letter Annexure 2 appears to be correct. Annexure A with the counter affidavit is letter dated 10.6.87 by the Divisional Manager to the Regional Manager stating that the performance of the petitioner required to be reviewed and if necessary further extension of the probationary period may be required and accordingly the confirmation letter of the petitioner was withheld. Annexure B with the counter affidavit is the letter which the Regional Manager had written to the Divisional Manager on 12th June, 1987 in. acknowledgement of the aforesaid letter Annexure A appreciating the action taken by the Divisional Manager. Besides, it may be noted that it is a fact admitted by the petitioner that she was never allowed pay in the pay scale of Development Officer, and that she continued to draw Rs. 500/- per month. This fact by itself, in our opinion, provides reliable substantial confirmation of the respondents' contention that the petitioner had not been confirmed in service and that the letter at Annexure 2 had not actually been issued, for otherwise the petitioner would have been allowed the pay scale of the post as stipulated in Annexure 2. We, therefore, think that the petitioner's contention that she had been confirmed in service was not correct. 11. The respondents' contention further is that the petitioner has ceased to be in service because she had not been confirmed and in view of clause 5 of the letter of appointment, the petitioner's service stood automatically terminated. Sri Banerjee submitted that the petitioner's service stood terminated after two years. 12. We have considered the submission on behalf of the respondents. There was stipulation in the letter of appointment for automatic termination of service in case the period of probation was not extended. The respondents admittedly had not issued any communication to the petitioner stating that her service stood automatically terminated. In para 5 of counter affidavit it was stated "In the instant case no letter of confirmation of her service was issued to the petitioner. Her probationary period was also not by any order. As such in terms of the conditions embodied in the dated 6.3.86, which are binding on the petitioner, her services under the company stood terminated on the expiry of the probationary period". Her probationary period was also not by any order. As such in terms of the conditions embodied in the dated 6.3.86, which are binding on the petitioner, her services under the company stood terminated on the expiry of the probationary period". The facts do not bear out the above contention for the respondents themselves did not consider the service of the petitioner as automatically terminated after expiry of the probation period of 12 months. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner's service was treated as terminated. On the contrary, long after the expiry of period of probation of 12 months by Annexure 3 letter dated 4.11.87 the petitioner was informed that she had been absenting from office from 28.9.87 to 6.11.87 without prior approval and sanctioned leave, and the petitioner was requested to report to the office immediately. Annexure 4 is another letter dated 24.11.87 to the same effect whereby the petitioner was intimated that the period from 28.9.87 was treated as leave without pay. The respondents thus treated her as still in service and clause 5 of the letter of appointment was not acted upon. 13. The petitioner had submitted a letter at Annexure 5 dated 6th April, 1988 wherein she had said that she had proceeded on leave and she had fallen sick and could not join, that on 7th March, 1988 she had reported for duty to the Divisional Manager but she was not allowed to join on the ground that she ceased to be in service. The petitioner wrote another letter to the same effect on 2.5.88 (Annexure 6) followed by letter dated 17.6.B8 Annexure 7 and finally the notice dated 17.7.89 Annexure 8. The respondents' have riot produced any material except placing reliance upon clause 5 of appointment letter regarding automatic termination. We are, therefore, inclined to think that the respondents' contention that the petitioner's service stood automatically terminated as, pleaded in para 5 of the counter affidavit should not be accepted. 14. Sri Banerjee, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the petitioner's services stood terminated after two years of service. There is no such plea in the affidavit-in-opposition. We are, therefore, inclined to think that the respondents' contention that the petitioner's service stood automatically terminated as, pleaded in para 5 of the counter affidavit should not be accepted. 14. Sri Banerjee, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the petitioner's services stood terminated after two years of service. There is no such plea in the affidavit-in-opposition. The services of the petitioner could be considered as terminated on the expiry of twelve months, but the petitioner was treated as in service long after even in November, 1987 which could only mean that the period of probation was treated as extended. There was, however, no order to that effect. 15. We think that while the term of appointment gave power to terminate even automatically there had to be an order or record to that effect. The respondents were authorities of a public sector company and their action had to be recorded or formally expressed more so when the interests and rights of the petitioner were adversely to be affected and she as an employee was dealing with the public for insurance work. We further think that the existence of power with the authority to that the services of the petitioner as terminated, could not absolve the authorities from their obligation to observe the principles of natural justice, i.e. that the petitioner ought to have been extended opportunity to be heard or at least apprised of the action proposed to be taken, as laid down in Maneka Gandhi. AIR 1978 SC 587 and State of Punjab vs. A. Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1313 . More so when earlier the petitioner was recommended for confirmation and even a letter to that effect was written but letter was not issued. In M.S. Gill, AIR 1978 SC 851 it was laid down that grounds on which action was taken could not subsequently be enlarged. We think that in the stand the respondents have taken the respondents could, as indeed they have, keep enlarging the grounds. They first said that she be confirmed, then said there was error and letter of confirmation was not issued, the period of probation was treated as extended and again stand was taken that service stood terminated because the period was not extended and at the hearing, stand was taken that the service stood terminated after two years. They first said that she be confirmed, then said there was error and letter of confirmation was not issued, the period of probation was treated as extended and again stand was taken that service stood terminated because the period was not extended and at the hearing, stand was taken that the service stood terminated after two years. All this has been possible because the company did not issue any formal order even as record of an event that according to it had automatically takes place. We therefore are of the dear view that the version of automatic termination should not be accented. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, we direct that tine petitioner should be considered as having continued in service on probation and shall be entitled to such emoluments for the period as she was entitled during the period of probation after taking into consideration her prayer for leave as may be admissible to her, in accordance with rules and orders of the company. We order and dispose of the petition accordingly, and leave the parties to bear their own costs.