KARIA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Court has admitted the Second Appeal on the following substantial questions of law :" (1) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in law in holding that the impugned order of dismissal is contrary to the decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Lalubhai Rumalbhai, 1984 GLH (UJ) 21 : (1984 GLT 1) when by the time the impugned order was passed, the concerned rules were amended by Bombay Police (Punishment and Appeal) (Gujarat Second Amendment) rules, 1982 with effect from 17-8-1982? (2) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in law in holding that the impugned order of dismissal was premature as the order of acquittal rendered by the Criminal Court had not become final and the acquittal appeal was pending in the High Court? (3) Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to sit in appeal against the quantum of penalty and whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty of dismissal can be treated to be in any way unduly harsh?" ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate and decide the aforesaid substantial question no. 1, it is necessary to peruse the relevant provisions of the Bombay police Act and that of the Bombay Police (Punishments and Appeals) rules, 1956, followed by the Gujarat Second Amendment of 1982 with effect from 17/08/1982. Schedule I to the Bombay Police (Punishments and Appeals) Rules, 1956 (for short the Rules) does reveal that so far as the area for which the Commissioner of Police has been appointed under Sec. 7 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 is concerned, the Deputy commissioner of Police has some authority to inflict punishments. The deputy Commissioner of Police can impose punishment on all persons to whom the Rules are made applicable. By sub-rule (2) of Rule 1, these rules are made applicable to all Police Officers of and below the rank of inspectors. Therefore, the plaintiff being the Head Constable, these Rules are applicable to him. In Col. 3 at Sr. No. 3 of Schedule I, Part II to the Rules, it has been laid down that all punishments specified in Rule 3 are subject to restrictions specified in Col. 4 and they can be inflicted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police or Assistant Commissioner of Police. In Col. 3 at Sr. No. 3 of Schedule I, Part II to the Rules, it has been laid down that all punishments specified in Rule 3 are subject to restrictions specified in Col. 4 and they can be inflicted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police or Assistant Commissioner of Police. It is true that Rule 3 (l) (iii) of the said Rules provides for punishment of dismissal. However, Col. 4 at Sr. No. 3 of Schedule I, Part II to the rules specifically provided that punishments of recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government by negligence or breach of orders suspension, compulsory retirement, reduction, removal, dismissal or fine shall be inflicted only under the orders of Commissioner of Police. It further provided that in cases where defaulters were appointed by the Commissioner of Police or the Inspector General of Police, the deputy Commissioner of Police or the Assistant Commissioner of Police shall not inflict punishments of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal. ( 3 ) NOW, there is an amendment in the aforesaid proviso in Col. No. 4 at Sr. No. 3 of Part II of Schedule I to the Rules. By Gujarat Second amendment Rules, 1982, the following part of the said proviso has been deleted with effect from 17/08/1982 : "punishments of recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders suspension, compulsory retirement, reduction, removal, dismissal or fine shall be inflicted only under the orders of the Commissioner of Police. " therefore, the cases where the defaulters arc appointed by the Commissioner of Police or the Inspector General of Police, the Deputy Commissioner of police or the Assistant Commissioner of Police shall have no power to inflict punishments of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal for the reason that the amendment is to the part of the said proviso in Col. No. 4. No. 4. Now, in order to decide whether the appellate Court committed error in holding that the impugned order of dismissal is contrary to the decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Lalubhai Rumalbhai, 1984 GLH (UJ) 21 : (1984 GLT 1), when by the time the impugned order was passed, the concerned Rules were amended by the Bombay Police (Punishments and Appeals) (Gujarat Second Amendment) Rules, 1982 with effect from 17-8-1982, whether the plaintiff was appointed by the Commissioner of Police or the Inspector General of Police or by the authority equivalent to the Commissioner of Police, it is an admitted position from the service book of the plaintiff at Exh. 45 that the plaintiff was appointed as a police Constable by the District Superintendent of Police, Rajkot, who was the head of the whole Police force in the District of Rajkot. On his appointment, the plaintiff had joined as Police Constable on 15/12/1954. Mr. J. J. Yagnik, learned Advocate for the respondent-plaintiff, relying upon Sees. 7 and 10 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 submitted that the District Superintendent of Police was the head of the entire Police force so far as the Rajkot District was concerned, when the plaintiff came to be appointed in the year 1954. The District Superintendent of Police should, therefore, be treated as equivalent in power and position to the post of Commissioner of Police. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police is in contravention of the proviso made in Col. 4 at Sr, No. 3 of Part II of Schedule I to the Rules. On behalf of the appellant, no notification or circular is shown to the effect that the district Superintendent of Police was the lower authority than the commissioner of Police. In view of that matter, the impugned order of dismissal by the Deputy Commissioner of Police is contrary to the aforesaid proviso in Col. 4 at Sr. No. 3 of Part II of Schedule I to the said Rules. The impugned order of dismissal is not therefore contrary to the aforesaid decision reported in 1984 GLH (UJ) 21 : (1984 GLT 1) (State of Gujarat v. Lalubhai), in view of the said Gujarat Second amendment of 1982. The point No. 1 is answered accordingly. 4 at Sr. No. 3 of Part II of Schedule I to the said Rules. The impugned order of dismissal is not therefore contrary to the aforesaid decision reported in 1984 GLH (UJ) 21 : (1984 GLT 1) (State of Gujarat v. Lalubhai), in view of the said Gujarat Second amendment of 1982. The point No. 1 is answered accordingly. ( 4 ) THE third question relates to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court on the quantum of penalty and whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the penalty of dismissal can be treated to be in any way unduly harsh. It is true that the findings of fact recorded in the course of the departmental inquiry, unless they are collateral or jurisdictional, are exempt in the judicial review and the Civil Court cannot sit in appeal over the ultimate decision based on such findings. The Civil Court cannot also review such final decision on merits. However, there are two well-known exceptions to the rule that Civil Court cannot sit in appeal on the decision arrived at by the departmental authority. The first exception is one where there is "no evidence" to support the findings. Secondly, the ultimate decision based on such findings must not be perverse and unreasonable. Both these concepts can be said to have affinity with each other. The principle "no evidence" means and includes such a basis of which no reasonable person shall record a finding of the guilt. In other words, the evidence in support of a fact-finding is substantial when from such evidence an inference of existence of the fact may be drawn reasonably. The second exception as to "perverse or unreasonable" would mean that no reasonable person would come to the conclusion on a given set of facts and circumstances. In view of this settled legal position, this point is to be answered that ordinarily the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal against the quantum of penalty, unless it is shown that the penalty imposed is based on no evidence or the same is perverse or unreasonable. . . . . . . . . . The following observations made by this Court in the case of S. M. Sharma v. South Gujarat University, [1982 (1)] XXIII (1) GLR 233, are relevant to be quoted (at page No. 256 of GLR) :"47. . . . . . . . . . The following observations made by this Court in the case of S. M. Sharma v. South Gujarat University, [1982 (1)] XXIII (1) GLR 233, are relevant to be quoted (at page No. 256 of GLR) :"47. Yet another aspect which is relevant is the requirement of taking into consideration ail the material aspects before deciding upon the quantum of penalty. The age, maturity, antecedents, family background, motivation, socioeconomic factors, role played in the commission of malpractice or unfair practice, etc. are all factors which must enter into account in the quantification of penalty in disciplinary jurisdiction even in the academic field. Besides, though penalties are imposed with the end in view of creating a deterrent effect, the current thinking in penology even in the context of hardened criminals is that reformation and curative technology are also as much a part of penalty procedures as retribution. Their thinking must be reflected with greater force in the disciplinary jurisdiction exercised by the academic bodies who deal with delinquents quo whom they are in loco pareniis. The perpetrator of the malpractice or unfair practice at the examination, in most of the cases, is a youth at the threshold of life. To deprive him of education and an opportunity to secure academic qualification over an unreasonably long period might do more harm than good and his channalisation into good and useful life, which is the prime object of education and one of the principal purposes underlying the penalty might be thereby frustrated. " ( 5 ) A Division Bench of this Court in R. M. Parmar v. Gujarat Electricity board, Baroda, [1982 (1)] XXIII (l) GLR 352, has observed with regard to the imposition of penalty by the statutory authority created under Sec. 11a of the industrial Disputes Act and has enumerated some of the important dimensions which are required to be kept in mind while imposing penalty. In this background, both the Courts below have rightly held that the penalty with which the plaintiff has been visited in the instant case is grossly disproportionate to the misconduct of which he is found guilty. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissal cannot be the punishment which could have been reasonably imposed upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff joined services of the Police Department in the year 1954. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissal cannot be the punishment which could have been reasonably imposed upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff joined services of the Police Department in the year 1954. On the date when he was dismissed from service, he had put in 30 years of service. There is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff was found to be guilty of misconduct on any past occasion and that his past record of service warranted a strict view being taken of his misconduct. The antecedents of the plaintiff are not such as to warrant an extreme harsh penalty. On perusal of the impugned dismissal order, it is clear that the authority concerned has not applied its mind from this angle, nor it has come to the conclusion that it is unsafe to retain the plaintiff in police force. Therefore, on the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, the penalty of dismissal imposed on the plaintiff is unduly harsh. Penalty is not the end in itself and its only aim is not to seek retribution. Reformation and curative technology have also their place in penalty procedures and every departmental authority exercising disciplinary jurisdiction is required to have an informed mind about the same. In this view of the matter, it cannot therefore be concluded that it is unsafe to retain the plaintiff in service and that the maximum penalty of dismissal is the only alternative. On an overall view of all the relevant circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the plaintiff is disproportionate and harsh. ( 6 ) ON the aforesaid premises, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. .