S. K. JHA, C. J. ( 1 ) THE three petitioners, amongst others, were elected under the provisions of Group C of Section 20 (1) of the M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on 14-4-88 which is borne out by Annexure-P-4 to the petition. Some mare persons were declared duly elected under the provisions of Cl. (xix) of Section 20 (1) of the Act read with statute No. 23 framed thereunder for Dr. Hari Singh Gour Vishwavidyalaya, Sagar. Some other members were declared elected under Group B of Section 20 (1) of the Act read with Statute No. 25. This is borne out by Annexure P-5. ( 2 ) IT is better to state at the outset that the facts in this case are not in controversy. It is only the question of interpretation of certain statutory provisions which is involved in this petition. ( 3 ) SECTION 20 (1) begins to read as follows: "the Court shall consist of the following persons, namely. . . . . . . . . " it is not necessary in reproduce all the remaining provisions of sub-section (1), but it is sufficient to take note of the fact that there are 5 groups of members under Groups A to E for constituting the Court. ( 4 ) AS has already been mentioned above, the petitioners were elected from amongst the persons mentioned in Group C, whereas some others were elected under the members mentioned in Group B. It is worthwhile to quote the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 20 of the Act which read as under: " (2 ). The term of office of members elected under Group D of Section (1) shall be one year. (3 ). The term of office of members nominated or elected, as the case may be, under Group B and Group C or included in Group E of sub-section (1) shall be conterminous with the term of the Court which shall be three years. (3 ). The term of office of members nominated or elected, as the case may be, under Group B and Group C or included in Group E of sub-section (1) shall be conterminous with the term of the Court which shall be three years. " as has already been stated earlier, the Court is said to consist of the persons mentioned in 5 groups and it would bear repetition to say that the groups are A to E. ( 5 ) IT hill be seen from the provisions of Section 20 (2) that the term of office of the members elected under Group D of subsection (1) has been fixed to be one year which means one year from the date on which they are declared elected. In contradistinction, the language of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) clearly lays down that the term of the members nominated or elected under Groups B and C, or included in Group E of sub-section (1) shall be conterminous with the term of the 'court' which shall be three years. It is not in dispute that the clause 'which shall be three years' relates to and is with reference to the term of the court and not the term of nomination or election of the members. Therefore, the members either nominated or elected, as the case may be under Groups B and E and included in Group E of subsection (1) shall so remain during the period that the court is in existence, the period of which has been fixed to be three years from the date that it is constituted. ( 6 ) LEARNED Advocate General strenuously argued that the term 'conterminous' means only the finishing or the ending time and has no reference to the date on which the court came into existence. According to him, irrespective of the fact that the court did not come into existence, the members nominated or elected under any of the Groups mentioned in sub-section (1) shall be for a period of three years as members of the court even though the court was not constituted. In our view, this argument is fallacious. The Statute itself makes a distinction between the term 'prescribed' in sub-section (2) for the members elected under Group D on one Land and under Groups B, C and E on the other. In our view, this argument is fallacious. The Statute itself makes a distinction between the term 'prescribed' in sub-section (2) for the members elected under Group D on one Land and under Groups B, C and E on the other. Where sub-section (2) speaks of one year from the date when the members are elected from out of Group D, the tenure of members nominated or elected or included, as the case may be, under Groups B, C and E has been made conterminous with the term of the Court and the term of the Court has been fixed to be three years. ( 7 ) THE Oxford English Dictionary lays down the meaning of the term 'conterminous' as being synonymous with conterminous and the meaning which is laid down as 'exactly coextensive' and another meaning which is laid down is 'exactly coextensive in time, range, sense, etc. '. Therefore, there cannot be an end or a limit to a thing which has not come into existence at all. The whole question, therefore, would be as to whether the Court was constituted in terms of S. 20 (1) irrespective of the fact that some members under Groups B,c,d and E were declared either elected or nominated. To accept the argument of the learned Advocate-General would be to do violence to the language of the statute which is against the principles of Interpretation of Statutes. ( 8 ) IN this connection, a reference to Ss. 23 (2) and 25 of the Act is also relevant. S. 23 (2) reads thus: "members of the Executive Council other than exofficio members shall hold office for a period of three years: provided that a member of the Executive Council elected under item (iii) of sub-sec. (1) shall cease to hold office as such member if he ceases to be a member of the Court. " it will thus be seen from this provision that the period of three years prescribed for members of the Executive Council other than exofficio members has been fixed from the date they are elected, but such member of the Executive Council who has been elected under item (iii) of sub-sec. (I) of S. 20, has been fixed again to be with effect from the date he ceases to be a member of the Court. (I) of S. 20, has been fixed again to be with effect from the date he ceases to be a member of the Court. ( 9 ) EXPLANATION (4) to S. 25 (1) reads thus: "all the members of the Academic Council other than exofficio members and members referred to in sub-sec. (3) shall hold office for a term of three years. " this again has reference to the tenure of their office as three years from the date they are appointed as members of the Academic Council other than exofficio members and the members -referred to in sub-sec. (3) of S. 20. This also supports the contention of Shri Rajendra Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioners that the language of S. 20 (3) of the Act is so clear especially in contradistinction to the language of S. 20 (2), read with the provisions referred to above, that there cannot be any escape from the conclusion that the Court shall be deemed to have come in existence when it is duly constituted. So long as the Court is not constituted, no member elected, nominated or coopted for the purpose holds office as a member of the Court. ( 10 ) IT would again bear repetition to say that the Court never came into existence, and though the petitioners; amongst others mentioned in Annexures-P-4 and P-5, never held office as members of the Court. We have stressed upon the construction of the statutory provisions as incorporated in S. 20 (1) of the Act, read with Ss. 23 and 25 of the Act for the purpose of coming to a conclusion with regard to the validity of Annexure-P-7 which is the subject-matter of challenge in this petition. ( 11 ) FOR that purpose, a few other dates are relevant. On 18-8-88, the State Government issued a notification u/s. 52 of the Act. S. 52 lays down that if the State Government, on receipt of a report or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the administration of the University cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Act, without detriment to the interests of the 'university and it is expedient in the interest of the University to do so, it may, by notification for reasons to be mentioned therein, direct that the provisions of Ss. 13, 14, 20 to 25, 40, 47, 48, 54 and 68 shall, as from the date specified in the notification (hereinafter in this section referred to as the appointed date), apply to the University subject to the modifications specified to the Third Schedule. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 52 lays down that the notification issued under sub-sec. (1) shall remain in operation for a period of one year from the appointed date and the State Government has been empowered to extend the period from time to time by such further period as it. may think fit so however that the total period of operation of the notification does not exceed three years. ( 12 ) NOTIFICATION dated 18-8-88 has not been annexed either to the petition or to the return filed on behalf of the University, but learned counsel for the parties agree that it is the correct date on which the first notification u/s. 52 was issued which is also borne out by a subsequent notification dated 23-8-90 (Annexure-P-6) by which the period of the so-called super-session u/s. 52 (1) was extended for a period up to 31-12-1990 or till the appointment of a regular Vice-Chancellor whichever was earlier with effect from 18-8-90. ( 13 ) PURSUANT to the deadline fixed in Annexure-P-6 when the effect of the notification u/s. 52 was to have ceased to have its effect on 31-12-90, another notification was issued on 5-9-90 by the University which is incorporated in Annexure-P-7 (which is the subject-matter of challenge in this petition ). By this so-called notification of 5-9-90 (Annexure-P-7), an election programme has been fixed for a fresh election of members for the purpose of Constitution of Court. When this petition was filed on 14-9-90, a Bench of this Court, while rejecting the prayer for ad interim writ, or for staying the operation of the notification (Annexure-P-7), observed that the elections, as scheduled to be held on 20-12-90 and the date for sending ballot papers is fixed as 20-11-90. The matter again came up before a Bench of this Court on 15- 11-90 when the stay application was finally heard on I. A. No. 7092/ 90 which was again rejected, but this Court, in its order, stated: "it is directed that elections to the office of the members of the Court be held, but election to the 15 seats in graduates constituency under Cl. (xix) of Group C of sub-sec. (1) of s. 20 of the M. P. Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1973, shall be subject to the ultimate result of this petition. " this writ petition itself was fixed for hearing in January, 1991. Hence this petition has been put up for hearing so early. ( 14 ) ALTHOUGH learned Advocate-General half-heartedly took a point which was not taken in the return, but as a submission on a pure question of law, that an alternative remedy was open to the petitioners to resort to the provisions of S. 55 of the Act which prescribes that if any question arises regarding the interpretation of any provision of this Act or of any Statute, Ordinance or Regulation or as to whether any person has been duly elected, appointed as or is entitled to be, a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter shall be referred to the Kuladhipati whose decision thereon shall be final. . . . . . . The question of alternative remedy is of no consequence when the case has been finally heard on merits. It could have been well advanced for whatever worth it was before the case was fixed for final hearing and before the case was heard. Only at the close of arguments on merits this point was taken. Therefore, we do not take any serious note of the submissions made by the learned Advocate-General with regard to alternative remedy and can be of no avail at this stage. ( 15 ) LEARNED Advocate-General next invited our attention to the provisions of S. 52 (3) of the Act for the purpose of pointing out as to the effect of the notification issued u/ S. 52 (1) of the Act. S. 52 (5) lays down that before the expiration of the period of operation of the notification or immediately as early as practicable thereafter, the Kulpati shall take steps to constitute the Court, Executive Council and Academic Council in accordance with the provisions of the Act, as unmodified and the Court, Executive Council and Academic Council as so constituted, shall begin to function on the date immediately following the date of expiry if the period of operation of the notification or the date on which the respective bodies are so constituted whichever is later. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 16 ) SECTION 52 (4) reads as under: "as from the appointed date, the following consequences shall ensue, namely: (iii) every person holding office as a member of the Court, the Executive Council of the Academic Council, as the case may be, immediately before the appointed date, shall cease to hold that office. " according to his submission, every person who was holding office as a member of the Court constituted u/ S. 20 (1) of the Act was not to hold office with effect from the date of the notification u/s. 52 (1 ). We do not see how this question is germane to the main question at hand which at the outset, we have stressed, is as to whether the Court was constituted at all on 14-4-88. If no Court was constituted, none of the members mentioned in Annexures-P-4 and P-5 can be said to have held his office as member of the Court. ( 17 ) TO crown it all, we can once again refer to a portion of Annexures-P-4 and P-5 which is very relevant for the purpose of coming to the conclusion as to whether the Court was constituted at all on 14-4-88 u/s. 20 (1) of the Act. Para 2 of Annexure-P-4 reads thus : "as provided under sub-sec. (3) of S. 20 ibid, the term of office of these members shall be conterminous with the term of the Court and shall be three years. This will be effective from the date of constitution of the Court to be notified later. So also in the last para of Annexure-P-5, it is clearly mentioned that the term of membership of the elected teachers will commence from the date of constitution of the Court which will be declared later. (Underlining is ours for the sake of emphasis.) According to the arguments at all hands, such a declaration of the Constitution of the Court was never made. This reinforces our conclusion that the constitution of the Court was not complete under the provisions of S. 20 (1) of the Act. "( 18 ) THERE is thus no escape from the conclusion that no Court was constituted either on 14-4-88 or any time thereafter. This reinforces our conclusion that the constitution of the Court was not complete under the provisions of S. 20 (1) of the Act. "( 18 ) THERE is thus no escape from the conclusion that no Court was constituted either on 14-4-88 or any time thereafter. Therefore, the members elected within the categories mentioned in Group C of S. 20 (1) never entered office as members of the Court at all and, therefore, their term cannot be said to have expired because it was to be coextensive with the life of the Court which was three years from the date that it was so constituted. The constitution of the Court which was not complete u/s. 20 (1) on 14-4-88 or any time thereafter, could not be held to become nugatory merely by the issuance of the impugned notification of the University as contained in Annexure-P-7. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that Annexure-P-7 is vitiated and is in clear contravention of the statutory provisions as engrafted in the Act. ( 19 ) WE accordingly allow this petition and quash the impugned notification of the University as contained in Annexure-P-7. As a necessary corollary, the Constitution of the Court shall now be completed taking into account the members either elected or nominated on 14-4-88, or at any time thereafter, if any, before the issuance of the notification u/s. 52 of the Act. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .