Judgment :- 1. We regret that we cannot accept the contentions of the appellant as we find no error committed by Bakthavatsalam, J., in coming to the conclusion that a writ will not lie against the respondents herein for the redressal of his grievances. We may here, before referring to the facts of this case, pick up the thread from a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of The Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd., Mayiladuthurai v. The Registrar of Chits, Pondicherry 2, in which this Court has held as follows: “The Hon‘ble the Chief Justice has the inherent power to allocate the Judicial business of the High Court including who of the Judges should sit alone and who should constitute the Bench of two or more Judges. No litigant shall, upon such constitution of a Bench or allotment of a case to a particular Judge of the Court will have a right to question the jurisdiction of the Judges or the Judge hearing the case. No person can claim as a matter of right that his petition be heard ‘ by a single Judge or a Division Bench or a Particular single Judge or a particular Divisional Bench. No Judge or a Bench of Judges will assume Jurisdiction unless the case is allotted to him or them under the orders of the Honble the Chief Justice.” The Full Bench has come to the said conclusion after tracing the source of powers of the Chief Justice in the Court including the Judges sitting alone or constituting a Bench. 2. The question herein however is who then a counsel, who developed some sort of reservation and feels that he has not been receiving justice in his case at the hands of a particular Judge or a Bench of Judges, can ask for transfer of his case to another Judge or a Bench of Judges of the Court or not? Our answer to this is a more firm “no” than in the case of a litigant who may have in some circumstances, good reasons to say that his case should not be heard by a particular Judge or a Bench of Judges. Our answer to this is a more firm “no” than in the case of a litigant who may have in some circumstances, good reasons to say that his case should not be heard by a particular Judge or a Bench of Judges. Bakthavatsalam, J. has elaborately dealt with the various principles and since we are of the opinion that the writ petition is not maintainable and hence the appeal is also not maintainable, we do not think it necessary to deal with every aspect of the matter. We however take notice of the events giving rise to this appeal and trace the happenings chronologically. We think, we would he able to pinpoint the issue. 3. The appellant herein, who is an Advocate of this Court, filed a batch of writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 2128 to 2131 of 1990 on behalf of five individuals against the Steel Authority of India. These writ petitions were allowed by S. Ramalingam, by a common order dated 17.4.1990. The Steel Authority of India preferred writ appeals, which were eventually listed for admission before a Bench consisting of the second and third respondents herein. The appellants clients, it is said, had entered caveat through the appellant. According to the appellant, the Bench admitted the said appeals in W.A. Nos. 601 to 604 of 1990 on 25.6.1990 without hearing him (the caveators’ Advocate) and without permitting him to make any submission but granted two weeks time to file counter affidavit in the miscellaneous petitions. Caveators filed counter-affidavit on 9.7.1990. The appellant then requested the Bench to hear him and dismiss the miscellaneous petitions. Ignoring the version of the appellant about what transpired in the course of the bearing of the miscellaneous petitions, we have before us, the order passed by the Bench in which it is stated, “We heard both the sides. The common order of the learned single Judge, has worked out the financial burden to be cast on the appellants. The solvency of the Appellants is not certainly in issue. The financial burden would always be discharged towards the respondents if ultimately the verdict in the writ appeals should be in favour of the respondents. If the contrary position is to be countenanced, that may bring in other aspects of controversy. Hence, we grant stay as prayed for, in these applications. The financial burden would always be discharged towards the respondents if ultimately the verdict in the writ appeals should be in favour of the respondents. If the contrary position is to be countenanced, that may bring in other aspects of controversy. Hence, we grant stay as prayed for, in these applications. At the same time, we are conscious that the controversy in the writ appeals must be settled at the eariest point of time. Considering the burden of this Court in disposing of writ appeals we find that we could give the date of the earliest only after Dasara Holidays. Accordingly, while granting stay, as prayed for, in these applications, we direct the writ appeals themselves to be posted for final hearing on Wednesday, the 3rd October 1990 at the top of the list, subject to part heards.” 4. Not satisfied with this order, the caveator/respondents in the writ appeals, preferred further miscellaneous petitions, being C.M.P. Nos. 9466 to 9468 of 1990 praying for proponing the date of hearing of the writ appeals. They also filed another set of miscellaneous petitions, being C.M.P. Nos. 8172 to 8175 of 1990 seeking the hearing of the writ appeals by any other Division Bench of the Court. All the above C.M.Ps. were however placed before the same Bench consisting of second and third respondents herein. Once again, if we ignore the allegations made by the appellant, the Bench gave indulgence in C.M.P. Nos. 9466 to 9468 of 1990 by agreeing and accordingly proponing the date of hearing and fixing 23.7.1990 for the appeals to be listed subject the part-heards at the top of the list. The Bench however passed no orders in C.M.P. No. 8172 to 8175 of 1990. But according to the appellant, the Bench observed that he would be free to move the matter before any other Bench for final hearing of the writ appeals. The appellant has stated however: “That bemused with the turn of events before the Bench during the last few days, petitioner turned to My Lord the Chief Justice to share his anguish arising out of the present crisis of confidence in the Bench but was either prevented by the respondent No 4 or due to pre-occupation of His Lordship, petitioner could not call on My Lord the Chief justice till 25-7-90. In the meantime, as ill luck would have it, respondent No. 4 having got an inkling of the petitioner having fallen into the bad books of this particular Bench, arranged to list yet another Writ Appeal No. 681 of 1990 posted for admission before the same Bench on 26-7-90 in spite of the petitioner requesting him not to post the matter before this II Bench in question. The appeal was against a part of the order dated 17-7-90 passed by His Lordship Mr. Justice S. Ramalingam in W.P. No. 10265/93 whereby after granting the writ of certiorari. His Lordship had declined to grant the prayer of Mindamus However when the appeal was called, the petitioner humbly but firmly submitted in the Open Court that it was the apprehension of his client that he would not get justice at the hands of the august Bench and as such to delist the appeal and direct the office to place the papers before My Lord the Chief Justice to post; the same for admission before any other Bench But the Bench had already made up its mind to punish the appellant for having engaged the petitioner to be bis counsel. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed in limine on 26-7 90. The judgment of the Bench to say the least is nothing but a carbon copy of the Judgment passed by the Learned Single Judge. In a nutshell the Bench was pleased to dispose of the Appeal without deciding the controversy. By this time, the petitioner had filed one more C.M.P. No. 9728 of 1990 in W.A.No 604 of 1990 lor advancing the date of hearing of the said appeal and hearing the C.M.P Nos. 8172 to 8175 of 1990 afresh by any other Bench on 24-7-1990. When the petitioner could not succeed to meet My Lord the Chief Justice in his Lordships Chamber for 2 days, the petitioner sought to mention on the matter in the Open Court before I Bench on 26-7-90 at 1-30 p.m. But My Lord the Chief Justice respondent No. 1 herein was pleased to direct the petitioner to file a petition in order to enable His Lordship to ascertain as to whether the II Bench had indeed consented to delist the Batch of Writ Appeal Nos. 601 to 604 of 1990 The petitioner was and still is unable to understood about the nature, character and the provision of law under which such a petition could be filed and before whom. Then eventually on 30-7-90 the petitioner again mentioned in the matter before the same II Bench in question seeking its permission to move any other Bench in respect of hearing of the CM.P.No 9728 of 1990 in W.A No. 4604 of 1990 which was indeed granted. The petitioner obtained a motion letter from the Court Officer (Bench Clerk) and handed over the same to the fourth respondent, who had (he proverbial last straw in the turning of the table. When the C.M.P. did not appear in the list on 31-7 90 before any Bench, petitioner contacted the 4th respondent who made him understand that he had ascertained from the Court Officer (Bench Clerk) that the 2nd Bench indeed did not grant such leave to the petitioner to move any other Bench. That on 1-8-90 to mark the disquietening turn to go from bad to worse two more items 1. L.P A.S.R.No 54359 of 1990 L P.A.S.R. No. 55640 of 1990 (ii) C.M.P. No. 9439 of 1990 came up for orders before the same Bench. The petitioner politely but firmly requested the Bench to release the item Nos. 5 and 9 from their Lordship list and direct the office to place the papers before My Lord the Chief Justice to post all the matters in which the petitioner appeared as a counsel or party in person before any other Bench for he bad lost confidence in that Bench. But the Bench was bent upon dispensing with justice. That is how ultimately the axe fell on both of the above items and the petitioner had to meet his Waterloo.” 5. Featuring the events as stated above, the appellant filed W.P.S.R. No. 60735 of 1990 on 7.8.1990. In the words of the appellant: “as expected, the writ petition faced stiff resistance by the Registry of this Honourable Court. The Office raised and reiterated a number of objections at snails speed and refused to number the writ petition for self-serving reasons. Ultimately, the curtain was rung down by His Lordship Mr. In the words of the appellant: “as expected, the writ petition faced stiff resistance by the Registry of this Honourable Court. The Office raised and reiterated a number of objections at snails speed and refused to number the writ petition for self-serving reasons. Ultimately, the curtain was rung down by His Lordship Mr. Justice S. Ramalingam at least for the time being when the learned Judge was pleased to reject the writ petition at a premature stage holding the same to be not maintainable inter alia on the ground that the 3rd respondent (R. 4 herein) is not the prescribed authority against whom the relief prayed for in the writ petition could be granted.” 6. Writ Appeal Nos. 601 to 604 of 1990 which had been admitted by the Bench consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein in which a date had been fixed was finally heard by another Bench of this Court and dismissed by Judgment/order dated 9.10.1990. The appellant first attempted, he has stated, to get back the unnumbered W.P.S.R. No. 60735 of 1990. but when it was not returned as it formed part of the Court records, he decided to file the instant petition 7. A so called brief of the reasons of the appellants exasperation in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition shows that the appellant is one of those who hold the view that a crisis has overtaken the Judiciary and people are losing faith in the credibility of the judicial process. He had in fact in the past filed a petition in W.P.No 167 of 1987 objecting to the procedure in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the High Court for the reason that if Judges were to be appointed on the recommendation of the State Government, they may not be inclined to do full justice to a citizen against the State, which petition was admitted to hearing on 26 11.1987 The said writ petition is still pending disposal. We have carefully picked up the events wherever they touched the judicial conduct of the respondents 2 and 3. Do we find anything that would cause any apprehension in the mind of the appellant that the second and third respondents had developed any disliking for him? We have carefully picked up the events wherever they touched the judicial conduct of the respondents 2 and 3. Do we find anything that would cause any apprehension in the mind of the appellant that the second and third respondents had developed any disliking for him? Why should a counsel feel that a judicial, order was passed in a particular case against the interest of his clients only because Judges were angry with him? An Advocate no doubt gets his appointment and remuneration from his client. But he is an officer of the Court. He presents the case of his client and he assists the Court and thus his duty comes to an end. He does not have to account for the Judgment or order to anybody. It is enough if he discharges his trust fully and faithfully to his client. Judiciary is the last bull-wark of the State. Every tyrant bully or outlaw will be happy if its credibility is spoiled. Courts exist in public interest and have to account for what they do by their opinions expressed in their judgments/orders. A Judge is not unjust until his judgments and orders are unjust. A Judge is not unfair if he delivers judgments and makes orders without fear or favour. If there is some mistake of fact or law in any judgment or order, that cannot show any bias or illwill. The appellant, who himself is a fairly senior Advocate, is not unaware of the glorious past of this Court. Judges today may not be bestowed with the same wisdom as their predecessors were, but to say, without any material, that they have acted with illwill is, if not anything else, unfair. 8. The appellant, according to him, was the Advocate of the Caveators in W.A. Nos. 601 to 604 of 1990. The main and the only grievance of his is that he was not allowed to make any submission before the Bensh concerned passed the order on 25.6.199). This statement cannot be wholly true. If he was not heard and Learned Judges were not conscious of the caveat, they would not have allowed two weeks time to file, counter affidavit in the ‘miscellaneous petition. This statement cannot be wholly true. If he was not heard and Learned Judges were not conscious of the caveat, they would not have allowed two weeks time to file, counter affidavit in the ‘miscellaneous petition. However, when the caveators filed counter affidavit the Bench heard both the sides and while granting stay as prayed for by the appellants in their respective miscellaneous petitions, it directed the writ appeals themselves to be posted for final hearing and fixed a date for that purpose subject to part heard) cases. When later the caveators/respondents applied and sought for proponing the date of hearing of the writ appeals, the Bench allowed that prayer also and the date of hearing was changed as prayed for by the caveators. What was there in the conduct of the Bench that “bemused the appellant that he had such anguish” arising out of the crisis of confidence in the Bench that it took him to the Chief Justice? A caveat is nothing but a formal notice, which literally is not different from a caution. Its origin as a petition to Court is generally traced to the proceedings in the Courts of probate. It is just an intimation given to the Court notifying it that it ought to beware or suspend proceedings before it until the merits of the caveat are determined. It does not create any obligation upon the Court to desist from making any order in the proceeding before it unless the caveat is decided. All that a Court is expected to do on the face of a caveat is to beware and to hear the caveat or before a decision is taken. A caveator does not get a right to defeat the proceedings at the there-shold or to insist that he must be heard on merits of the case before any interim order is passed. The hearing at the stage of the admission of an appeal to the caveator will not take the place of a final hearing of the appeal at the end of the proceeding That is why Courts allow caveators to be heard in opposition to the petition in appeal but not to be heard in opposition to the admission of the appeal to a hearing. This is the rule applied to civil appeals and there is no reason why the same be not applied to writ appeals also. This is the rule applied to civil appeals and there is no reason why the same be not applied to writ appeals also. Appeals filed under S. 96 and 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure are heard in accordance with the procedure in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and notice is issued to the respondents in the appeal only after the hearing under Rule 11 thereof. No hearing before notice is required to be given to the respondents or their Pleader. Whatever little doubt existed as to the scope of a caveat in a suit or proceeding however is given a finality under S. 148-A of the Code of Civil Procedure introduced by Amendment Act 104 of 1976 it states: “(1) Where an application is expected to be made, or has been made, in a suit or proceeding instituted, or about to be instituted, in a Court, any person claiming a right to appear before the Court on the hearing of such application may lodge a caveat in respect thereof. (2) Where a caveat has been lodged under sub-S (1), the person by whom the caveat has been, lodged (hereinafter referred to as the caveator) shall serve a notice of the caveat by registered post, acknowledgment due, on the person by whom the application has been, or is expected to be, made under sub-S.(1). (1) Where, after a caveat has been lodged under sub S.(1), any application is filed in any suit or proceeding, the Court shall serve a notice of the application on the caveator. Where a notice of any caveat has been served on the applicant, he shall forthwith furnish the caveators, at the caveators expense, with a copy of the application made by him and also with copies of any paper or document which has been, or may be, held by him in support of the application. Where a caveat has been lodged under sub-S ([) , such caveat shall not remain in force after the expiry of ninety days from the date on which it was lodged unless the application referred to in sub-S.(1) has been made before the expiry of the said period.” 9. The Learned Judges, who granted time to the caveators to file counter-affidavit in miscellaneous petitions, only followed almost the universally acknowledged rule applied to a caveat. The Learned Judges, who granted time to the caveators to file counter-affidavit in miscellaneous petitions, only followed almost the universally acknowledged rule applied to a caveat. They permitted the caveators to bring on the record of the case their version why any prayer for stay should be refused and felt as they have said in their order dated 9.7.1990. “We heard both the sides The financial burden would always be discharged towards the respondents if ultimately the verdict in the Writ Appeals should be in favour of the Respondents Hence we grant stay as prayed for.” Why should a counsel unless he has got some preconceived ideas think that any order as above was unjust and unfair or such order was passed to harass his clients. We do not wish to say and we make it clear that we do not intend these words to be read as any stigma, censure or condemnation of what the appellant did Yet, we are saying because we must say that it would be only to scandalise the Court by creating the story of some anguish arising out of the so called crisis of confidence in the Bench, if such story is taken to the fourth respondent who is an officer of the Court, who could not and cannot do anything in the matter or to the Chief Justice in Chambers or any Court or in the two petitions. W.P.S.K. No. 60735 of 1990 before S Ramalingam, J. and/or W.P. No 18704 of 199O and the present writ appeal. Everything stated to have happened subsequently was created by the appellant. Nothing happened in the Court that ordinarily does not happen in the proceedings before it. The appellant could not just assume that a particular Bench of the Court was making orders in which he appeared because it was angry or hostile. If there were orders that could not have been posted and caveators were not satisfied, they had a right of appeal, if not under any other provision under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India. The appellant could not for that reason find a new jurisdiction in the Chief Justice of the Court or in any other person to seek transfer of his cases from one Bench of the Court to another Bench of the Court. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. The appellant could not for that reason find a new jurisdiction in the Chief Justice of the Court or in any other person to seek transfer of his cases from one Bench of the Court to another Bench of the Court. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. 3 the Supreme Court considered Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court and in that connection referred to sub-S.(1) of S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 a clause of the Letters Patent similar to our Court and said: “The section is an enabling enactment and confers power on the High Courts of making rules for the exercise of their jurisdiction by single Judges r by division courts. The power conferred by the Section is not circumscribed in any manner whatever and the nature of the power is such that it had to be conferred by the use of words of the widest amplitude. There could be no particular purpose or object while conferring the power in limiting it qua the jurisdiction already possessed by the High Court, when in the other provisions of the Government of India Act it was contemplated that the existing jurisdiction as subject < to the legislative power of the Governor-General and the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court was liable to be enlarged, modified and curtailed by the Legislature from time to time. It is thus difficult to accept the argument that the power vested in the High Court under sub-S.(1) of S 106 was a limited one and could only be exercised in respect to such jurisdiction as the High Court possessed on the date when the Act of 1915 came into force. It was argued that simultaneously with the repeal of S. 108 of the Government of India Act 1015 and of the enactment of the provisions in S. 223 of the Government of India Act of 1935 and late on in Art. 225 of the Constitution of India, there had not been any corresponding amendment of clause 15 of the Letters Patent and the reference to S. 10S in clause 15 of the Letters Patent could not therefore be taken as relating to these provisions, and that being so, the High Court had no power to make rules in 1940. This objection also in our opinion is not well founded as it overlooks the fact that the power that was conferred on the High Court by S. 108 still subsists, and it has not been affected in any manner whatever either by the Government of India, Act 1955 or by the new Constitution.” 10. In that connection, when a question arose as to how to understand the role of the Chief Justice as well as puisne Judges of the Court in discharging their judicial as well as administrative functions in several cases including the one reported in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan 4, the Supreme Court had observed that the Chief Justice is the master of the roster who possesses inherent power in the matter of Constitution of Benches and; “He has full power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of allocation of business on the High Court which flows not only from the provisions contained in sub-S.(3) of S. 51 of the Act 5, but inheres in him in the very nature of things.” This however cannot mean that a Chief Justice can just shuffle, shift, reallocate, vest and divest Judges with the portfolios as he likes. In Review CMP. No. 186 of 1989 in W.A. No. 613 of 1987 (Order dated 7.11.1990) 6, a Full Bench of this Court said: “We think, we should remind ourselves that the jurisdiction of the Court may be qualified or restricted by a variety of circumstances. The power of the Court may be exercised within such limits and in such manner that it ensures a fair-hearing, unbiased determination of the dispute and ho Judge should be in a hurry or be concerned with any particular case because, as observed in the Judgment of the Calcutta High Court (supra). The cardinal position cannot be overlooked that before jurisdiction over the subject matter is exercised the case must be legally brought before the concerned Court for the hearing and determination and that a judgment pronounced by Court without investment of jurisdiction is void.” The Full Bench has also cautioned: “No person can claim that his matter should be heard by a single Judge much less a particular Judge or a particular Division Bench of the Court. The business of the Court will be determined by the Honble the Chief Justice alone, who in his discretion may decide what Judge is to sit alone and what Judges are to constitute different benches and allotted business of the Court. The Letters Patent afore-quoted recognises this power of the Honble the Chief Justice of the Court and as held by the Supreme Court even in the absence of a specific provision, this is an inherent power of the Honble the Chief Justice.” It only means, in our view, that (1) the portfolio decision of the Chief Justice is binding on all concerned, but once the portfolio is decided, no one gets the right to ask for a change in it, whether it is a litigant or a counsel and (2) for the portfolio concerned, the Bench or the Judge sitting alone shall be the Master, who shall not in any manner be under the whip of the Chief Justice in all such cases which are of his/their portfolio S. Ramalingam, J. took rather a simplistic view in W P.S R. No. 60735 of 1990 in dismissing the petitioner as not maintainable on the ground that the Chief. Justice was not made a party to the petition. The order in the said case does not give to us any guidance in understanding why he thought that no writ could issue in the absence of the Chief Justice, but it could issue when he was made a party. The Chief Justice or in that view of the matter any other Judge in the Court, when they do not act in their individual capacity, act as the Court only. For a writ against the Chief Justice or in that matter against any other Judge of this Court, it is necessary that it is shown by the petitioner that if the Chief Justice or any other Judge had any legal obligation or a duty under any particular law or otherwise to act, which duly was not performed by him or that in performance of that duty, he committed any error of law or jurisdiction. No case cited before as by the appellant is relevant to know how the Chief Justice of the Court has/had jurisdiction to transfer a case which is already before a Bench or a learned Judge of the Court, except by change of the portfolio, or recall a particular case from a particular Bench or a particular learned Judge of the Court should not hear the case of a particular client or counsel. We do not say as it is already settled by several pronouncements of the Supreme Court, that a Chief Justice or a Judge of the Court as such can not be called under Art. 226 of the Constitution to answer for their administrative acts under challenge. S. Ramalingam, J. in W.P.S.R. No. 60735 of 1990 has observed: “When work is so assigned, it is for the learned Judge to decide whether, for some reasons, they should not hear the cases so assigned to them and if they decide so, they may direct the papers to be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for posting such cases before some other Bench. In the extraordinary circumstances, the counsel himself may make a special request that his case may not be heard by a particular Bench and if that request is made bona fide , the learned Judges themselves direct the papers to be placed before My Lords the Chief Justice for orders regarding the posting of the matter before some other Bench. It is also open to a party or a counsel to make a special mention before My Lord the Chief Justice so that the cases pending before one Bench may be posted before another Bench and it is for My Lord on the Chief Justice to satisfy about the reasons given for such postings.” With respect we disagree with the last observation of S. Ramalingam, J. that a party or a counsel may make a special mention before the Chief Justice so that the case pending before one Bench may be posted before another Bench. So far as other two observations are concerned, we think it right to say that if for some reasons, the learned Judges assigned with a case or cases, find that they should not hear the case or the cases, they may direct the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice for posting such case or cases before some other Bench and in some extraordinary circumstances, the counsel appearing in a case may make a special request that a particular case or cases may not be heard by a particular Bench for reasons none other than the reasons that are spelt out in the principle that not one shall be a Judge in his own cause {Nemo debet casa juaose propria causa). So far as the first rule is concerned, if the Judge himself or the Judges themselves say that a particular case or cases assigned to him/them say be taken out of his/their list, there should be no difficulty. So far as the second rule is concerned in which it is said that a counsel may bring to the notice of the Court that a particular case or cases may not be heard by a particular Bench or a Judge of the Court meant to as only that the counsel would bring a fact to the notice of the Court and no more. He cannot be allowed to insist or ask the Court not to hear a case. It will be again for the Judge or the Judges hearing the case to decide whether he/they should say that the cases be listed before another Judge or Bench or not. Judges of the Court including the Chief Justice are equals and exercise the same judicial power except such powers that are specifically assigned to the Chief Justice. There is no reason to concede a power in the Chief Justice to transfer a case from one Bench to another Bench of the Court or from one Judge to another Judge of the Court. There is no reason to concede a power in the Chief Justice to transfer a case from one Bench to another Bench of the Court or from one Judge to another Judge of the Court. Act of allocating business or portfolio or assigning case or cases is different from the act of recalling the case from the file of a particular Judge or a Bench of the Court and from transferring a case from the file of a particular Judge or a Bench of the Court, to and her judge or a Bench of the court because any decision about it would partake the character of a judicial order. The appellant cited a number of cases before Bakthavatsalam, J. and also before us. We catalogue the cases cited before us only to observe that they do not in any manner meet the objections as to the maintainability of the instant petition. The cases cited are; Pradyat Kumar v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court . A.I.R. 1056 S.C 285. Pramatha Nath v. Chief Justice, Calcutta A.I.R. 1961 S.C 545. Himansu Kumar v. Jyoti Prokash , A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1634. Jyoti Prokash v. Chief Justice, Calcutta High Court , A.I.R. 1965 SC. 961. K Prabhakaram v. State , A.I.R. 1970 Kerala 27. Gordon Woodroffe and Company (P) Ltd. v. S. Venugopal , 19581 L.L.J. 300 = I.L.R. 1958 Madras 374. Bhupati Bhosab Dalai v. Registrar of the Original Side , AIR. 1971 Calcutta 519. Union of India v. Sakrarchand , A I.R. 1977 S.C 2328. Gupta v. President of India , A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149. 10 R J. Meta v. Chief Justice V.S. Despande , A.I.R. 1982 Bombay 125. GujaratElectricity Board v. Atmaram A I.R. 1989 S.C. 1433. Mahendra v. Dansan A.I.R. 1952 Patna 341. 13. Pur an Chand v. Abudllah A.I.R. 1938 All 606. Mohan Lal Baid v. State of West Bengal and others , A.I.R. 1990 Calcutta 168. Shri Anadi Mukta Salouru S.R.V.R.J.M.S. Trust v. V.R. Rudari, A.I.R. 1989 S C. 1607. BombayMunicipalityv. Advance Builders, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 793. Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 769. L.D. Jaiksal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1374. 11. Mohan Lal Baid v. State of West Bengal and others , A.I.R. 1990 Calcutta 168. Shri Anadi Mukta Salouru S.R.V.R.J.M.S. Trust v. V.R. Rudari, A.I.R. 1989 S C. 1607. BombayMunicipalityv. Advance Builders, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 793. Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 769. L.D. Jaiksal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1374. 11. We are in agreement with the view expressed by learned single Judge except that part of his judgment in which he has approved the observation of S. Ramalingam, J. about any party or counsel making a special mention before the Chief Justice so that the case pending before one Bench of the Court may be posted before another Bench of the Court. Unless it is found that there is any such jurisdiction to recall a pending file from the portfolio Judges or Judges, such special mention will not be permissible. If this procedure is to be allowed to come in vogue, it would create serious consequences. It is easy to concede that the Honble the Chief Justice shall not yield to prayers which are unreasonable and shall not easily transfer a case from one Bench to another. But it will not be easy for the Honble the Chief Justice to sit in decision on requests from the litigants and their counsel to transfer their cases from one Bench/Judge to another Bench/Judge. We have given a full length of hearing to the appellant to satisfy us where and how the Chief Justice’ gets any administrative Jurisdiction over the judicial work of the Judges of the High Court because once cases are brought before a Judge or a Bench of the Court, it is so brought for judicial determination by him/it The appellant has not been able to show any authority to this effect. 12. Since we hold that there is no such jurisdiction which the Honble the Chief Justice can exercise in our view, the writ petition is not maintainable. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.