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1991 DIGILAW 237 (KER)

Thomas Joseph v. State of Kerala

1991-06-22

M.A.ANSARI, T.C.RAGHAVAN

body1991
JUDGMENT M.A. Ansari, C.J. 1. These appeals are against the judgment of a learned Judge of this Court, declining to issue writ against the notification as well as he bye-laws by the Municipal Council, Changanacherry. A. S. No. 793 is against the dismissal of O. P. 690/59 and A. S. 795 is against the order in O. P. 418/59. The appellant in the former, is one Thomas Joseph in his capacity of the Secretary of the Changanacherry Merchants Association, while the same person has filed the other appeal in his individual capacity. The grounds raised against the notification are identical, and would be better understood with a short summary of the bye-laws, the new rules and notification being given in the very beginning. 2. The Municipal Council is governed by the Travancore District Municipalities Act, No. XXIII of 116, hereafter referred to as the Act, which, among other things, provides for places not being used for certain purposes without licence. The provision in contained in Section 261, which is in Chapter XII of the Act, and by publishing notification in the Gazette and by beat of drum, authorizes the Council, directing that no place within the municipal limits should be used for any one or more of the purposes specified in Schedule III without the licence of the executive authority and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein. The provision to the Section enacts that the notification would take effect after sixty days from the date of publication and with the previous sanction of the Government in any area outside the Municipal limits. The authorization to make rules is given in Section 326, which provides that the Council may make bye-laws, not inconsistent with the Act or with any other law, for several things enumerated in the Section. Further conditions on the authority to frame by-laws is provided by Section 330, which enacts that no bye-law or cancellation or alteration of a bye-law shall have effect until the same shall have been approved and confirmed by the Government, and that the bye-law or cancellation or alteration shall be published in the Gazette, after which they will come into operation. Section 332 requires, complete copies in English and in a language of the district, of all bye-laws in force for the time being, to be kept for sales to the public at the cost price; and in addition to the aforesaid requirements. Section 329 reads as follows:- The Municipal Council shall, before making or altering bye-laws, publish a draft of the proposed bye-laws and alterations together with a notice specifying a date at or after which such draft will be taken into constitution, and shall, before making the bye-laws or alterations, receive and consider any objection or suggestion which may be made in respect of such draft by any person interested therein before the date so specified. The other provisions of the Act necessary for purposes of the appeal before us are Sections 349 and 350, read as follows:- 349. Save as otherwise provided, every notification under this Act other than one issued by Our Government, shall be published in Our Government Gazette both in English and in a language of the district. 350. Every bye-law, order, notice or other document directed to be published under this Act shall, unless a different method be prescribed by this Act, or by the Council, be written in or translated into the language of the District and deposited at the Municipal Office, and a copy shall be posted up in a conspicuous position at such office and such other places as the Council may direct. And a public proclamation shall be made throughout Municipality by beat of drum that such copy has been so posted up and that the original is open to inspection at the Municipal office. The next important extract from the Act is Schedule III referred to in Section 261, and contains the list of businesses, whose being carried on would require licence. That list mentions: grain selling wholesale or storing for wholesale trade, manufacture, storing, packing, pressing, cleansing, preparing or manufacturing by any process whatsoever * * * * * * * * * * * In general, any purpose or the doing in the course of any industrial process anything which in the opinion of the executive authority is likely to be dangerous to human life or health or property or is likely to creative or cause a nuisance. 3. 3. In exercise of the aforesaid powers of framing the bye-laws, the Municipal Council had framed Rules, providing, among other things, licence being taken by those carrying on retail grain shops. This requirement received Government sanction on December 22, 1958, and was published along with the notification under Section 261, in the Kerala Gazette dated January 27, 1959. Soon after the writ petitions in which these appeals arise were filed, complaining that requiring persons o take licence for businesses not expressly mentioned in Schedule III was bad and the authorization under the last item of the Schedule being not canalized amounted to the unconstitutional delegations of framing Rules. The next ground is that the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) has been infringed. In addition to these two constitutional objections, the further complaint is the failure to observe the requirements of Section 349, as the notification under Section 261, had not been issued in Malayalam. 4. The learned Judge has held that the provision of Section 349 was directory; and therefore, the failure to publish in Malayalam was not fatal. He has not expressed any opinion on the authorization under the residuary item of the schedule being illegal due to the aforesaid direction not being canalized. But the appellant's learned advocate has particularly urged that objection before us, relying on Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India (A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 554).The proposition, however, is now well settled that only that legislative delegation is bad, where the enactment not necessarily by its preamble, but after all the Sections have been summarized, fails to give any indication of the object, for which the legislation had been made. It follows that the impugned item would be struck down only if Schedule III, along with the other provisions of the Act, be found not to have furnished the object, the policy or the purpose, which would guide the delegated authority to frame rules. But on going through the several provisions of the Act, it is clear that the Act, like all other similar enactments, contemplates framing bye-laws to preserve the sanitation of particular locality or guard it against epidemic or other forms of activities, injuriously affecting the health or comfort of its residents. But on going through the several provisions of the Act, it is clear that the Act, like all other similar enactments, contemplates framing bye-laws to preserve the sanitation of particular locality or guard it against epidemic or other forms of activities, injuriously affecting the health or comfort of its residents. It is also clear that the taking of licence for carrying on business, has been provided in order to control, among other things, such business as attract rats which carried plagues. Nor do we see what assistance the learned Advocate can derive from Hamdard Dawakhans's case (A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 554), which affirms the rule laid down in earlier pronouncements of the same Court about what is the proper limit of legislative delegation. That limit, as we have already stated, is that the delegate must not be uncontrolled, and we have found the Act in the cases before us not to have erred by leaving the object not sufficiently indicated by its provisions. Therefore the first ground fails. 5. Coming to the complaint of the fundamental right being infringed, it is obvious that the right is controlled by Article 19(6), which authorizes reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. Were it otherwise, the Legislature would be without authority of insisting on business dangerous to the public health being carried on with licence controlling its dangerous effects. Obviously, Section 261, read with Schedule III of the Act, authorizes reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public, and the second complaint also, therefore, fails. 6. Regarding the objection of failure to publish the notification and the bye-laws in Malayalam and the direction in Section 349 being mandatory, we are grateful to the learned Advocates on both sides for having placed before us large number of authorities on what are mandatory and directory provisions. We, however, feel that powers under Article 226 should not be exercised unless substantial miscarriage of justice is done to the party invoking the jurisdiction. There is no complaint that prior to the rule being framed, the businessmen in the particular locality were not given adequate opportunity to see the rules in their draft form. Nor is there any complaint that the rules in the form required by the act are not kept at the Municipality's office. There is no complaint that prior to the rule being framed, the businessmen in the particular locality were not given adequate opportunity to see the rules in their draft form. Nor is there any complaint that the rules in the form required by the act are not kept at the Municipality's office. Moreover, there has been publication by beat of drum, and the writ petitioners do not profess not to know English, in which language the notification and the bye-laws had been published. In these circumstances we fail to understand how the petitioners can claim to be unaware of the rules due to their publication not being in Malayalam. They must have become aware of the rules and notification, because they know the language, in which they have been published. Therefore, there is no miscarriage of justice so far as the petitioners are concerned, and consequently there is no necessity to decide whether the publication in Malayalam is mandatory under the Act. We, therefore, see no force in these appeals, which are dismissed with costs, counsel's fee being fixed at Rs. 100/- in each.