Research › Browse › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 22 (ORI)

MAHADEV SASMAL @ SAMAL v. STATE OF ORISSA

1991-02-04

K.C.JAGADEB ROY, L.RATH

body1991
JUDGMENT : L. Rath, J. - The petitioners have approached this Court having been aggrieved by an order passed by the Revenue Officer purported to be u/s 8(1)(b) of the Orissa Lind Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') directing the petitioners ' eviction from the land as paryat and taking over possession by the Revenue Inspector. The facts, stated in brief, are that the proceeding u/s 8(1)(b) of the Act was initiated and notice was issued to the petitioners in OLR Case No. 27 of 1984 directing them to show cause as to why they should not be (sic)ted from the land they having kept it without cultivation for the last sixty years. The petitioners showed cause denying the allegation contending that they are cultivating the land. The Revenue Officer conducted a spot verification on 16-2-1985 but the petitioners were absent even though they had been noticed earlier. The Revenue Officer disposed of the proceeding on. 21-9-1985 basing upon the facts found during his spot visit that, the land was used as a compost pit and that a portion of the land was also used as a pond. He also found that the land was being used by the villagers of Kolothigam for the last 30-40 years and that the villagers have got a right of easement over the land. The Revenue Officer further purported to find that the petitioners had cunningly sold away the land to one Dandapani Dalai and his wife (opp, party Nos 6 and 7 in this proceeding) to create animosity among the villagers. 2. Mr. Pal, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in assailing the order, that the entire proceeding started u/s 8(1)(b) of the Act was misconceived and without jurisdiction and that the findings purported to be arrived therein are. also without substance and also could not have been reached in such a proceeding It is his submission that. in-as much as the proceeding is a suo motu one initiated by the Revenue Officer, the proceeding was still-born since commencement of a suo motu proceeding u/s 8(1)(b) is not contemplated It is his further contention that to start a proceeding u/s 9(1)(.b) notice for three months as required u/s 8(2) is compulsorily necessary but that such notice had never been given and hence the proceeding could not have started in the first place, 3. A counter affidavit has also been fifed by the State in which, the fact that no notice had been given u/s 8(2) of the Act is not disputed. 4. Section 8 of the Act re a provision faying down the grounds of eviction of a raiyat. This provision, which declares the grounds does not state the machinery to put such grounds into implementation. Necessary provision for their implementation is Section 12 which contemplates that an application is to be made by the landlord before the Revenue Officer in the prescribed manner within sixty days from the date on which the dispute arises and that the Revenue Officer, after making such enquiry as may be necessary, shall pass necessary orders as he deems fit. It is conceded by the learned Additional Government Advocate that neither Section 8 or 12 nor any other provrsion in the Act authorises the Revenue Officer to start a suo motu proceeding for eviction of a raiyat ors th base of the grounds enumerated in Section 8. ft is brought to our notice that the proceeding was started on the basis of the report of the .Revenue inspector only. It is nowhere shown that such a proceeding can be commenced on the basis of a report of the Revenue Inspector. Even where the State is the landlord, as in the present case, a petition for eviction of a raiyat on any of the grounds specified in Section 8(1) has to be filed on behalf of the State and the Revenue Officer as the statutory authority, is to cause the enquiry. and decide the dispute but he cannot initiate a 'proceeding suo motu himself and decide the lis himself. In that event the Revenue Officer would be combining in himself both the functions of the accuser and the judge which is violative of the very concept of a Judicial determination. 5. No such proceeding could also be started, as is rightly contended by Mr. Pal, without the necessary notice u/s 8(2) for three months having been given, Sec 12 prescribes the limitation of sixty days from the date on which the dispute arises. 5. No such proceeding could also be started, as is rightly contended by Mr. Pal, without the necessary notice u/s 8(2) for three months having been given, Sec 12 prescribes the limitation of sixty days from the date on which the dispute arises. The dispute must relate to a dispute between the landlord and a raiyat and hence it must be shown that the dispute has arisen on a particular date so as to compute the period of limitation, Though it may not be said that the date of the notice u/s 8(2) is necessarily the date of the dispute in all cases, yet the date of the notice, when notice is given, may be a convenient way to determine the date of the dispute. 6. Even apart from such facts, the very allegation in Annexure-2, the notice issued by the Revenue Officer, shows that the land had been. laying fallow since last sixty years. If the land had not been put to cultivation since the last sixty years and had been put to some other use, it can hardly be said that the restrictions as imposed u/s 8(1) would create a negation to the use of the land in the manner in which it had been used for last sixty years. The notice in that event would itself become misconceived because the Act cannot have operation retrospectively beyond its commencement unless there is any specific legislative provision for the same. It is admitted on all hands that there is no such provision. 7. The findings as regards use of the land by the villagers reached by the Revenue Officer and defect in the transfer to the opp. party Nos. 6 and 7 are also not findings which could be reached in the proceeding u/s 8(1,(b) of the Act and hence are clearly beyond the authority vested in the officer. 8. In the result, the order in Annexure-7 is not sustainable in law and is quashed. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 300/-. K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J. I agree.