TIBRIWAL, J. — Before deciding this bail application on merits, it has become necessary to decide the preliminary objection raised by the learned Public Prosecutor, that the application for grant of pre- arrest bail u/s 438 Cr. P.C. is not maintainable in view of specific bar contained u/s. 18 of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). As the question was of vital importance, a general notice was given to the learned members of the bar inviting their assistance to submit their views on this legal point. Section 18 of the Act reads as follows: "Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons committing an offence under the Act: — Nothing in Section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under this Act." (2). The argument of the learned Public Prosecutor is that the provisions contained in the aforesaid section are clear and unambiguous and there is total bar to apply the provisions of section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to pre- arrest bail, ordinarily called "anticipatory bail". Section 438 Cr.P.C. provides for grant of bail to person/persons apprehending arrest and this power has been given to the High Court or the Court of Sessions. (3). It is made clear at the very outset that I am not examining the constitutional validity of the various provisions contained in the Act including that of section 18 of the Act. Presently, I am only concerned to interpret section 18 of the Act, as to whether, it creats a complete bar to entertain any application for grant of pre-arrest bail u/s. 438 Cr. P.C. of the court has power of judicial scrutiny before declining the benefit of pre-arrest bail to a person apprehending his arrest to see whether the said person has committed an offence under the Act and if this judicial scutury is permissible then to what extent? In order to appreciate the rival submissions made by the learned counsel about the impact of section 18 of the Act, it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act. (4). In order to appreciate the rival submissions made by the learned counsel about the impact of section 18 of the Act, it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act. (4). From a bare reading of the entire scheme of the Act, it is manifest clear that the Act has been made to prevent the commission of the offences of Atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes and to provide for special courts for the trial of such offences. The Act came into force w.e.f. 30.01.1990. Section 3 of the Act provides punishments for offence of Atrocities. The word atrocity means an offence punishable u/s 3 of Act. Section 4 of the Act provides punishment for neglect of duties by public servant required to be performed by him under that Act. (5). The effect of section 3 of the present Act .is that if certain acts are committed by persons, who are not members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, against persons who are members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, will be an offence or more serious offence involving more severe punishments, which otherwise the said acts do not constitute an offence or if they constitute an offence then punishment is not so severe in the common law. Section 7 of the Act provides for forfeiture of property which has been used for the commission of the offences. Then section 8 creates certain presumptions as to offences which are not otherwise available in the common law. Then section 10 gives power to special courts to direct any person, likely to commit any offence under Chapter II of the Act, to remove himself beyond the limits of such area, by such route and within such time as may be specified in the order and not to return to that area from which he was directed to remove himself for such period not exceeding to two years as may be specified in the order, while in the common law, there is no such provision except in section 20 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 and sections 3,4, and 5 of the Rajasthan Control of Gundas Act, 1975. Then section 13 prescribes the penalty for non-compliance with the order made under section 10 of the Act. Then section 13 prescribes the penalty for non-compliance with the order made under section 10 of the Act. Section 14 provides for constitution of special courts to try the offences under the Act. Section 15 deals with appointment of an advocate as Special Public Prosecutor for the Special Courts. Then Section 16 prescribes the powers of the State Government to impose collective fine in certain cases. Then section 18 of the Act provides that the provisions of section 438 Cr. P.C. shall not apply to persons who have committed the offence under the Act. Section 20 of the Act overrides other laws which are inconsistent to the provisions under the Act. (6). Thus, a perusal of the aforesaid provisions make it clear that they are departure from the ordinary law, since the said law was found to be inadequate and not sufficiently effective to deal with the atrocities committed against the persons of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is a penal statute and its provisions are drastic in nature. Certain Acts have been made to construe an offence which is not in the common law and in certain cases, enhanced punishments have been provided. Then some presumptions against the accused are permissible and special courts have been constituted for the trial of the offences committed under the Act. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the legislature considered the crimes against the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to be of the aggravated nature, if committed by the members other than of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Hence, special provisions which in certain respects are harsh have been made providing for special forum for the speedy disposal of such cases, as well putting restrictions in respect of the release of the offenders on bail with suitable changes in the procedure with a view of achieving its object. (7). It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that when statute provides enhanced punishment as compared to the punishment prescribed for similar offences under the ordinary penal laws of the country and also for constitution of special court then higher responsibility and duty is cast on the court/Judge to be sure that there exists a prima-facie case involving a person in the commission of the offence under the Act. It is submitted by them that the provisions of section 18 should not be construed in a manner, so as to create a complete bar even to entertain an application u/s. 438 Cr. P.C. without application of mind on the facts as to whether the accusations made against a person do constitute an offence under the Act or not. (8). It was also contended that the intention of the legislature cannot be to deny the benefit of pre-arrest bail to those persons who did not commit any offence under the Act, but the case has been registered or got registered under the Act simply to deny the benefit of pre arrest bail and to humiliate them by getting arrest. It is submitted that it will be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India if a person is allowed to be arrested in a case, which, if put to judicial scrutiny, does not involve in the commission of an offence under the Act. In this connection, reliance has been placed on Ayubkhan Kalandar Khan Pathan vs. State of Gujarat & others(l). A reference has already been made to the case of Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others v. State of Punjab (2) to get the support that section 438 Cr.P.C. is meant to meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution and that the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. The submission is, that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of section 438 Cr. P.C. According to them, the beneficient provision contained in section 438 Cr.P.C. must be saved, not jettisoned. On the other hand the learned Public Prosecutor, who is assisted by Mr. R.K. Yadav and Mr. Bagdi, submits that our Constitution provides for establishment of a socialist, secular and democratic order. It also provides equality of opportunity for education and employment. The entire object of our Constitution is to ensure that the weaker sections of the society, particularly the Scheduled Casts and Scheduled Tribes, should be made prepared for meaningful participation in the new system to acquire an equal position in the national life. It also provides equality of opportunity for education and employment. The entire object of our Constitution is to ensure that the weaker sections of the society, particularly the Scheduled Casts and Scheduled Tribes, should be made prepared for meaningful participation in the new system to acquire an equal position in the national life. Though a variety of measures have been taken from the very beginning in terms of various constitutional provisions including specific safeguards, but the achievement did not measure upto the great expectations of the founding father. Inspite of several safeguards, the land to the tiller remains a dream for the countless millions belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and even their tenure has not been effectively protected. It has been argued that inspite of the fact that 40 years have passed since the Constitution came into force, the socio-economic conditions of the persons of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes remained the same. They are denied number of civil rights and are subjected to various offences, humiliation and harassment. Serious crimes are committed against them for various historical socio-economic reasons and they are being deprived of their life and property by the members of the upper class. It was further argued that when the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes try to preserve their self respect and honour, the members of the upper class get irritent for the dominance. Their occupation and cultivation over the land, even allotted by the Government, is resented and all sort of atrocities are committed against them to oust them from their land to humiliate them in the public. They are not even allowed to exercise the right of franchise. According to them, the existing laws, like the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and normal provisions of the Indian Penal Code have been found to be inadequate to check these crimes, as such, a special legislation to check and deter crimes against them, committed by non- Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes has, therefore, become necessary. According to them, the interpretation of section 18 should be made in such a way so that purpose and object of the Act is not frustrated. Their contention is that section 18 of the Act creates a complete bar and the court cannot even entertain any application for grant of pre-arrest bail u/s. 438 Cr. According to them, the interpretation of section 18 should be made in such a way so that purpose and object of the Act is not frustrated. Their contention is that section 18 of the Act creates a complete bar and the court cannot even entertain any application for grant of pre-arrest bail u/s. 438 Cr. P.C. if the case is registered by the police under the Act or subsequently, it is found that the offence under the Act has been committed. (9). I have given my due consideration to the weighty submissions made by both the sides. It is true that the Act has been enacted with a special object. It is also a fact that atrocities on the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes could not be checked under the existing laws and the normal provisions of the Indian Penal Code. It is also correct that the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are being subjeced to various atrocities, like deprivation of land and property, denial of right of franchise, rape on their women folk etc. Our goal to socialistic, secular and democratic order is still a dream to be achieved and this dream cannot be achieved till deterent steps are taken to provide protection to the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, so that they may live a life of honour, claim equality in employment and education and exercise their right of vote freely. (10). But it is equally important to safeguard the fundamental rights of a citizen. Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except upholding a procedure established by law. This right is available to all citizens. Similarly Article 14 provides equal protection to all citizens. Whenever a case of deprivation of personal liberty comes before the court, then the court is always jealous to protect the fundamental right of a citizen, provided under Article 21 and 14 of the Constitution. Denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty. In the case of Gurubax Singh Sibbia (supra) the Apex Court of this country has observed as under: — "We find a great deal of substance in Mr. Denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty. In the case of Gurubax Singh Sibbia (supra) the Apex Court of this country has observed as under: — "We find a great deal of substance in Mr. Tarakundes submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Sec. 438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that Section. Sec. 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An over-generous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Sec. 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with un-reasonable restrictions. The beneficient provision contained in Sec. 438 must be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger after the decision in Menaka Gandhi vs. Union of India (1978)I SCC 248 that in order to meet the challenge of Art. 21 of the Constitution the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. Sec. 438 in the form in which it is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on the ground that is prescribes a procedure which is unjust or unfair. We ought, at all costs, to avoid throwing it open to a Constitutional challenge by reading words in it which are not to be found therein." In Gudikanti Narsimhulu v. Public Prosecutor (3) it has been observed by Honble Krishna lyer.J. as under : — "...the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensistized judicial process....After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of procedure established by law. The last four words of Art. 21 are the life of the human right." In Sibias case, the Supreme Court further observed: — "In regard to the anticipatory bail if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the. ends of justice but from some ulterior motive the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant, the applicant by having him arrested a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made." "In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja (4) the Honble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the provisions of Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as TADA), though in a different contex regarding powers of the court to evaluate the material and document on record for framing of charges." In the said case after considering the entire scheme of the Act, the Supreme Court observed as under: — "To put it differently the ratio of the decision is that the provisions of the Act need not be resorted to if the nature of the activities of the accused can be checked and controlled under the ordinary law of the land. It is only in those cases where the law enforcing machinery finds the ordinary law to be inadequate or not sufficiently effective for tackling the menace of terrorist and disruptive activities that resort should be had to the drastic provisions of the Act. While invoking a criminal statute, such as the Act, the prosecution is duty bound to show from the record of the case and the documents collected in the course of investigation that facts emerging therefrom prima-facie constitute an offence within the letter of the law. When a statute provides special or enhanced punishment as compared to the punishments prescribed for similar offences under the ordinary penal law of the country, a higher responsibility and duty is cast on the Judge to make sure there exists prima-facie evidence for supporting the charge levelled by the prosecution. Therefore, when a law viz. a person with serious penal consequences extra care must be taken to ensure that those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute are not roped in by stretching the language of the law. Therefore, when a law viz. a person with serious penal consequences extra care must be taken to ensure that those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute are not roped in by stretching the language of the law. But that does not mean that the judicial officer called upon to decide whether or not a case for framing a charge under the Act is made out should adopt a negative attitude. He should frame a charge if the prosecution shows that the material placed on record and the documents relied on give rise to a strong suspicion of the accused having committed the crime alleged against him." The Honble Supreme Court further observed as under: — "From the above discussion, it seems well settled that at the sections 227-228 stage the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case." (11). It is true that the aforesaid observations have been made by the Honble Supreme Court while deciding the ambit of consideration, at the stage of framing charges as such, the said observations may not be fully applicable while interpreting Sec. 18 of the Act. But it may give some guidelines of the ambit of consideration while interpreting section 18. (12). With regard to interpretation of statute, I would like to refer the following observation/guidelines made by the Honble Supreme Court in Kehar Singh and others v. The State (Delhi Admn.) (5):- "228. During the last several years, the golden rule has been given a go-bye. We now look for the intention of the legislature or the purpose of the statute. First, we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. We now look for the intention of the legislature or the purpose of the statute. First, we examine the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense of the words. But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. We then examine every word-evcry section and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provision out of the frame- work of the statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences." (13). In the aforesaid background, section 18 of the Act has to be interpreted. Section 18 of the Act prescribes that nothing in Section 438 Cr. P.C. shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation having committed an offence under the Act. In other words, the benefit of pre-arrest bail under section 438 Cr.P.C. have been excluded in a case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under the Act. The question then arises, who should decide as to whether a person has committed an offence under the Act? Whether in should be left entirely to the person who makes a complaint and who may have a grudge in getting a person arrested by making such allegations so that he may be deprived the benefit of pre-arrest bail or it should be left to the police officers who register the case and who may also have the same design for the various reasons. In my view, Section 18 of the Act should be so construed so that it may safeguard the fundamental right of personal liberty and equal protection available to a citizen under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution on the one hand and the object underlying the Act is also not frustrated. This is only possible if a judicial scrutiny is permissible and the matter is not left entirely either to the complainant or to the police officer. If section 18 of the Act is given such an interpretation so as to exclude entertainability of the application under section 438 Cr. P.C. in the concerned court simply because a case under section 3 or 4 of the Act has been registered at any stage, then the chances of injustice and misuse shall be much more. There may be cases in which even the allegations made in the report/complaint taken on the face value do not constitute an offence under the Act and there may be cases also that after taking into consideration the statements of the witnesses recorded during investigation,and other material collected, commission of an offence under the Act by an accused person is not prima-facie disclosed or made out. Should citizen, in such situation, be deprived the benefit of the provision of section 438 Cr. P.C. on the ground that section 18 of the Act prohibits even entertainability of such application for pre-arrest bail under section 438 Cr. P.C. In my considerate view, such view may lead to absurdity and unreasonableness and may also be violative to the fundamental right of equal protection and personal liberty enshrined under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution. (14). The matter may be considered from a different angle also. Whether a complaint is made by a person to put criminal machinery in motion, he is always jealous to see the person, against whom he is making the complaint, should be humiliated by getting his arrest by police and in order to achieve this object, he may be over enthusiastic to see that the case is registered under section 3 or 4 of the Act. There may be some unscrupulous police officers who may also adopt the same line for the various reasons. There may be some unscrupulous police officers who may also adopt the same line for the various reasons. To interpret section 18 of the Act in a way so as to create a complete bar even to the maintainability of an application under section 438 Cr.P.C. in the concerned court, then it would mean that the power of arrest is given in the hands of the complainant or to the police officer. It cannot be the intention of the legislature that the persons who did not commit an offence under the Act or they are roped in by. stretching the language of section 3 and 4 of the Act should be denied the benefit of pre-arrest bail if they are otherwise entitled to get the same. Therefore, a harmonious construction should be given to section 18 of the Act in such a manner that the object of the Act is not frustrated but at the same time the persons who did not commit an offence under the Act is not deprived the benefit of pre-arrest bail if he is otherwise entitled to get under the provisions of section 438 Cr.P.C. This is possible only if a judicial scrutiny is made permissible and it is held that section 18 of the Act does not create a complete bar to the maintainability/entertainability of an application under section 438 Cr.P.C. I. therefore, hold that section 18 of the Act does not exclude the applicability of section 438 Cr.P.C. completely so far the maintainability of an application for grant of pre-arrest bail is concerned. (15). The matter does not end here, as the question of ambit of consideration of judicial scrutiny is also vital to be decided. Learned counsel for both the parties have made submissions that if a judicial scrutiny is permissible then it should not be limited only to the police report or the complaint but the statement of witnesses and other material should also be taken into consideration. In this connection both the parties have their own fears. Learned counsel for both the parties have made submissions that if a judicial scrutiny is permissible then it should not be limited only to the police report or the complaint but the statement of witnesses and other material should also be taken into consideration. In this connection both the parties have their own fears. While from the side of the accused, the fear is that though such allegations may be made by a complainant in the police report complaint which constitute an offence u/s 3 or 4 of the Act but there is no evidence to substantiate those allegations and in that situation a person should not be deprived the benefit those allegations in that situation a person should not be deprived the benefit of pre-arrest bail u/s 438 Cr.PC. simply because the case has been registered u/s 3/4 of the Act. Contrary to this, the fear of the other party is that the FIR is not the last word and it may be lacking such averments to constitute an offence u/s 3/4 of the Act. But subsequently, at the stage of enquiry/investigation sufficient material may come on record by which prima-facie case of the commission of the offence under the Act is made out and in that situation the person should not be entitled to get benefit of pre-arrest bail in view of section 18 of the Act. In my view, learned counsel for both the parties are right in their submissions and the judicial scrutiny should not be limited to the extent of police report/complaint but also to the statements of the witnesses and other material collected during investigation. But the ambit of judicial scrutiny cannot be extendet to the extend of appreciation of evidence but to the extent to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken on their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting an offence under the Act. (16). The net result of the aforesaid discussion is as follows : — i. That section 18 of the Act does not create a complete bar even to maintainability of an application u/s 438 Cr. P.C. ii. (16). The net result of the aforesaid discussion is as follows : — i. That section 18 of the Act does not create a complete bar even to maintainability of an application u/s 438 Cr. P.C. ii. That whenever such applications come for consideration before the competent court then it should make a judicial scrutiny as to whether from the FIR, the statements of witnesses and other documents on record, the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingedients constituting an offence under the Act or not. The court may for this limited purpose, sift the evidence, as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gosper truth even it is opposed to common sense or to broad probabilities of the case. But it does not mean that it can appreciate the evidence at this stage and make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons into the matter and the evidence. iii. That if on judicial scrutiny, the court comes to the conclusion that an offence under the Act is prima-facie made out then, the court should exclude the application of sec. 438 Cr.P.C. and dismiss the application without further going on merits of the case at that stage. (17). The preliminary objection is, therefore, answered as indicated above.