Judgment Mrs. Pal, J. In this application the petitioners have prayed for institution of contempt proceedings against the respondents for violation of an order dated 30th October, 1990 passed in an appeal preferred by the petitioners. The order in question is brief and is as follows:- "In the mean time the interim order as issued earlier will continue." 2. The appeal arose out of an order disposing of a writ proceeding. While it is not necessary to go into the merits of the writ proceeding a brief statement of the background is noted for the purpose of determining the issues involved in this application. In the writ proceeding, the petitioners had challenged a decision of the Government by which it was directed that teachers of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation who exercised option for the revised scale of pay as sanctioned in respect of them, must retire at the age of 60 years. The petitioners' case appears to be that a teacher of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation is entitled to the revised scale of pay as well as to the right to retire at the age of 65 years if such teacher continued to be mentally alert and physically fit. 3. The writ proceeding was heard and disposed of by K.M. Yusuf, J. who upheld the decision of the Government. In other words the learned Judge held that teachers who exercised their option for the revised scale of pay must retire at the age of 60 years. 4. Being aggrieved by the decision of K.M. Yusuf, J. the petitioners preferred an appeal therefrom. An application for stay was also filed. The said application for stay was moved before the Vacation Bench of this Court. An order was passed by the Vacation Bench directing the application for interim order to be placed before the regular Bench one week after the holidays i.e. on 29th October 1990. It was further directed that "in the meantime the option to retain pre-revised scale of pay of the teachers of Calcutta Municipal Corporation Schools shall not be required to be exercised" 5. The matter was listed before the regular Bench on 30th October, 1990. According to the respondents the matter was listed at the instance of the petitioners on the plea that the interim order would expire on 29.10.90. The matter was listed before the regular Bench on 30th October, 1990. According to the respondents the matter was listed at the instance of the petitioners on the plea that the interim order would expire on 29.10.90. Be that as it may, on 30th October 1990 the regular Bench gave directions for filling of affidavits and the application for stay was adjourned for 2 weeks i.e. till 15th November 1990. The regular Bench also directed that in the meantime the interim order as issued earlier to continue, as quoted above. 6. According to the petitioners from 17th November 1990 the respondents stopped the salary in the revised scales to the teachers. It is contended by the petitioners that this was a contumacious act on the part of the respondents inasmuch as by virtue of the interim order passed by the vacation bench and continued by the regular bench, the petitioners were entitled to the revised scale without exercising their option. It is further contended that the phrase "in the meantime" read in the context meant "until the application for stay was heard." 7. It appears that the application for stay had come up for hearing on 4th March, 1991 before another Division Bench presided over by B.C. Basak, J. (as His Lordship then was). 8. An order was passed on 4th March, 1991 by the said Division Bench inter alia as follows: "There will be no interim order for the time being. The said application will be heard along with the appeal and we shall try to expedite the hearing of the appeal itself." 9. When this application was initially moved it was pointed out to the petitioners that the application was defective in form as it as not in keeping with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Rules 1975 relating to this High Court framed under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules. 10. An application for amendment was moved by the petitioners for amendment of the main application for contempt. This was allowed. 11. The respondents have filed affidavits in this proceeding. In their affidavits the respondents have stated:- (1) That the respondent No.3 had construed the order dated 30.10.90 as meaning that the interim order would only continue for two weeks i.e. up to 15th November, 1990. This was allowed. 11. The respondents have filed affidavits in this proceeding. In their affidavits the respondents have stated:- (1) That the respondent No.3 had construed the order dated 30.10.90 as meaning that the interim order would only continue for two weeks i.e. up to 15th November, 1990. (2) That they had no intention to violate any order of the Court and that if they were found to have committed any violation of any order of this Court they tendered their unqualified apology for the same. 12. We are unable to hold that there has been any contempt committed by the respondents as alleged by the petitioners, for the following reasons:- (a) Whatever the effect of the interim relief granted by the order dt.30.10.90 was, it was made clear that the relief would continue "in the meantime." The matter revolves, therefore, around the construction of the phrase "in the meantime" used in the order dated 30.10.90. In our view the phrase must be given its normal meaning i.e. "during or within the time which intervenes". The interim order was therefore continued by the order dated 30.10.90 only for a period of two weeks i.e. up to 15.11.90. It is not the petitioners case that the respondents had committed any act of contempt prior to 15.11.90. The language of the order dated 4.3.91 would also show that the Division Bench proceeded on the basis that there was no interim order in existence. (b) In any event assuming the phrase "in the meantime" should be construed in the manner stated by the petitioners, it is well established that if an order is capable of two constructions and the alleged contemner has accepted one such construction, it cannot be held that the alleged contemner has committed contempt of the order if he acts in accordance with the construction put by him on the order. In the case of S.K. Saha vs. Gokul Chand reported in 1988 Cr. In the case of S.K. Saha vs. Gokul Chand reported in 1988 Cr. LJ 21 a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: "In our considered view a proceeding for civil contempt cannot be predicated upon the disobedience of an order or direction which provides scope for different reasonable and rational interpretations." (c) Finally inspite of an opportunity given to the petitioners to amend the petition for contempt in order to bring it within the form prescribed by the said rules, the petitioners singularly failed to properly avail of such opportunity. The amendments sought for and allowed did not improve the position. The cause title of the petition was defective and in violation of Rule 4 of the said Rules. The contumacious conduct complained of was not set out as prescribed. The prayer of the petition also did not distinctly state particulars of the contumacious conduct alleged. Merely stating that the order dated 30.10.90 was violated is not sufficient compliance with Rule 7 of the said Rules. The petitioners should have stated how the order dated 30.10.90 was alleged to be violated by the respondents. Strict compliance with the procedural requirements is• essential for founding proceedings in contempt. Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. It is therefore imperative that the alleged contemnor is clearly informed of the charge he is called upon to meet. Compliance with Rules 4 and 7 of the said Rules ensures this. 13. For the reasons aforesaid we hold that the petitioners have not been able to make out a case for this Court to take proceedings in contempt against the respondents. The application is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Tarun Chatterjee, J.: I agree. Application dismissed.