Judgment :- 1. Both these petitions are for issuance of writs in the nature of habeas corpusto quash the orders of detention of one Gunaraja aliasPattu aliasIqbal and Nithi aliasNithiyanandam. 2. Both of them, it is said are associates. Adverse notice cases and the basic facts relating to the incident of the ground case are exactly the same. Considering them as goon das, the Commissioner of Police, Madras city passed the orders of detention in Nos.55 and 56 BDFGIS/90, both of date, 23.8.1990 under Sec.3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act14 of 1982). 3. They came to adverse notice in nine cases of tor cycles on different dates spread over a period between 23.1.1990 and 4.7.1990, of different police stations in the City of Madras. All these factors came to light, on their being arrested on 9.8.1990 in the incident relating to the ground case. 4. The vivid narration of the occurrence in the ground case as detailed in paragraph 3 of the grounds of detention runs as under: “Thiru Prakash, Male, aged 30, S/o.Loganathan is residing at No. 100, Sandiyappa Mudali Street, Otteri, Madras-12. Thiru Prakash is an auto driver. On 9.8.1990 at about 19.00 hrs. was proceeding to Anna Nagar to meet his friend Tr.Ramu. While Tr.Prakash was proceeding on the 3rd Main Road on the Southern direction, noticed Tvl.Gunaraja aliasPattu aliasIqbal (hereinafter called Gunaraja) and Tr.Nithi aliasNithiyanandam (hereinafter called Nithiyanandam) coming in the opposite direction in a TVS Suzuki white colour motor cycle bearing No.CAP 1393. At the tower main gale Tr.Nithiyanandam asked about the way to go to Villivakkam. Tr.Prakash showed the way to go to Villivakkam and proceeded further. Within short time, Tvl.Nithiyanandam, rushed before Tr.Prakash and at the point of knife terrorised Tr.Prakash by saying “TAMIL” Tr.Prakash feared danger and tried to run away from the spot. Meanwhile Tr.Gunaraja inserted his hand into. Tr.Prakashs pant pocket. Later Tvl.Gunaraja and Nithiyanandam terrorised Tr.Prakash by saying “TAMIL” Tvl.Gunaraja and Nithiyanandam went near the motor cycle and Tr.Gunaraja started the motor cycle, but the motor cycle did not start. Meanwhile Tr.Prakash raised hue and cry by saying, “TAMIL” Tvl.Daniel Rajkumar, Murali and Rajan who were there at the spot heard the hue and cry of Tr.Prakash and rushed to help Tr.Prakash. Meanwhile, Tr.Gunaraja started the vehicle. Meanwhile Tr.Prakash raised hue and cry by saying, “TAMIL” Tvl.Daniel Rajkumar, Murali and Rajan who were there at the spot heard the hue and cry of Tr.Prakash and rushed to help Tr.Prakash. Meanwhile, Tr.Gunaraja started the vehicle. Tr.Nithiyanandam, who was sitting in”the back side further raised rowdy shouts by saying “TAMIL” However, Tvl.Prakash and others tried to catch Tvl.Gunaraja and Nithiyanandam at the spot. At that time,Tr.Nithiyanandam rushed to stab Tr.Prakash with the knife. Tr.Prakash warded, off the attempt. In his attempt, the knife fell over Tr.Prakashs left hand caused bleeding injury. Meanwhile Tr.Gunaraja lost the balance and the motor cycle hit the platform and fell on the road side. Immediately Tr.Gunaraja picked up jelly stones from the road side and pelted the same indiscriminately against Tvl.Prakash and others. The nearby shop keepers noticed the atrocious activities of Tvl.Nithiyanandam and Gunaraja and closed down their shops and suspended their business. The public who came from shopping, the public who were doing business on the platform noticed the atrocious activities of Tvl.Nithiyanandam and Gunaraja feared danger and ran helter and skelter. Tvl.Nithiyanandam and Gunaraja thus created terror and panic at the spot. The traffic in that area was dislocated. Tvl.Prakash and others further tied to catch them at the spot. Tvl.Nithiyanandam and Gunaraja abandoning the motor cycle proceeded towards Grand Theatre. Tr.Prakash and others chased them. At the junction of 3rd Main Road and Grand Theatre, Tr.Prakash and others surrounded them. “Tvl.Prakash, Daniel Rajkumar caught hold of Tr.Gunaraja and Tvl.Murali and Rajan caught hold of Tr.Nithiyanandam at the spot. Tr.Prakash retrieved the cash Rs.55.60 nP. from Gunaraja pant pocket. The knife in the possession of Nithiyanandam was snatched taken away by Tr.Murali. Tr.Daniel Rajkumar took the motor cycle from the abandoned place. Later the accused along with the properties, i.e., motor cycle, cash Rs.55.60 nP. and the knife were taken to K.4 Annanagar Police Station by Tr.Prakash and other witnesses. Tr.Prakash lodged a complaint in this regard to the Inspector of Police. Crime K.4 P.S.Tr.Bakiamuthu, the Inspector of Police Crime K.4 P.S.Registered a case in K.4 P.S. Crime No.760 of 1990 under Sec.392 read with Secs.397, 394, 366 & 506(ii), I.P.C Tr.Prakash was sent to Government Hospital for treatment. The accused were examined and their confession statements were recorded. The properties so produced by the victim Tvl.Prakash and others were seized under cover of mahazar. The accused were examined and their confession statements were recorded. The properties so produced by the victim Tvl.Prakash and others were seized under cover of mahazar. The Inspector of Police visited the spot and prepared observation mahazar. The Inspector of Police also seized the jelly stones which were found scattered all over the roadside, under caver of seizure mahazar. The Inspector of Police examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. During the course of the investigation, it is revealed that Tvl.Gunaraja anc Nithiyanandam committed theft of “motor iycle bearing No.CAP.1393 which is connected in K.4 Annanagar Police Station, Crime No.54 of 1990 under Sec.379, I.P.C. The Inspector of Police produced the accused before the XIII M.M. Court, Madras and requested for police custody for the recovery of properties concerned in the other cases. The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate, XIII Court granted police custody for 13 days. The properties concerned in other cases were recovered as per the confession statements of the accused. Later he was surrendered before the XIII M.M. Court and duly lodged at Central Prison, Madras as remand prisoner. The Investigation of the case is not yet over. The offence under Sec.392 read with Secs.397, 394, I.P.C. are offences committed against property as such punishable under Chapter XVIII of the I.P.C. The offence under Sec.336, I.P.C. is an offence committed against human body as such punishable under Chapter XVI of the I.P.C. The offence under Sec.506(ii), I.P.C. is an offence as such punishable under Chapter XXII of the I.P.C. By committing the above described grave cri me in the public, in the evening time, in the busy locality, in a residential area, Tr.Nithi aliasNithiyanandam along with his associate Gunaraja aliasPattu aliasIqbal has created alarm and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people in the area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.” 5. The prejudicial amecedent activities, as disclosed by the adverse cases, coupled with the basic facts of the ground case, connected by proximity of time, furnished the requisite materials to the detaining authority for deriving the subjective satisfaction for passing the orders of detention as aforesaid. 6. The Government gave their initial approval to the said orders of deter tion on 31.8.1990, besides sending the requisite records to the Advisory Board forgetting its approval. The Board, as a matter of fact, signified its seal of approval on 4.10.1990. 6. The Government gave their initial approval to the said orders of deter tion on 31.8.1990, besides sending the requisite records to the Advisory Board forgetting its approval. The Board, as a matter of fact, signified its seal of approval on 4.10.1990. The Government thereafter had confirmed the orders of detention after duly communicating the same to the respective detenus. The orders of detention are respectively challenged by Smt.Mehrunnisa, wife of detenu Gunaraja aliasPattu aliasIqbal and the detenu Nithi aliasNithiyanandam himself. 7. The common ground of attack as to the sus-tainability of the orders of detention in both the petitions revolves on the absence of cogent and relevant materials for coming to the conclusion of the imminent prospect of the detenus being released on bail and getting themselves involved by indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. A special ground of inordinate delay involving the consideration of the representation vitiating the order of detention of Cunaraja aliasPattu aliasIqbal had also been taken. 8. The question as to whether a person in jail custody can be served with an order of detention while he is in such custody, a moot and knotty question indeed, came up for consideration in the apexof the judicial administration of this country on many an occasion and seizing the opportunity the apex court in series of pronouncements laid down the law on the subject. We are loath to load with so much of case laws on this aspect of the matter by referring to all such pronouncements, when especially we had the occasion in innumber-able cases of this nature to catalogue all those pronouncements and in this view of the matter, we rather wish to be choosy in making reference to the epoch making judgment of the Constitutional Bench of Rameshwar Shah v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 334 :(1964)1 Crl.L.J. 257 :(1964) 4 S.C.R. 921 and the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Shri Darmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, 1990 CH.LJ. 1232. 9. 1232. 9. In Rameshwar Shah v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 334 :(1964)1 Crl.L.J. 257 : (1964)4 S.C.R. 921 the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court expressed: “As an abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Sec.3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person in jail. Take for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, again the considerations of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority is bona fidesatisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is likely to be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. It may not be easy to discover such rational connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and the view that his detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole of his sentence. It may not be easy to discover such rational connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and the view that his detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole of his sentence. Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case. The question which still remains to be considered is; can a person in jail custody, like the petitioner, be served with an order of detention whilst he is in such custody. In dealing with this point, it is necessary to state the relevant facts which are not in dispute. The petitioner was arrested on the 25th January, 1963. He has been in custody ever since. On the 15th February, 1963 when the order of detention was served on him, he was in jail custody. On these facts, what we have to decide is: was it open to the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent his from acting in a prejudicial manner when the petitioner was locked up in jail. We have already seen the logical process which must be followed by the authority in taking action under Sec.3(1)(a). The first stage in the process is to examine the material adduced against a person to show either from his conduct or his antecedent history that he has been acting in a prejudicial manner. If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, then the authority has to consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in a prejudicial manner in future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of detention. If this question is answered against the petitioner, then the detention order can be properly made. If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, then the authority has to consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in a prejudicial manner in future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of detention. If this question is answered against the petitioner, then the detention order can be properly made. It is obvious that before an authority can legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary to prevent him from acting, in a prejudicial manner, the authority has to be satisfied that if the person is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to the said person at the relevant time, If a person is already in jail custody, how-can it rationally be postulated that if he is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner. At the point of time when an order of detention is going to be served on a person, it must be patent that the said person would act prejudicially if he is not detained and that is a consideration which would be absent when the authority is dealing with a person already in detention. The satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner is thus the basis of the order under Sec.3(1)(a), and this basis is clearly absent in the case of the petitioner. Therefore, we e no escape from the conclusion that the detention of the petitioner in the circumstances of this case, is not justified by Sec.3(1) (a) and is outside its purview.” 10. In Shri Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India , 1990 Crl.L.J. 1232the Supreme Court observed: “The decision referred to above led to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention, and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression ‘compelling reasons’ in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detainingauthority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that, (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities cf he detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activites.” 11. It can thus be seen that no decision of the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of holding that no order of detention can validly be passed against a person in custody under any circumstances whatever. Therefore, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be taken into consideration in the context of considering the order of detention passed in the case of a detenu, who is already in jail. 12. Coming to the facts of the instant case, we shall endeavour to find out as to whether the clamping of the orders of detent ion of the detenus whilst in custody would be justified in the circumstances of the case. 13. The orders of detention had admittedly been passed on both the detanus on 23.8.1990. There is also no pale of controversy that separate order of detention on each of these two detenus had been served while they were n prison as remand prisoners in the ground case. No doubt true it is that as disclosed by paragraph 4 of the orders of detention, there was awareness of the detaining authority as to their having been the remand prisoners. Notwithstanding this awareness, the detaining authority would say that there is imminent possibility of their coming out on bail and in that eventuality, they would indulge in further activities, which would be prejudicial to the maintenanceofpublicorder. Furtherrecourse to normal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing them from indulging in such activities, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the detaining authority would further say. 14. Furtherrecourse to normal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing them from indulging in such activities, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the detaining authority would further say. 14. There is no dispute that the antecedent activities of the detenus are proximate in point of time and this would be made patent by a casual glance of the various dates, on which the occurrences took place in the adverse as well as ground cases. In such a circumstance, the potentiality for the detenus to engage themselves in prejudicial activities in the near further cannot be ruled out of consideration. But, deriving subjective satisfaction on that aspect of the matter alone is not sufficient. It is further necessary for the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that there was an imminent possability of their coming out on bail. Without their being enlarged on bail, there is a bleak plausibility of themselves engaging in the activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 15. No doubt, the detaining authority had indicated its mind as to the imminent possibility of the detenus being released on bail. It is after all an ipso dixitof the detaining authority without any relevant or cogent materials for arriving at such a conclusion. If a casual look or cursory glance of theoffences they werestated to have committed in the ground case is made, one of such offences, namely, the offence under Sec.397, I.P.C. is one exclusively triable by a Court of Session and the Magistrate has no power at all to release them on bail. If at all bail is to be granted, it may be done only by a judicial officer in not less than the cadre of a Sessions Judge. 16. The disturbing factor is, as already referred to, the detenus were remand prisoners on the date when the orders of detention were served. The further factor causing anxiety is that they did not at all take out any application for their release on bail. 16. The disturbing factor is, as already referred to, the detenus were remand prisoners on the date when the orders of detention were served. The further factor causing anxiety is that they did not at all take out any application for their release on bail. Even if they did file applications for their release on bail, there is every conceivable opportunity for the prosecuting agency to oppose the bail applications tooth and nail drawing out the attention of the court before which the bail applications are moved, the gravity of the offences and their propensity to commit crimes of such a magnitude by revealing before the Court their prejudicial antecedent activities. To say, on the face of the existence of such clinching circumstances and the predicament situation in which the detenus were placed, there was an imminent plausibility of their being released on bail is rather remote besides being inconceivable. 17. Even assuming for arguments sake that the detenus happened to be released on bail in the ground case, despite stout opposition emerging from the prosecuting agency, leave alone agitating the matter further by knocking at the door of the competent court for cancellation of bail, since neither the detenus’ arrest is shown; nor production after arrest before Court is made for purpose of remand in the adverse cases that came to light on their being arrested in the ground case, it cannot be stated that there were bright and imminent prospects of their being released on bail in those cases in the meantime so as to engage themselves in revelling activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 18. The special ground of attack that there is inordinate and unexplained delay in considering and disposing of the representation of the detenu Gunaraja aliasPattu alias’lqbal and as such his continued detention is impermissible and unconstitutional, as being violative of the mandatory provisions of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India, may now fall for consideration in the arena of discussion. 19. Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India reads: “When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him theearliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” 20. The Apex Court viewed with all seriousness, the supine indifference, callousness and recalcitrant attitude on the part of appropriate authorities while dealing with the representations at various stages and disposing of the same in plethoras of pronouncements and we may at this juncture appropriately refer to a few. 21. Shelat, J. in Khaind Haque v. State of West Bengal Khaind Haque v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 S.C.W.R. 529 after referring to two earlier decisions in S.K. Abdul Karim v. State of West Bengal , (1969)1 S.C.C. 433 and Druga Show IN RE. , [1970] 3 S.C.C. 696, has observed thus: “The fact that Art.22(5) enjoins upon the detaining authority to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation must implicitly mean that such representation must, when made, be considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible, otherwise, it is obvious that the obligation to furnish the earliest opportunity to make a representation loses both its purpose and meaning.” 22. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal , 1970 S.C.C. (Crl.) 92deprecated the conduct of appropriate authorities in unduly and unreasonably delaying the consideration and disposal of a representation and stated: “The reason for immediate consideration of the representation is too obvious to be stressed. The personal liberty of a person is at stake. Any delay would not only be an irresponsible act on the part of the appropriate authority but also unconstitutional because the Constitution enshrines the fundamental right of a detenu to have his representation considered and it is imperative that when the liberty of a person is in peril immediate action should be taken by the relevant authorities.” 23. Sarkaria, J. in Shaik Hanif v. State of W.B. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 679,:1974 Crl.L.J. 606: (1974)1 S.C.C. 637 :1974 S.C.C. (Crl.) 292 expressed: “It is the duty of the court to see that the efficacy of the limited yet crucial, safeguards provided in the law of preventive detention is not lost in mechanical routine, dull casualness and chill indifference on the part of the authorities entrusted with their applications.“ 24. Chinnappa Reddy, J., nFrances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra nFrances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra , 1980 S.C.C. (Crl.) 419expressed: ‘…no allowance can be made for lethargic in lifference. No allowance can be made for needless procrastination.” 25. Chinnappa Reddy, J., nFrances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra nFrances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra , 1980 S.C.C. (Crl.) 419expressed: ‘…no allowance can be made for lethargic in lifference. No allowance can be made for needless procrastination.” 25. In Raisuddin v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 46 :1983 Crl.L.J. 785 : (1983)4 S.C.C. 537 :1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 16 it is pointed out: “…If on such examination, it is found that there was any remissiness, indifference or avoidable delay on the part of the detaining authority State Government in dealing with the representation, the Court will undoubtedly treat it as a factor vitiating the continued detention of the detenu…..” 26. Ratnavel Pandian, J., in Rama Dhondu Borade v. KSaraf Commissioner of Police Rama Dhondu Borade v. KSaraf Commissioner of Police 1989 S.C.C. Crl.) 520, after referring to the dictum laid down n Smt.Shalini Soni v. Union of India Smt.Shalini Soni v. Union of India, 1981 S.C.C. Crl.) 38and some other decisions dealing with Similar questions of delayed disposal of representation, laid down the proposition of law as: “The detenu has an independent constitutional right to make his representation under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. Correspondingly, there is a constitutional mandatecommanding the concerned authority to whom the detenu forwards his representation questioning the correctness of the detention order clamped upon him and requesting for his release, to consider the said representation within reasonable dispatch and to dispose the same as expeditiously as possible. This constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect but if this constitutioial imperative is observed in breach, it would amount to negation of the constitutional obligation rendering the continued detention constitutionally impermissible and illegal, since such a breach would defeat the very concept of liberty-the highly cherished right-which is enshrined in Art.21 of the Constitution.‘ 27. However, in the .same decision His Lordship pointed out: “What is reasonable dispatch depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in that regard.“ 28. In the backdrop of the principles evolved by the Supreme Court, as respects the consideration and disposal of the representation made by a detenu, let us now proceed to scan the materials available on record to arrive at a just conclusion, in the instant case. In the backdrop of the principles evolved by the Supreme Court, as respects the consideration and disposal of the representation made by a detenu, let us now proceed to scan the materials available on record to arrive at a just conclusion, in the instant case. The consideration and disposal ofthe representation of the detenu Gunarajart alias Pattu aliasIqbal had been dealt with in paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit filed by the second respondent and it is in the following terms: “With regard to the contentions in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit, it is submitted that a representation dated nil from the detenu was received by the Government on 17.9.1990 through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras in his letter dated 35.9.1990. The parawise remarks on the said representation were called for from the Commissioner of Police, Madras in Goveriment letter dated] 8.9.1990. The same day, a copy of it was sent to the Advisory Board which was programmed to review the detenus case on 4.10.1990. The parawise remarks of the Commissioner of Police, Madras were received by the Government on 24.9.1990. The Government carefully examined the representation along with the parawise remarks of the Commissioner of Police, Madras and the connected records. The connected file was submitted to officers on 25.9.1990. The Under Secretary to Government passed orders on 25.9.1990 and Deputy Secretary to Government passed orders on 26.9.1990. The Secretary passed orders on 26.9.1990. The Minister for Law passed orders on 27.9.1990 rejecting the request of the detenu. As 27th, 28th and 30.9.1990 are Government holidays, the rejection order was issued in Government letter dated 1.10.1990 and it was served on the detenu on 1.10.1990 and his acknowledgment thereafter was obtained. It is also submitted that a representation dated 15.9.1990 and another representation submitted before the Advisory Board on 4.10.1990 from Tmt.Mehrunisa, the petitioner herein received by Government on 19.9.1990 and 5.10.1990, respectively. Even though as per Art.22(5)of the Constitution of India, the detenu has only one fold right for consideration of his representation, this respondent called for the remarks of the detaining authority and after careful examination along with the parawise remarks of the detaining authority and the connected records, the said representations were rejected on 8.10.1990 and 18.10.1990 respectively. Copies of the rejection orders were also served on the detenu on 9.10.1990 and 19.10.1990. Copies of the rejection orders were also served on the detenu on 9.10.1990 and 19.10.1990. The representations of the detenu were actively and continuously under the consideration of the Government. Hence, I submit that the contentions raised in this paragraph is not tenable or sustainable.” 29. The counter-affidavit of the first respondent dealt with this aspect of the matter in paragraph 7, which is as follows: “Regarding the contention in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the affidavit, it is not. correct to state that the representation of the detenu was not considered properly and there was delay in considering the representation. On 18.9.1990, Government called for remarks on the representation of the detenu. The same was received at this office on 18.9.1990. The remarks of the sponsoring authority were called for on 19.9.1990 and the representation was considered and reply sent to Government on 20.9.1990. Further, on 20.9.1990, Government called for remarks on the representation of the petitioner. The same was received on 20.9.1990. The remarks of the sponsoring authority was called for on 21.9.1990. 22.9.1990 and 23.9.1990 were Government holidays. The remarks of the sponsoring authority were received on 24.9.1990. This respondent was out of station on other duty on 25.9.1990. The representation was considered and reply sent to Government on 26.9.1990. Further, on 8.10.1990, Government called for remarks on the representation of the petitioner. The same was received on 9.10.1990. The representation was considered and reply sent to Government on 9.10.1990. Under the circumstances, it is not correct to state that the representation was not considered properly and that there was delay in considering the representation, by this respondent.” 30. From a cursory perusal of the relevant portions of the counter-affidavits of the first and second respondents, as extracted above, it is rather crystal clear that the Government in effect received three representations, one from the detenu Gunaraja aliasPattu aliasIqbal and two from his wife Mehrunnisa. All the three representations appeared to have been considered by the Government, after getting the remarks from the authorities concerned. The detenu sent his representation through the Central Prison, Madras and the representation so sent does not appear to bear any date. Such a representation had been despatched by the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras in his latter dated 15.9.1990 and the same was received by the Government on 17.9.1990. The detenu sent his representation through the Central Prison, Madras and the representation so sent does not appear to bear any date. Such a representation had been despatched by the Superintendent, Central Prison, Madras in his latter dated 15.9.1990 and the same was received by the Government on 17.9.1990. The Government, in turn on the next day, namely, 18.9.1990 called for paragraph wise remarks on the said representation from the Commissioner of Police, Madras. The office of the Commissioner of Police received the letter from the Government on the same date and the remarks of the sponsoring authority were called for on 19.9.1990 and the representation was considered and reply sent to the Government on 20.9.1990. The despatch so made appeared to have been received by the Government on 24.9.1990. Admittedly, 22.9T 990 and 23.9.1990 were Government holidays. Such being the case, if at all there is unexplained delay it was for one day only, that is relavable to the date 21.9.1990. Such a minimal delay, in such circumstances, appears to our mind, to be of no consequence. 31. The other two representations given by the wife of detenu, being subsequent ones, had also ‘been considered by the Government, though they had no obligation on their part to do so. In this view of the matter, we are rather afraid that the strenuous argument of learned Counsel on this aspect of the matter is to bear any fruit in yielding any result in his favour. 32. At this juncture, an. useful reference may be made to the weighty observation of His Lordship Mr. V.R.Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Bench in aru Ram v. Union of India, 1980 Crl.LJ. 1440 “Judges themselves are prisoners of the law and are not free to free a prisoner save through the open sesame of justice according to law.” The axiomatic truth lying under the aid observation comes to our rescue in securing the liberty of the detenus inasmuch as the facts of the present case fall within the parameter of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, as quoted above, which is the law declared for the country under Art.141 of the Constitution, in the sense of the same being followed by all Courts in India. 33. In this view that who have taken on the common ground of attack, it goes without saying that the impugned detention orders deserve to be quashed. 34. 33. In this view that who have taken on the common ground of attack, it goes without saying that the impugned detention orders deserve to be quashed. 34. We allow both the writ petitions and direct that both detenus be set at liberty forthwith unless they are in lawful detention otherwise.