Raj Mandal Thakur v. State Of Bihar — 1991 DIGILAW 222 (PAT)

Judgment 1. These two appeals have been placed before this Bench as there was difference of opinion between two Hon ble Judges of this Court and accordingly, both the appeals have been heard together and are being disposed of by this order. 2. Deceased Kapildeo Narain Singh was brutally murdered on 9th of September, 1982 in a village Path way, close to his residential house, in village Parsauni Kapur within Baruraj police station, in the district of Muzaffarpur. At one point of time, he had been working as a postal peon and was popularly known as Dak Babu. During the relevant time, after relinquishing his said job he had been working as a tube well operator at Jaintpur and used to attend to his duties from his native village. 3. On the ill-fated day at about 6.30 p.m. deceased accompanied with Murlidhar Pandey (P.W. 1) had gone to Hardi Bazar for purchasing certain articles and in course of that, he had purchased some clothes from the shop of one Misri Lal Sao (P.W. 5) and thereafter, they were returning on their respective bicycles. The deceased was a bit ahead of P.W. 1. The road going from Hardi Bazar bifurcates near an orchard of one Kundan Lal Singh, wherefrom, a village Path starts towards the house of the deceased. 4. After reaching the orchard, the deceased took a turn towards his house and at stage, all of a sudden, appellants along with Parichchan Thakur and Mouze Lal (since absconding) appeared, of whom, Phuldeo, Raj Mandal, Chandeshwar and Parichchan were armed with Farsas, whereas, Mouze Lal and Nagina Ram were armed with Guptis and Budhan and Bishundeo were armed with lathis. The appellants before pounching upon the deceased, were hiding themselves in the bushes and thereafter, Phuldeo ordered others to kill him and the said appellant himself assaulted him (deceased) with a Farsa on his head as a result of which, he dropped down. Mouze Lal (absconding) and Nagina pierced their respective Gupties in the neck of the deceased and Raj Mandal, Chandeshwar and Pancham further assaulted him with their respective Farsas. Budhan Ram and Bishundeo Thakur also assaulted him with lathis. 5. Mouze Lal (absconding) and Nagina pierced their respective Gupties in the neck of the deceased and Raj Mandal, Chandeshwar and Pancham further assaulted him with their respective Farsas. Budhan Ram and Bishundeo Thakur also assaulted him with lathis. 5. Informant Braj Kishore, son of the deceased (P.W. 6) who had been in the said orchard for the purpose of easing himself, saw his father being assaulted in the aforesaid manner by the appellants and their other associates (absconding) and on seeing this, he cried out whereupon, Murlidhar Pandey (P.W. 1), Anand Mohan Singh (P.W. 2), Gaya Singh (P.W. 3), Shyam Nandan Singh (P.W. 4) and Punyadeo Singh (not examined) arrived at the scene of occurrence and saw the offenders running away. Kapildeo was found to be dead. 6. It appears that at Kaithualia police outpost one Chandeshwar Pd. Singh (whose identity could not be established at the trial) submitted a written report (Ext. 8) stating therein that some murder had taken place and on the basis of that, a constable (Rajendra Sing) attached to that outpost, recorded a Sanha (Ext. A) and then, went to Baruraj police station and gave an information to that effect to Ram Kishore Singh (P.W. 8), the officer incharge of the police station. On the basis of that information, sanha entry No. 145 dated 10-9-82 was recorded in the station diary (Exts. 5 and 5/1) at 12.30 and 12.45 a.m. respectively. Thereafter, P.W. 8 left for the place of occurrence and reached at about 1.45 a.m. on reaching at the spot P.W. 8 prepared an inquest (Ext. 6) over the dead body of the deceased, seized blood stained earth, Farsa, broken with a piece of handle measuring 2" in length and an old Releigh cycle No. DH 48597 and prepared a seizure list (Ext. 7) in presence of Punyadeo Narain Singh P.W. 1. The Fardbeyan of P.W. 6 son of the deceased was drawn at 4 a.m. and thereafter, the statements of the witnesses were recorded. In course of investigation, the other portion of the broken piece of the Farsa, which had already been seized was spotted and seized under seizure list (Ext. 7/1). The dead body of the deceased was already sent to S. K. Medical College Hospital, Muzaffarpur on 10th September, 82 for post-mortem examination, which was conducted by D. W. B. K. Mehta (P.W. 7). 7. 7/1). The dead body of the deceased was already sent to S. K. Medical College Hospital, Muzaffarpur on 10th September, 82 for post-mortem examination, which was conducted by D. W. B. K. Mehta (P.W. 7). 7. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet against the appellants and two others (since absconding). Nagina Ram of Criminal Appeal No. 18/85 was subsequently summoned by the trial Court under the provisions of S. 319, Cr. P.C. 8. In the trial Court, the appellants denied having committed any offence. Appellants Phuldeo, Nagina, Raj Mandal and Bishundeo also took the plea of alibi. According to Phuldeo on 9-9-82 he was at Muzaffarpur and had been performing his duties in the Public Works Department as Junior Engineer. The alibi of appellant Nagina was that at the relevant time he was also at Muzaffarpur with Mr. V. D. Ram, Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarpur. Appellant, Raj Mandal has taken alibi that on the date of occurrence he was at village Sheori, within the Saraiya police station where his sister resided and appellant Bishundeo took a plea that he had a hair cutting saloon in Mohalla Gosai Tola, in the town of Patna and on the date of occurrence he had been doing his caste profession in between 4 p.m. and 10 p.m. at the residence of one Birendra Singh (D.W. 7), there Satyanarain Puja was being performed on the occasion of Jitia. 9. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge found all the appellants guilty and convicted them under S. 302/34, Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The appellants were also convicted under Ss. 147 and 148 of the Code, but no separate sentence was passed in relation to the aforesaid offences. 10. The prosecution in all examined 8 witnesses in support of its case, whereas, 7 witnesses were examined on behalf of the defence. Out of prosecution witnesses P.Ws. 1 to 4 and 6 are eye-witnesses to the occurrence. P.W. 5 deals in cloth business at Hardi Bazar. P.Ws. 7 and 8 are Doctor and investigating officer respectively. 11. Out of the defence witnesses, D.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 have been examined to prove the plea of alibi taken by the appellants Phuldeo and Bishundeo. 1 to 4 and 6 are eye-witnesses to the occurrence. P.W. 5 deals in cloth business at Hardi Bazar. P.Ws. 7 and 8 are Doctor and investigating officer respectively. 11. Out of the defence witnesses, D.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 have been examined to prove the plea of alibi taken by the appellants Phuldeo and Bishundeo. No witness has been examined in support of the plea of alibi on behalf of appellant Nagina and Raj Mandal, except making statements under S. 313, Cr. P.C. 12. Out of the 5 eye-witnesses to the alleged occurrence, P.W. 6, son of the deceased is the informant. Before I take up the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants, it is necessary to discuss the evidence of the eye-witnesses. 13. P.W. 1 is said to have accompanied the deceased to Hardi Bazar where, the latter had gone on a cycle to purchase some clothes. The witness has stated that while returning, the deceased turned towards village from the place where, the road had bifurcated and thereafter, the incident took place, It appears from his statement that soon after the deceased took a turn towards his residence through the path-way, the incident took place and the appellants and other associates assaulted him in the manner as alleged. It is true that the witness is involved in some criminal cases, but that alone would not be sufficient to reject his evidence. The witness has been cross-examined at a great length, but it will appear that it is not on the point of occurrence, rather, the cross-examining counsel was more anxious to bring on record about his involvement in some cases. P.W. 1 has fairly admitted that he had some litigation with the appellants. Enmity, no doubt is there, not only with P.W. 1 but also with some other witnesses, which will be stated at the appropriate stage, but one cannot also overlook that enmity at times, provides a good motive to take revenge against his opponent. 14. The other three witnesses, i.e. P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 claimed to have seen the appellant running away from the scene of occurrence. The presence of the appellants at the scene, where the murder had taken place, is corroborated by their evidence as they had seen them running away. 14. The other three witnesses, i.e. P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 claimed to have seen the appellant running away from the scene of occurrence. The presence of the appellants at the scene, where the murder had taken place, is corroborated by their evidence as they had seen them running away. P.W. 6 has stated that he had been easing in the orchard, close to which the incident had taken place and from there he saw the incident and after having seen his father being assaulted, he cried out, which attracted the attention of others. 15. The learned counsel for the appellants has been very much critical about the evidence of these witnesses and it has been submitted that the evidence on record would show that the deceased including his son and other witnesses had enmity with some of the appellants and that was the reason to implicate them falsely. Elaborating his argument, the learned counsel has submitted that there are two important aspects of the matter, which would directly suggest that they could not have been the witnesses to the occurrence, rather, subsequently, they were set up in order to feed fat their grudges, on account of enmity between the deceased and the appellants. 16. In this connection, the learned counsel submitted that the investigating officer arrived at the spot on getting an information from a writer constable of an out-post, where one Chandeshwar Singh had given an information that a murder had taken place, but in that information there is nothing to indicate about the assailant(s) of the deceased. It is accordingly submitted that in absence of any name of the assailant it is apparent that the deceased was killed by some unknown person otherwise, there was no occasion for not disclosing the name of his assailant(s) by Chandeshwar while giving an information at the police station. 17. The second contention is that the F.I.R. is doubtful, because the same cannot be treated as such since already an information was given by Chandeshwar and also by a constable to the investigating officer concerned by making a sanha entry on the basis of which, the investigating officer proceeded to the spot. The F.I.R. according to the learned counsel, is therefore, that the report of the said Chandeshwar and not the one which was drawn up subsequently on the! statement of P.W. 6. The F.I.R. according to the learned counsel, is therefore, that the report of the said Chandeshwar and not the one which was drawn up subsequently on the! statement of P.W. 6. Further, it is stated that the evidence of the investigating officer would indicate that even after arriving at the spot, he did not record the statement of the witnesses including the informant, rather he engaged himself in doing other legal formalities and much after that, he recorded the statement of P.W. 6, which would indicate that after it was decided to implicate the appellants a story was set out and on the basis of that the statement of P.W. 6 was recorded. Alternatively, it is stated that even if it is assumed that the statement of P.W. 6 was a fardbeyan, it should not be looked into, because obviously, it was an after thought one, as the same was recorded a couple of hours after the arrival of the Investigating Officer at the spot, although P.W. 6 was present there. 18. I take up the last point first, as the other two are interlinked with each other. So far as the two earlier informations are concerned, I have some difficulty in accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the following reasons. It is true that one Chandeshwar is said to have made a statement before a police station, but there was absolutely nothing in it save and except that an information was given that a murder had taken place in the village in question. In that report neither any indication was given as to who was murdered, nor any other facts/circumstances leading to that murder were given. As a matter of fact, it was just an information and as such, it cannot be treated to be a First Information Report, because the F.I.R. at least should suggest some description to treat it as such. The second Sanha entry (Ext. 5) reads as follows : "THANA LAKAHA RAJENDRA SINGH ? SAHAYAK THANA KAITHA THANA AYE AUR REPORT KIYE KI PARSAUNI KAPUR MEN SRI KAPIL DEO NARAYAN SINGH KI HATYA HO GAYA HAI. THANA PAR KOI PADADHIKARI NAHIN HAI ISLIYE AWASHYAK KARWAI HETU CHALE". 19. The aforesaid statements, in the sanha entry No. 145 dated 10-9-82 not only are vague, but also does not give minimum necessary description of a First Information Report. THANA PAR KOI PADADHIKARI NAHIN HAI ISLIYE AWASHYAK KARWAI HETU CHALE". 19. The aforesaid statements, in the sanha entry No. 145 dated 10-9-82 not only are vague, but also does not give minimum necessary description of a First Information Report. It simply says that murder of the deceased had taken place and as no officer was available in the police station, the maker left for the place i.e. village Parsauni. 20. In this connection, two decisions one reported in AIR 1951 Madras 812 : 1951 (52) Cri LJ 857 (Gurusami Naidus case) and the other AIR 1967 Cal 478 (Manna Lals case) may be seen wherein, it has been held that an information of commission or suspected commission of a cognizable offence, if given by a person having personal knowledge to an officer of the police station, the same is admissible as an information under S. 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the instant case, both the earlier informations had not been given by any person, who had some personal information about the commission of a cognizable offence. Rather, just by way of an information, the police was informed of a murder and nothing beyond it. So far as the statement of Chandeshwar is concerned, neither he has stated that about the source of his knowledge, nor he had given details of himself in order to locate him in the event of necessity. As a matter of fact, as the record shows the prosecution, in spite of its best efforts could not produce him since his identity was not established. Apart from that, even if it is assumed that the information given by Chandeshwar was a First Information Report, the defence cannot take advantage of it by saying that since the name/names of the killers of the deceased being absent there, the appellants cannot be held to be responsible for that. One Chandeshwar might have got some information from any source(s) about the murder of a person and thought it necessary to report it to the police to enquire into. But by no stretch of imagination that information can be treated as a First Information Report as has been sought to be made out. In the circumstances, non-examination of Chandeshwar or the person, who had reported the sanha cannot be fatal to the prosecution. But by no stretch of imagination that information can be treated as a First Information Report as has been sought to be made out. In the circumstances, non-examination of Chandeshwar or the person, who had reported the sanha cannot be fatal to the prosecution. In this connection, a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1988 SC 696 (Appa Bhai V/s. State of Gujarat) may be seen wherein, it has been observed that the prosecution case cannot be thrown out on the ground of non-examination of some witnesses. 21. Now, I take up the other points raised. It is true that most of the witnesses, excepting P.W. 4 have some sort of enmity with the appellants, but that cannot be a ground to reject that testimony unless there is compelling reasons for doing so, I may however, add here that where some sort of enmity between the parties is admitted, it needs special secrutiny to judge whether the witness deposed are truthful or not. 22. In this connection, the principle laid down in various decisions may also be seen, as it has been observed that there be different situation wherein, the witnesses appear to depose, but simply because some of them are partisan should not be a ground to reject them. As I have indicated earlier, the rule of prudence demands that the evidence of the partisan witness has got to be judged with great caution. 23. The evidence of three witnesses, who are on inimical term with some of the appellants on the point of occurrence, has already been stated and their evidence is fully supported by an independent witness i.e. P.W. 4, as had had no reason to implicate any of the appellants. Then again, the son of the deceased had also no apparent motive against any of the appellants. It is true that there was some land dispute between his father and some of the appellants, but in term of the Panchayati, as the evidence goes, the deceased got possession over the land. The very fact that the dispute was settled by a Panchayati does show that it was settled in an amicable way with the consent of the parties in a good atmosphere. In other words, the settlement of the land dispute in favour of Kapildeo (deceased) was not by way of any Court verdict. The very fact that the dispute was settled by a Panchayati does show that it was settled in an amicable way with the consent of the parties in a good atmosphere. In other words, the settlement of the land dispute in favour of Kapildeo (deceased) was not by way of any Court verdict. Had that been so, it could have been said that there was a bitter relationship between the parties over a piece of land, but it was on account of a Court decree that a particular party got possession over it. In this situation, I do not find that there should be any grudge on the part of the son of the deceased (P.W. 6) so as to implicate the appellants falsely. 24. Therefore, if the evidence of the witnesses, i.e. P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 6 supported by the evidence of an independent witness P.W. 4 coupled with the medical report and the objective evidence found by the Investigating Officer at the spot is judged, I do not find any ground to disbelieve the entire prosecution case. 25. No doubt, the fardbeyan of P.W. 6, the son of the deceased was recorded a couple of hours after the arrival of the Investigating Officer at the (sic) for that, the maker cannot be held responsible. It is well settled that the delay of a few hours by itself in the recording the statement of the informant does not amount to serious infirmity, unless there is/are material(s) to suggest or indicate that Investigating agency had deliberately delayed in recording the statement to afford an opportunity to the maker to set up a case of his own choice. In the instant case, P.Ws. 1 and 3 were examined at the spot itself by the Investigating officer and others were examined in course of investigation. If there has been delay in recording the statement of P.W. 6 i.e. the son of the deceased by the Investigating Officer, one cannot come to a conclusion straightway that this delay was deliberately made to give an opportunity to the informant to set up a case in order to implicate the appellants. 26. If there has been delay in recording the statement of P.W. 6 i.e. the son of the deceased by the Investigating Officer, one cannot come to a conclusion straightway that this delay was deliberately made to give an opportunity to the informant to set up a case in order to implicate the appellants. 26. The other arguments had been that in no case the witnesses who claimed to be the eye-witnesses to the occurrence could not have seen the incident, because, according to the informant P.W. 6 after having seen his father being assaulted with deadly weapons by the appellants he shouted and on hearing his cries, P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 appeared at the scene of occurrence and therefore, at best, it can be said that they saw the offenders subsequent to the incident in a different manner, but even then, it was not possible for them to identify them for two reasons, firstly, because, while they were running away, it is normally not possible to identify a person from behind and secondly, the time of incident as alleged was an evening and when the evening had set in, that was an additional predicament for the witness to identify the offenders. I regret, this contention cannot be accepted. It is true that in the F.I.R. a statement as indicated, had been made but that cannot be a factor in judging the evidence of the other witnesses. The informant in his own way has stated what he has seen, but from his statement, the evidence of other witnesses cannot either be doubted or any other inference can be drawn. No doubt the F.I.R. plays an important role in a criminal case, but at the same time, the claim of the witness(s) as the case may be, can only be judged after having examined his evidence and other facts and circumstances. In the instant case, the witnesses who claimed to have seen the incident, were at different place and they arrived at the spot where the incident had taken place on hearing the cries of the informant, but the informant is not competent to say that before they actually reached that spot, they had no occasion to see the incident or the appellants. In this background, the evidence of the witnesses once again may be referred to. 27. In this background, the evidence of the witnesses once again may be referred to. 27. P.W. 1 claimed to have gone to Hardibazar with the deceased Kapildeo and had been returning with him on their respective bicycles. It is a matter of common experience that on a narrow village pathway while passing through it one has to go ahead as it is not possible for two persons to go side by side in a narrow village path. Therefore, the evidence of this witness that at the point when the road had bifurcated towards the village of the deceased, he took a turn and soon thereafter, the incident had taken place which he had seen, cannot be doubted. P.W. 1 who has given a vivid description of the occurrence on these material particulars, has not been cross-examined on these important points, rather, the defence as stated above, was anxious to bring on record the past enmity between the parties, which the witness without any hesitation admitted. Thus, as a matter of fact, there was no attempt on his part to conceal this aspect of the matter. Ostensively, this past litigation may attribute a motive for him to implicate the appellants, but one cannot over look that since he could not be shaken in cross-examination on the point of actual incident and identification of the appellants and others, even if there was past litigation between them, the factual aspect of the matter remained unrebutted. The fact that P.W. 1 accompanied the deceased to Hardibazar for the purpose of purchasing some clothes cannot also be doubted because, it is fully corroborated by the cloth dealer of the Bazar P.W. 5, who is an independent witness and clearly stated that the deceased had come to his shop and had purchased a piece of cloth. 28. So far as P.Ws. 2 and 3 are concerned, they also claimed to have gone Hardibazar for the purpose of marketing and according to them, they were returning on foot and saw the incident from the distance of 32-35 yards. It is a matter of common experience that in villages, the villagers often go for purchasing their necessary house-hold articles from a near-by Bazar, because in each and every village there is no such bazar, where all the articles are available. 29. It is a matter of common experience that in villages, the villagers often go for purchasing their necessary house-hold articles from a near-by Bazar, because in each and every village there is no such bazar, where all the articles are available. 29. The possibility of identifying the culprits at about 6.30 p.m. in the month of September, cannot be doubted because by that time it is not complete dark, so as to take the help of any other means of identification. The defence in order to show, however, that the sun-set took place on that particular day at 6 p.m. proved a Almanac (Ext. G). It is a matter of common experience that in the month of September, darkness does not set in by 6-30 p.m. The sun set, according to Ext. G was at 6 p.m. and within half an hour, the incident took place when there was sufficient light to identify any person. Therefore, this argument has no force. 30. So far as P.W. 2 is concerned, the learned counsel has been critical on the point that he was examined two days after and that apart, he has some enmity with the appellants. The delay in examining this witness cannot be a ground to reject his testimony because it is for the investigating officer to investigate who are the persons, who had actually seen the incident or had any knowledge direct or indirect in that regard. If the investigating officer for any reason had delayed in examining the witness, the fault will lies with the investigating officer and not with the witness(s). 31. It may be pointed out here that he is a named witness in the F.I.R. and therefore, his presence at or near the place of occurrence cannot be doubted. The defence has tried to show that he reached the spot after having heard the Hulla of the P.W. 6. Even if it that be assumed, he had chance to see the offenders who after having brutally killed the deceased, were running away from the spot. The evidence of this witness bears the stamp of truth. 32. So far as P.W. 3 is concerned, a similar comment was made, as has been made in respect of the foregoing witnesses. It is stated that he was also inimical to the appellants, because at the instance of the appellants side a criminal proceeding was initiated against him. The evidence of this witness bears the stamp of truth. 32. So far as P.W. 3 is concerned, a similar comment was made, as has been made in respect of the foregoing witnesses. It is stated that he was also inimical to the appellants, because at the instance of the appellants side a criminal proceeding was initiated against him. The witness has not disputed his involvement in the criminal proceeding, but he was one of those, who was also returning from Hardibazar and claimed to have seen the incident. So far as the evidence on the point of incident is concerned,it remains unrebutted. As a matter of fact, his evidence has been examined closely and I do not find anything to doubt his version so far as his claim of having seen the incident is concerned. 33. As I have already stated, P.W. 4 an independent witness has given a detailed statement relating to the occurrence. Nothing could be shown or placed that he had any grudge or malice against the appellants or any others. As a matter of fact, the defence could not bring any thing on record to throw doubt in his evidence. The only criticism that has been made against him is that it was not possible for him to witness the incident, as he was in the orchard when the incident had taken place. Nothing could be brought that the orchard was so dense that a person present there cannot see anything which was going on outside the said orchard within his vision. Therefore, simply because he was in a mango orchard, cannot be a ground to say that he could not have seen the incident. 34. An argument has also been raised that P.W. 4 was examined at a latter stage and by that time, the prosecution had enough opportunity to tutor the witnesses. This submission obviously is based on an assumption, as it is not supported by any other evidence/circumstance that although he was available, he did not allow the police to record his statement at the earliest. As stated above, that it is the responsibility of the Investigating Officer to examine the persons, who are connected with the case directly or indirectly at the earliest. As stated above, that it is the responsibility of the Investigating Officer to examine the persons, who are connected with the case directly or indirectly at the earliest. In Ranbir V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1973 SC 1409 it has been observed that the delay in examining a witness during his investigation is material only if it is indicative of a suggestion of some unfair progress by the investigating agency for the purpose of introducing the got up witnesses to falsely support the prosecution case. In that decision, Supreme Court further held that evidence of a witness does not become unworthy if he was examined after some delay by the Investigating Officer. As already in the evidence of P.W. 4 that either he himself caused delay in getting him examined though available, with an intention to allow him to be influenced by any body to depose falsehood against the appellant, nor is there any indication that the delay was caused purposely by the Investigating Officer in order to give an opportunity to the prosecution to set up its witnesses. 35. To sum up, the evidence of the witnesses is very specific that the deceased on way to his village from Hardibazar was brutally killed by the appellants and some others. I may repeat here that since the prosecution party has got enmity with some of the witnesses, I have my anxious consideration to the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 6 with a great caution and regard being had to other facts and circumstances, the objective evidence found by the Investigating Officer at the spot coupled with the evidence of an independent witness P.W. 4. I am satisfied that it was the appellants and their associates (since absconding) who were practically in search of the deceased to be killed and when they got an opportunity at about evening time on the date of occurrence, they availed of that and brutally finished him. 36. Before I part with the judgment, I may indicate that it is needless to dwell upon the evidence of the defence witnesses, who have been examined on the point of alibi taken by some of the appellants, as this point has not been pressed by the learned counsel for the appellants. As a matter of fact, even then I examined the evidence of those D.Ws. As a matter of fact, even then I examined the evidence of those D.Ws. and I find that they are not at all trustworthy and the alibi taken by some of the appellants is nothing but a product of imagination. 37. In the result, I, in full agreement with S. B. Sinha, J., find no merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed. The bail bonds of appellants Raj Mandal Thakur, Chandeshwar Thakur, Budhan Ram and Bishundeo Thakur (Cr. Appeal No. 18/85) and appellant Phuldeo Narain Singh (Cr. Appeal No. 113/85) are cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the Court below to serve out their sentences. If they fair to surrender, the Court below shall take all coercive steps to apprehend them to serve out their sentences. 38. Let a copy of the judgment and the lower Court records be sent down forthwith for information and follow up action. Appeals dismissed.