ORDER S.K. Jha, C.J. -- 1. Shri J.P. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued very strenuously that it be declared that the provisions of section 20 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 are ultra vires as impinging upon the provision of equality clause of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The bone of contention of his argument is that there is no rational nexus between the object to be achieved by the statutory provision and the object for which the Act was brought on the statute book. 2. Before dealing with the question of vires, it is necessary to reproduce section 20 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 : "Special provision for recovery of possession in certain cases: Where the landlord in respect of any accommodation is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public Institution and the accommodation is required for the use of employees of such landlord, or in the case of a public institution, for the furtherance of its activities, then, notwithstanding anything contained in section 12 or in any other law, the Court may, on a suit being filed before it in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such accommodation by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Court is satisfied– (a) that the tenant to whom such accommodation were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment, or (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy accommodation, or (c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such accommodation, or (d) that the accommodation is required bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities. Explanation -- For the purposes of this section, 'public institution' includes any educational institution, library, hospital and charitable dispensary. 3. The sheet anchor of Shri Agrawal's contention is the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Shri Ramkrishna Dalmia and others v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and others. Explanation -- For the purposes of this section, 'public institution' includes any educational institution, library, hospital and charitable dispensary. 3. The sheet anchor of Shri Agrawal's contention is the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Shri Ramkrishna Dalmia and others v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and others. The principles enunciated in Dalmia's case (supra), by the Supreme Court have been repeatedly taken notice of both by the Apex Court as well as the different High Courts in the country. It is worthwhile to reproduce a portion of the Supreme Court's decision in Dalmia's case (supra), where S.R. Das, C.J. speaking for the Constitution Bench, laid down certain fundamental principles in this regard with regard to inhibition on the part of legislature forbidding any class legislation if such a classification is not founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that the differentia must have rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different basis namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of Supreme Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law, but also by a law of procedure. 4. The different principles culled and the case law or the juristic principles and constitutional provisions, has been, with great respect, summed up succinctly by the learned Chief Justice. It is also well established by the decisions of Supreme Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law, but also by a law of procedure. 4. The different principles culled and the case law or the juristic principles and constitutional provisions, has been, with great respect, summed up succinctly by the learned Chief Justice. These established principles are: (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is ,always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court may take into consideration the matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the fact of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot he carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. 5. The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the Court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws. 6. 5. The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the Court when it is called upon to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and violative of the equal protection of the laws. 6. Reverting back to the language of section 20 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 in question, it will be seen that the section enacts provision for recovery of possession of an accommodation belonging to any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution. By enacting this provision, the legislature has not created a class of which it could be said that it has no rational nexus with the object the legislature wants to achieve by this Act. The classification cannot, therefore, be termed as unreasonable and this section does not offend against Article 14 of the Constitution. 7. Consequently, this petition is dismissed.