JUDGMENT J.K. Mathur, J. - This appeal was filed by the appellants having been convicted by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Faizabad for having committed offences under Sections 147 and 302 IPC. This court admitted the appeal and suspended the sentence. The petitioner being in jail, was also ordered to be released on bail. 2. The appellant has moved an application now saying that in pursuance of the order passed by this court he was released on bail by the Chief Judicial Magistrate but a notice has been issued by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge requiring him to deposit the fine failing which the recovery is to issue. According to the petitioner the learned Additional Sessions Judge is interpreting the order of suspension of sentence as an order for suspension of imprisonment alone. The petitioner wants a further order to stay realisation of fine. 3. It appears that learned Additional Sessions Judge did not try to apply his mind to correctly interpret the order passed by this court and his inertia has resulted in not only the harassment to the appellant but also this court being asked to spell out the meaning of a plain word which is most commonly used in criminal trials. 4. The word 'sentence' has been given to mean : 'determination of punishment pronounced by a court or a Judge' in the Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary. 5. In the New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary the word 'sentence' has been given to mean 'as abatement of judicial decision to punish' and also as 'a penalty which forms part of such a sentence.' Thus the plain meaning of the term 'sentence' is the part of the order communicating the punishment or the punishment itself. Nowhere the word is given to mean sentence of imprisonment alone even in its pure literal meanings. Thus the suspension of sentence would mean suspension of any punishment so imposed. The punishments which can be imposed for offences under the Penal Code have been enumerated in the Indian Penal Code in Section 53 and include fine also. 6. Another reason for this interpretation is that the provisions of Section 389 are not autonomous, operating in exclusive territory of their own. These provisions provide an interim remedy against the orders passed under some other provisions of the CrPC and have to be understood in that context. 7. 6. Another reason for this interpretation is that the provisions of Section 389 are not autonomous, operating in exclusive territory of their own. These provisions provide an interim remedy against the orders passed under some other provisions of the CrPC and have to be understood in that context. 7. Under Section 235(2) of the CrPC a Sessions Judge has been empowered to pass a sentence on a person who has been convicted. Similarly under Section 248(2) a sentence can be passed by a Magistrate in warrants cases upon persons who have been found to be guilty. Similar provisions have also been made in respect of summons cases Section 253(2) CrPC and 255(2) CrPC. 8. It is the sentence passed under any of the aforesaid provisions which can be suspended under Section 389 of the CrPC. The aforesaid provisions merely empower the court to pass a sentence. Imprisonment, fine or any other punishment authorised by law can be passed under the aforesaid provisions in appropriate cases. Execution of these very punishments is suspended by provisions of Section 389. 9. It, therefore, clearly follows that any sentence which is imposable by the court of Sessions or the Magistrate is liable to be suspended under the provisions of Section 389 CrPC and that it does not merely suspend a sentence of imprisonment. The Contextual meaning of sentence is also the same, being any punishment. 10. In the CrPC the sentence of fine has been specifically provided under Section 253(2) and 376(c) and 376(d) which specifically mention about the sentence of fine. 11. These provisions make it clear that the term 'sentence' when used in context of its suspension under Section 389, is inclusive of sentence of fine also. Lastly if a restricted meaning is given to the term 'sentence' to include only imprisonment, the Judge would never be able to impose fine or forfeiture or even a sentence of death inasmuch as in Section 28, which defines the powers of sentencing of the various courts, it has been provided that the High Court may pass any sentence authorised by law while the Sessions Judge can also pass any sentence authorised by law excepting that a sentence of death passed by such a Judge shall be subject to confirmation. None of these provisions specifically mention about imposition of fine or any other punishment. None of these provisions specifically mention about imposition of fine or any other punishment. It, therefore, is absolutely clear that term 'sentence' means imposition of any punishment provided by law and, therefore, when the sentence is suspended, the punishments imposed upon the person concerned stand suspended. It does not restrict itself to sentence of imprisonment alone. In view of this it is not necessary to pass a separate order for suspension of realisation of fine. The application is disposed of accordingly.