This appeal is from an order of remand made on 30.6.S2 in Title Appeal No. 79 of 1981 by the Assistant District Judge (1) Cachar. 2. The plaintiff instituted Title Suit No.25/72 in the Court of the Munsiff (4) Silehar against the defendants for declaration of his title to the disputed land and khas possession of it. The case of the plaintiff was that he was the owner of the disputed land under a deed of gift but, before the Munsiff. the plaintiff did not produce the original deed of gift; nor produced secondary evidence. The Munsiff, therefore, dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by the decree, the plaintiff filed Title Appeal No. 79/81. During the pendency of the appea1 the plaintiff appellant filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC for allowing him to file the certified copy of the deed of gift on the following grounds. After exercise of due diligence he could not produce the original deed of gift at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, and that the plaintiff fell very seriously ill of blood pressure and other serious complications resulting in unconsciousness and hospitalization in the Silchar Medical College Hospital. The lower appellate Court rejected the petition by order dated 2. 4. 82 holding that the application was filed after an inordinate delay. However, at the time of the disposal of the appeal, the lower appellate Court felt that the deed of gift is essentially necessary for effective or just decision of the case although it rejected the application for production of additional evidence and, therefore, the case was remanded directing the trial judge to give the plaintiff an opportunity to prove the execution of the deed in the interest of justice. 3. The contention of Mr. B, Acharyya, the learned counsel for the appellants, is that the learned Assistant District Judge having rejected the application under Order 41 Rule 27 for production of the additional evidence, the order has become final, and as such, his order to give the plaintiff an opportunity to prove the execution of the deed of gift is barred by res judicata. 4. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has referred me to a decision of the Supreme Court reported as Y.V. Patil vs. Y- L. Patil, AIR 1977 SC 392 . 4. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has referred me to a decision of the Supreme Court reported as Y.V. Patil vs. Y- L. Patil, AIR 1977 SC 392 . In that case, the Supreme Court has held ; "Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it will be binding and subsequent stage of the proceeding". The decision of the Supreme Court quoted above is in respect of an order passed in the same proceeding. In the present case, the order rejecting the prayer for production of additional evidence was made in the course of the same proceeding in Title Appeal No. 79 of 1981 and, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel has sufficient force. But the High Court will not be bound by the order of the lower appellate Court. In other words, the order made on 2. 4. 82 rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 for production of additional evidence could not be discarded by the lower appellate Court although at the subsequent stage it was found that the order caused injustice to the plaintiff. but it would not bind the High Court for the reason that in the appeal before the High Court the entire subject-matter is available for adjudication before the High Court. The only question is whether the order rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 was justified or not. In respect of the order dated 2. 4. 82 rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 on the ground of delay. I am of the view that there is no presumption that the delay was occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence. But the application was rejected on the ground of delay although the plaintiff gave reasons for delay, as already stated. It would have been just and fair if the lower appellate Court allowed the petition to produce the additional evidence on the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the order made on 2. 4. 8z was bad. 5. For the foregoing reasons, I am not inclined to interfere with the order of the lower appellate Court and the appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.