BHARATKUMAR MANILAL PAREKH v. UNION OF INDIA — 1991 DIGILAW 222 (GUJ)

M. B. SHAH, Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) ). The petitioner is detained on 3/01/1991 and was kept at Central Prison Ahmedabad in pursuance of the detention order dated 24th May 1990 passed by the respondent No. 1 Joint Secretary to the Government of India under Section 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 (hereinafter referred to as COFEPOSA Act ). ( 2 ) IN the grounds of detention it is inter alia alleged that an information was received by the enforcement Directorate Ahmedabad that one Shri Kamlesh Rawal had caused remittance of huge amount abroad on the basis of bogus import documents. Therefore Kamlesh Rawal was apprehended and his statement was recorded. As a result of the inquiry initiated by the Enforcement Directorate Ahmedabad number of documents relating to bogus imports were seized from the various banks situated at Ahmedabad. From those documents it was found that more than Rs. 18 crores were remitted through various banks on the basis of bogus/forged documents. From the statement of Kamlesh Rawal it was found that he was closely knowing one Prabodh G. Rawal of Bombay and that Prabodh G. Rawal had asked him to work as per directions of one Nitin Shah a close associate of Shri Prabodh Rawal. At the suggestion of Nitin Shah and Prabodh Rawal he became proprietor of M/s. Mikem Sales Corporation M/s. Villifen Sales Agencies and M/s. Toxmax Traders. One more firm in the name of M/s. Rajul Sales Corporation was also opened and one Shri Kirit S. Vaghela resident of Mansa was made its proprietor by Prabodh Rawal. ( 3 ) ON the basis of the aforesaid disclosure the premises of Prabodh Rawal and Nitin Shah were searched by the officers of Bombay Zonal Office of the Enforcement Directorate under Section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 From the residence of Prabodh Rawal currency of Rs. 34 1 800 and number of documents relating to remittances of foreign exchange abroad by way of bogus imports and foreign currency worth Rs. 25 0 were seized. From his other residence at Khiranagar Indian currency of Rs. 1 50 0 and foreign currency of pound 42 and documents showing bogus imports and corresponding remittances along with rubber stamps of number of agencies viz. banks customs shipping/clearing agents Director of Industries etc. were seized. 25 0 were seized. From his other residence at Khiranagar Indian currency of Rs. 1 50 0 and foreign currency of pound 42 and documents showing bogus imports and corresponding remittances along with rubber stamps of number of agencies viz. banks customs shipping/clearing agents Director of Industries etc. were seized. ( 4 ) DURING the course of investigation it was found by Bombay Office that one Shri V. Rajashekhar of Canara Bank Bangalore had come to Bombay and was staying in Ritz Hotel. It was also found that he was trying to contact Shri Nitin Shah. Therefore Rajashekhar was apprehended and on search some documents were seized from his possession. His statement was recorded under Section 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 on 8-8-1989. In his statement it is stated that he had come to Bombay on invitation of Nitin Shah and Bharat Parikh (detenu) who are close associates of Guru (Prabodh Rawal ). He has also further stated that Nitin Shah used to go to Canara Bank Bangalore and was bringing huge amount of cash for being remitted against number of imports documents received from abroad. He admitted that he has remitted more than Rs. 5 crores during the last one year. He stated that he had brought along with him certificates of import documents which were to be handed over to the detenu. ( 5 ) THE statement of Babubhai Limbhachia in whose premises the detenu was staying was recorded on 23/03/1990. In that statement Limbhachia has confirmed that detenu was a close associate of Prabodh Rawal and that he was collecting funds for him forging documents and remitting money abroad with active assistance of Nitin Shah. Because of the said activities Limbhachia had expelled the detenu from his residence. ( 6 ) ON further investigation statements of Pragnesh Jariwala and Suresh Jariwala were recorded. Pragnesh Jariwala has stated that his father Suresh Jariwala was assisting Prabodh Rawal in collecting the Indian currency in India from various persons and was acting as an agent of Prabodh Rawal and for this his father received Rs. 1. 5 lakhs as commission. He has also stated that Prabodh Rawal with the help of Nitin Shah and detenu was engaged in remitting funds abroad through bank under the guise of imports. 1. 5 lakhs as commission. He has also stated that Prabodh Rawal with the help of Nitin Shah and detenu was engaged in remitting funds abroad through bank under the guise of imports. Suresh Jariwala was collecting large amount and was handing it over to the detenu or the wife of Prabodh Rawal or to Prabodh Rawal himself. ( 7 ) FURTHER investigation was carried out with regard to the remittance through banks at Ahmedabad and Bangalore. After investigation it was found that the modus operandi of the gang of Shri Prabodh Rawal Nitin Shah Kamlesh Rawal Kirit Vaghela and the detenu as stated in the grounds of detention was as under:shri Prabodh Rawal has been arranging in sending the documents from outside India purported to be in respect of consignments shipped from Dubai and Singapore. All these documents are bogus and the Bills of Lading are forged one. These documents were drawn on various bogus and fictitious companies in India for payments in foreign exchange. As soon as the documents are received in India payments are made in the bank account on these fictitious companies; the remittances are sent to the purported foreign suppliers the foreign exchange thus remitted are being made available to various persons who need foreign exchange abroad. Documents in bunch A and G seized from Rawals premises shows how foreign exchange remitted abroad are sold at higher rates to various persons. It was also seen from page 16 of bunch P that foreign exchange was not only made available to various persons and transferred to various purported foreign suppliers but it was also transferred to numbered Swiss Bank account. Thus the foreign exchange obtained from various bank accounts in India at official rates was sold in the black market at huge profits. ( 8 ) IN the grounds of detention it has also been mentioned that efforts were made by the Enforcement Directorate Bombay and Ahmedabad to trace out Prabodh Rawal Nitin Shah Kirit Vaghela and the detenu but all of them were still absconding. The respective reports from the officers have been considered. At this stage it should be noted that in the grounds of detention it has been mentioned that statement of Kumari Shilpa Rawal daughter of Prabodh Rawal was recorded and she had stated that her father mother and elder brother have gone to Dubai and are not available in India. The respective reports from the officers have been considered. At this stage it should be noted that in the grounds of detention it has been mentioned that statement of Kumari Shilpa Rawal daughter of Prabodh Rawal was recorded and she had stated that her father mother and elder brother have gone to Dubai and are not available in India. ( 9 ) IN paragraph 16 it has been stated as under:in view of the foregoing I have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that you have been actively assisting Shri Prabodh Rawal in causing remittances of huge amount of foreign exchange abroad against bogus imports. I am also satisfied that your aforesaid activities are prejudicial to the conservation of foreign exchange resources of the country. Even though adjudication and prosecution proceedings under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1873 are likely to be initiated against you I am satisfied that in view of the facts stated hereinabove it is necessary to detain you under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 with a view to preventing you from indulging in activities prejudicial to the conservation of countrys foreign exchange resources. ( 10 ) AT the time of hearing of this matter Mr. B. N. Patel learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner vehemently submitted that the order passed by the detaining authority requires to be quashed and set aside on the following grounds: (1) The detaining authority has not applied its mind as to whether instead of detaining the petitioner prosecution would serve the purpose and the statement in the detention order that the petitioner can be prosecuted under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and yet he is required to be detained is not genuine consideration. (2) There is no material against the detenu for arriving at the conclusion that the detenu is involved in the illegal activities of Prabodh Rawal as he was merely servant of Prabodh Rawal. (3) Before detaining the petitioner (a) the relevant material is not considered by the detaining authority such as family background of the petitioner to find out whether the petitioner was actively associated with Prabodh Rawal because even at present his family members are absolutely poor with no means of livelihood ant (b) the relevant document i. e. the statement of Rajeshekhar is wrongly read for holding that the petitioner invited Rajashekhar to Bombay. (4) There is unreasonable delay in passing the detention order as investigation was virtually over in October 1989 while the detention order was passed on 24/05/1990. (5) There is total inaction or lethargy in executing the detention order as the petitioner was arrested only on 3/01/1991. (6) There is delay in considering the representation of the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner filed his representation on 19/01/1991 and the same was rejected on 8/02/1990. ( 11 ) BEFORE considering other authorities which were cited at the bar we would first refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh AIR 1990 SC 231 . In the said decision the Court was required to deal with the provisions of National Security Act and Articles 21 and 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. The Court has inter alia held as under the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities cannot furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The protection of personal liberty is largely through insistence on observance of the mandatory procedure. In cases of preventive detention observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Social security is no doubt the most important goal of the State but it is not the only goal of a good society. There are other important values in a society. One of the foremost and fundamental right guaranteed in the Constitution is personal liberty and one cannot be deprived of it except by the procedure prescribed by law. The detention order itself said that the detenu was already in custody and was likely to be released wherefore it was necessary to order for his preventive detention. It is not denied that the above relevant materials were placed before the detaining authority. The Act nowhere provides that the detaining authority cannot resort to preventive detention without first criminally prosecuting the detenu. A clear distinction has to be drawn between preventive detention in which anticipatory and precautionary action is taken to preventive the recurrence of apprehended events and punitive detention under which the action is taken after the event has already happened. The Act nowhere provides that the detaining authority cannot resort to preventive detention without first criminally prosecuting the detenu. A clear distinction has to be drawn between preventive detention in which anticipatory and precautionary action is taken to preventive the recurrence of apprehended events and punitive detention under which the action is taken after the event has already happened. It is true that the ordinary criminal process of trial is not to be circumvented and short circuited by apparently handy and easier resort to preventive detention. But the possibility of launching a criminal prosecution cannot be said to be an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. Nor would it be correct to say that if such possibility is not present in the mind of the detaining authority the order of detention would necessarily be bad. The failure of the detaining authority to consider the desirability of launching a criminal prosecution before ordering preventive detention may in the circumstances of a case lead to the conclusion that the detaining authority had not applied its mind to the important question as to whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention but such is not the case here. Though the possibility of prosecution being launched is not an irrelevant consideration failure to consider such possibility would not vitiate the detention order. In Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 190: ( AIR 1974 SC 2154 ) the Court did not lay down that possibility of a prosecution being launched was an irrelevant consideration not to be borne in mind by detaining authority but it laid down that the mere circumstance that a detenu was liable to be prosecuted would not by itself be a bar to the making of an order of preventive detention. It did not follow therefore that failure to consider the possibility of criminal prosecution being launched could ever lead to the conclusion thai a detaining authority never applied its mind and the order of detention was therefore bad. The High Court under Art. 226 and Supreme Court under Art. 32 or 136 do not sit in appeal from the order of preventive detention. The High Court under Art. 226 and Supreme Court under Art. 32 or 136 do not sit in appeal from the order of preventive detention. But the Court is only to see whether the formality as enjoined by Art. 22 (5) had been complied with by the detaining authority and if so done the Court cannot examine the materials before it and find that the detaining authority should not have been satisfied on the materials before it and detain the detenu. In other words the Court cannot question the sufficiency of the grounds of detention for the subjective satisfaction of the authority as pointed out in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration AIR 1982 SC 1143 : (1982) 3 SCR 707 Those who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order must be the judges of what the national security or public order requires. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing. The justification for such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability and not criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Thus any preventive measures even if they involve some restraint or hardship upon individuals do not partake in any way of the nature of punishment but are taken by way of precaution to prevent mischief to the State. There is no reason why executive cannot take recourse to its powers of preventive detention in those cases where the executive is genuinely satisfied that no prosecution can possibly succeed against the detenu because he has influence over witnesses and against him no one is prepared to depose. However pusillanimity on the part of the executive has to be deprecated and pusillanimous orders avoided. (Emphasis added.) ( 12 ) KEEPING the aforesaid principles in mind we would deal with the contention that the detaining authority has not applied its mind as to whether instead of detaining the petitioner his prosecution would serve the purpose. As stated earlier in the grounds of detention it has been specifically mentioned that the detenu was actively assisting Prabodh Rawal in causing remittances of huge amount of foreign exchange reserves of the country. As stated earlier in the grounds of detention it has been specifically mentioned that the detenu was actively assisting Prabodh Rawal in causing remittances of huge amount of foreign exchange reserves of the country. It has been further stated that even though adjudication and prosecution proceedings under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973 are likely to be initiated against the detenu the authority was satisfied in view of the facts stated in the detention order that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from indulging in activities prejudicial to the conservation of countrys foreign exchange resources. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the detaining authority has not really considered the circumstances and the aspect of the matter whether the petitioner is required to be detained in spite of the fact that he was likely to be prosecuted because the authority has not considered as to what sort of prosecution would be initiated against the petitioner and whether the offence for which the petitioner was likely to be prosecuted was bailable or non-bailable and in spite of likelihood of such prosecution the petitioner was still required to be detained and therefore the detention order was passed mechanically. In the affidavit-in-reply this contention is denied by the detaining authority. It has been pointed out that COFEPOSA is meant for detaining a person for Substantial period of time so that he may not indulge in his nefarious activities which are contrary to augmentation of foreign exchange reserves of the country; while the prosecution is meant to prosecute a person for his misdeeds; the detaining authority has considered all these aspects before issuing the detention order and it was denied that there was no genuine consideration of the aforesaid aspect. 12. 1 Considering the aforesaid statements made in the detention order and in the affidavit-in-reply in our view it would be difficult to accept the contention of the petitioner that there has been non-application of mind by the detaining authority as to the relevant fact that the petitioner was likely to be prosecuted for his alleged misdeeds. The detaining authority was satisfied that even though he could be prosecuted because of the facts and circumstances of the case it was necessary to detain the detenu so as to prevent him from indulging in similar nefarious activities. This is apparent from the grounds of detention. The detaining authority was satisfied that even though he could be prosecuted because of the facts and circumstances of the case it was necessary to detain the detenu so as to prevent him from indulging in similar nefarious activities. This is apparent from the grounds of detention. When the detaining authority has arrived at the subjective satisfaction after considering the facts alleged against the petitioner in the grounds of detention it is not for this Court to review the said satisfaction of the detaining authority and to substitute its own opinion for that of the authority. 12. 2 The aforesaid subjective satisfaction is based upon the material collected by the detaining authority and the facts alleged against the detenu are stated in the grounds of detention. It is for the detaining authority to draw inference from the said facts. But it cannot be said that the present case against the detenu is based on no evidence against him. Similarly whether there is sufficient material for arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner is likely to continue his prejudicial activities would also be a question to be determined by the detaining authority. The jurisdiction of the detaining authority is to be exercised on subjective satisfaction on the ground of suspicion of commission in future of activities prejudicial to the society. This jurisdiction of the authority is different than that of a judicial trial where the accused can be convicted for the offences as per the procedure prescribed. Considering the large-scale nefarious activities mentioned in the detention order and the modus operandi if the detaining authority has arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is likely to continue his prejudicial activities even pending prosecution then it cannot be said that detention order is illegal or without application of mind. 12. 3 Further in the detention order it is not required to be stated that the detenu is to be prosecuted for a particular offence and that he is likely to be released on bail by the Court. It is well settled law that even if a criminal prosecution fails preventive detention order can be passed after considering the relevant circumstances. For this purpose Mr. It is well settled law that even if a criminal prosecution fails preventive detention order can be passed after considering the relevant circumstances. For this purpose Mr. Rawal learned Advocate for the respondents rightly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Ratan Makin v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 610 wherein the Court has held that the object of making an order of detention is to prevent commission in future while the object of criminal prosecution is punitive. Even if a criminal prosecution fails an order of detention is then made it would not invalidate the order of detention. The Court further observed that mere fact that a criminal prosecution can be instituted cannot operate as a bar against making of an order of detention as the object of making the order of detention is to prevent the commission in future of activities injurious to the community. The Court has to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine whether the detention order is passed so as to by-pass a criminal prosecution or whether it is passed to prevent the commission of activities injurious to the community. The relevant discussion is as under: Even if a criminal prosecution fails and an order of detention is then made it would not invalidate the order of dentention because as pointed out by this Court in Mohd. Subrati v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3 SCC 250 : (AR 1973 SC 207) the purpose of preventive detention being different from conviction and punishment and subjective satisfaction being necessary in the former while proof beyond reasonable doubt being necessary in the latter the order of detention would not be bad merely because the criminal prosecution has failed. It was pointed out by this Court in that case that the Act creates in the authority concerned a new jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention on their subjective satisfaction on grounds of suspicion of commission in future of acts prejudicial to the community in general. This jurisdiction is different from that of judicial trial in Courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offences. Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would therefore not operate as a bar to a detention order or render in mala fide. This jurisdiction is different from that of judicial trial in Courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offences. Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would therefore not operate as a bar to a detention order or render in mala fide. If the failure of the criminal prosecution can be no bar to the making of an order of detention a fortiori the mere fact that a criminal prosecution can be instituted cannot operate as a bar against the making of an order of detention. If an order of detention is made only in order to bypass a criminal prosecution which may be irksome because of the inconvenience of proving guilt in a Court of law it would certainly be an abuse of the power of preventive detention and the order of detention would be bad. But if the object of making the order of detention is to prevent the commission in future of activities injurious to the community it would be a perfectly legitimate exercise of power to make the order of detention. The Court would have to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine on which side of the line the order of detention falls. Here the petitioner was caught in the act of smuggling gold and the circumstances in which the gold was being smuggled as also the facts set out in the written statement of the petitioner clearly indicate that the petitioner was engaged in the activity of smuggling gold and if that be so it is not possible to say that the order of detention was passed by the second respondent with a view to subverting supplanting or substituting the criminal law of the land. The order of detention was passed plainly and indubitably with a view to preventing the petitioner from continuing the activity of smuggling and it was therefore a perfectly valid order of detention. 12. 4 Similarly in the case of Saraswathi Seshagiri v. State of Kerala AIR 1982 SC 1165 the Court has held that even a single solitary act attributed to a person is sufficient to warrant an inference that he is likely to repeat his activity in future. In that case the detenu tried to export illegally Indian currency to the tune of Rs. In that case the detenu tried to export illegally Indian currency to the tune of Rs. 2 88 900 to a foreign country in a planned and pre-meditated manner by clever concealment of it in several parts of his baggage. The Court held that it fully justified that the detaining authority in coming to the conclusion that the detenu might repeat his illegal activity in future also and that his detention was necessary to prevent him from repeating the same in future. The Court further held that mere fact that detenu could be prosecuted under the Customs Act cannot be an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. The relevant discussion is as under: 9 From the aforesaid observation it is evident that an inference in each case will depend on the nature of the act and the attendant circumstances. In the present case the detenu tried to export Indian currency to the tune of Rupees 2 88 900 to a foreign country in a planned and premeditated manner by clever concealment of it in several parts of his baggage. This fully justified the detaining authority in coming to the conclusion that he might repeat his illegal act in future also and that his detention was necessary to preventing him from repeating the same in future. His past act in the circumstances might be an index of his conduct. 10 It was next contended for the detenu that detenu could be prosecuted under the Customs Act and as such his preventive detention was uncalled for. The Counsel for the detenu in support of his argument strongly relied upon Smt. Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1982 SC 8 That case instead of supporting the detenu goes against him. The Court dealing with the point held - possibility of prosecution or the absence of it is not an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention; the authority may prosecute the offender for an isolated act or acts of an offence for violation of any criminal law but if it is satisfied that the offender has a tendency to go on violating such laws then there will be no bar for the State to detain him under a Preventive Detention Act in order to disable him to repeat such offences. What is required is that the detaining authority is to satisfy the Court that it had in mind the question whether prosecution of the offender was possible and sufficient in the circumstances of the case. In some cases of prosecution it may not be possible to bring home the culplrit to book as in case of a professional bully a murderer or a dacoit as witness do not come forward to depose against him out of fear or in case of international smuggling it may not be possible to collect all necessary evidence without unreasonable delay and expenditure to prove the guilt of the offender beyond reasonable doubt. The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken into account in making a detention order. It is indeed largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a person that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community or his act of violation of foreign exchange regulations and his smuggling activities are likely tohave deleterious effect on the national economy. 11 When the legislature has made only the subjective satisfaction of the authority making the order of detention it is not for the Court to question whether the grounds given in the order are sufficient or not for the subjective satisfaction of the authority. 12. 5 Considering the ratio of the aforesaid decisions it is apparent that the possibility of launching a criminal prosecution cannot be an absolute bar to the order of preventive detention nor the failure of a prosecution is a bar to the detention order. Preventive detention is a device to afford protection to the society. The object of preventive detention is not to punish a man for having done something; but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing. The detention order is justifiable if there is suspicion or reasonable probability that the detenu is likely to indulge in anti-social activities. The detention order is pased with a view to disabling the detenu from committing the offences or repeating his prejudicial activities. In all cases when the detention order is challenged the Court is required to find out the object of the detention order. The detention order is pased with a view to disabling the detenu from committing the offences or repeating his prejudicial activities. In all cases when the detention order is challenged the Court is required to find out the object of the detention order. If it is abuse of power or to by-pass a criminal prosecution the detention order would be bad. But while considering the aforesaid aspect the Court under Article 22b of the Constitution of India is not sitting in appeal against the order passed by the detaining authority. The Courts jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited. Taking into account the facts stated in the detention order it is apparent that the detention order is passed to prevent the detenu from further indulging in illegal activities in association with Prabodh Rawal who as per the detention order is absconding and has gone to Dubai as per the statement of his daughter Shilpa who was arrested and released on bail. The detention order further states that even the other associate of the petitioner Nitin Shah was also absconding. The detaining authority has specifically arrived at the conclusion from the facts stated in the detention order that it was passed with a view to prevent the petitioner from continuing large-scale prejudicial activities of the conservation of countrys foreign exchange reserves. In our view the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be without any basis or material in view of the numerous documentary and other evidence. 12. 6 Mr. B. N. Patel learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Zarin Noormamad Kasam v. State of Gujarat 6 GLH 1145. In our view the ratio in the said decision is not different. For deciding the matter the Court has relied upon the decision in the case of Smt. Hemlata Kantilal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1982 SC 8 and other cases. In that case this Court considered the statements in the detention order that it would take long time to finalise adjudication proceedings and prosecution proceedings launched against the detenu and therefore for the purpose of preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activities of like nature the detention order was passed. In that case this Court considered the statements in the detention order that it would take long time to finalise adjudication proceedings and prosecution proceedings launched against the detenu and therefore for the purpose of preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activities of like nature the detention order was passed. After going through the report and the file the Court arrived at the conclusion that there was no genuine satisfaction that prosecution was not sufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in similar activities. The Court held that merely because prosecution may likely to take time the authority would not be justified in exercising their powers by resorting to detention and therefore the detention order was vitiated as the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the relevant question in proper perspective. In our view in the present case detention order is not passed on the ground that launching of prosecution or initiation of adjudicating proceedings is likely to take some time. The order is passed by arriving at the conclusion in clear terms that it was necessary to prevent the detenu from indulging and continuing the activities prejudicial to the conservation of countrys foreign exchange reserves. Further the observations of the Division Bench of this Court while discussing and relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court are to be considered along with the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Saraswati Sheshagiri v. State of Kerala (supra) Shiv Ratan Makin v. Union of India (supra) and Hemlata Kantilal v. State of Maharashtra (supra ). In this view of the matter in our view there is no substance in the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. ( 13 ) WITH regard to the second contention that there is no material against the detenu for arriving at the conclusion that he is involved in illegal activities of Prabodh Rawal as he was merely servant of Prabodh Rawal is without any substance. In the grounds of detention it has been clearly stated that the petitioner was associate of Prabodh Rawal; that he was going to Bangalore and meeting Mr. Rajasekharan of Canara Bank Bangalore and that he used to bring huge amount of cash for being credited to the account of M/s. Taxmax Traders Bangalore which were being remitted against the number of bogus import documents received from abroad. Rajasekharan of Canara Bank Bangalore and that he used to bring huge amount of cash for being credited to the account of M/s. Taxmax Traders Bangalore which were being remitted against the number of bogus import documents received from abroad. Rajashekhar has admitted that he had remitted more than 5 crores of rupees during the last one year. It has also been stated by him that he had gone to Bombay with some documents which were to be handed over to the detenu. The statements of Suresh Jariwala and Pragnesh Jariwala also involve the detenu in the said illegal activities. Babubhai Limbachia at whose residence the detenu was staying has also stated that the petitioner was close associate of Prabodh Rawal and was collecting funds for him forging documents and remitting money abroad with active assistance of Nitin Shah. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that there was no material against the petitioner. It should not be forgotton that in the detention order this Court is not exercising appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to find out whether the formalities enjoined by Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and the preventive detention Act have been complied with by the detaining authority. If the formalities have been complied with this Court has no jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine the materials before it and to find out that the detaining authority could not have been satisfied on the materials placed before it and detain the detenu under the preventive detention Act. In this connection it would be worthwhile to reproduce the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Hemlata v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1982 SC 15. The Supreme Court held as under:it is needless to say that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court either under Article 32 or under Article 136 of the Constitution do not sit on appeal on the orders of preventive detention. The normal law is that when an isolated offence or isolated offences is or are committed the offender is to be prosecuted. The normal law is that when an isolated offence or isolated offences is or are committed the offender is to be prosecuted. But if there be a law of preventive detention empowering the authority to detain a particular offender in order to disable him to repeat his offences it can do so but it will be obligatory on the part of the detaining authority to formally comply with the provisions of sub-Art. (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The High Court under Article 32 has to see whether the formalities enjoined by Article 22 (5) have been complied with the Court cannot examine the materials before it and find that the detaining authority should not have been satisfied on the materials before it and detained the detenu under the Preventive Detention Act for that is the function of an appellate Court. ( 14 ) THE third contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that the detaining authority has not considered the relevant material such as family background of the petitioner to find out whether the petitioner was actively associated with Prabodh Rawal because even at present his family members are absolutely poor with no means of livelihood. In our view for appreciating this contention the Court has to presume that the statements of V. Rajashekhar Suresh Jariwala Pragnesh Jariwala and Babubhai Limbachia are not relevant or that incorrect facts are stated in the said statements. As stated earlier this is not a function of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further from the family background of the petitioner no inference can be drawn that the petitioner might not have indulged in the alleged activities of associating himself with Prabodh Rawal in remitting amount illegally abroad. Similarly it cannot be said that the authorities have wrongly read the statement of Rajashekhar by stating in the grounds of detention that Rajashekhar had come to Bombay on invitation of Nitin Shah and Bharat Parikh. From the statement it appears that Guru (Prabodh Rawal) had invited Rajashekhar to come to Bombay. He has stated that Bharat (detenu) who was working for Taxmax Traders had booked his ticket from Bangalore to Bombay and from Bombay to Bangalore. He has also booked a room for him in Ritz Hotel. It was his say that around 2nd August Mr. He has stated that Bharat (detenu) who was working for Taxmax Traders had booked his ticket from Bangalore to Bombay and from Bombay to Bangalore. He has also booked a room for him in Ritz Hotel. It was his say that around 2nd August Mr. Bharat of Taxmax Traders came to his office and asked for the invoice and packing list containing the import-export code number for his files. Extra copies of the said documents were given to Bharat. When he came to Bombay on 4-8-89 Mr. Bharat and Mr. Nitin Shah met him in his hotel room and handed back the said documents by stating that they did not contain import-export code number. It is his say that during 1988 15 bills were cleared and during 1989 32 bills were cleared by him. Each bill was approximately valued at Rs. 5 to 9 lakhs. He has further stated that including other persons Bharat was coming at his office for remitting the amount by cash. To a further question he has replied that neither Guru nor Bharat had given their Bombay address or telephone number. When Bharat was staying in his room at Hotel Ritz he had noted down the telephone numbers and address of Prabodh Rawal and Shilpa Rawal from Bharats pocket telephone booklet. without his knowledge. Therefore considering the entire statement it cannot be said that the statement of Rajashekhar is irrelevant for commenting the detenu with the illegal activities of Prabodh Rawal only on the ground that in detention order it has been wrongly mentioned that Bharat and Nitin Shah invited the petitioner to come to Bombay instead of mentioning that Guru invited him on several occasions to come to Bombay and hence the detention order is vitiated or that there is non-application of mind by the detaining authority. ( 15 ) THE next question is whether there is an unreasonable delay in passing the detention order as contended by. the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In the petition it has been stated that the entire investigation was over in the month of October 1989 and in spite of this detention order was passed on 4/05/1990 and that there was no reasonable explanation for the delay in passing the detention order hence the detention order requires to be quashed and set aside. In the petition it has been stated that the entire investigation was over in the month of October 1989 and in spite of this detention order was passed on 4/05/1990 and that there was no reasonable explanation for the delay in passing the detention order hence the detention order requires to be quashed and set aside. In the affidavit-in-reply it has been stated that statement of Babubhai Limbachia was recorded by the authority on 23/03/1990 and the voluminous documents were being collected from several banks in Ahmedabad and Bangalore. The examination of the documents took some time and hence there was no unreasonable delay in passing the detention order. Moreover kingpins of this racket were still absconding and the authorities were trying to locate them. It was therefore denied that the detention order was vitiated because of unreasonable and unexplained delay as the work was voluminous and mammoth and the persons who could cooperate in the investigation were and are at large and non-cooperative. It has been further stated that the petitioner himself was absconding and hence the investigation of the case could not be completed earlier. 15. 1 For the delay in passing the detention order it is to be remembered that the delay itself would not vitiate the detention order or would not mean that subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority was not genuine. It would depend upon the facts of each case and whether the grounds alleged against the detenu are stale or illusory or whether because of delay the link of the petitioner in indulging in illegal activities is snapped. This question is dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendrakumar v. State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 1255 . The Supreme Court in that case emphasised and made it clear for the guidance of different High Courts that a distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention under a law relating to Preventive Detention like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 and the delaly in complying with the procedural safeguards of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The Court observed that when a person is detected in the act of smuggling or foreign exchange racketeering the Directorate of Enforcement has to make a thorough investigation into all the facts with a view to determine the identity of the persons engaged in these operations which have a deleterious effect on the national economy. Sometimes such investigation has to be carried on for months together due to the magnitude of the operations. Hence unless grounds are stale or the detenus nexus with illegal activity is snapped the delay in passing the order would not vitiate the detention order. The relevant observations of the Court are as under:viewed from this prespective we wish to emphasise and make it clear for the guidance of the different High Courts that a distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 and the delay in complying with the Procedural safeguards of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. It has been laid down by this Court in a series of decisions that the rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not inflexible. Quite obviously in cases of mere delay in making of an order of detention under a law like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Smuggling Activities Act 1974 enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering who owing to their large resources and influence have been posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the nation the Courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay if not satisfactorily explained must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. In that case the Court held that even though there was unexplained delay between 2nd February and 28 May it could not raise a legitimate inference that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority was not genuine or that the grounds were stale or illusory or that there was no rational connection between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. In the present case as stated in the grounds of detention it is apparent that the Directorate of Enforcement was required to consider numerous documents statements of number of persons and also was required to collect large number of documents from banks at Ahmedabad Bangalore and Bombay and to find out whether remittances made in foreign countries was genuine or on a bogus import bills. Not only this the petitioner and another person who are involved in these activities were absconding and therefore the concerned authority was not in a position to record their statements. Hence it cannot be said that there is any unexplained delay which would vitiate the detention order or that inference should be drawn that the live link of the petitioner for indulging in his prejudicial activities is snapped. Hence there is no substance in this contention also. ( 16 ) THE next contention raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner is that there was total inaction or lethargy in executing the detention order dated 24th May 1990. The petitioner was arrested only on 3/01/1991 and therefore the detention order requires to be quashed and set aside. It was submitted that the delay of 71/2 months in executing the detention order would vitiate the detention as there is no material on record to show that the petitioner had continued his illegal activity or was likely to continue his illegal activity after a lapse of the aforesaid time. For this purpose in the petition it has been stated that the petitioner was not absconding and no reasonable and proper steps to execute the detention order were taken by the respondents and when the petitioner came to know about the detention order he surrendered on 3/01/1991. For this purpose in the petition it has been stated that the petitioner was not absconding and no reasonable and proper steps to execute the detention order were taken by the respondents and when the petitioner came to know about the detention order he surrendered on 3/01/1991. It has been therefore pointed out that virtually for a period of 15 months there is no evidence with the detaining authority that the petitioner had indulged in similar activity during that period. 16. 1 In support of this contention learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhawarlal v. State of Tamilnadu AIR 1979 SC 541 wherein the Court has observed that there must be a live and proximate link between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention namely the prevention of smuggling activities. The Court observed that in appropriate cases it can be assumed that the link is snapped if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case the Court may strike down order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and changed circumstances. The Court also observed that where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest there is warrant to consider that the link is not snapped but strengthened. In the aforesaid case there was delay of 3 years and 2 months in executing the detention order. The Court held that the detenu was absconding and the authority has taken appropriate step under the provisions of Section 7 of COFEPOSA and has also proclaimed him as a person absconding under Section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The proclamation was published in several leading English and local daily newspapers. His photograph was exihibited in cinema halls and a reward of Rs. 5000. 00 was also announced for his apprehension. On the basis of the said facts the Court held that the delay in execution order was sufficiently explained by the authority and therefore the detention order was not vitiated on the ground of delay in execution of the order. Mr. 5000. 00 was also announced for his apprehension. On the basis of the said facts the Court held that the delay in execution order was sufficiently explained by the authority and therefore the detention order was not vitiated on the ground of delay in execution of the order. Mr. Patel learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that in the present case no action is taken by the detaining authority in arresting the petitioner and therefore the detention order requires to be quashed and set aside. However Mr. Rawal vehemently relied upon the statement made in the affidavit-in-reply to the effect that Shri B. K. Srimali the Officer who was working at Ahmedabad Office had visited the petitioners village several times to locate him but he could not trace the petitioner. His family members at his village and his relative at Bombay knew that the Enforcement Directorate wanted the petitioner and yet he has not reported at the office of the Enforcement Directorate either at Bombay or at Ahmedabad because he wilfully absconded in remote area of Gujarat. He also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sayed Farooq Mohammad v. Union of India 1990 0 SCC 537 where the Court has observed as under: in the instant case it has been clearly averred in the affidavit that two notices were served one on the petitioners mother and another on the petitioners brother directing the petitioner to appear before the detaining authority. The petitioner it has been stated has intentionally absconding and thereby evaded arrest. These averments have not been denied by the petitioner. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the delay was not explained and the link between the grounds of detention and the avowed purpose of detention has been snapped. Reference may also be made in this connection to the decision in T. A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala. This ground of challenge is therefore devoid of any merit. 16. 2 In the present case also in the affidavit-in-reply it has been specifically stated that the petitioner was absconding. In the grounds of detention also it has been mentioned that efforts were made by the Enforcement Directorate Bombay and Ahmedabad to trace out the petitioner Prabodh Rawal Nitin Shah and Kirit Vaghela who were absconding. This fact is based upon the respective reports from the officers concerned. In the grounds of detention also it has been mentioned that efforts were made by the Enforcement Directorate Bombay and Ahmedabad to trace out the petitioner Prabodh Rawal Nitin Shah and Kirit Vaghela who were absconding. This fact is based upon the respective reports from the officers concerned. There is no denial by the petitioner in his further affidavit-in-reply that Shri B. K. Srimali the Officer posted at the Ahmedabad Office has visited the petitioners village several times to locate him but he could not trace the petitioner. In this view of the matter in our view it cannot be said that the live link with the activities of the petitioner is snapped on that there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay from the date of order of detention and the date of serving the notice on the detenu which would throw doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards necessity for detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. Mr. Rawal therefore rightly submitted that merely because there is some delay the Court should not set aside the detention order and in each individual case the circumstances are required to be considered for finding out whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained or not. It is true that even the Supreme Court has not laid down any hard and fast rule which would be applicable under all circumstances with regard to delay. The Court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned. This is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T. D. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala AIR 1990 SC 225 . The Supreme Court observed that: in Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra (1981) 4 SCC 647 (AIR 1982 SC at p. 13) this Court held: delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention is not fatal to the detention of a person for in certain cases delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. What is required by law is that the delay must be satisfactorily examined by the detaining authority. 9 See also Golam Hussain v. Commr. What is required by law is that the delay must be satisfactorily examined by the detaining authority. 9 See also Golam Hussain v. Commr. of Police of Calcutta (1974) 4 SCC 530 : (AIR) 1974 SC (1336) S. K. Serajul v. State of West Bengal (1975) 2 SCC 78 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1517 ) Rekhabehn Virendra Kapadia v. State of Gujarat (1979) 2 SCR 257 : ( AIR 1979 SC 456 ) Harnek Singh v. State of Punjab (1982) 1 SCC 116 - (AR) 1982 SC 682) Shiv Ratan Makin v. Union of India (1986) 1 SCC 404 : ( AIR 1986 SC 610 ) Smt. K. Aruna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1988) 1 SCC 296 ( AIR 1988 SC 227 ) and Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat (1982) 3 SCC 153: ( AIR 1988 SC 1255 ). 10. In a recent decision in Yogendra Murari v. State of U. P. (1988) 4 SCC 559 : ( AIR 1988 SC 1835 para 6) this Court has reiterated the earlier view consistently taken by this Court observing:. . . . it is not right to assume that an order of detention has to be mechanically struck down if passed after some delay. . . . It is necessary to consider the circumstances in each individual case to find out whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained or not. 11 The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order the Court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned when called upon to answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. 12 Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and the date of securing the arrest of detenu such a delay would throw considerable doubt on the guidelines of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for the detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. 16. 3 Mr. Patel however relied upon the aforesaid decision and submitted that in the case of Shafiq Ahmad v. District Magistrate Meerut AIR 1990 SC 220 wherein the could has observed that 1 here was no explanation for delay in arresting the detenu from 15/04/1988 to 2/10/1988 and the ground given that from May to September 1988 the entire police force was extremely busy in controlling the situation was considered by the Supreme Court as no ground. Therefore the Court held that there was inexplained delay not warranted by the facts and hence the detention order was bad on that ground. However it should be noted that in that very judgment the Court has observed that in a situation where the person concerned is not available or cannot be served then the mere fact that the action under Section 7 of the National Security Act has not been taken would not be a ground to say that the detention order was bad. If the petitioner is not having any property no property could be attached and hence not passing of order under Section 7 would not be a relevant factor for deciding whether any attempt was made by the authority to arrest the detenu. The Court has also observed that whether the delay was unreasonable depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In our view in the present case it has been specifically averred by the respondents that one Mr. B. K. Srimali was specially posted and was asked to visit the petitioners village and it was found that the petitioner was absconding and therefore it cannot be said that the delay occasioned in arresting the petitioner is not explained by the respondents. Similar question was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Salam v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1446 . The court held that delay by itself does not invalidate the detention order. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The relevant observations in paragraph 14 are as under:. . . . The Courts have not laid down that on mere such delay the detention has to be struck down. In Yogendra Murari v. State of U. P. (1988) 4 SCC 559 : ( AIR 1988 SC 1835 ) it is held that (at p. L837 of AIR): it is not right to assume that an order of detention has to be mechanically struck down if passed after some delay. . . . It is necessary to consider the circumstances in each individual case to find out whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained or not. That apart we are unable to agree with the learned Counsel that because of this delay the necessary nexus got severed and that the grounds have become stale and illusory. In appreciating such a contention the Court also has to bear in mind the nature of the prejudicial activities indulged by the detenu and the likelihood of his repeating the same. It is this potentiality in him that has to be taken into consideration and if the detaining authority is satisfied on the available material then on mere delay as long as it is not highly unreasonable and undue the Court should not normally strike down the detention on the ground. It is this potentiality in him that has to be taken into consideration and if the detaining authority is satisfied on the available material then on mere delay as long as it is not highly unreasonable and undue the Court should not normally strike down the detention on the ground. In Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra (1981) 4 SCC 647 : ( AIR 1982 SC 8 ) it is held that delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person. For these reasons we are of the view that in this case the delay by itself does not invalidate the detention but even otherwise it has been reasonably explained. ( 17 ) IT is lastly contended that there is delay in considering the representation of the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner filed his representation on 19/01/1991 and the same was rejected only on 8/02/1990. In the affidavit-in-reply it has been pointed out that the petitioners representation dated 19/01/1991 was received in the COFEPOSA Cell of the Ministry on 22/01/1991. On the same day it was placed before the detaining authority who directed to call for the comments of the Sponsoring Authority. The comments were called on 23/01/1991. The parawise comments were prepared by the Sponsoring Authority and dispatched on 3 1/01/1991. The same were received by the COFEPOSA Cell of the Ministry on 4/02/1991 as 2nd and 3/02/1991 were closed holidays. The case was processed and was submitted to Joint Secretary COFEPOSA on 5/02/1991. The Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) processed and submitted the same to SS and D. G. (EIB) on the same date who forwarded to the Finance Minister on 6/02/1991. On that very day the Finance Minister rejected the representation of the detenu. The case file was received from the Ministers Office on 8/02/1991. On that very day a memo was sent to the detenu stating that his representations were rejected. On the basis of the aforesaid facts it was submitted that there was no delay in considering the representation filed by the petitioner. 17. 1 However from the aforesaid facts Mr. Patel vehemently submitted that after receipt of the representation from the detenu on 22/01/1991 there was no necessity on the part of the detaining authority to send it for the comments of the Sponsoring Authority. 17. 1 However from the aforesaid facts Mr. Patel vehemently submitted that after receipt of the representation from the detenu on 22/01/1991 there was no necessity on the part of the detaining authority to send it for the comments of the Sponsoring Authority. He further submitted that in any set of circumstances there was no reason for the detaining authority to send it for the comments in the office at Ahmedabad as Sponsoring Authority was at Bombay. 17. 2 For meeting this contention Mr. Rawal learned Advocate for the respondents took some time for filing the affidavit-in-reply. He has stated at the bar that he has not received any instruction from the office at Delhi or from the office at Bombay in spite of his best efforts. He has tendered one affidavit-in-reply filed by Mr. K. C. Naredi who according to him has gone through the relevant files and is serving at Ahmedabad Office. In the affidavit he stated that the representation of the petitioner along with the letter calling for parawise comments was received by Ahmedabad Office on 25/01/1991. The office felt that it was necessary to send it for parawise comments on the said representation to the office of the Enforcement Directorate Bombay since that office was the proposing authority. Accordingly it was sent by speed post which was received at Bombay Office on 28/01/1991 as 26th and 27/01/1991 were closed holidays. The Bombay Office after receiving the said representation placed the same along with relevant files before the Assistant Director on 29/01/1991. The said authority after scrutinising the files and going through the representations which is in 22 pages prepared parawise comments on 30/01/1991. The said draft was finalised typed and was ready for dispatch on 31/01/1991. As stated earlier that was received by the COFEPOSA Cell at Delhi on 4/02/1991 as 2nd and 3/02/1991 were closed hoildays being Saturday and Sunday. Mr. Rawal submitted that from the facts stated above it cannot be held that there is delay in considering the representation filed by the detenu. He submitted that in similar circumstances the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Salam v. Union of India has held that delay has been satisfactorily explained. As against this Mr. Mr. Rawal submitted that from the facts stated above it cannot be held that there is delay in considering the representation filed by the detenu. He submitted that in similar circumstances the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Salam v. Union of India has held that delay has been satisfactorily explained. As against this Mr. B. N. Patel learned Advocate for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maheskumar Chauhan v. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1455 wherein the Court has observed that the representation of a detenu whose liberty is in peril and deprived should be considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible; otherwise the continued detention will render itself impermissible and invalid as being violative of the constitutional obligation enshrined in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and if any delay has occurred in disposal of a representation such delay should be explained by the appropriate authority to the satisfaction of the Court. Mr. Patel heavily emphasised upon the observation of the Supreme Court to the effect that in spite of weighty pronouncements of this Court making the legal position clear it is still disquieting to note that on many occasions the appropriate authorities cause considerable delay in considering and disposing of representations and also exhibit culpable indifference in explaining delay in spite of repeated adjournments being taken by the learned Counsel for the respondents for filing affidavit in reply. He submitted that the Court should not tolerate such type of indifference or callous attitude on the part of the authority. 17. 3 It is true that in the present case the authority has shown callous attitude by not filing further affidavit-in-reply even though learned Counsel for the respondent has taken sufficient time and informed the authority even by sending telegram. Still however the question is whether from the facts as narrated in the two affidavits referred to above are sufficient to point out that there is no delay in considering the representation filed by the petitioner. In the aforesaid case before the Supreme Court there was no explanation given by the concerned authority for the period from 2 5/08/1989 to 11/09/1989 i. e. for more than 16 days. But in the present case in our view on the record there is sufficient explanation of the time taken in deciding the representation within a period of 15 days. But in the present case in our view on the record there is sufficient explanation of the time taken in deciding the representation within a period of 15 days. As stated earlier the representation was received on 22/01/1989 and it was finally disposed of by the concerned Minister on 6/02/1991. During that time the representation was sent at Ahmedabad Office for comments which in turn sent it to the Bombay Office for parawise remarks. The Bombay Office prepared the report on 31/01/1991 and sent it to Delhi which was received at Delhi on 4/02/1991. It is to be noted that during the aforesaid period there were four holidays as mentioned in the affidavit-in-reply i. e. 26th and 27th January 3 and 4/02/1991. However Mr. Patel further submitted that there was carelessness and negligence on the part of the detaining authority in sending the representation for comments at Ahmedabad Office and for that no explanation is given by the detaining authority in the affidavit-in-reply. He also submitted that the Ahmedabad Office has not dealt with the representation at all; it has merely forwarded it to Bombay Office. Therefore the concerned authority has dealt with the petitioners representation in a negligent manner. In our view from the facts stated in the detention order it is apparent that the case was investigated by the Ahmedabad Office and also by the Office at Bombay. Not only this in Ahmedabad also some accounts were opened as stated in the detention order and it is not the case that Ahmedabad Office. has not at all investigated the matter. Mr. Rawal learned Counsel for the respondents has pointed out that the representation submitted by the petitioner contains averments with regard to the Ahmedabad incidents and therefore if the detaining authority has sent the said representation for comments at Ahmedabad Office it cannot be said that it has dealt with the representation in a negligent manner. In our view considering the facts as they are merely because the detaining authority has sent the representation for comments at Ahmedabad Office it cannot be said that it has dealt with the representation in a negligent manner. In our view considering the facts as they are merely because the detaining authority has sent the representation for comments at Ahmedabad Office it cannot be said that it has dealt with the representation in a negligent manner. At this stage it should be noted that the matter was investigated first by the Enforcement Directorate Ahmedabad Office on the basis of information received by it that one Shri Kamlesh Rawal had caused remittance of huge amount abroad on the basis of bogus import documents. After some investigation the matter was referred to Bombay Office as Prabodh Rawal was carrying on his activities from Bombay. The petitioner is admittedly a resident of Gujarat State. As the petitioner was absconding to detain him watch was kept by the Ahmedabad Office at his residence. Many transactions were also investigated by Ahmedabad Office. Therefore after considering the petitioners representation which admittedly runs into 22 pages if the detaining authority calls for the remark from Ahmedabad Office it cannot be said that it has dealt with the representation of the petitioner in a callous manner. It is true that the Ahmedabad Office had sent the representation to the Bombay Office immediately for considering the representation of the petitioner or for offering its parawise remarks. The Bombay Office dealt with it promptly and the parawise comments were prepared on 30/01/1991 It should be noted that 26th and 27/01/1991 were holidays. On 31/01/1991 it was typed and sent it to Delhi. Again there was holidays on 2nd and 3/02/1991. On 4th February the COFEFEPOSA Cell of the Ministry received the parawise comments from the Bombay Office and on 5/02/1991 it was considered by the Joint Secretary COFEPOSA Cell and thereafter on 6th February the representation was considered by the Finance Ministry which in turn rejected it. Therefore taking into consideration all these facts it cannot be said that 15 days (out of which there were 4 holidays) time taken for considering the representation is in any way unreasonable. In our view there is no substance in this contention and it cannot be said that on the facts of the case there is any delay in considering the representation of the petitioner. ( 18 ) IN the result there is no substance in the petition and it is therefore rejected. Rule discharged. (RPV) Petition rejected. .