Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. These two appeals under Sec.54 of the Land Acquisition act were heard together with the consent of the parties and are being disposed of by this common judgment. These appeals have arisen out of Reference Case Nos.4 and JO of the year 1983 made under Sec.18 of the Land Acquisition Act. 2. Admittedly in the said reference cases, the appellants were not the parties, But these appeals have been preferred by them allegedly as being persons adversely affected by the judgment dated 7-9-1987 and the award dated 17-9-1987 on the ground that it has to pay the amount of enhanced compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Judge in the aforementioned two reference cases. 3. The appellants in the memo of appeal and or by way of a separate application had not brought on records the relevant and material facts for the purposf of determining as to how it is entitled to maintain the same, It. however, filed an application under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act and the learned counsel for the parties have made their submissions on the basis of the materials brought on record in the matter of condonation of delay. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in reply to the application filed on behalf of the appellant under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, the question of maintainability of the appeals was raised. By an order dated 21-3-1991 while allowing the application for condonation of delay, it was made clear that the court did not apply its mind to the question of maintainability of the appeal. 5. When the hearing of the appeals were taken up, Mr. N, N. Tiwary learned counsel for the appellants again raised the question of maintainability of the appeal and the said question has been allowed to be raised as a preliminary point. 6. The basic facts involved in these appeals are admitted, A notification dated 16-3-1980 was issued by the State of Bihar under Sec.4 of the Land acquisitiou Act, 1894 for acquisition of the land in-question for a public purpose, namely, for expension of Cuastic Soda Factory at the Government cost. Thereafter, a declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 16-8-1980. 7. Thereafter, a declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 16-8-1980. 7. According to the respondents, not only the acquisition was made for public purpose and at the expenses of the state, the requisition therefor was made by the Industries Department of the Government of Bihar. The amount of compensation was sanctioned by the State of Bihar and the delivery of possession was also obtained by the authorities of the State of Bihar. 8. It appears that notice under Sec.12 of the Land Acquisition Act was served upon the respondents on 18-11-1982. The respondents have further contended that an ante-dated instrument of lease dated 17-2-1985 was executed in the year 1987, whereby and where under the lands in-question were transfened in favour of the respondents. 9. The respondents have also filed a supplementary counter affidavit on 27-4-1991 and a reply thereto has been filed on behalf of the appellant on 7-5-1991. In the said supplementary affidavit, it has been contended that the acquisition was not made for the company at its costs nor any agreement was entered into by and between the appellant and the State Government before the publication of the preliminary notification under Sec.4 of the Act. It was further submitted that the agreement enteied to by the parties subsequent to the notification under Sec.4 of the agreement will be contrary to the provisions of Sec.39 thereof. 10. It was further submitted that even the purported deed of lease dated 17-7-1985 (Annexure-c) executed by the State of Bihar in favour of the appellant company had not been filed before the Land Acquisition Officer. It was further submitted that the Government itself is the major share-holder of the appellant company having 51% share therein. 11. The appeliant however, in its rejoinder to the said supplementary counter affidavit stated that it was formed and incorporated under the Indian companies Act, in terms of an agreement dated 12-6-1976 entered by and between the Bihar State Industrial Development Corporation and three other companies. Allegedly Bihar State Industrial Development Corporation being a promoter had agreed to land its good office for the purpose of acquisition of land for the appellant from the State Government. 12. It was further stated that the Managing Director of the appellant company sent a latter dated 22-11-1977 (Annexure-4) to the Deputy commissioner, Daltonganj. Allegedly Bihar State Industrial Development Corporation being a promoter had agreed to land its good office for the purpose of acquisition of land for the appellant from the State Government. 12. It was further stated that the Managing Director of the appellant company sent a latter dated 22-11-1977 (Annexure-4) to the Deputy commissioner, Daltonganj. The same, however, does not appear to be in the prescribed form The Additional Collector, Palamau, however, by reason of his letter dated 20th December, 1977 (Annexure-5) requested it to take steps for filing requisition through tho Industries Department which evidently means the Industries Department of the State of Bihar. The Managing Director of the appellant, thereafter, by a letter dated 15-12-1977 requested the Bihar State Industrial Development Corporation to initiate the acquisition proceeding through Industries Department. The said letter is contained in Annexure-6. 13. Allegedly, the Director, Industries, requested the Managing director of the Company by letter dated 15-3-1982 to make a sum of Rs.678447.92 paiss available for the purpose of acquisition of the same. Allegedly, the possession of the acquired lands were delivered to the appellant company on 5-3-1983. 14. Mr. N. K. Prasad learned counsel appearing for the appellant, therefore, submitted that these appeals are maintainable in view of the fact that the appellant-company is the person interested in the matter of acquisition of the lands belonging to the respondents and, particularly, in view of the fact that it has to pay the enhanced Compensation as per the impugned awards. Learned Counsel in this connection has relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. V/s. Francis Victor Cotinho reported, in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1118; in Abdul Hussain Tayabali V/s. State of Gujarat and others reported in AIR 1968 SC 432 ; in The General government Servants Co-operative reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 866 and a Full Bench decision of this Court in Amar Singh Yadav and another V/s. Shanti Den and others reported in AIR 1987 Patna 191. 15. Learned counsel has further subnlitted that the appellant company should have been given rotice in terms of Sec.20 (b) of the Land acquisition Act as it is also a persons interested in the subject matter of the Land acquisition case. 16. 15. Learned counsel has further subnlitted that the appellant company should have been given rotice in terms of Sec.20 (b) of the Land acquisition Act as it is also a persons interested in the subject matter of the Land acquisition case. 16. For acquiring the land of the citizens of India under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, exhaustive provisions have been Lald down therein and/or rules framed thereunder, Prior to the amendment in the Land acquisition Act by reason of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, lands could be acquired for a company, although may be for a public purpose. However, when lands were to be acquired for and on behalf of the company, not only the entire expenses have to be borne by it, but the provisions contained in Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have to be followed. Whenever such a procedure was required to he adopted, provisions of the land Acquisition Companies Rules, 1963 (in short to be called and referred to for the sake of brevity as the said Rule) must also be complied with. 17. It stands admitted that the requirements of the law as Lald down in part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and/or the said Rules were not complied with. The appellants are also bound by their own conduct. It now stands admitted from the facts as stated hereinbefore that the requisition for acquisition of the lands in-question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition act was made by the Industries Department of the State of Bihar. The notification under Sec.4 of the Act as also the declaration under Section 6 specifically refer that the acquisition in question was being made for public purpose. In the said notification a it was further stated that the said acquisition was to be made at the costs of the Government. The appellant have also not denied the contention raised on behalf of the respondents to the effect that the amount of compensation was sanctioned by the State of bihar ; amount of award by the Collector was deposited by the State of bihar and the delivery of possession was effected by the Sfae of Bihar and the delivery of possession was effected by the State of Bihar, The entire land acquisition proceeding, therefore was completed on or about 23-2-1983. As noticed hereinbefore, notice of award in forms of Sec.12 of the Land acquisition Act was issued on 18-11-1982. Thus, the entire land acquisition proceeding were completed during the perod 1980-83 The Reference was made in the year 1983 and the same was entertained by the learned Land acquisition Judge on 9-2-1983. Sec.19 of the Land Acquisition Act provides as to the statements which are required to be sent by the Collector. Only in that statement the Collector inter alia, was required to mention as to who are the persons interested in the Reference. 18. Notices are to be issued by the Court in terms of Sec.20 of the said Act only to the persons mentioned therein unless on the basis of any other materials brought on record by way of an application under Order I rule 10 sub-rule (2) of the Code of civil Procedure or otherwise that apart from the persons mentioned therein, other persons may also be found to be interested in the subject matter of the Reference in which case only, the notices are required to be issued to such persons. The Land Acquisition Judge issued notices to all persons in the year 1983. 19. Admittedly, the purported deed of lease was executed by the State of Bihar in favour of the Appellant-company on 17-7-1985 The appellant is required to pay the compensation only in terms of this subsequent arrangement and not by reason of an agreement which was required to be entered into in terms of Sec.41 of the Land Acquisition Act road with Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules. Thus it is evident that admittedly no docuoient whatsoever has been brought on record to show that either at the time of the making of the Reference or during the pendency of the (Reference case and or at the time of making an award, it was brought to the notice of the court that the appellant was interested in the subject matter of the reference. 20. There cannot be any doubt that before an acquisition can be made for the company, the provisions of part VII of the Land Acquisition Act as also the provisions of the Land Acquisition Companies Rules, have got to be complied with. 21. In Abdul Husain V/s. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1968 SC 432 upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. 21. In Abdul Husain V/s. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1968 SC 432 upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. N. K. Prasad, it has merely been held that an enquiry in terms of Rule 4 may also be held before a notification under Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act It was held :- "the inquiry, the report to be made consequent upon such inquiry, obtaining the opinion of the Land Acquisition Committee, all these are intended to enable the Government to come to a tentative conclusion that the land in-question are or are likely to be needed for a public purpose and to issue thereafter-Section 4 notification. In our view, no objection to the appointment of master to perform the functions of the Collector under Section 3 (c) or to his competence to make the inquiry and the report under Rule 4 or their legality can be validly made. It follows that the consent given by the State Government for initiating acquisition proceedings was validly given and was in compliance with the provisions of Part VII of the Act and the State Government could validly issue the impugned notifications. 22. Evidently such is not the position here. Admittedly provisions of act as also Land Acquisition Companies rules were not complied with at all. 23. In Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v Francis Victor Coutinho reported in AIR 1980 SC 1118 it was held as follows :- "it seems to us that the definition of a persons interestssd given in section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed rued so as to embraco all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the land there actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stand transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the Company and the Government. Thus it cannot be said that the company no clalm or title to the land at all. Secondly since under the agreement the Company bad to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this purpose. Secondly since under the agreement the Company bad to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this purpose. the Company could undoubtedly appear and adduced evidence on the question of the quantum of compensation. " (Italics is mine) 24. In this case, it is evident from the records that the appellant was nowhere in picture on records of the case before the deed of lease was executed in its favour by the State of Bihar in the year 1985. In Himalayan Tiles case in-question. In the notifications also, the purpose of the acquisition was specifically mentioned as which the lands were needed, use for Himalayan tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. REspondernt No.1 whose lands were sought to be acquired filed writ petition for quashing the entire land were acquisition proceeding. The said writ petition was allowed and a letters patent appeal was preferred by the aformentioned Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. which was dismissed on the ground that it was not the person interested within the meaning of Sec.18 (1) of the Act. In the facts of that case, as noticed hereinbefore, as the acquisition was made for the company it was held that the appellant was a person interested within the meaning of provisions of the said Act. 25. In the General Servants Co-operative Housing Society ltd. V/s. Wahab Uddin and others reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 866, the Supreme Court held that if Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition Companies rules is not followed, the notification under Sec.6 would be invalid. It was, however, further held in the facts of that case that as the respondent thereof claimed right, title and interest in respect of the lands in-question having purchased in auction sale by Goverment under Displaced persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act by depositing the entire sale consideration, he would be the person interested in the matter. 26. In Amar Singh Yadav and another V/s. Shanti Devi and others, reported in AIR 1987 Patna 191, a Full Bench of this Court noticed the difference in the views of the Supreme Court in tie Himalayan Tiles (supra) and in Municipal corporation of the State of Ahmedabad V/s. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel (1970) 1 SCWR 183. 26. In Amar Singh Yadav and another V/s. Shanti Devi and others, reported in AIR 1987 Patna 191, a Full Bench of this Court noticed the difference in the views of the Supreme Court in tie Himalayan Tiles (supra) and in Municipal corporation of the State of Ahmedabad V/s. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel (1970) 1 SCWR 183. However, in that case, the Full Banch formulated the following two questions :- "1. Where there is a direct conflict betwixt two decision of the supreme Court, rendered by equal Benches, which of them should be followed by the High Court and the Court below ? 2. Whether a person, who was not before the Land Acquisition officer, can maintain an application for being impleaded as a party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil P. C. in the reference proceedings before the District Judge under Sec.18 of the land Acquisition Act ?" 27. Ordinarily a person who was not before the Land Acquisition officer cannot subsequently maintain an application for being impleaded as a party under Order 1, Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure in the proceedings before the District Judge under Sec.18 of the Land Acquisition act. This Court held :- "it seems some what patent that entertaining and allowing persons who were not before the Collector to become parties to the proceeding before the District, Judge would run counter to the letter and spirit of the statute and is bound to enlarge the area and bring in issues which would be extraneous in what had been earlier considered by the Collector. Doing so wound be deviating from the very nature of the special jurisdiction, and would, thus, be opening a pandoras box of ills on which later the lid cannot be pressed down. " This Court further held after taking into consideration various that decisions :- "in fairness to Mr. Verma, one must also notice his reliance on the full Bench judgment in Indo Swiss Time Limited, Dundahera V/s. Umrao, AIR 1981 Punj and Hary 213. However, that can hardly be of any meaningful ronsequence to him. On that issue it has already been held in his favour that on a liberal construction the petitioners might well be within the ambit of being a person interested. However, that can hardly be of any meaningful ronsequence to him. On that issue it has already been held in his favour that on a liberal construction the petitioners might well be within the ambit of being a person interested. However, in view of the very special nature of the jurisdiction herein, there is no entitlement for every interested person to being impleaded as a party in the reference proceedings. Under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code, even in face of the crucial fact that such a person was never before the Collector in the acquisition proceeding. In view of this it becomes somewhat unnecessary to consider and adjudicate on the extreme abstract a position, whether Order 1, Rule 10 is not applicable at all to the proceedings under Sec.18 of the Act. Even on the assumption that Order 1, Rule 10 may be attracted, the application for impleading has to be considered in the tight constrains of Sections 18, 19 and 21. It may be well said that of the two extremes one that Order 1, Rule 10 is totally barred and the other one that the same is attracted herein, as if in every ordinary civil suit, the golden mean is that even though Order 1, Rule 10 may not be barred, yet, its application has to be narrowly confined in special and so restricted jurisdiction. " 28. This decision, therefore, goes against the contention of tha appeallant inasmuch as if tha appellant-comyany not being a party in the Reference would not have been in a position to got itself itnpleaded as a party in the reference case isself in terms of Order I, Rule 10 r. P. C. , evidently the appeal shall not lie at his instance. 29. In Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya V/s. Municipal Committee and others, reported in AIR 1988 SC 2137 , the Supreme Court have taking into consideration himalayan Tiles case (supra) and distinguishing the same decided an almost identical case. There also the acquisition was made by a Municipal Committee and subsequently some portions of the land were sold to Hindu Kan a maha Vidyalaya and Sanatan Dharam High School, The agreement provided that in he event of compensation being enhanced the appellant shall ha liable to pay the same to the Municipal Committee. There also the acquisition was made by a Municipal Committee and subsequently some portions of the land were sold to Hindu Kan a maha Vidyalaya and Sanatan Dharam High School, The agreement provided that in he event of compensation being enhanced the appellant shall ha liable to pay the same to the Municipal Committee. A reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was made and the compensation was directed to be enhanced. It was held that the subsequent transferees are not persons interested within the meaning of Sec.3 (b) of the Act. It was held : - "indisputably the law in dispute was not acquired for the purpose of appellants instead the land was acquired for the Municipal Committees for the purpose cf developing its Scheme No.5. After the declaration of Award, Municipal Committee took possession of the land and thereafter transferred a portion of the same to the appellants under an agreement. In these circumstances, the ratio Lald down by this Court in Himalayan Tiles Marbles (P)Ltd V/s. Francis Victor Continho, (dead) by LRs. (1980) 3 SCR 233 : air 1980 SC 1118 , does not apply as the appellants are not interested persons and they have no right to question the award. " 30. In a recent decision reported in AIR 1991 Madras 20 (The Tamil nadu State Housing Board V/s. Sangama Nadar and others, a earned Single judge followed the aforementioned decision, AIR 1988 SC 2139 , and other decisions. It was held that the petitioner could not clalm itself to be implea-ded as party on the ground that the land had been acquired for the purpose of the petitioner. 31. A person comes within the definition of person interested and, thus, a person aggrieved, for the purpose of maintaining an appeal against an award only when the acquisition is made at its instance after fallowing the procedure Lald down in Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and the provision of the Land Acquisition Companies Rules. 31. A person comes within the definition of person interested and, thus, a person aggrieved, for the purpose of maintaining an appeal against an award only when the acquisition is made at its instance after fallowing the procedure Lald down in Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and the provision of the Land Acquisition Companies Rules. On this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the requisition was made by the Industries Department of the State of bihar ; the notifications were issued under Sec.4 and 6 of the Act stating therein that the land in question were being acquired for the public purpose at the cost of the Government; the amount was sanctioned by the State ; the delivery of possession was given to the State and even in the reference mads under Sec.18 of the Land, Acquisition Act, the collector did not even mention that the appellant company was person interested in the subject matter of the reference. 32. The appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, was not in the picture at all till the lands in question were transferred in its favour by reason of a registered deed of lease dated 17-7-1985. Despite the fact that the company had the knowledge of the land acquisition proceedings, it never even made any attempt to implead itself as a party to the reference. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it must ba held that as it was not a person interested, the Land Acquisition Judge was not obliged to send any notice to the appellants as contemplated under Sec.20 (b) of the Act. 33. In Neelaganga Bai and another V/s. State of Karnataka and others, reported in 1990 (2) PLJR 69 (SC), it was held that Sec.20 (b) will have application only in a case where the land was required for the purpose of respondent corporation and the burden of payment of the compensation was on the Corporation. 34. As noticed hereinbefore, in the instant case, the land was not acquired for the appellant-company, but the State subsequently transferred the same in its father. 35. It may be mentioned that in the event it is held that the land was acquired for the company without complying with the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act as also Land Acquisition Companies Rules, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, was mentioned hereinbefore, the acquisition itself would be illegal. 35. It may be mentioned that in the event it is held that the land was acquired for the company without complying with the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act as also Land Acquisition Companies Rules, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, was mentioned hereinbefore, the acquisition itself would be illegal. 36. In Abraham Mathai V/s. Sub. Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) and others, reported in (1990)4 Supreme Court Cases 136 the Supreme Court was considering Rules 5 (b) and (c) of the Karala Land Acquisition Rules, 1963 which provide that notice of the objection should be serve d upon the object or as well as to the departmertal officer requiring the land. In the case it was held :- "rule 3 (b) is mandatory and non-service of the notice on the government department at whose instance the requisition for acquisition was initiated, the notification under Sec.6 becomes bad and as such the same was quashed This decision is not applicable to the instant case for the simple reason that the requisition was not made at the instance of the government department but at the instance of the Manager, Private School and the Education department merely has given a note certifying that the purpose of the requisition is a public purpose and that the school agreed to bear the entire cost" 37. Although this decision is a converse case, but is an authority for the proposition that notices apt required to be served only upon the persons who had sent requisition for acquiring the lands and not upon the person who had legally nothing to do with it. In this case, as indicated hereinbefore although the requisition was purported to have been sent by the Managing director of the appellant company, the same was not acted upon and in its place, the Industries Department of the State of Bihar sent a requisition. All along in the acquisition proceeding, State c f Bihar took active part and the appellant was not at all in the picture. Even it some sort of arrangement was entered into by and between the State of Bihar and the appellant-company who had nothing to do with the land acquisition proceeding, thereby the appellant itself does not become rerson interested within the meaning of Sec.3 (b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 38. Even it some sort of arrangement was entered into by and between the State of Bihar and the appellant-company who had nothing to do with the land acquisition proceeding, thereby the appellant itself does not become rerson interested within the meaning of Sec.3 (b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 38. Section 20 (o) of the Act comas into picture only when the land was not acquired by the State but for other person which in turn means upon compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act. 39. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, it must be held that the appellants are not persons interested within the meaning of the aforementioned provision and, thus, these appeals are not maintainable. In the result, those appeals are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.