PANDYA, J. ( 1 ) THE original complainant of Criminal Case No. 894 of 1989 of the Court of J. M. F. C. , Mirzapur has filed the present Revision Application against an order below Exh. 14 of the said Criminal Case. Initially, the complaint came to be dealt with by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate of Magistrate court, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad, Rural District who was pleased to take cognizance on 7-7-1989, the date of the filing of the complaint and was pleased to order that process be issued for offence under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act ). ( 2 ) THE matter thereafter, came to be transferred to the said Court of j. M. F. C. and to be precise the 4th Court and the application Exh. 14 came to be given by the respondents-accused of the said Criminal Case on 6-1-1990. The learned Magistrate heard the parties and by his order dated 31-1-1990 allowed the application and acquitted the accused. Now, we are not concerned whether he could have acquitted the accused under Sec. 203 of Cr. P. C. or what order should have he passed at the end of hearing of the said application if at all he was inclined to accept * praying to quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 31-1-1990 passed by Judicial magistrate, First Class Ahmedabad in Criminal Case No. 894 of 1989. (Only a part of the judgment approved for reporting is published.) the contentions of the accused. We are concentrating entirely on the question on the basis of various dates given in the complaint, was it possible for the learned Magistrate to hold that the complaint is time-barred ? My answer is in the negative. ( 3 ) THE cheques were issued on different dates and they were all post-dated. Each cheque was for Rs. 10,000. 00. They were 5 in number, but only 4 are disclosed in the complaint. As per the details given in the complaint paper book page 15, two cheques were issued on 30-4-1989 and 2 were dated 3-5-1989. The cheques were lodged with the complainants Bank for being realised and they returned dishonoured on 17-5-1989. The complainant, therefore, issued a notice dated 29-5-1989 which came to be refused on 12-6-1989. This was followed by filing of a complaint on 7-7-1989. The cheques were lodged with the complainants Bank for being realised and they returned dishonoured on 17-5-1989. The complainant, therefore, issued a notice dated 29-5-1989 which came to be refused on 12-6-1989. This was followed by filing of a complaint on 7-7-1989. The said Act came to be amended in the year 1988 and Chapter 17 has been added whereby a new offence came to be created pertaining to dishonour of cheques for insufficient funds etc. For this purpose, we have to refer to the said newly added Chapter in the said Act. The offence as spelt out in Sec. 138 has been subjected to certain provisos thereof and the said in provisos are required to be quoted extensively. They are quoted hereunder :" (A) the cheque has been presented to the Bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the Bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the may be to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation :- For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability". Now, when we read the aforesaid 3 provisos, it becomes clear that the payee or a holder in due course of the cheque is required to present the cheque within six months from the date of its issuance or within a period of its validity whichever is earlier. On this count, in the instant case, there is no doubt whatsoever. Second proviso is to the effect that within days of receipt of information by the payee or the holder in due course regarding the return of cheque unpaid he should make a demand by giving a notice in writing. This also in the instant case, has been done within the said period of 15 days. Second proviso is to the effect that within days of receipt of information by the payee or the holder in due course regarding the return of cheque unpaid he should make a demand by giving a notice in writing. This also in the instant case, has been done within the said period of 15 days. The last proviso gives a sort of reprieve to the defaulter in the sense that over and above the said period mentioned in the said Act with regard to negotiable instrument there is also a period of 15 days provided on his receiving the notice. In the instant case, according to the complainant, notice came to be refused on 12-6-1989 and with regard to this fact, namely, instead of actually physically receiving the notice there being a refusal relied on by the complainant, a contention has been raised on behalf of the accused which would be dealt with if necessary at a later stage. ( 4 ) NOW, when we go to Sec. 142 of the said Act where the cognizance itself has been prevented to be taken by the competent Court as per cl. (b) thereof and it reads as under :"clause (b) : Such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Sec. 138. " ( 5 ) NOW, in view of the aforesaid factual background, the period of one month mentioned in cl. (b) noted above would certainly start from the date of refusal i. e. , 12-6-1989 and the complaint having been filed on 7-7-1989, clearly it is within time and there is no question whatsoever of it being time-barred. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, the learned Magistrate seems to have taken the view that within 15 days of the return of the cheque and probably that would be logically the position after issuing the notice, without waiting for its result, complaint would have been filed. This view of the learned Magistrate is just not tenable in view of the clear unambiguous language of the concerned statute. This view of the learned Magistrate is just not tenable in view of the clear unambiguous language of the concerned statute. ( 7 ) WHEN we turn to the reasoning given by the learned Magistrate, we find in part 4 at page 21 of the paper book that somehow or the other he has insisted upon the requirement of filing the complaint within 15 days of the date of issuing the notice and that is how he has specified 29-5- 1989 on which date according to the complainant, the notice was issued and 15 days thereafter, according to him, the complaint should have been filed. But when we read the aforesaid paragraph, we find that he has specified the date by which the complaint should have been filed to be 17-5-1989, which is even, according to his own reasoning, 10 days prior to the issuance of notice which is totally incorrect and wholly untenable. It may be that instead of 17-5-1989 what he means is 27-5-1989 which should be the position if we reckon 15 days from 12-6-1989, the date on which, according to the complainant, the notices were refused. ( 8 ) PRIOR thereto, he has also referred to the actual receipt of notice because he has referred to cl. (c) of Sec. 138 proviso and has thereafter expressed himself to the effect that 15 days are provided therein after the accused receives the notice. But he has further noted that when no such notices have been received, there could not be any question of counting this period of 15 days. Confining ourselves to the aforesaid reasoning of the learned Magistrate it is quite clear that there is no reason whatsoever for him to express himself in this manner because cl. (b) of Sec. 142 refers by incorporation to cl. (c) of Sec. 138 and when we refer to the said cl. (c) of Sec. 138 proviso, 15 days period is given by way of grace to the drawer to honour his commitment as per the cheque. (b) of Sec. 142 refers by incorporation to cl. (c) of Sec. 138 and when we refer to the said cl. (c) of Sec. 138 proviso, 15 days period is given by way of grace to the drawer to honour his commitment as per the cheque. If we are to agree with the learned Magistrate, it would mean that no complaint ever could be filed, because on the one hand the holder of the cheque or the payee thereof has to wait till the end of 15th day that is the statutory grace period available to the drawer of the cheque to honour his commitment and on the other hand he would be precluded from filing the complaint and hit by period limitation under cl. (b) of Sec. 142 as interpreted by the learned Magistrate. This could never be the intent of the Legislature and it is not. ( 9 ) IT is quite clear that one months period referred to in cl. (b) of sec. 142 shall be reckoned only from the end of 15th day as provided in cl. (c) if at all the complainant has issued the notice. Now, if he does not issue any notice, there cannot be any cause of action and therefore, the issuance of notice is a must, which in the instant case has been complied with. (Rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.) .