JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---We purpose to dispose of this group of four appeals through a common judgment for the reason that the point of law that falls for determination in all the four cases is a common one. The brief facts giving rise to these appeals may be summarized as follows. 2. The four appellants before us at the relevant time, i.e., in the year 1979-80, were employees of Air India and were stationed at Calcutta. Pursuant to certain incidents that are alleged to have taken place in the month of October 1980, the Corporation instituted disciplinary proceedings against these employees and on the culmination of those proceedings, it was decided to award certain punishments to the four employees. We are not immediately concerned with the greater part of those proceedings because it is common ground that the Corporation applied to the National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, by way of four approval applications under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as"the said Act") to grant approval for the proposed disciplinary action. One of the requirements of that section is that the employees in question must be paid the equivalent of one month's salary or wages. It appears from the order of the Tribunal that the concerned employees resisted the grant of approval and that they filed their written statements in those proceedings. Those written statements dealt with the merits of the cases. 3. In the course of the arguments that were advanced, however, one more ground was canvassed on behalf of the employees, namely, that the requirements in respect of payment of one month's wages had not been complied with by the Corporation. What was, in fact contended was that even though certain payments had been made to the concerned employees by Air India, the quantum of the amount did not correspond with the one month's wages and that, consequently, the mandatory requirements of the section had not been complied with. The learned Member of the Tribunal dealt with various aspects of the cases on merits and recorded findings against the employees. The learned Member of the Tribunal dealt with various aspects of the cases on merits and recorded findings against the employees. However, in the concluding part of the order, while dealing with the objections in relation to section 33(2)(c) of the said Act, the learned Member upheld the objection and recorded the finding that the approval as sought could not be granted on the ground that the requirements of the section had not been complied with or rather that the mandatory requirements had been breached. 4. It is necessary for us to mention while dealing with the factual aspect of the case that one circumstance of significance had taken place in the course of that proceeding, namely, that when this objection was raised on behalf of the employees, the Corporation pointed out that the amount deducted by them at the time when the payments in question has been made, was the amount which the Corporation was required to deduct from the salary or wages under the West Bengal State Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employment Act, 1979. There is some dispute in two of the four cases with regard to whether the quantum ought to have been Rs. 10/- or Rs. 15/- which, in our opinion, is not of much consequence, but what needs to be pointed out is that the Corporation at that point of time tendered to the employees in question, without prejudice to their contention that they had originally acted in a correct manner, the difference of the amount. The employees had not accepted the amount and the Corporation thereupon deposited the disputed amount with the Tribunal. As indicated earlier, it was on this solitary ground that the Tribunal refused to grant sanction and, accordingly, dismissed the applications. 5. The Corporation thereafter preferred four writ petitions before this Court, namely, Writ Petitions Nos. 1287/83, 1288/83, 1289/83 and 1290/83. These writ petitions were heard by a learned Single Judge who, by his judgment and order dated 21-1-1986, allowed the petitions in question. The learned Single Judge took the view that the Tribunal was in error in having refused to grant the approval on the ground that the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act had been breached and, accordingly, set aside that finding. The learned Single Judge took the view that the Tribunal was in error in having refused to grant the approval on the ground that the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act had been breached and, accordingly, set aside that finding. However, in the course of the hearing, it was pointed out to the learned Single Judge by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that since the learned member of the Tribunal had upheld this objection on a point of law that he had not proceeded to consider several of the other contentions that the employees desired to advance in their defence. Consequently, the learned Single Judge remanded the proceeding to the Tribunal for a decision on merits as regards the remaining issues. It is against this judgment and order that the employees have filed the present set of appeals. 6. The issue that falls for determination before us spans a very limited compass. It can briefly be summarized as follows :--- "Whether in computing the amount of one month's salary to be paid under section 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act the employer is justified in reducing the amount actually tendered to the employee to the extent of the statutory tax deductions". 7. Appearing on behalf of the appellants, Mr. Phadnis has contended that a clear and unambiguous interpretation of the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act must necessarily imply that the quantum in terms of money that is required to be tendered to an employee prior to the stage at which the approval is sought must be the whole of the amount that comprises one month's wages/salary. Mr. Phadnis drew our attention to the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act, which are as follows :--- "(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman-- Provided that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer." Mr. Phadnis further contended that such payment is condition precedent for the grant of approval and, consequently, according to him, unless and until the whole of that amount has been tendered to the employee, it is not open to the employer to apply for the grant of approval nor is it open to the Tribunal to accord such approval. In support of his submission, Mr. Phadnis drew our attention to the definition of wages as appearing in section 2(rr) of the said Act, which is as follows:- "(rr) "wages" means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes-- (i) such allowance (including dearness allowance) as the workman is for the time being entitled to; (ii) the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity or of any service or of any concessional supply of foodgrains or other articles; (iii) any travelling concession, (iv) any commission payable on the promotion of sales or business or both; but does not include-- (a) any bonus; (b) any contribution paid or payable by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund or for the benefit of the workman under any law for the time being in force; (c) any gratuity payable on the termination of his service;" What needs to be noted is that the additions and deletions do not refer to tax dues. This Act concerns itself only with the methodology of arriving at the aggregate wage figure and is silent with regard to statutory or tax deductions implying thereby that they would be applicable wherever the law so requires. 8. Mr. Phadnis further submitted that for purposes of interpreting the provisions of the said Act, it is this definition alone that will have to be taken into account. What he contended is basically that in so far as the definition of section 2(rr) of the said Act does not contemplate any deduction, not even by way of deductions that are required to be made by operation of statute, such as tax deduction as has been done in the present case, that the employer is obliged to tender to the employee concerned the whole of the amount in question. The argument of Mr. Phadnis is further expanded to the extent that he submits that a tax deduction of salary or wages in cases where the law requires such deduction to be made can only arise in relation to payments for work that has, in fact, been undertaken and the tender of an amount under section 33(2)(b) of the said Act is not such payment in return for the actual work. He, therefore, submits that if at all an incidence of tax arises that it is the responsibility of the person who receives the amount to discharge that obligation and that if he is right with regard to his interpretation under section 2(rr) of the said Act that the deduction even of a tax amount under section 33(2)(b) of the said Act would be totally barred. 9. Mr. Phadnis has drawn our attention to a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of (Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Co. v. S.K. Dutta)1, 1970(II) L.L.J. 547. In that case, the Court while interpreting the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act held that payment of one month wages had to be effected without making any deduction of dues. In that case, certain recoveries were required to be made from the employee that related to an earlier loan. It was undisputed that these recoveries were to be effected from month to month by way of deduction from the employee's salary. In keeping with the earlier practice while making payment under section 33(2)9(b) of the said Act, the employer had sought to deduct this amount. The Court, however, did not approve of this deduction is so far as it was not a deduction that was contemplated under section 2(rr) of the Act and accordingly the Court held that there was a breach of the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act. It is essential for us to record that the facts of the case before the Patna High Court are distinguishable from the facts of the present cases in so far as the deduction that was made in that case was not a statutory deduction. It is essential for us to record that the facts of the case before the Patna High Court are distinguishable from the facts of the present cases in so far as the deduction that was made in that case was not a statutory deduction. Furthermore, even if the reasoning adopted by the learned Judges of the Patna High Court in that decision were to be applied to the facts of the present case, it will have to be noted that the amounts deducted in the present instance do not come within the prohibition of section 2(rr) of the said Act. 10. Mr. Phadnis also placed heavy reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (Bharat Electronics Ltd., Bangalore v. Industrial Tribunal, Karnatak)2, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1080. This again was a case in which the Court was concerned with section 2(rr) and section 33(2)(b) of the said Act, but it is necessary for us to prefix our observations by stating that the case in question related to the addition or otherwise of the night shift allowance. Essentially, the Court in that case was concerned with the definition of wages as appearing in section 2(rr) of the said Act and the question as to whether the night shift allowance had to be added on or not to the wages. There can be no dispute about the fact that the provisions of section 2(rr) of the said Act must be strictly complies with and any deviation that position would certainly attract an adverse order from a Court. 11. Mr. Phadnis, also placed heavy reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph (17) of that judgment wherein the Court has observed as follows :-- "How could a short payment of Rs. 12/- be said to have lessened the softening of such rigour is thought stirring. Viewed in the context, there could genuinely be a dispute, as in the present case, as to whether a particular sum was due as wages. It is, of course, risky for the management to raise it as to pay even a paisa less than the month's wages due under section 33(2)(b), would be fatal to its permission sought. Viewed in the context, there could genuinely be a dispute, as in the present case, as to whether a particular sum was due as wages. It is, of course, risky for the management to raise it as to pay even a paisa less than the month's wages due under section 33(2)(b), would be fatal to its permission sought. But at the same time it needs to be clarified that it is for the management to establish, when questioned, that the sum paid to the workman under section 33(2)(b) represented full wages of the month following the date of discharge or dismissal, as conceived of in the provision and as interpreted by us in entwining the ratios in (Bennett Coleman v. Punya Priya Das Gupta)3, case A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 426 (supra) and (Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India)4, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 130, (supra) and adding something ourselves thereto". Mr. Phadnis contended on the basis of the observations of the Supreme Court that it was clearly and unequivocally observed by the Supreme Court that the issue is not with regard to the quantum which in that case was Rs. 12/-, but the strict compliance with the statutory provisions and that, consequently, there was no difference whether the amount was Rs. 12/- or for that matter one paisa because the breach was a breach and that such a breach would have fatal consequences. The point in dispute was the addition of the night shift allowance that formed one of the components of the pay-packet and was entirely different from the situation in the present case where after correctly computing the aggregate wages, a statutory tax-deduction had been made. The real issue that falls for determination is as to whether a breach of the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act has occurred because there can be no dispute with regard to the principle that if such a breach has occurred, then the consequences must follow. 12. Relying on these decisions, Mr. Phadnis, therefore, submitted that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in allowing the petitions, namely, that the deduction made by the Corporation in the present case while effecting the payments was a permissible reduction and that, consequently, there was no breach of the provision of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act, would have to be set aside. Mr. Mr. Phadnis forcefully contended, drawing considerable support from the observations of the Supreme Court, that the provisions of this section are mandatory and that no leniency is permissible with regard to their enforcement and that, consequently, the Tribunal was fully justified in having strictly enforced those provisions. 13. Appearing on behalf of the respondent-Corporation, Mr. Andhyarujina, learned Counsel, has, in the first instance, submitted to the Court that the entire challenge proceeds on what he terms as an 'erroneous' basis. Mr. Andhyarujina, in the first instance, points out that the cases referred to by Mr. Phadnis related to what could be regarded as deductions. Mr. Andhyarajina submits that section 2(rr) of the said Act concerns itself with additions or subtractions while computing the total amount that constitutes wages or salary. He submits that what we are concerned with is the amount that is required to be disbursed to the employee, and in his submission it is this amount that section 33(2)(b) of the said Act concerns itself with. For this purpose, Mr. Andhyarujina has drawn our attention to the definition of "salary" or "wages" as appearing in section 2(j) of the West Bengal State Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employments Act, 1979. The definition is reproduced below :--- "Salary" or "wages" includes pay, dearness allowance and all other remunerations received by any person on regular basis, whether payable in cash or in kind, and also includes perquisites, and profits in lieu of salary, as defined in section 17 of the Income-tax Act, 1961;" Mr. Andhyarujina, therefore, submits that this definition is the one that is material as far as the present proceedings are concerned and that it is an all encompassing definition which takes into account section 17 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Section 17(1) of the Income-Tax Act defines "salary" as follows :- "17. Andhyarujina, therefore, submits that this definition is the one that is material as far as the present proceedings are concerned and that it is an all encompassing definition which takes into account section 17 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Section 17(1) of the Income-Tax Act defines "salary" as follows :- "17. For the purposes of section 15 and 16 of this section,-- (1) "salary" includes-- (i) wages; (ii) any annuity or pension, (iii) any gratuity; (iv) any fees, commissions, perquisites or profits in lieu of or in addition to any salary or wages; (v) any advance of salary; (va) any payment received by an employee in respect of any period of leave not availed of by him; (vi) the annual accretion to the balance at the credit of an employee participating in a recognised provident fund, to the extent to which it is chargeable to tax under Rule 6 of part A of the Fourth Schedule; and (vii) the aggregate of all sums that are comprised in the transferred balance as referred to in sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 of Part A of the Fourth Schedule of an employee participating in a recognised provident fund, to the extent to which it is chargeable to tax under sub-rule (4) thereof;" 14. It is the contention advanced by Mr. Andhyarujina that reading these two definitions harmoniously that the Court will, therefore, have to determine as to what is the quantum, in terms of money, which the employee is required to be paid by way of salary or wages under section 33(2)(b) of the said Act. He has further drawn our attention to section 4 of the West Bengal State Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and employments Act, which deals with the employer's liability to deduct and pay tax on behalf of employees. Under section 4, which is reproduced below, a statutory obligation is cast on the employer to deduct and pay to the Government the amount of tax that is payable under the provisions of this Act, and the Schedule to this Act very clearly indicates the mode of deduction which is that the deduction small be made from the monthly salary or wages payable. "4. "4. Employers' liability to deduct and pay tax on behalf of employees---The tax payable under this Act by any person earning a salary or wage shall be deducted by his employer from the salary or wage payable to such person, before such salary or wage is paid to him, and such employer shall, irrespective of whether such deduction has been made or not when the salary or wage is paid to such persons, be liable to pay tax on behalf of all such persons : Provided that if the employer is an officer of Government, the State Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, prescribe by rules the manner in which the employer shall discharge the said liability : Provided further that where any person earning a salary or wage-- (a) is also covered by one or more entries other than entry I in the Schedule and the rate of tax under the said entry, or (b) is simultaneously engaged in employment of more than one employer, and such person furnishes to his employer or employers a certificate in the prescribed form declaring, inter alia, that he shall obtain a certificate of enrolement under sub-section (2) of section 5 and pay the tax himself, then the employer or employers of such person shall not deduct the tax from the salary or wage payable to such person and such employer or employers, as the case may be, shall not be liable to pay tax on behalf of such person". Mr. Andhyarujina, therefore, submits that unlike other heads of allowance about which there may or may not be dispute that with regard to these statutory deductions there be no dispute whatsoever. He further submits that there is no option left to the employer who in this instance was the Corporation while disbursing the payment to the employee, except to deduct the tax amounts payable. Mr. Andhyarujina accordingly contended that the Corporation had acted correctly and that the action on its behalf was justified and, consequently, that the Tribunal ought not to have refused sanction purely on the ground that the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act had been breached. Mr. Andhyarujina accordingly contended that the Corporation had acted correctly and that the action on its behalf was justified and, consequently, that the Tribunal ought not to have refused sanction purely on the ground that the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act had been breached. We agree with this submission because it is abundantly clear that the law casts upon the Corporation the duty to deduct at source the amount payable by way of profession tax and in complying with this requirement, it cannot be charged with having breached the requirements of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act. In fact, the making of payment under this section pre-supposes the compliance with other laws for the time being in force. 15. Mr. Andhyarujina advanced another submission which, to our mind, is of some consequence. He pointed out that a learned Single Judge had taken serious note of the fact that the objection which ultimately found favour with the learned Member of the Tribunal had not been canvassed in the written statement. At the point of time when this objection was raised before the Tribunal without prejudice to its contention that it has acted correctly, the Corporation immediately offered the disputed amount; whether it was accepted by the employees or not is quite irrelevant. Mr. Andhyarujina submits that this is not a case where there was a complete breach of the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act because admittedly the Corporation had paid the greater part of the amount less a very small quantum in respect of which the present dispute has been raised. He, therefore, submits that even if there was a marginal error or mistake on the part of the Corporation that it immediately offered to correct the position and, consequently, that what had transpired could not have been construed as a breach of the provisions of the section. In support of his submission, Mr. Andhyarujina placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of (B. Lawrie and Co. v. W.B. More)5, 1981(42) F.L.R. 272. In that case the Court was concerned with a situation where the payment tendered under section 32(2)(b) of the said Act fell short of the actual requirements and a question arose as to whether this infirmity was curable. v. W.B. More)5, 1981(42) F.L.R. 272. In that case the Court was concerned with a situation where the payment tendered under section 32(2)(b) of the said Act fell short of the actual requirements and a question arose as to whether this infirmity was curable. The relevant observations of the Court are as follows :-- "The employer will be entitled to some consideration if in his application for permission he were to bring these facts and contentions to the notice of the Tribunal and make an offer to deposit the dispute amount before the Tribunal either along with the application or within such time as the Tribunal may order with a further offer that the same may be paid to the employee as and when directed by the Tribunal". Though on the facts of that case the High Court held that the conduct on the part of that employer ought not to be condoned because the Court came to the conclusion that the employer was wholly lacking in bona fide, what in principle was decided was effectively that the defect is, in fact, a curable one. 16. A clear reading of the provisions of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act will indicate, as has been observed by the learned Judges of the Patna High Court, who have reproduced the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (Syndicate Bank Ltd. v. V. Ramnath Bhat)6, 1967(32) F.J.R. 490, that essentially the payment in question is be made in order to "soften the rigour of unemployment that will face the workman, against whom the order of discharge or dismissal has been passed". This is a provision analogous to some of the requirements whereby termination of an employee is permissible on payment of equivalent of one or more months' salary. What was essentially intended by the Legislature is that one month's salary or wages were required to be paid to the employee concerned. Undoubtedly, this is a mandatory provision and, therefore, will have to be strictly construed, but the enforcement cannot be carried to unreasonable limits and that too in border line cases. We are on a much stronger footing in this case where admittedly there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the section even according to the case of the appellants. All that the law has provided for is that the employee should not be sent away "empty-handed". We are on a much stronger footing in this case where admittedly there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the section even according to the case of the appellants. All that the law has provided for is that the employee should not be sent away "empty-handed". This is only one of the procedural requirements which must be conformed to and as has been rightly observed by the earlier judgment of this Court referred to supra, that if there is marginal shortfall and if it is demonstrated in a given case that it was a bona fide error that the defect is certainly curable. In substance and in principle, therefore, it will have to be held that such a situation cannot be construed as constituting a breach of the mandatory provisions of the Act sufficient to deny approval on this ground alone. 17. There is considerable justification in the argument advanced by Mr. Andhyarujina, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation, when he points out that in the present case the Corporation was not at all in error in having reduced the amount that was actually tendered. The Corporation, as indicated earlier, is required to observe the provisions of the various laws for the time being in force, namely, the provisions of the Income-tax Act or other Acts as were in force in the State of West Bengal. Furthermore, a reading of section 33(2)(b) of the said Act itself will fortify this position because that provision does not contain a non-obstante clause and, consequently, will have to be read to mean that the provision of this section will have to be harmoniously construed and applied in conjunction with the provisions of other laws for the time being in force. 18. While construing the provisions of section 4 of the West Bengal State Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employment Act, Mr. Andhyarujina has rightly submitted that the amount deducted by the Corporation will have to be construed in law as an amount tendered to the Government by the Corporation on behalf of the employees. He has amplified the position by pointing out that the courts have held as unjustified any "non-addition" of a necessary component of the wage packet or any impermissible deduction. The "wages" as understood under section 33(2)(b) of the said Act would signify the correct amount so payable to the employee. He has amplified the position by pointing out that the courts have held as unjustified any "non-addition" of a necessary component of the wage packet or any impermissible deduction. The "wages" as understood under section 33(2)(b) of the said Act would signify the correct amount so payable to the employee. This amount by operation of law stands reduced by "deductions at source" or "statutory deductions" by way of tax-payments. The ultimate test would be as to whether the amount tendered corresponded with what the employee would receive as wages in the normal course of his employment. The retention of the tax amount by the Corporation was, therefore, synonymous with its tender to the Government by the employee. Legally and factually, this is the correct interpretation of section 4 and, consequently, the reduction of the amount under this head cannot be regarded as deduction from the wages payable. 19. In this view of the matter, the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants by Mr. Phadnis will have to be rejected. The appeals accordingly fail. The judgment and order of the trial Judges stands confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----