Judgment :- The petitioner is working as a staff nurse in the Military Nursing Service, for short MNS. Her rank is that of a Lieutenant. The petitioner was granted leave for a period of 52 days in the year 1988. The leave was to expire on the 12th October, 1988. While so, the petitioner received a communication from the third respondent informing her that she has been released from service "on marriage grounds". The leave sanctioned to her also was cancelled and consequently she was ordered to report for duty on the 20th September, 1988 (vide Ext. P1). The only inference possible from Ext. P1 is that her services- were terminated "On marriage grounds" The petitioner thereupon moved this O.P. and prayed for the reliefs mentioned hereunder: i) to declare that the release from service of the petitioner "on marriage ground" alone is illegal and violative of Articles 14,15,16,19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore, void and unenforceable. ii) to call for the records leading upto all orders and the communication Ext. P1 and quash the same by the issuance of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction. iii) to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to continue the petitioner in the service of the Military Nursing Service and permit her to rejoin duty as such and further permit her to avail of all the privileges allowable to a member of the Military Nursing Service. iv) to issue such other writs, orders or directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem, fit and proper in the circumstances of the case". 2. According to the petitioner the above order would result in her being discriminated against in matters of employment under the State. She therefore argues that the order is hit by the prohibition contained in Articles 14,15 and 16 of the Constitution. She has a further case that in any event her right to eke out a living, protected by Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is interfered with by the order. This order, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits, therefore results in the petitioner being deprived of her fundamental rights as a citizen of India, guaranteed by the Constitution. She has a further case that in any event her right to eke out a living, protected by Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is interfered with by the order. This order, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits, therefore results in the petitioner being deprived of her fundamental rights as a citizen of India, guaranteed by the Constitution. He therefore argues that the order, based on which the above direction is issued that a female nurse in the MNS, on her getting married, will loose her job, is liable to be declared unconstitutional and hence nonest. 3. On a scrutiny of the averments contained in the counter affidavit it is clear that the authority concerned concedes that the service of a nurse in the MNS would get terminated on marriage. At the same time it has been stated that the individual concerned can continue in service provided the continuance is sanctioned by the authority concerned who must be of opinion that the individual possesses the criteria detailed in Annexure 'A' attached to Ext. RI(c) guidelines. A reference in this connection to the following excerpt from the counter affidavit is profitable:-' " However, due to the persisting shortages in the cadre, a compromise, even temporary, had to be made somewhere and that was how a temporary provision effective for a period of 2 years was introduced in Jan. 1968 to retain the officers of MNS in service even after marriage for a period of 2 years at a time. This provision was reviewed every 2 years till June 1979 when these orders were made to stand "till further orders". Eversince Jan 1968, the married officers of MNS were given the option either to continue in service or seek release on getting married at the end of a two-year period of retention already granted. Under this policy, all those officers who sought release exercising this option were allowed to proceed on release; likewise those who sought continued retention were being granted retention with the rarest of the rare exceptions. It was in early 1987 that the whole policy regarding grant of retention to officers of MNS after marriage was reviewed and it was decided to introduce g set of criteria to be satisfied by the married officers for being allowed continued retention in service". It was in early 1987 that the whole policy regarding grant of retention to officers of MNS after marriage was reviewed and it was decided to introduce g set of criteria to be satisfied by the married officers for being allowed continued retention in service". From the discussion above the inference irresistible is that a member of the MNS will be discharged from service on her getting married although there is the chance of her being retained in service provided the re tension is justifiable under Ext. RI(c) guidelines. 4. Since the petitioner has not chosen to challenge Exts. R1(a), R1(b) and R1(c), the petition, for that reason alone, is liable to be rejected, the counsel for the respondents submits. 5. The first question that arises for consideration therefore is: Is it necessary for the petitioner to get Ext. R1 (c) containing the criteria, demolished before she gets a declaration that her release from service "on marriage ground" is unconstitutional and hence ab-initio void. It should in this connection 'be remembered that the criteria enumerated in Ext. R1(c) are intended to be only the guidelines, the authority concerned shall keep in mind while passing the discretionary order within the meaning of Ext. R1(a) and Ext. R1 (b) permitting the MNS officer to remain in service even after marriage. These two documents recognise the discretionary power vested in the authority which is competent to permit the service of an officer of the MNS extended from time to time after her release from service 'on marriage ground'. Exts. R1(a),R1(b) and R1(c) however, do not confer any right as such on the officer in the MNS as to say that she can get a declaration that her release from service on "marriage grounds" is bad in law and hence she must be deemed to be in service, through a court of law. Ext. R1(c) contains only administrative rules, the authority, who in the exercise of the discretionary power made mention of in Ext. R1(a) and Ext. R1(b), shall comply with. If they fail to comply with the above administrative directions while issuing the order in exercise of the discretion, the order can perhaps be challenged before courts on the ground of non-compliance with those directions. Court then has to consider and apply the said directions and whatever its effects may be. R1(a) and Ext. R1(b), shall comply with. If they fail to comply with the above administrative directions while issuing the order in exercise of the discretion, the order can perhaps be challenged before courts on the ground of non-compliance with those directions. Court then has to consider and apply the said directions and whatever its effects may be. That effect will be given to it by the court exactly as effect will be given to a statute providing that murderers shall be hanged, or last wills must have two witnesses. (See The Nature and Sources of The Law-pp. 110-112 by John Chipman Gray, Second Edition). The order releasing the petitioner from service under challenge however, is not based on Ext. R1(c). If that be the position, to my mind, it is unnecessary for the petitioner to challenge Exts. R1(a), R1(b) and R1(c). 6. The next question can be stated as follows:--Is the petitioner; entitled to the declaration that the order releasing her from service on "marriage ground" is unenforceable as the same is one passed in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14,15,16 and 21 of the Constitution. Certain well established principles shall be kept in mind while searching for an answer to the question. They are: It should in this connection be remembered that it is one of the cardinal features of our' Constitution that a person, on his being enlisted in armed forces, does not cease to be a citizen so as to say that he is deprived of his rights fundamental or otherwise under the Constitution. However in the larger interest of national security and military discipline the law makers can abrogate such rights in their application to the armed forces. Nonetheless; that shall not be carried so far as to create a class of citizens not entitled to the benefits of the liberal spirit of the Constitution. (See the decision of the Supreme Court in PrithiPal Singhv. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413). The principle thus stated, to my mind, does not leave any doubt as regards the rights of an army personnel to move the High Court under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under Article 32 for the enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14,15,16 and 21 of The Constitution, unless it be that the said rights are abrogated. The principle thus stated, to my mind, does not leave any doubt as regards the rights of an army personnel to move the High Court under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under Article 32 for the enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14,15,16 and 21 of The Constitution, unless it be that the said rights are abrogated. It is relevant in this context to note that it is not the case of the respondents that law makers have abrogated these rights in their application to the members of MNS. The respondents however resisted the petition by raising the contentions, discernible from the following excerpt, from the counter affidavit: "Nursing is a unique profession where single minded and professional care of a Nurse is the basic and primary requirement. This is more so in the Armed Forces where the patients happen to be the soldiers who are required to defend the country effectively. Marriage does place substantial constraints in the way of a professional nurse in discharging her duties. This is especially true in view of the major responsibility a woman as a mother takes in the rearing of the children and more so in view of the regular transfers every 2-3 years in the Armed Forces Hospitals. The care of the patients reigns supreme in the minds of the authorities who cannot compromise on the standards of efficiency of the nursing services in the Armed Forces Hospitals under any circumstances". 7. This approach to the issue by the respondents, in my view, reflects only the male chauvinism which, Ancient Indians and Indians of modern times, who have constituted India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, have condemned. To know why such condemnation, one has to bestow his attention on two aspects; (1) as to whether any difference had been made between. men and women in ancient India and (2) does The Constitution, the people of India have adopted, permits such differentiation. 8. To understand the first aspect with some exactitude we may have to probe into the heritage, this ancient land, where wisdom made its home before it went into any other country (as stated by Swamy Vivek ananda) has kept in store, for us. About the position, the women held in the society in the days of yore, many entertained the same belief as the one discernible from the counter affidavit. About the position, the women held in the society in the days of yore, many entertained the same belief as the one discernible from the counter affidavit. This doubt was cleared by Swamy Vivekananda by giving the answer, extracted, hereunder, to the question of a disciple, namely, "Sir, history does not tell us of any Maths for women in India in ancient times, only during the Buddhist period one hears of Maths for women; but from it in course of time many corruptions arose. The whole country was overrun by great evil practices". The answer: "It is very difficult to understand why in this country so much difference is made between men and women, whereas the Vedanta declares that one and the same conscious Self is present in all beings writing down Smritis etc., and binding them by hard rules, the men have turned the women into more manufacturing machines. Therefore do I say that though outwardly there may be difference between men and women, in their real nature there is none. When you will realise that all-illumining reality of the Atman, then you will see that this idea of sex-distinction has vanished altogether. This view expressed by Swami Vivekananda, to my mind, is reflected in Articles 15 and 16 of The Constitution. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on ground of sex. Article 16(1) declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the state and Article 16(2) says that no citizen shall, on grounds of sex be ineligible for, or discriminated against, in respect of, any employment or office under the State. Sub-Articles 3,4 and 5 speak of exemptions. They are not relevant here. It therefore follows that the order releasing the petitioner from service on the ground of marriage is highly discriminatory and hence hit by the prohibition contained in Articles 14,15 and 16. If the family and domestic commitments of a woman member of the MNS is likely to be in conflict with the efficient discharge of duties, a similar situation may well arise in the case of a male or female doctor serving in the nursing homes*. Nonetheless married male doctors, female doctors and male nurses in the 'Armed Forces Hospitals' are allowed to continue in military service until they reach the age of superannuation. Nonetheless married male doctors, female doctors and male nurses in the 'Armed Forces Hospitals' are allowed to continue in military service until they reach the age of superannuation. It can thus be opined without fear of contradiction that the members of MNS are discriminated against in matters of employment under the State. The petitioner therefore is well founded in her argument that the order releasing her from service is hit by the prohibitions contained in Articles 14,15 and 16 of The Constitution. In view of the above declaration it is unnecessary to consider the argument of the petitioner that the order interferes with her right to take out a living guaranteed under Article 21 of The Constitution. C.B Muthamma v. Union of India, AIR 1979 S.C.1868. 9. It is sad to say that this ancient land, which is on its onward march to the 21st Century with ambitious reforms to have more developments, still allows orders mentioned above reflecting male chauvinism to be issued, with impunity. This morbid approach amounts to an open insult to the institution of our womanhood. This is impermissible. The order releasing the petitioner from service therefore is declared unenforceable in law. The O.P. accordingly is allowed. No costs.