N. J. PANDYA, J. ( 1 ) ). These are referred matters. In all these are 11 matters as listed above. The occassion to refer these matters to a Division Bench arose when learned Single Judge, Justice K. G. Shah was hearing said appeals individually and it was found that in each of them common question involved was pertaining to the consent required to be obtained by the person who has filed the complaint on behalf of the local authority, be it municipality or local health authority and the controversy was, because the consent obtained by him was a written consent as per Section 20 (1) of the Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the authority granting the consent should also record his reasons for giving the consent. The learned Single Judge addressed himself to the controversy and in the course of hearing before him, it was pointed out that there is a judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court on this point which has already answered the controversy in favour of the defence in the sense that there must be reasons recorded by the consenting authority while granting consent under Section 20 (1) of the said Act as stated hereinabove. This case is that of K. S. Prajapati v. State of Gujarat and Another and has also been reported in 32 (1) GLR 82 = 1990 (2) GLH 576 . It was urged before the learned Single Judge that there are decisions of other High Courts of Single judge as well as Division Bench holding contrary view. It was also pointed out further that the decision relied on by the learned Single Judge in the said Prajapalis case namely that of a learned single Judge of Bombay High Court as well as a judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in air 1986 S. C. 2160 A. K. Roy and Anr. v. State of punjab, would not lead to this conclusion. In short, the learned Single Judge fell that there appears to be a scope for further discussion on the point and there may be possibility of holding a contrary view to the one held by the learned single Judge Shri Bhairavia and therefore, the matter came to be referred to a Division Bench and this is how we heard all these 11 matters and are disposing them of by this common order. The two questions which are raised for reference have been set out in claboratre in the order of the learned Single Judge passed on 4/09/1990 in all the 11 matters together and at page no. 15, the questions that he has raised are as under: (I) Is it obligatory upon the person authorised to give "written consent" for prosecution contemplated by Section 20 (1) of the Prevention of Food adulteration Act, 1954 to give its reasons for giving the consent ?and (II) What would be the effect, if the author by giving the consent has not given the reasons for giving the consent ? ( 2 ) ). On behalf of the prosecuting agency, that is the Corporation or local health authority or municipality, as the case may be, the learned advocate Shri Shelat has advanced the arguments and on behalf of the respective respondents of the separate appeals, learned Advocate shri J. A. Shah has mainly advanced the arguments and whatever they wanted to add to it by way of further submission L. A. Shri Yagnik, L. A. Shri Modi and L. A. Shri Farroqui have been heard. ( 3 ) ). In view of the Supreme Court judgment, naturally, the submission will be made by the parties supporting the view that the written consent required to be given as per Section 20 (1) of the said Act should accompany the reasons also and the Supreme Court pronouncements in a. K. Roys case is a binding authority and Article 141 of the Constitution enjoins upon this Court to follow the same. On the other hand, L. A. Shri shelat has very strongly urged that their Lordships of the Supreme Court were not called upon to decide the contents and the form of the consent nor the issue whether the written consent order should be a reasoned one was raised nor the parties Advocates had addressed the court on that point, much less, therefore they were required to decide as to whether the consenting authority should record his reasons in writing and as such, in the submission of the learned Advocate Shri Shelat, A. K. Roys case is not a precedent at all. ( 4 ) ). ( 4 ) ). Apart from the said Supreme Court judgment in A. K. Roys case, on behalf of the respondents, l. A. Shri Shah has evolved an argument on the line that the Court should read in Section 20 (1) of the said Act the requirement of recording reasons by the consenting Authority and this submission has been made on the count of avoidance of arbitrariness, display of fairness on the part of the public authority and public officials, accountability and the general expectations as expressed in several pronouncements both of supreme Court and High Courts that the authority in question exercising the power under a statute are doing so, in accoradance therewith and this could be ascertained according to Mr. Shah only when the reasons are recorded and expressly given in support of a decision. ( 5 ) ). The question referred to this Bench does admit of the submissions being made as to the requirement of reasons being recorded in writing in support of the consent when we take into consideration question No. 1. The area of controversy between the parties, therefore in the present referred matters is not confined only to the question whether A. K Roys decision is binding precedent or not and if it is not what will be the effect on the judgment given on the basis thereof. We have, therefore, heard the learned Advocates on both the sides on this larger area of controversy also and in this background we are processing with the questions as to whether the consenting authority is required to record its reasons in writing while giving the consent. As a corollary thereto, of course is the question as to what will be the effect if no reasons are given though the statute requires that reasons be given. By this, of course, we mean that if the answer to question No. 1 is in favour of the respondents we will be reading that requirement into the statute. To understand this aspect of the matter, we quote hereinbelow Section 20 (1) of the said Act. By this, of course, we mean that if the answer to question No. 1 is in favour of the respondents we will be reading that requirement into the statute. To understand this aspect of the matter, we quote hereinbelow Section 20 (1) of the said Act. " No prosecution for an offence under this act, not being an offence u/s. 4 or Sec. 14-A shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State government or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government; provided that the prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in Section 12, if he produces in Court a copy of the Report of the Public Analyst along with the complaint. "in order to understand the impact of section quoted hereinabove, we may refer to said A. K. Roys decision as reported in AIR 1986 SC, page 2160. In para 8 of the judgment, the question that has arisen in the matter before them has been expressly stated by Ld. Judges and they are two in number. Further in that very paragraph both the questions have been amalgamated and have been posed as ultimate question to be whether terms of Section 20 (1) of the Act do not postulate further delegation by the person authorised to institute prosecutions for an offence under the said Act. Thereafter, as has been done in the instant case, Section 20 (1) has been quoted and has been analysed. We express ourselves in full agreement with this analysis as contained in para 10 of the judgment. The prosecution, therefore, could be launched under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration act provided it is instituted by the Central government or the State Goveranment or a person authorised in that behalf by the Central government or the State Government and the 3rd category would be, the prosecution be insituted with the written consent of any of the 4 specified categories of authorities or persons. ( 6 ) ). Obviously, therefore, where any of the four aforesaid categories of authorities, namely the central Government, or the State Government or the persons authorised on this behalf by the central Government or the State Government have chosen to launch the prosection, no consent whatsoever is necessary. ( 6 ) ). Obviously, therefore, where any of the four aforesaid categories of authorities, namely the central Government, or the State Government or the persons authorised on this behalf by the central Government or the State Government have chosen to launch the prosection, no consent whatsoever is necessary. Consent would become necessary and only when it is instituted by a person other than these 4 specified categories of authorities or persons. This would mean that the person who is not falling into categories of authorities or persons as specified therein can launch prosectuion only on getting a written consent from any of them. ( 7 ) ). Coming to the specifics of the case before us, it would mean that the prosecution having been launched by a person not falling into any of the said categories, the need for a written consent is a must. Having thus established the need for a written consent as a condition precedent, what should be treated as a consent having been given under the said Section that is required to be seen. No doubt, on behalf of the respondents submission has been made that the reasons are necessary to be recorded in writing and for that purpose, of course, they are placing reliance on that portion of A. K. Roys case where the learned Judges have expressed themselves on that line. This expression is to be found in paragraph 11 and while concluding that terms of Section 20 (1) do not postulate further delegation by the person so authorised; he can only give his consent in writing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a particular case and record his reasons for the launching of such prosectuion in the pubic interest (Emphasis is supplied. ). It is quite understandable that the respondents would be relying on the portion of the said observation underlined as it categorically states that the person who has to give consent should record his reasons for the launching of such prosecution in the public interest. ( 8 ) ). ). It is quite understandable that the respondents would be relying on the portion of the said observation underlined as it categorically states that the person who has to give consent should record his reasons for the launching of such prosecution in the public interest. ( 8 ) ). With regard to this part of the judgment, as noted earlier, on behalf of the prosecution Agency, l. A. Shri Shelat has come out with a submission that this observation cannot be considered to be forming part of ratio decidendi of A. K. Roys case and therefore, it should not be taken as a binding authority. Needless to say, the respondents on their part maintained that this is very much part of the ratio as laid down in A. K. Roys case and has binding force of Supreme Court judgment as could be under the present dispensation. ( 9 ) ). We will, therefore, now address ourselves to the controversy as to whether it forms a part of the ratio as laid down in A. K. Roys matter or not ? The case required to be dealt with in A. K. Roys matter was further delegation of power to launch the prosecution pursuaant to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Punjab Rules, 1958 and more particulary its Rule 3. After analysing section 20 (1) in the manner stated above, the Supreme court has clearly expresed itself to the effect that no further delegation is contemplated by the statute and hence Rule 3 is required to be struck down and as a consequences thereto notification published in exercise of power as given by Rule 3 whereby the Food Inspector was further delegated the power of launching prosecution was struck down. It was further pointed out that the Food Health Authority being one delegated with the power as per Section 29 (1), could no doubt give a written consent to the Food inspector to launch the prosecution or as was noted in the said judgment in many states over and above the Food Health Authority even the food Inspectors are given authority by the State governement itself to launch prosecution and in no case the present official who has been delegated the power u/s. 20 (1) can either sub-delegate his power or further delegate his power, because the statute prohibits him from doing so. We express ourselves in wholehearted agreement with this analysis and otherwise also we further express that this part of the judgment is certainly binding to the court. ( 10 ) ). However, in our opinion, this being the controversy addressed to by the Supreme court, the observations quoted hereinabove as appearing in paragraph 11 with regard to the written consent and more particularly" record his reasons for the launching of such prosectuion" do not form part of the ratio of the judgment. It will be relevant to recapitulate that the contention that the order of written consent is required to be reasoned one was not raised before the Court. ( 11 ) ). To resolve the controversy of correctness of sub-delegation, that part of Section 20 (1) of the said Act where the provision as to written consent is given, in our opinion, was not necessary to be considered at all. ( 12 ) ). In the judgment itself, in our opinion, we find an indication in this regard because after setting out the facts of the case up to paragraph 5, in paragraph 6, the relevant provision of the said act are quoted and the Section 20 (1) followed by section 24 (2) and other necessary portion thereof, further followed by Rule 3 of the said Punjab rule. In paragraph 7, the Notification issued on different dates have been quoted including the one which was under challenge. Thereafter in paragraph 8 the main question have been formulated as referred to above. In paragraph 9, no ground has been stated that the prosecution has not been launched either by or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State government. Therefore it has become necessary to ascertain whether the Food Inspector, Faridkot was duly authorised to launch the prosecution. We may bear in mind the fact that his authority in that regard has been questioned and not the consent which ordinarily would have been given to him in relation to a particular case by the concerned authority was being considered. Therefore it has become necessary to ascertain whether the Food Inspector, Faridkot was duly authorised to launch the prosecution. We may bear in mind the fact that his authority in that regard has been questioned and not the consent which ordinarily would have been given to him in relation to a particular case by the concerned authority was being considered. Now, if the delegation was held to be valid and it was held that Food Inspector, Faridkot was duly authorised, there would have been no question of his being armed with a consent as per Section 20 (1), in other words, he will falling into the category of person who can launch the prosectuion on their own as per the provisions of the said Section without waiting for the consent being given in respect of a particular case by the authority empowered in this behalf. Further on in paragraph 10, we find Section 20 (1) being analysed part by part and it being noted that it created in inhibition in the institution of prosecution for an offence under the said Act except on fulfilment of one or the other of the two conditions. The conditions are institution by the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in that behalf by the Central Government or the State Govt. If the authority given to the Food inspector, Faridkot in the case before the Supreme court, was held to be valid, he would naturally be falling into the category of these persons or authorities. As noted earlier, in that case, there was no need for consent whatsoever. Thereafter, the second condition has been noted which is that of the prosecution being instituted with the written consent of any of the four specified categories of authorities of the persons. ( 13 ) ). Further it is noted that if either of these conditions is not satisfied there would be no sufficient authority for the institution of such a prosecution. Then the learned Judges have proceeded further as to whether there was any possibility of further delegation by the person authorised by the Central Govt. or the State Govt. ( 14 ) ). At the cost of repetition, we may mention, therefore that in the case before the Supreme court, there was no need for a consent if the Food inspector, Faridkot was held to be duly authorised. or the State Govt. ( 14 ) ). At the cost of repetition, we may mention, therefore that in the case before the Supreme court, there was no need for a consent if the Food inspector, Faridkot was held to be duly authorised. It is in this background that we are required to appreciate the aforesaid observation contained in paragraph 11 to decide whether it forms part of the ratio of the judgment or not ? ( 15 ) ). For the purpose, we will be referring to various Supreme Court judgments starting with air 1980 S. C. page 1707 (Rajput Ruda Meha and ors. v. State of Gujarat ). While dealing with the question as to what is precedence, it has been stated that when certain question is neither raised nor aruged, a discussion by the Court for pondering over the issue in depth would not be a binding precedent. This question was required to be addressed to and answered by the Supreme Court when after deciding the matter and before signing the judgment it was brought to me notice of the learned Judges that there exists a case on the point which should be borne in mind. This case was that of Silaram v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1979 SC 745 . Holding that it is not an authority regarding scope of Section 384 C. P. C. the learned Judges had kept the judgment as given by them as it is, and while considering this question the aforesaid observation as to the precedent was made. ( 16 ) ). In our opinion, especially when the question of delegation being involved and therefore, the requirement of consent was excluded, as per the statutory provision itself, it was not at all necessary to decide as to what should be the contents of consent even remotely. It was equally not necessary to decide the question of contents of consent in order to decide the question of delegation as that was before the Court. In keeping with this ovservation in Rajput Ruda Meha and ors. , case, we hold that it is not a binding precedent. ( 17 ) ). Another decision cited in 1990 (2) Judgment today, p. 489 many matters have been decided by this common judgment and in course thereof, at page 504 with regard to the precedent we find necessary observations and ruling. , case, we hold that it is not a binding precedent. ( 17 ) ). Another decision cited in 1990 (2) Judgment today, p. 489 many matters have been decided by this common judgment and in course thereof, at page 504 with regard to the precedent we find necessary observations and ruling. It has been specifically laid down as to what is binding precedent and what constitutes the same. Needless to say, the answer is that it is the ratio decidendi which is binding, namely the principle upon which the case was decided. For this purpose, we may refer to paragraphs 47,48 and 49 of the judgment. The question being argued was as to which will be a decision or (sic) inquirium. After discussion and satisfying as to what would amount to per incuriam, further on it has been pointed out that a judicial decision is that abstraction of the principle from the facts and arguments of the case. Onsubsequentoccassiona Judge may either extend or narrow down the principle, but so far as the binding precedent is concerned, in relation to a particular judgment it will be a principle that has been abstracted from the facts and arguments of the case. ( 18 ) ). Next authority is 1989 (3) Judgment Today, p. 156. Observation of Supreme Court constituting obiter dictum, High Court not bound by the same. This is the clear-cut ruling as contained in para 19 of the judgment at p. 164. In this paragraph, we find the detailed discussion on the point and with regard to Chandrakant Khares case it was considered binding by this Court. It was pointed out that the question involved was whether the meeting which was duly convened and had commenced could have been adjourned by the Muncipal Commissioner and the question was not whether a notice for convening a meeting issued by the Municipal Corporation could be cancelled by him (Municipal Commissioner) before the commencement of the meeting with a view to have the meeting held on a subsequent date. Observing that the Division Bench of this court was not really called upon to consider the situation in such a case as notice in Khares case and for some other reasons, the decision given by this Court was turned by the Supreme Court what will operate as binding precedent is the decision given by the Supreme Court in connection with the matter that was argued and dealt with by it and necessarily, therefore, not other observations that were made in the course of the judgement where only a particular question was addressed to. ( 19 ) ). We have got a full bench decision of this court reported in 24 (l)GLR, page No. 1 Calico mills case. Speaking for the full Bench Mr. Justice M. P. Thakkar, the Honble the Chief justice as he was then, it has been clearly slated that the ratio of Supreme Cburt judgmentmust be extracted intelligently and meaningfully not mechanically and with a superficial quick look. The Full Bench was required to make this observation in connection with the case reported in air 1973 S. C. , p. 225 involving A. K. Roy v. Vollas Ltd. and referring it as Voltass case and after discussion it was concluded that the Supreme court was never called upon to make pronouncements on as many as six points and therefore it was felt that it will not be a binding precedent as Voltass case dealt with by the supreme Court cannot be said to be laying down ratio in connection with any of these six points. ( 20 ) ). On behalf of the respondents L. A. Shri modi had cited AIR 1969 S. C, p. 814 with relevant remarks at page 821 paragraph 30 containing the observation that even obiter dictum or observations made in the Supreme Court judgment would carry considerable weight. About this position of law, there can be no dispute. AIR 1969 Rajasthan p. 192 has been cited by L. A. Shri Modi and in that judgment at page 208 para 48 it has been stated that even the obiter dictum of supreme Court is binding. With respects to the learned Judges, we do not agree with them and more particularly this would be our finding in keeping with the said full decision in Calico mill (supra ). With respects to the learned Judges, we do not agree with them and more particularly this would be our finding in keeping with the said full decision in Calico mill (supra ). AIR 1969 Calcutta, page 249 is cited by Shri Modi where it is laid down that the supreme Court judgment must be given effect to by a High Court. This obviously is in keeping with the Constitutuional provision as enshrined in Article 141 about which there cannot be any quarrel or controversy. However, we are of the view that what is required to be gi ven effect to and what is required to be followed as binding precedent is ratio of a given case which again as expressed by the Full Bench of this Court in calicos case, is required to be intelligently and meaningfully carved out and not mechanically to be followed. . ( 21 ) ). Having come to this conclusion we must now revert to the judgment of the learned Single judge as reported in 32 (1) GLR p. 82 = 1990 (2) glh 576 . We should also refer at this stage to one more judgment given by our learned brother justice S. D. Dave in Surat Municipal Corporation v. Uttam Sweet Mart and Ors. In both the matter we find that the respective learned Judges have proceeded on this basis of the aforesaid A. K. Roys case laying down the latest legal position. That is in reference to Bombay High Court judgment also. It is Gahininath Bhimrao Patak v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1988 Criminal law Journal, page 48. This judgment is given by a learned single Judge of that Court and in the course thereof, AIR 1961 S. C. , p. 1 has been referred to. We will be reverting to that 1961 judgment at a later stage, but for the time being for considerating this question as dealt with by our 2 learned brothers sitting single, we stop at making reference to the said Bombay Judgment. ( 22 ) ). While making the order of reference, the learned Single Judge Shri K. G. Shah had an occasion to refer to Calcutta High Court judgment where also the said Supreme Court judgment in A. K. Roys case was cited and dealt with. It is 7969 Criminal Law Journal p. 1190 Om prakash Shaws case. ( 22 ) ). While making the order of reference, the learned Single Judge Shri K. G. Shah had an occasion to refer to Calcutta High Court judgment where also the said Supreme Court judgment in A. K. Roys case was cited and dealt with. It is 7969 Criminal Law Journal p. 1190 Om prakash Shaws case. In paragraphs 5,6,7 and 8 of this judgment, the Division Bench of Calcutta high Court has expressed itself to the observation to be found in A. K. Roys case with regard to consent are obiter. While noting that high Court surely cannot brush aside the observations of the Supreme Court, even if mere obiter, however, High Court cannot read obiter as a blanket algebraic formula, but must try to understand the same in consonance and in conformity with the observations in the earlier or later decisions on the point where they are more in the nature of ratio rather than obiter. High court must not treat each and every observation in the judgment of Supreme Court as if it were a statute or a scripture but must try to ascertain the reason behind the observation after reading the judgement as a whole and wherever possible in the light of and in tune with the earlier observations on the point. This is our opinion, more or less on the same line with 24 (1) GLR p. 1 Calicos case. ( 23 ) ). No doubt, there have been instances where A. K. Roys case has been followed by other High Courts and they arc pointed out by learned Advocates for the respondents by citing various journals. They were 1991 Vol. I. FAC 170, 2 Bombay High Courts D. B. Decision, 1991 Vol. I FAC 55, a Himachal Pradesh High court decision, and 1990 (2) FAC 267. In all these cases A. K. Roys case has been referred to specifically. One more decision is 1990 Vol 1,2 fac p. 14 where A. K. Roys case has not been referred to specifically but a general observation is made to the effect that there are Supreme Court judgments. ( 24 ) ). In our opinion, while dealing with a. K. Roys case in the earlier part of this judgment, we have at length pointed out as to why the question of consent was not there before the Supreme Court. ( 24 ) ). In our opinion, while dealing with a. K. Roys case in the earlier part of this judgment, we have at length pointed out as to why the question of consent was not there before the Supreme Court. We reiterate that the question as could be seen on reading the judgment was that of sub-delegation or re-delegation by a delegated authority. Had it been the finding of the Supreme court that the delegation was correct, obviously there was no need for consent for launching the prosecution. In either way, therefore the aspect of consent was not at all in consideration and therefore, in keeping with the aforesaid judgments, we come to the conclusion that A. K. Roys case is not a precedent for the purpose of and the ratio of that judgment, is not in connection with the contents of "consent" required to be given by the concerned authorities u/s. 20 (1) of the said Act. We have further stated that nowhere from the judgment, reading it carefully throughout, do we gather that the parties before the supreme Court had addressed the Court on the point of consent and that it was treated as a matter in contorversy requiring answer from the Supreme Court. ( 25 ) ). Now, we go to that aspect of the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents that section 20 (1) of the said Act with regard to the consent should be read so as to contain within it the requirement of consenting authority recording its reasons. Shri J. C. Shah leading the defence arguments has been pleased to observe that this would be their submission whether this would be there in the decision of the Supreme court in A. K. Roys case or not. In order to appreciate this arguments we would have to go back to A. K. Roys case for some time. ( 26 ) ). With regard to that case, it was urged by l. A. Shri Shah that because entire Section 20 (1) has been quoted in the judgment, it must be taken that while making those observations in paragraph 11, the aspect of consent was also borne in mind and therefore, those observations came to be made even if the submission of the respondents that it forms the ratio of the judgment is not acceptable. In either event, according to Mr. In either event, according to Mr. Shah, the said A. K. Roys case is of great importance with regard to this aspect of Section 20 (1) of the Act. ( 27 ) ). In the Bombay decision referred to earlier in Gehininaths case, there is a reference to AIR 1961 SC 1 and the same is referred to by the learned single Judge, Justice Bhairavia in his decisions, i. e. Prajapathis case. It is State of bombay (now Gujarat)- appellant v. Parsottam kaniyalal-respondent. ( 28 ) ). This decision has been cited by L. A. Shri shelat also. On going through the decision it is quite clear that the Supreme Court was required to address itself and it did address to the question as to what is the meaning of written consent as found in Section 20 (1) of the said Act. If there be any authority therefore, with regard to the consent that is to be found in Section 20 (1), in our opinion, this is the authority. The Supreme Court has in unequivocal terms expressed itself to the effect that written consent granted by the competent person or authority need not specify the name of the complainant as it is not a statutory requirement, because the consent is specific prosecution. Secondly, it is also to be found in the said decision that it would be reasonable to read by implication that before granting a written consent, the authority competent to inititate the prosecution should apply its mind to the facts of the case and satisfy itself that prima facie exists for the alleged offence that being put up before a court. While accepting this proposition, the Court in terms has held that it will not accept the further implication of the name of the complainant being specified in the written consent. ( 29 ) ). The case before the learned Magistrate who dealt with under the provisions of the said act, was challenged on the ground that prosecution was incompetent to initiate the prosecution because of non-compliance with the terms of section 20 (1) of the said Act. The L. A. Magistrate did not agree with this proposition and convicted the accused and the learned Sessions judge, Baroda accepted the challenge and acquitted the accused. The L. A. Magistrate did not agree with this proposition and convicted the accused and the learned Sessions judge, Baroda accepted the challenge and acquitted the accused. Finally the matter came up before the Bombay High Court by way of Appeal and it came to be treated as Criminal Revision petition and the order passed by the learned sessions Judge came to be confirmed. There was also disagreement between the High Court and the learned Sessions Judge as to whether the consent can be given any authority other than the state Government. The High Court was of the view that the consent could be given by a local authority. But there being no name of the person, whe was to file the complaint, the prosecution was held to be bad. ( 30 ) ). In our opinion, therefore, the Supreme court was referred to interpret Section 20 (1) with regard to the consent and its attention having been pointedly focussed on that and the challenge as to the requirement of name of the complainant being included in the consent having been negatived, in the course of the hearing, the court did accept the said implication as to the competent authority applying its mind to the facts of the case and satisfying itself that a prima facie case exists. It was not even remotely suggested that after satisfying himself in this manner and applying his mind to the facts of the case, the competent authority should record his reasons in writing. It is, therefore, obvious that this decision will have to be accepted by the respondents also, but of necessity they will have to made an attempt of further expanding its scope by calling upon this court to read into Section 20 (1) over and above what has been implied by the said Par shottam kanaiyalals case, further requirement to be implied and it would be of recording reasons in granting the consent. ( 31 ) ). If we recall the argument of L. A. Shri shah that in A. K. Roys case, Section 20 (1) was being interpreted, we will have to also bear in mind that that very section was being interpreted in Parshottams case and the attention was focussed only on the aspect of written consent which is very much the issue before us. If we recall the argument of L. A. Shri shah that in A. K. Roys case, Section 20 (1) was being interpreted, we will have to also bear in mind that that very section was being interpreted in Parshottams case and the attention was focussed only on the aspect of written consent which is very much the issue before us. If there be any binding authority on this, in our opinion, it is this 1961 Supreme Court Pg. 1. ( 32 ) ). L. A. Shri Shah had tried to press into service a distinction between word consent and word sanction. He had referred to the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, the prevention of corruption Act and other statutes where there is reference to sanction being required before the filing of a charge-sheet or a case before a competent authority. As aginst that, according to the learned Advocate here there is a provision only for consent. According to him, because requirement of consent is imposed by the statute it prohibits even the filing of a complaint; while in a case requiring sanction the case can be filed but for want of sanction the cognizance cannot be taken by the Court. Further elaborating upon this distinction according to him, the consent creates a further requirement and as a result, let alone congnizance but there cannot be a complaint. This, according to him, would necessitate the recording of reasons in writing. ( 33 ) ). Strictly speaking, in our opinion, no such distinction between the two concepts is called for. Estimologically and in plain English language sense, sanction, no doubt, means a sanctity being granted to a decision by a higher authority, while consent would be nothing else but an agreement of 2 persons with regard to a proposition. The consent, therefore, indicates meeting of mind on a given point. ( 34 ) ). In our opinion, therefore, whether for want of sanction a case could be filed or not being a subject-matter of enquiry here, we will not enter into that controversy, but taking that proposition as it is on the one hand and the fact situation on the other, for want of consent no complaint could be filed. This will ultimately in our opinion, result into one situation only, namely that there will be no case against the proposed accused. It does not carry us any further. This will ultimately in our opinion, result into one situation only, namely that there will be no case against the proposed accused. It does not carry us any further. L. A. Mr. Shah thereafter, referred to concept of consent as to be found in the law of Contract and for that purpose, he has also referred to the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 and more particularly section 13 thereof. No doubt, the concept of consent in the field of contract is specifically as to parties being ad idem. L. A. Shri Shah, therefore, had further elaborated that the same idea should be brought in with regard to the written consent found in the said Section 30 (1) and unless therefore, there is reasons recorded in writing, it will not be possible to decide whether there has been any agreement of mind and the person who sought the consent and the authority that gave the consent were thinking the same thing or not ? ( 35 ) ). We do not agree with L. A. Shah that the concept of consent in the field of Contract can be brought into to understand the concept of consent to be found in Section 20 (1) of the said Act. Necessarily there is a proposer and an acceptor in a contract and both of them are supposed to be dealing with each other freely and more particularly in our opinion, its greater importance will be appreciated when we advert to the fact that they are doing it for consideration. There is an element of quid pro quo in the contract and without consideration it will be a naked contract, i. e. nudem pactum. It is not even suggested that while seeking consent there is any clement of quid pro quo with regard to written consent to be found in section 20 (1) of the said Act. Effort to draw a parallel between the field of contract vis-a-vis consent and Section 20 (l)of the said Act in the aforesaid background must fail. One additional factor would be that in the field of contract, parties would be independent of each other acting on their own; while u/s. 20 (1) necessarily the person seeking the consent would be subordinate to the person who is to give consent. One additional factor would be that in the field of contract, parties would be independent of each other acting on their own; while u/s. 20 (1) necessarily the person seeking the consent would be subordinate to the person who is to give consent. In our opinion, therefore, there can be no comparisons with the concept of "consent" understood under section 20 (1) of the said Act. ( 36 ) ). L. A. Shri Shah, therefore, had branched out it into another field of law namely administrative law and particularly regulatory jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court as well as High courts on various authorities who are as per the settled position of law being treated as State under Article 12 of the Constitution. In this regard, he had cited decisions in CIDCOs case reported in 1990 S. C. Cases Vol. 3, page 280 and mahavir Automobiles case reported in AIR 1990 sc. 1031 . ( 37 ) ). In CIDCOs case the authority, that is the development Corporation had called for tenders for development of certain plots. The dispute arose about acceptance of tenders of the bidders. It has been laid down that reasons for rejection should be disclosed and public accountability, the requirement of fairness and the very concept of rule of law would call for the recording of reasons in writing and further it should be communicated to the person whose tenders have been rejected. ( 38 ) ). In Mahabir Automobiles case, since long IOC was supplying lubricants to the petitioner-Company or firm and all of a sudden the contract came to be terminated. The Supreme court again observed that it is expected of public authorities that they function with fairness, openness and satisfy their clients that there is no element of arbitrariness. This would obviously to be taken care of by expressly giving out reasons. ( 39 ) ). When it was pointed out to L. A. Shri shah that in both the matters, the parties who had a grievance were complaining of their rights having been infringed, namely the right of a citizen of being treated equally under Article 14 when in response to an advertisement they have submitted tenders or valid subsisting contract is there between the petitioner Mahabir automobiles and the IOC, it could not be terminated abruptly without any reason. Obviously therefore, in both the matters, the aggrieved parties were being visited with civil consequences. ( 40 ) ). When this aspect was pointed out to L. A. Shri Shah, he had very fairly conceded that so far as respondents are concerned, they cannot claim that any of their rights arc being violated, or infringed. However, this had prompted L. A. Shri Shah to come out with two hypothetical cases. . ( 41 ) ). In one such situation, he had visualised the case where in spite of there being a report of the Public Health Authority that a food article is adulterated, the Food Inspector may not propose the launching of prosecution and the consenting authority on its own may call for the papers. The second hypothetical case was with regard to two separate sweet-meat dealers having been subjected to the visit of a Food Inspector, samples having been drawn from each of them and reports with regard to both the samples having been found against the dealers, the Food Inspector proposing prosecution for one and not for the other. ( 42 ) ). Coming to the first hypothetical case of the Inspector not proposing a prosecution and consenting authority calling for the case on its own would obviously result into a prosecution and hence, even if there be any ulterior motive on the part of the Food Inspector or other reason that had prompted him not to prosecute would be frustrated. In our opinion, therefore, it is hardly a case further required to be discussed. ( 43 ) ). Coming back to the second hypothetical case of two dealers one of whom is being prosecuted and the other not, obviously, at the first sight, it would appear that they are not being treated equally or though similarly placed one is being subjected to prosecution and the other is favoured by not being subjected to prosecution. ( 44 ) ). However, if this is to be taken as a consequence firstly it is quite clear that it is not emanating from absence of reasons being recorded in writing. It is obviously as a result of an act or an omission on the part of the Food Inspector. ( 44 ) ). However, if this is to be taken as a consequence firstly it is quite clear that it is not emanating from absence of reasons being recorded in writing. It is obviously as a result of an act or an omission on the part of the Food Inspector. Secondly, it could not be even remotely suggested that of the two dealers, one who is about to be prosecuted can claim a right or not being prosecuted till the other dealer is also prosecuted. In our opinion, there cannot be a right of not being prosecuted because the prosecution is the direct result of breach of duty cast on a citizen of this country not to commit any crime and particularly form with reference to enactments like Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. ( 45 ) ). No doubt, L. A. Shri Shah had advanced the aforesaid hypothetical cases with a view to point out that in such circumstances it will not be possible but for the reasons recorded in writing to come to a definite conclusion as to why one has been prosecuted and the other is not ? In our opinion, that could never be the subject-matter of enquiry in a given prosecution much less could it be a grievance on the part of the person about to be prosecuted that a dealer similarly situated like him has not been prosecuted. In our opinion, therefore, these two examples do not help the respondents case in any manner. ( 46 ) ). On the contrary, as rightly submitted on behalf of the appellants there is a Supreme Court judgment reported in AIR 1970 S. C. , p. 318 in dhiansingh v. Sharampur Municipal Board. Laying down after referring two earlier decisions they are AIR 1948 P. C. p. 82 and AIR 1954-S. C. p. 637 both had dealt with the question of validity of consents given for the institution of certain criminal proceedings, has held that the sanctioning authority was required to apply its mind and find out whether there was any justification for instituting the prosecution. ( 47 ) ). ( 47 ) ). The Judicial Committee as well as the supreme Court has laid down that in such cases, the Court must be satisfied either from the order of the sanctioning authority or from other evidence that all the relevant facts are placed before the sanctioning authority and that authority had granted the sanction after applying its mind to those facts. No doubt, in the case before the supreme Court, i. e. Dhiansing v. Sarampur Municipality these decisions were cited to support the submissions that while authorising a particular authority u/s. 20 (1) this requirement of application of mind has to be fulfilled and therefore, there cannot be an authority granted in favour of one particular individual or an official as in respect of each of the cases mind has to be applied. Answering to this, the Supreme Court in dhiansinghs case has expressed itself to the effect that no question of applying ones mind to the facts of the case before the institution of the complaint arises as the authority to be conferred under that provision can be conferred long before a particular offence has taken place. It is an conferment of authority to institute a particular case or even a class of cases. Section 20 (1) merely prescribed that persons or authorities designated in that section are alone competent to file complaints under the statute in question. ( 48 ) ). What is to be carved out from dhiansinghs case therefore, is that so far as the conferment of authority is concerned, no application of mind would be required as that question will arise only at the time of instituting a prosecution against a given accused and only at that time facts of the case will have to be borne in mind in keeping with the said earlier pronouncements of the Privy Council as well as the Supreme court. ( 49 ) ). L. A. Shri Shah had fairly conceded that the act of granting of consent by the concerned authority will be an administrative act and he will not claim it to be an act of quasi-judicial proceedings. This exactly was the submission, no doubt, of L. A. Shri Shelat that it is only an administrative function and therefore according to L. A. Shri Shelat, no reasons are required to be recorded while granting consent. This exactly was the submission, no doubt, of L. A. Shri Shelat that it is only an administrative function and therefore according to L. A. Shri Shelat, no reasons are required to be recorded while granting consent. In this connection he had referred to the decisions reported in 1989 (2) FAC 269 and 1991 (2) Judgment today 285. If there are administrative orders, no reasons are required to be given unless law requires it. It is nobodys case that this is the statutory requirement so far as the consent u/s. 20 (1) of the said Act is concerned. The Court is, therefore, called upon to read into it by interpretation. It being an administrative act, in our opinion, the said exercise of reading into the statute and the requirement of recording reasons in writing will fail. ( 50 ) ). L. A. Shri Yagnik had cited 1990 Criminal law Journal, page 2148 in support of his contention that even principles of natural justice would demand and that the decision by administrative authority should be accompanied by reasons and these reasons must be recorded except in cases where requirement is dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication. However, as we go through the case, this requirement was expressed to be necessary in connection with a petitioner before the Supreme court who was facing punishment under sections 162 and 164 of Army Act, 1950 with army Rules 1954 and other relevant provisions. There also it is observed that finding and sentence by the Court Martial, i. e. the court of first instance should be recorded and its confirmation as well as post confirmation petition to Central government, on the decision thereon either of these authorities, if they are agreed with the finding of the court of first instance, need not record any reasons. It is to be found in para 35 of the judgment that the requirement of recording the reasons should govern the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. ( 51 ) ). Obviously, the act of granting consent u/s. 20 (1) is not a quasi-judicial function. ( 51 ) ). Obviously, the act of granting consent u/s. 20 (1) is not a quasi-judicial function. Moreover, the Court before which as a result of granting of the consent the accused will be facing prosecution can at the instance of the accused certainly, if so required, on its own, examine whether there is application of mind on the part of the consenting authority and whether all the relevant particulars and matters and documents were placed before the consenting authority before he granted his consent. The aforesaid decision, in our opinion, therefore, would not help the respondents. ( 52 ) ). L. A. Shri J. G. Shah had advanced a proposition that for quite some time, the Supreme court had a view that in the field of administrative decisions recording reasons may not be required and that may be confirmed only to the exercise of quasi-judicial function. But later on according to Shri Shah, me Supreme court has veered to the view that even in administrative action the reasons be given. In support of this submission he had cited AIR 1990 sc 1402 - Neelima Mishras case. However, in paragraphs 19 and 22 of the judgment it is to be found that this requirement is contemplated only with regard to the administrative orders that will involve civil consequences and even reference has been made to the very foundation of administrative of justice, namely, audi alteram partem. No doubt, the shift has been made in keeping with a broader notion of fairness or fair procedure in the administraitve action as noted in para 23 of the judgment. ( 53 ) ). Comparing this idea with the situation available with regard to the proposed prosecution u/s. 20 (1) of the said Act, it must become clear that there is no civil consequences whatsoever involved. On the contrary, the general rule as to the criminal jurisprudence that any one can set criminal law into motion has been restricted with a view to grant protection to the traders so that they are not unnecessarily harassed and therefore, except for a safeguard having been provided in the form an authority having been appointed for giving consent, if either the State government or the Central Government or the authorities designated in that regard are themselves not to be the complainant till the prosecution is launched obviously the accused will have no say in the matter. There is, therefore, no question of hearing him. Obviously there is no lis between the proposed complainant on the one hand and the accused on the other till the prosecution is launched, i. e. the complaint is filed. The whole exercise is at the decision making stage only confined within the office of the Food Inspector and the consenting authority and will, therefore, be purely an administrative action. We, therefore, do not agree with the submission of L. A. Shri Shah. ( 54 ) ). As back as in the year 1954, the Supreme court has laid down in case of Madanmohan- singh v. State of U. P, and others reported in AIR 1954 SC 637 that the prosecution can prove the consent itself and the fact of it being granted in the course of the trial. This would necessarily, therefore, mean proving consent if its legality and validity is challenged. Evidence in that regard can be adduced by the prosecution and after considering the same the Court conducting the trial can come to the conclusion on the point of its legality and validity. Similarly, here also as and when the consent is challenged of any of the aforesaid counts, the prosecution can lead evidence on the same line and the Court conducting the trial can deal with the case in the manner. The case before the Supreme Court was under Prevention of Corruption Act where a sanction was involved and its legality and validity was required to be proved and the practice adopted in that regard, namely, examination of the Personal assistant of the Sanctioning Authority, signature of the draft put by the Sanctioning Authority below the word approved and on that basis the sanction having been granted was held to be valid. This would clearly indicate that what has gone into granting of sanction can be shown to the court to satisfy its conscience about its legality and validity and in keeping with the said 1961 s. C. decision in Parshottams case, application of mind and placement of all relevant particulars and materials can be also proved so that the challenge as to the consent can be appreciated by the court and considered in that light. In that view of the matters, it is quite obvious that there will be no need to record the reasons for granting of consent in writing. ( 55 ) ). In that view of the matters, it is quite obvious that there will be no need to record the reasons for granting of consent in writing. ( 55 ) ). In case of State of Bihar v. Shri P. S. Sharma and Anr. reported in Judgment Today 1991 (2)S. C. , p. 147 the prosecution was launched against a public servant where previous sanction u/s. 197 of Cr. P. C. was called for. Dealing with this aspect at paragraph 68, p. 179 it has been categorically held that order of sanction is only an Administrative Act and not a quasi-judicial act nor a lis involved. Therefore, the order of sanction need not contain a detailed reasons in support thereof as was contended on behalf of the accused in that case. ( 56 ) ). The discussion so far in our opinion, will bring us back to the decision given by the learned single Judge, Justice Bhairavia, as also decision of the learned single Judge, Justice J. D. Dave. Justice Bhairavia in Prajapatis case has relied on Cehininaths case, the Bombay decision referred to earlier - 1988 Cr. L. J. 48. In that decision in paragraph 7, at page 51, a reference to said Parshottam Kanaiyalals case has been made followed by A. K. Roys case (supra ). The learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court thereafter has come to a conclusion that the latest law laid down by the Supreme Court is to the effect that the sanctioning authority is not only to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case to be satisfied that a prima facie case existed, but also to record reasons as to why launching a prosecution against an offender is necessary in the public interest. 49 and 50 he had granted consent to prosecute shri Cehininath. He had referred to the requirement of prosecution and recorded his satisfaction as to it being a fit case and has also taken a note of the fact that food article under reference was examined by the public analyst and his report was also referred to by number and dale and was lacking according to the learned Judge whether reference to said A. K. Roys case was launching of prosecution was not stated by him to be necessary in the public interest. ( 57 ) ). ( 57 ) ). The Bombay High Court Nagpur Bench has dealt with S. D. Ragdev - Food Inspectors case as Criminal Appeal No. 16/86 and it is a division Bench judgment reported in 1989 (2) ac 269. Before the said D. B. A. K. Roys case was cited and they had expression (sic) their opinion clearly to the effect that the court in A. K. Roys case was not dealing with the validity of the consent and therefore observations will have to be made only in the context in which they are made as such, the context was found to be the validity of sub-delegation of powers u/s. 20 (1 ). The Division Bench was, therefore, of the view that the observations about recording reasons should be read in context of administrability or otherwose of application of mind to the facts and nothing more. In the case before the said learned judges of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High court, it was urged that in the consent order, the type of adulteration is not mentioned and hence non-application of mind should be inferred. They had declined to do. With reference to Exh. 25, the public analysts report, clear-cut fact of adulteration was found and no doubt the report of the public analyst was placed before the consenting authority along with other material document. ( 58 ) ). Now, if we are to express ourselves on he question of consent being granted in public interest as observed in A. K. Roys case, we are of the opinion that the very finding of adulteration of food article would call for intervention on the part of the concerned authorities and that by itself would be in public interest. We are further of the view that the very object of the enactment as disclosed by its title "prevention of Food Adulteration" would indicate as much and if any action is contemplated in violation of any of the provisions of the enactment, Rules and the standard prescribed thereunder, it would obviously be in public interest. The need for an enactment like the said Act in our view is self-evidence and automatic. The need for an enactment like the said Act in our view is self-evidence and automatic. In a poor country like ours, where starvation is if not a Rule, nutritional deficiency is certainly is, if wholesome food articles are not assured to the consumers, i. e. people at large obviously the State will be failing in its duty and the enactment therefore, is obviously in public interest and as such its enforcement will certainly be only that whenever decision in that line is taken, in our opinion, it will be in public interest. ( 59 ) ). All told, therefore, the learned single judges decision in Gehininaihs case of the bombay High Court followed by the learned single Judge Shri Bahiravia in Prajapatis case when viewed in the background of the position that emanates after discussion the A. K. Roys case, in our opinion, can be of no avail to the respondents. The same will be the position with regard to the judgment given in Surat Municipalitys case by the learned Single Judge Shri S. D. Dave on 9-4-1991. ( 60 ) ). So far as the questions that have been referred to us are concerned, our answers would be: (1) In the negative ; (2) None. . ( 61 ) ). In our opinion, if the reasons are not recorded, there will be no adverse effect to the consent given by the concerned authority. .