JUDGMENT - DESAI A.A., J.:---The petitioner a builder by business, has questioned the correctness of order dated 17-8-1990 passed by the second respondent, Joint Charity Commissioner, in exercise of power under section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act (hereinafter called as "the Act") 2. The respondent No. 1 Alliance Ministries is a registered Public Trust under the Act. The respondent Trust amongst others held properties in question at Kodalikanal (Tamilnadu). The trust decided to dispose of the properties in question by sale, and by publication invited the offer. The petitioner respondent No. 3 amongst others submitted their offer. Correspondence was exchanged between the parties. The petitioner offered Rs. 28 lacs as a purchase price; whereas the respondent No. 3 offered Rs. 291 lacs. The respondent trust accepted the offer of respondent No. 3. The respondent Trust, therefore, on 15-10-1987 applied to the respondent Charity Commissioner for grant of permission to sell in pursuance of section 36 of the Act. The petitioner on 18-6-1988 filed his objection to the sale in favour of respondent No. 3. According to him, the sale was not in best interest of the Trust. The respondent No. 2 by impugned order dated 17-8-1990 rejected the objection of the petitioner and granted sanction for the sale in favour of the respondent No. 3. Correctness thereof has been questioned in this petition styled as one under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition was heard by the Single Judge from time to time. On 13-11-1990 the learned Single Judge issued a rule returnable on 10-12-1990 and granted interim stay as prayed by the petitioner. Thereafter, matter was listed before me for final hearing. I heard the matter for quite some time. Shri Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised the question that this matter is to be heard and decided by a Division Bench. According to him, Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court (Appellate Side) Rules, does not include the writ petitions questioning the order passed under the Act to be dealt and decided by the Single Judge. I thereupon referred the matter to the registry. It is certified on 12-4-1991 that the order impugned in the instant writ petition being one in the proceedings under the Local Act, as per sub-rule (3) of Rule 18, the matter can be heard by Single Judge. I thereupon referred the matter to the registry. It is certified on 12-4-1991 that the order impugned in the instant writ petition being one in the proceedings under the Local Act, as per sub-rule (3) of Rule 18, the matter can be heard by Single Judge. Submission of Shri Deshpande is that by amendment to Rule 18 various local Acts have been incorporated. However, the amendment omits the Act for inclusion. As such, the order passed under the Act cannot be covered by a general entry of "local Act" as envisaged under sub-rule (3) of Rule 18 which was existing even prior to the amendment. True, there is no specific inclusion of the Act. However, according to me inclusion of various Acts does not curtail the scope and ambit of the term "local Act" as referred to under sub-rule (3) of Rule 18. Shri Deshpande then made a submission that sub-rule (3) refers to decrees or order passed by any subordinate Court in any suit or proceedings. According to Shri Deshpande, the Charity Commissioner is neither a Court nor subordinate to the High Court in hierarchy. According to him, it is an authority as defined under sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Act. Section 3 provides for the appointment of the Charity Commissioner. Chapters V and VI of the Act deal with the power of the Charity Commissioner. Section 50 authorised the Charity Commissioner to file a suit in the Court. As per section 26 decision in the civil suit is binding on the Charity Commissioner. As per section 72, orders of the Charity Commissioner can be questioned by presenting application before the District Court. Sub-section (4) of section 2 defines the Court which means "District Court". The office of the Charity Commissioner thus possessed all characters of the authority. It is further submitted that Rule 18(3) refers to suit or proceedings which leads to passing of decree. As such, the term "Court" as referred to under the rule has to be understood with a restricted meaning. According to him, Civil Courts which are established on regular basis and empowered under the Local Act to deal with the particular subject-matters are only covered under the relevant rule. Therefore, the sub-rule (3) of Rule 18 has no application to assign the instant petition to the Single Judge. 3. According to him, Civil Courts which are established on regular basis and empowered under the Local Act to deal with the particular subject-matters are only covered under the relevant rule. Therefore, the sub-rule (3) of Rule 18 has no application to assign the instant petition to the Single Judge. 3. This Court in the case of (S.D. Ghatge v. State of Maharashtra)1, A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 384, while explaining the meaning of the term "Court" with reference to Article 227 of the Constitution has observed: "It follows that the High Court's power of judicial superintendence under the amended Article 227 certainly covers judgments of all courts meaning thereby all regular Civil and Criminal Courts subject to its appellate or revisional jurisdiction but also extends to Tribunals, bodies or authorities, whatever be their label provided two conditions are satisfied: (a) such Tribunal, body or authority is basically a Court i.e. it performs judicial function of rendering definitive judgments having finality and authoritativeness to bind the parties litigating their rights before it in exercise of sovereign judicial power transferred to it by the State and (b) such Tribunal, body or authority is subject to High Court's appellate or revisional jurisdiction." If regular Civil Court in the hierarchy passes the order, then aggrieved party has a remedy under the Civil Procedure Code. The Court as referred to cannot be confined to the courts in the hierarchy of the High Court. The term "Court" is to be understood in common parlance in reference to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Other authorities with their outer appearance whether function as a Court is a pertinent question. Section 74 provides that all enquiries under the Act shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 73 provides: "In holding inquiries under this Act, the officer holding the same shall have the same powers as are vested in courts in respect of the following matters under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in trying a suit:--- (a) proof of facts by affidavits, (b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath. (c) ordering discovery and inspection and compelling the production of documents, (d) issuing of commissions." The Charity Commissioner under section 36 thus definitely discharges the judicial function. (c) ordering discovery and inspection and compelling the production of documents, (d) issuing of commissions." The Charity Commissioner under section 36 thus definitely discharges the judicial function. The order passed by the Charity Commissioner is determinative, having finality and authoritatively bind the parties. It exercises the power judicially as conferred by the Statute. The Charity Commissioner, therefore, possessed the necessary trapping of the Court for the purposes of Article 227 of the Constitution. In (Bapusaheb Balasaheb Patil v. State)2, A.I.R. 1975 Bom. 143, an officer on Special Duty appointed by State Government under section 3 of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, is held to be a Court for the purposes of Contempt of Courts Act. 4. The next question is whether the Charity Commissioner is a Court subordinate to the High Court. In (V.A. Chitale v. Vidya Vardhini Sabha)3, 1985 Cri.L.J. 359, it is held that the Charity Commissioner in exercise of power conferred under section 51 of the Act is under the judicial subordination of the High Court within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution. These authorities, therefore, are Court even within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act. To ascertain the subordinate, the authorities which assumed the character of a Court need not be one in the hierarchy. The question is, can Charity Commissioner decline to follow decision or direction of High Court? Answer to this by any logical conclusion cannot be in negative. I, therefore, record that the Charity Commissioner is a subordinate Court for the purposes of Article 227 of the Constitution as referred to in sub-rule (3) of Rule 18. I, therefore, hold that the matter is rightly allocated to the Single Bench in pursuance of Rule 18(3) of the Bombay High Court (Appellate Side) Rules, 1960. 5. The grievance of the petitioner is that he has not been granted an opportunity to negotiate. In case of such opportunity, he was anxious to offer the more price. In the pursis before this Court, the petitioner has offered Rs. 35 lacs for the property in question. Another grievance is that all the trustees were not present while accepting the offer of respondent No. 3. Particularly Rev. Both was absent in the meeting. As such, acceptance of the offer and subsequent sanction accorded thereto by the Charity Commissioner, are not in the interest of trust. 35 lacs for the property in question. Another grievance is that all the trustees were not present while accepting the offer of respondent No. 3. Particularly Rev. Both was absent in the meeting. As such, acceptance of the offer and subsequent sanction accorded thereto by the Charity Commissioner, are not in the interest of trust. The basic question is, what is a locus of the petitioner to canvass the grievance. According to Shri Deshpande, right of a person to question the correctness of the order of Charity Commissioner does not depend on his having interest in the trust. Moreover, the petitioner filed the objection in the proceedings under section 36 of the Act. He was thus a party to the proceedings and he has right to approach this Court being a party aggrieved. 6. Proceedings under section 36 of the Act are not a lis between the parties to adjudicate the contesting claim. Mandate of section 36 is that no transfer of the trust property shall be valid unless approved by the Charity Commissioner with a previous sanction. The Charity Commissioner as per the scheme has to accord sanction, having regard to the interest or benefit of the trust. The Charity Commissioner in these proceedings after enquiry has to record a satisfaction in that behalf. Section 36 merely authorities the Charity Commissioner to ascertain as to whether the trustees acted in the best interest of the trust. As per section 73-A any person having an interest in the Public Trust could be joined as a party in such proceedings on his application on such terms and conditions as the person holding enquiry may direct. The petitioner is a builder having no interest in the trust. His interest if any is commercial for the purposes of purchase of the trust property. He cannot even be objector much less even a proper party. Sub-section (2) of section 36 provides for revocation of the sanction under certain condition. Sub-section (3) of section 36 provides that revocation would be made only after granting reasonable opportunity to a person in whose favour the sanction was accorded. Such person may be at liberty to question the correctness of revocation since it entails the civil consequence and affects his right by approaching this Court by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution. Sub-section (3) of section 36 provides that revocation would be made only after granting reasonable opportunity to a person in whose favour the sanction was accorded. Such person may be at liberty to question the correctness of revocation since it entails the civil consequence and affects his right by approaching this Court by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution. The petitioner, since neither a necessary or nor a proper party to the proceedings under section 36, cannot claim any entitlement to invoke Article 227 of the Constitution to canvass his grievance against the sanction accorded under sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Act. 7. According to Shri Deshpande, the respondent No. 1 invited the offer. In pursuance thereof, the petitioner has submitted the offer. However, the trustees have acted improperly in rejecting the offer of the petitioner and accepting the offer of the respondent. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to participate in the proceedings under section 36 of the Act and also can approach this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The submission is wholly erroneous. Even if there is an impropriety, irregularity or illegality on the part of trustee while finalising the transaction, the petitioner is at liberty to take such appropriate step to claim damages or compensation for such breach. However, he not being a person having interest in the trust cannot question the correctness of the order passed under section 36 of the Act. The petitioner is a builder who is anxious to purchase and not being a person having interest in the trust or a beneficiary cannot question the correctness or legality of the order. The petitioner to succeed in his commercial deal under the guise of a guardian of the interest of a trust is prosecuting this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution which cannot be entertained. He is in reality prosecuting his personal commercial interest which cannot be permitted. In (Arunodaya Prefab v. M.D. Kambli)4, 1979 Mh.L.J. 104, it is observed that under section 36 of the Act read with Rule 24, the Charity Commissioner is concerned only with the according or refusing sanction to particular sale which the trustees proposed to make. It is a proceeding which concerns only with the trustees. To decide whether the sale is in the interest of the trust, he is empowered to make such enquiries as deemed necessary. It is a proceeding which concerns only with the trustees. To decide whether the sale is in the interest of the trust, he is empowered to make such enquiries as deemed necessary. It is for the trustees to decide to whom they should sell the property subject to the sanction of the Charity Commissioner to the proposed sale. It is further held that the petitioners who have sent uninvited offer to the Charity Commissioner have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Charity Commissioner by writ petition on the ground of being higher-bidder. The Charity Commissioner is not obliged to associate with the petitioner into enquiry or to consider the offer made by the petitioner. Shri Deshpande tried to urge that in the instant case, the petitioner made an offer on invitation. Therefore, he is entitled to maintain this petition. I am unable to agree. The nature of the proceedings under section 36 and the scope is definite. Even if the offer was made by the petitioner on the invitation of the trustees, he does not acquire any right to question the legality or correctness of the order passed by the Charity Commissioner under section 36 of the Act. 8. It is specifically pointed out by the respondent No. 1 trustee that the interest of the petitioner was ostensible. He has no genuine interest even in purchase. The petitioner is litigating at the behest of M/s. Rahija Construction which was a bidder on the earlier occasion. The petitioner is admittedly a close relation of Chandu Rahija. It is specifically averred that the petitioner and Chandu Rahija has an office located at Kodaikanal which is a subject-matter of sale. The petitioner has no resources or commercial potentiality to purchase the property. He is making this venture on behalf of the Rahija Construction. It is further averred that the advertisement marked as Annexure A with the petition on which the claim is based has nothing to do with the petitioner. The petitioner had not submitted an offer in pursuance of the said advertisement. M/s. Rahija Construction Company was the bidder in pursuance of the said advertisement. It is further specifically averred that this petitioner filed an affidavit before the City Civil Court in Civil Suit No. 4531/87 supporting the claim of Rahija Construction. All these averments as made have not been refuted by any counter reply. M/s. Rahija Construction Company was the bidder in pursuance of the said advertisement. It is further specifically averred that this petitioner filed an affidavit before the City Civil Court in Civil Suit No. 4531/87 supporting the claim of Rahija Construction. All these averments as made have not been refuted by any counter reply. It is thus apparent that the petitioner is indulging in this vexatious litigation. As such, it is apparent that the petitioner is indulging in this legal battle not for his own interest but making an endeavour to cherish the grievance of somebody else. 9. The petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 10. The petitioner made an offer of Rs. 35 lacs. This is without any bona fide. To make such offer at the stage cannot be said to be in good faith. The submission of Shri Deshpande that such offer can be accepted even in Court. Such offer possibly could be accepted only when the petitioner is bona fidely litigating with a legal right to approach this Court. If it is merely an attempt to forestall the transaction, it is not expedient to encourage such litigants. Besides availing the highest offer in the interest of trust, sanctity to a transaction is a matter of paramount consideration. Transaction legally entered into between the parties and approved by the Charity Commissioner cannot be permitted to oscillate, according to commercial climatic condition. The petition is dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 5,000/- payable to respondent No. 1-Trust. Petition dismissed. -----