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1991 DIGILAW 212 (KER)

Palliyali Mustafali v. Nechithodan Subair

1991-06-07

G.H.GUTTAL, VARGHESE KALLIATH

body1991
JUDGMENT : Varghese Kalliath, J. This appeal raises a question of limitation. A minor, represented by the guardian, is the appellant. The minor filed an application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for compensation for the injuries he sustained in a motor accident. He was represented by his next friend, guardian. Appellant claimed Rs. 50,000/- as compensation for the injuries he sustained. The claim was made on different counts. 2. The Tribunal, after assessing the evidence in the case, determined the compensation payable to the appellant at Rs. 20,000/-. But the Tribunal dismissed the application on the ground that the application was filed beyond the statutory period allowed for filing the claim petition. Before us, there is no serious controversy as to the reasonableness of the quantum of compensation. 3. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal grievously erred in holding that the application has been filed out of time and that it is barred by limitation. Section 110A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') mandates that an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the Act shall not be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. Further it is provided by the proviso that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The accident happened on 18-8-1982. The application was filed only on 20-12-1984. Obviously, the application was filed after the time allowed by Section 110A(3) of the Act. Taking stock of this situation, the Tribunal thought that the application deserves to he dismissed and so the Tribunal dismissed the application. 4. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal did not consider the benign provisions contained in the Limitation Act, viz., Section 29(2) and Section 6 of the Limitation Act. The content and scope of those Sections have to be taken note of for giving substantial justice and relief to an injured minor in a motor accident. 4. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal did not consider the benign provisions contained in the Limitation Act, viz., Section 29(2) and Section 6 of the Limitation Act. The content and scope of those Sections have to be taken note of for giving substantial justice and relief to an injured minor in a motor accident. Counsel submitted that the scheme of the enactment, particularly the statutory provisions in that part of the Motor Vehicles Act which deals with compensation for injuries sustained in a motor accident comprehends a scheme which deserves a generous, bountiful and open-handed construction and consideration by the court. Without giving violence to the language of the statutory provisions and without damaging the well accepted norms of construction articulated in several decisions of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court, a liberal construction of the provisions would certainly promote the intention of the legislature. In this background, counsel submitted that the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Limitation Act can be made applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal for compensation. He also contended that since the applicant is a minor and he has not attained majority when the application was filed, the delay in filing the claim petition deserves to be condoned under the proviso to Section 110A(3) of the Act, since if a generous construction of Section 110A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act is taken, the minority of the applicant can be treated as a cause which prevented the applicant from filing the application within the time prescribed u/s 110A(3) of the Act. 5. We shall examine the question of applicability of Section 6 of the Limitation Act in the light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the statutory provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as follows: -- "29(1).............,..... 5. We shall examine the question of applicability of Section 6 of the Limitation Act in the light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the statutory provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as follows: -- "29(1).............,..... (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 - 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law" The provision makes it clear that all proceedings under any special or local law if there is no clear exclusion mandated in the Act under which the proceedings are taken, Sections 4 - 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Counsel for the appellant relied on Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Limitation Act. In the petition before the Tribunal also it was stated that there is no limitation for the application since the applicant is a minor. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Limitation Act reads thus: -- "6. Legal disability:--(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the lime specified therefore in the third column of the Schedule". 6. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time as far as a minor is concerned upto the date of majority, The word 'suit' has not been defined in the Limitation Act. But Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act says that 'suit' does not include an appeal or an application. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a 'suit' is any proceeding which is instituted by the presentation of a plaint. But Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act says that 'suit' does not include an appeal or an application. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a 'suit' is any proceeding which is instituted by the presentation of a plaint. Too narrow and hyper-technical view in the matter of finding the exact implication of the presentation of an application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act would not justify the beneficent object manifested in the provisions of the Act regarding accidents claim. We have to say that although the provisions are not technically termed as a 'suit', they are instituted by presentation of an application which is more or less like a plaint. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed thereunder for trial of a claim petition clearly show that proceedings u/s 110A of the Act are in the nature of a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure. So, we feel that there is nothing wrong in holding that an application u/s 110A of the Act would attract the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act. 7. We are supported in taking this view by several decisions of the High Courts. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hayatkhan and Others Vs. Mangilal and Others, AIR 1971 MP 140 took the view that the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were therefore applicable to applications for compensation u/s 110A of the Act. In holding so, the court held that "The word 'suit' occurring in Section 6 is capable of having a very vide connotation and may include any legal proceedings commenced by one person against another in order to enforce civil rights." Of course, in Section 6 of the Limitation Act, the word used is 'suit'. So the question to be decided is whether the claim filed by the appellant herein would fall within the definition of the word 'suit' u/s 6 of the Limitation Act. 8. 'Suit' has been defined in Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary Second Edition as "an act or an instance of suing or seeking by entreaty : solicitation : a petition : as to make suit to the King". 8. 'Suit' has been defined in Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary Second Edition as "an act or an instance of suing or seeking by entreaty : solicitation : a petition : as to make suit to the King". In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the definition of the word is "the action of suing in a Court of law, legal prosecution : a process instituted in a Court of Justice for the recovery or protection of a right, the enforcement of a claim or the redress of a wrong". Naturally, in a case where compensation is sought on account of some injury or death occasioned by a motor accident, what is provided under the Act is an application before the Tribunal. The adjudication process and the nature of relief would certainly indicate that there is no difference in substance of a suit. There is no indication in the Limitation Act that it will apply only to suit under the CPC and not a similar proceedings under other enactments. This view has been taken in the decision reported in AIR 1974 Punj & Har 39 (Pritpal Singh v. New Suraj Transport Co. (P) Ltd., Amritsar. 9. Following Pritpal Singh and Others Vs. New Suraj Transport Co. (P) Ltd. Amritsar and Others, AIR 1974 P&H 39 in the decision reported in AIR 1982 NOC 34 (All) (Vijai Gopal v. Nanak), the court held that "Where a joint application u/s 110-A for compensation, by a widow and two minor children one of whom was a postumous child, was filed 13 months after the accident in which the deceased was killed, the application cannot be said to be barred by limitation", on the ground that both the minors suffered from a legal disability u/s 6(1) of the Limitation Act and hence the benefit thereunder was available to them. Further, as the widow could not give discharge in respect of the rights of the minor children u/s 7 of the Limitation Act the second part of Section 7 was attracted to the case and the Limitation stood extended in their favour. 10. Of course, a Division bench of this Court in M.F.A. Nos. 547 of 1984 and 126 of 1985 held that the petition filed by a widow and her minor children has to be treated for the purpose of limitation as if it is a petition filed by the widow and the minor children separately. 10. Of course, a Division bench of this Court in M.F.A. Nos. 547 of 1984 and 126 of 1985 held that the petition filed by a widow and her minor children has to be treated for the purpose of limitation as if it is a petition filed by the widow and the minor children separately. Since it has been found that such a petition is barred by limitation so far as the 1 st petitioner is concerned (the widow) and the fact that the 2nd petitioner is a minor will not save the limitation so far as the 1st petitioner is concerned, we have got our own doubts on this proposition of law. Now we are concerned only with the petition filed by the minor. 11. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the decision reported in Hayatkhan and Others Vs. Mangilal and Others, AIR 1971 MP 140 considered the whole aspect of the matter referring to several decisions and held that "The word suit is capable of having very wide connotation and may include any legal proceedings commenced by one person against another in order to enforce a civil right. Thus it cannot be disputed that an application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is a suit falling within the scope of the word suit used in Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963."The court said that a petition u/s 110-A of the Act for all material purposes is like a plaint and it pertains to a dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court. 12. In H.H. The Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1964 SC 444 , the court observed that "A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or petition in the nature of plaint, or where the claim is not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a Civil Court, would prima facie not be regarded as falling within Section 86 Code of Civil Procedure". Impliedly it indicates that a petition in the nature of plaint would fall within Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. Now coming to the applicability of Section 29 of the Limitation Act and the effect of Section 29, there is not much difficulty. Impliedly it indicates that a petition in the nature of plaint would fall within Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. Now coming to the applicability of Section 29 of the Limitation Act and the effect of Section 29, there is not much difficulty. If a period of limitation is prescribed by the special law or Schedule of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or Icoal law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 - 24 shall apply, of course, if there is no express bar. We are of opinion that Sections 4 - 24 of the Limitation Act are applicable and if Section 6 of the Limitation Act is made applicable, there is no limitation. 14. The case of the Bombay High Court reported in 1966 ACC CJ 37 (Khairunnissa A. K. Siddikki v. Municipal Corporation, Bombay) has taken apparently a different view that an application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot be treated as a suit. The Bombay High Court was considering a case in a totally different context. There, the question arose in the context of application of certain provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. In that case also, the court observed thus :-- "It is no doubt true that these cases illustrate that the word 'suit' is capable of having a very wide connotation and may include, depending upon the context, any legal proceeding commenced by one person against another in order to enforce a civil right. From this, it cannot necessarily be held that the word 'suit' must be given such a wide meaning wherever it occurs. In order to determine the ambit of the word used, the Court must consider the object which the provision was intended to achieve". 15. It is true that technically an application or a petition u/s 110A of the Act cannot be described as a plaint. In order to determine the ambit of the word used, the Court must consider the object which the provision was intended to achieve". 15. It is true that technically an application or a petition u/s 110A of the Act cannot be described as a plaint. But it is a petition which for all material purposes is like a plaint and it pertains to a dispute ordinarily triable in a civil court and the trial is also conducted by a judicial officer of the rank of a District Judge, by a procedure prescribed by the Rules and the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, as we said earlier, also very much inconformity with the procedure prescribed by the trial of the suit. When we are faced with a situation where the petition has to be dismissed on account of delay and when that petition has been filed by a minor, we feel that we have to take a very generous view of the matter, so as to rescue the petition from being tumbled down on the rock of limitation and thereby depriving compensation to an innocent victim and that too a minor in a motor accident. For these reasons, we hold that Section 6 of the Limitation Act is applicable in this case and so there is no question of limitation. 16. Assuming that Section 6 of the Limitation Act is not applicable, even then, the Tribunal has got a discretionary power to condone the delay under the proviso to Section 110A(3) of the Act. The Tribunal can entertain an application, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. A minor till he attains majority, may not be in a position to file an application by himself before attaining majority. In such circumstances, the provision allowing power to the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the application when such an application has been filed through the guardian of the minor, should be exercised, if there is no serious impediment in favour of the applicant. It has to be remembered that in the matter of approaching the court within the period of limitation, the Supreme Court is also taking a very liberal, pragmatic and meaningful attitude quite different from the view the courts were taking before a decade ago. 17. It has to be remembered that in the matter of approaching the court within the period of limitation, the Supreme Court is also taking a very liberal, pragmatic and meaningful attitude quite different from the view the courts were taking before a decade ago. 17. In the result, we hold that the application is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation. So the appeal has to be allowed. As regards quantum of compensation, the Tribunal has fixed it at Rs. 20,000/-. Counsel for the appellant did not urge any point for enhancement of this amount. We award an amount of Rs. 20,000/- as compensation. We also make it clear that this amount will carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of application till realisation and the respondents are jointly and severally liable for the amount. The amount has to be deposited before the Tribunal by the Insurance Company without delay. The Tribunal is directed to deposit the amount in a Nationalised Bank in the name of the minor for an appropriate period, till the minor attains majority. The father/guardian of the minor can receive interest on the said amount for the use of the minor. Appeal is allowed as above.