Judgment 1. THE short point involved in this case is whether the suit should be valued according to the valuation as given by the plaintiff or whether the plaintiff is to pay ad valorem Court-fees on the value of the property as stated in the Deed of Gift challenged in the suit. 2. THE plaintiff petitioners filed Title Suit No. 1634/87 in the III Bench of the learned Judge, City Civil Court of Calcutta against the defendant opposite party, Shri Madhusudan Das, the defendant no. 2 and several others for the following declarations: - "a) Decree for a declaration that the Deed of Gift execution on March 31, 1986 by Madhusudan Das, the father of the plaintiffs in favour of, the defendant is nullity, the: same being void and the said document is liable to be cancelled and/or delivered up; decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from giving into effect and/or further effect and/or taking any steps in aid thereto enforcing the purported Deed of Gift dated 31st March, 1986; c) Permanent injunction restraining the defendant, from interfering with and/or disturbing the plaintiffs' possession in respect of the scheduled property; d) Permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his men, agents and servants from making any additions/ alterations and/or changes in or upon any portion of premises No. 22, Kailash Base Street, P. S. Amherst Street, Calcutta; e) Cost of the suit with full Advocate's fees; 0 Such other relief and/or reliefs as the learned Court may deem fit and proper." The allegations of the plaintiff-petitioners in the plaint inter alia were, that the deed of gift purported to have been executed on March 31, 1986 by the said Madhusudan Das, the defendant no. 2 in he suit, who was the father of the plaintiff-petitioners as well as of the defendant no. 1 - opposite party, in favour of the defendant no. 1, was; a nullity and void inasmuch as the defendant no. 2 was suffering from melancholia and schizophrenia at the material time and he had no mental equilibrium and the defendant ho. 1 by exercising undue influence and coercion obtained the aforesaid gift from the defendant no. 1 in his favour. The suit was valued at Rs. 51/- for injunction under Section 7 (iv) (b) of the West Bengal Court-Fees Act, 1970. The defendant no. 1 by exercising undue influence and coercion obtained the aforesaid gift from the defendant no. 1 in his favour. The suit was valued at Rs. 51/- for injunction under Section 7 (iv) (b) of the West Bengal Court-Fees Act, 1970. The defendant no. 1 - opposite party raised a preliminary objection regarding the valuation of the suit and the Court-fees paid on it and the said matter came up for hearing before the learned Judge, III Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta, who by his order No. 20 dated 28th June, 1988, had inter alia, that the plaintiffs, in fact, wanted to set aside the disputed deed of gift made in favour of the defendant no. 1 by the defendant no. 2, under the garb of a declaration that the said deed was void, and as such the plaintiffs were to pay advalorem Court-fees on the valuation of the property as stated in the deed of gift and the learned Judge valued the suit at Rs.47,000/- and directed to pay the requisite court-fees within a stipulated time. Against the said order, the plaintiff-petitioners have moved this Hon'ble Court in revision and obtained the present civil order. 3. IT is argued on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioners that really speaking, the suit was for a declaration with a consequential relief and the suit was correctly valued by the plaintiffs under Section 4 (iv) (b) of the West Bengal Court-fees act, 1970, and the learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioners referred to the decisions of several High Courts, namely, AIR 1975 Punjab and Harayana 316, AIR 1977 M.P. 108 and 10981 Calcutta 189 in support of his contentions. 4. THE learned Advocate for the Caveator opposite party, however, supported the impugned order relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble supreme Court reported in AIR 1973 SC 2384 . So far as the decision of the Punjab and Harayana High Court in the case of Chhota Singh vs. Jit Singh and Others (AIR 1975 Punjab and Harayana 316)is concerned, that was a case file by the plaintiff for a declaration to the effect that the deed of gift made by him was null and void as having been procured by fraud and prayed for cancellation of the said. It was held in that case that considering the nature of the suit which was the subject matter of the said decision, the plaintiffs would, first have to prove, that the deed of gift was got executed from him by fraud and if he was able to prove the said allegation, he would be entitled to the declaration as claimed by him, and in that event he would also be entitled to the consequential relief to have the gift deed cancelled and as such according to R. S. Manila, C. J. delivering the judgment in the aforesaid case, the case was covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act and the plaint was properly valued. In the said decision, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shamsher Singh vs. Rajinder Prasad and Others ( AIR 1973 SC 2384 ) was referred to and discussed. The Single Bench decision of the M. P. High Court in the case of Partap and Another vs. Smt. Puniya Bai and Others (AIR 1977 M. P. 10811 also held that in a suit for declaring an agreement or transaction as not binding on the party, the question as to whether the consequential relief of setting it aside ought or ought not be sought for, depends on whether, in the pleadings, the plaintiff treated the transaction in question as voidable or void ab initio. In the former case, consequential relief has to be sought for and ad valorem Court-fees under Section 7 (iv) (c), Court-fees Act has to be paid, while in the latter case since the transaction according to the plaintiff is non-existing, the question of setting it aside does not arise and court-fee need be paid only on the relief of declaration, or in other words, where in the plaint it was alleged that the plaintiff did not execute any sale deed and also did not receive any consideration for such sale and that she was not a party to any document of sale, the transaction being treated as non-existing, the relief of setting aside the sale need be sought for in the plaint. 5. IN the Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Sm. 5. IN the Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Sm. Ranjani bala Rakshit vs. Biswanath Rakshit and Others (AIR 1981 Calcutta 189) which arose out of a suit for partition upon a declaration that a document purported to be executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendants 3, 4 and 5 dated 29th jury, 1955 was fraudulent, collusive and void and not binding on the plaintiff, it was held by Anil Kumar Sen and B. C. Chakraborti. JJ. in paragraph 18 at page 192 of the said decision as follows : - "in the instant case, we have found that the plaint assertion plainly is that she was given to understand that a Power of attorney was being done and she lent her signature on such representation. Therefore, in law, there was no valid execution, the mind of the applicant not having accompanied her signature. Such a case, if proved, would render the deed void. In this case the misrepresentation is both as regards the contents as well as to the character of the document, and as such the transaction is wholly void. In such a suit, it is not necessary to seek a relief of setting aside the document and no consequential relief is implicit in the relief asked for. " 6. THE Supreme Court in the case Shamsher Singh vs. Rajinder Prasad and ors. (supra) held inter alia that the Court in deciding the question of court-fee should look into the allegations in the plaint to see what was the substantive relief that was asked for. Mere astutenes in drafting the plaint would not be allowed to stand in the way of the court's looking at the substance of the relief prayed for. The Supreme Court held in the said case that a suit by a Hindu son against his father and the mortgage decree-holder for a declaration that the mortgage executed by the father in respect of this joint family property was null and void for want of legal necessity and consideration though couched in a declaratory form, is in substance a suit, either for setting aside the decree or for a declaration with a consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree holder from executing the decree against the mortgaged property and the plaintiff is liable to pay ad valorem court-fee under Section 7 (iv) (c ). A mortgage decree against the father is a good decree against the son and unless the decree is set aside it would remain executable against the son, and it was essential for the son to ask for setting aside the decree.-8. In the present case, the plaintiffs sought to declare as a principal relief the alleged deed of gift executed by the defendant no. 2 in favour of the defendant no. 1 as null and void being fraudulent, the prayer setting aside the said deed was made as a consequential! relief really speaking, and so also the prayer for permanent injunction and the plaintiffs not being parties to the disputed deed of gift and the plaint allegations being to the effect that the disputed deed was a sham transaction being obtained by fraud, according to me, are not obliged to sue for cancelation of the same. They can ignore the document and ask for the appropriate relief that they may be entitled to on that footing and pay the proper court-fee thereon without asking for cancellation of such document. Reference maybe made to the decision of the Madras High court in the case of In re : Thirupathiammal (AIR 1956 Madras 179 ). Accordingly, in the present suit, the plaintiffs first of all have to prove that the disputed deed of gift was not executed by the defendant no. 2 in favour of the defendant no. 1 on his own violation or in other words, the donor's mind did not accompany his signature and the defendant no. 1 got it executed from the defendant no. 2 by practising fraud and undue influence and if the plaintiffs are able to prove the said allegations, they would be entitled to the declaration as claimed by them in the suit and in that event they would also be entitled to the consequential relief to have the said deed of gift cancelled. The words 'consequential relief have not been defined in the Court-fees act. The meaning, which should be given to a word or expression not defined in an enactment should be its ordinary dictionary meaning or a meaning which is necessarily inferred by the context in which it is used or by the object of the provisions or by the scheme of the enactment. The meaning, which should be given to a word or expression not defined in an enactment should be its ordinary dictionary meaning or a meaning which is necessarily inferred by the context in which it is used or by the object of the provisions or by the scheme of the enactment. In order to bring a relief within the fold, "consequential relief - it is an off-spring of declaration sought for, the relief cannot be valued in terms off money, there is no separate provision for it and, the consequential relief is inseparably connected with the main relief. A relief is consequential, if it has no independent footing. What follows or ensues must have a nexus with the causa. The word 'consequential' is the result of an act. Cause and consequence are correlative terms which is not exclusive but inclusive for each other. Accordingly, the words consequential relief imply that the other relief should be one which flows directly from the declaration which the plaintiff desires to be made. This means that the plaintiffs should be entitled to the other relief only as a necessary consequence or result of the granting of the declaratory relief. The other relief must be so dependent on the declaratory relief that it cannot be allowed if the principal relief is refused. Reference on this point may be made to the decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Balaram Mondal vs. Sahebjan Gazi (54 CWN 139) and the Full bench decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Aft. Zeb-Ul-Nisa vs. Din mohamman (AIR 1941 Lah. 97 (F. B.)l, which was referred to both in the above decision of this Hon'ble Court and also in the subsequent Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court reported in AIR 1981 Cal. 189 . The prayer for setting aside the disputed deed of gift should not be made by the plaintiffs in a separate suit with such a prayer only, without first having a declaration that the deed of gift was a nullity or void. 189 . The prayer for setting aside the disputed deed of gift should not be made by the plaintiffs in a separate suit with such a prayer only, without first having a declaration that the deed of gift was a nullity or void. Hence, the said prayer is totally dependent upon the main prayer made by the plaintiffs, namely, for a declaration that the disputed deed of gift was void or a nullity, and upon such declaration, the necessary consequences would follow, namely, such a deed would stand cancelled or set aside, no matter, whether the plaintiffs prayed for such a relief, and if prayed for, such a relief can only be termed as a consequential relief as I repeat and reiterate that such a relief is inseparably connected with the main relief as prayed for by the plaintiffs in the present suit and it cannot be allowed if the principal relief is refused. Accordingly, the present suit cannot be termed to be a suit really speaking for setting aside the disputed deed of gift or in other words the said prayer cannot be termed to be a principal prayer made in the suit. 7. SO far as the Supreme Court's decision as referred to above is concerned, the facts and circumstances of the said case were quite different, as the decree passed against the father as referred to therein was binding upon his heirs and unless that decree was set aside, it would remain executable against the son who was the plaintiff in the suit and it was thus essential for the son to seek for setting aside the decree, but in the present case, since the plaintiffs were not parties to the alleged deed of gift executed by the defendant no. 2 in favour of the defendant ho. 1, the question of setting aside the said deed of gift did not arise at all and simply the suit for declaration that the disputed deed of gift was a nullity or void and not binding upon the plaintiffs without any consequential relief could have been brought by the plaintiffs ignoring the deed altogether, and even if the prayer for setting aside the deed was made in the suit, that was merely for as a consequential relief. 8. 8. THE result is that the impugned order cannot be sustained in law in view of the discussion and observations made: hereinbefore and is accordingly set aside and I hold that the plaint was properly valued as made by the plaintiffs. The civil order is thus allowed without costs. Let this order be communicated by the office to the trial court forthwith who is now to dispose of the suit in accordance with law and also in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. The trial court should make all endeavors to dispose of the suit within six months from the date of communication of this order. Civil Order allowed.