ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) JUDGMENT of acquittal passed in appeal by the learned Sessions Judge, Balasore is impugned in this revision application by the informant. ( 2 ) OPPOSITE Party No. 1 faced trial for alleged commission of offence punishable under S. 436 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'ipc' ). ( 3 ) PROSECUTION case bereft of unnecessary details is that on 6-11-1983 at 3 a. m. , the accused-opposite party No. 1 set fire to house of informant resulting in great loss and damage to a row of houses belonging to the informant part of which was let out to tenants also. The motive for this crime was indicated to be rivalry between informant's brother and accused-opposite party No. 1 relating to puja committee affairs. The incident was reported to the Assistant Sub-Inspector in-charge of Rupsa Out Post on 6-11-1983 at 7 a. m. Plea of defence was one of denial and false implication was also pleaded. ( 4 ) PROSECUTION to further its case examined six witnesses, P. W. 4 is the informant, P. W. 3 is his elder brother, P. Ws. 1 and 2 were claimed to be post occurrence witnesses, while P. W. 2 also stated above motive. Evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 3 was disbelieved as being unreliable. P. W. 2's evidence was accepted to the extent that he had heard from the informant about accused setting fire. Informant, P. W. 4's evidence was accepted. ( 5 ) THE learned trial Judge held that even on the sole testimony of P. W. 4 (informant), conviction can be sustained; but his evidence got corroboration partially from that of P. Ws. 2 and 3. He found accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year. In appeal the learned Sessions Judge held that the fate of conviction depended mostly on acceptability of P. W. 4's evidence. The learned Sessions Judge found that P. W. 2's evidence was not credible and there were major contradictions in his evidence. P. W. 3's evidence was also found unworthy of acceptance because he was the informant's elder brother and his evidence was unsatisfactory. It was observed that residual evidence on which prosecution case was to stand or fail, was that of P. W. 4. The learned Sessions Judge found his evidence unreliable because of several circumstances. P. W. 3's evidence was also found unworthy of acceptance because he was the informant's elder brother and his evidence was unsatisfactory. It was observed that residual evidence on which prosecution case was to stand or fail, was that of P. W. 4. The learned Sessions Judge found his evidence unreliable because of several circumstances. Since he found the evidence of P. W. 4 unsatisfactory and unreliable he set aside the order of conviction and sentence. ( 6 ) INFORMANT in this revision application has raised two grounds. (i) Appeal was taken up on a date prior to its date of posting. Hearing of the appeal was fixed to 28-7-1987 originally and without any intimation the same was proponed, and taken up on 9-7-1987 causing surprise to the informant's lawyer. (ii) The conclusions of the learned Sessions Judge are based on surmises, conjectures and presumptions and therefore, his judgment is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel appearing for the accused-opposite party No. 1, however, submits that informant has a very limited role to play in a prosecution. State is the protector of morals in the society and it is State's duty to see that crime is prevented and an offender is punished. Informant's role is of very little consequence as would be evident from the fact that even for participation in trial, permission of the Court is necessary. Order of the appellate court is also submitted to be justified. ( 7 ) COMING to the first question whether hearing of the appeal was preponed, I find that the original date was indicated to be 28-7-1987, the learned Sessions Judge has himself corrected it to 9-7-1987, and put his initial below the correction. No material was placed to show that at any point of time, the learned Sessions Judge indicated to the parties that the appeal was to be taken on 28-7-1987 and later on the date was preponed therefore, this submission is of no value. ( 8 ) RESIDUAL question is whether the conclusions of the learned Sessions Judge resulting acquittal are presumptuous and therefore, they affected the sustainability of his judgment. It cannot be gainsaid that a Court cannot act on presumptions to either convict or acquit an accused. Court has a duty to assess evidence led and to come to definite conclusions in this regard. It cannot be gainsaid that a Court cannot act on presumptions to either convict or acquit an accused. Court has a duty to assess evidence led and to come to definite conclusions in this regard. Where a Court proceeds on hypothesis and arrives at hypothetical conclusions having no nexus with evidence, then a valuable right accrues in favour of the affected party. Where, however, the Court refers to conduct of witnesses and draws its own inferences, which according to it, are normal, same cannot be termed to be a resultant of presumptions or surmises. There is distinction between a hypothetical conclusion and an inference drawn from unusual or abnormal conduct. A Judge is not a robot. He has also to consider whether conduct of a witness is such which is normal and consistent with the normal human behaviour. He has to judge whether in a particular circumstances any normal human being would have acted in a particular manner. If he finds that behaviour displayed is not usual or normal, it will not be impermissible for him to draw adverse conclusion. In such a case it is not a hypothetical conclusion. A presiding Officer can draw from his experiences in life and gauge from an angle of normal human behaviour. While hypothetical conclusions cannot be basis of a judgment, inferences from conduct and behaviour can be foundation of a conclusion. In the instant case, the views of the learned Sessions Judge fall to the second category. He has found conduct of P. W. 4 to be unusual and has drawn sustenance for his view from several surrounding circumstances admitted by the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, conclusions arrived at by the learned -Sessions Judge cannot be termed as perverse, and unreasonable to warrant interference. ( 9 ) IT has been strongly urged by the learned counsel for the informant that some of the conclusions arrived at are contrary to evidence and material aspects have been overlooked by the learned Sessions Judge while drawing his conclusions. Taking an overall view of the conclusions arrived at, I find no scope for interfering with his view about unreliable nature of evidence adduced by the prosecution. While exercising revisional jurisdiction, errors of jurisdiction can be corrected. Even if a conclusion is erroneous in part on factual aspects, interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction is to be made in rare cases. Taking an overall view of the conclusions arrived at, I find no scope for interfering with his view about unreliable nature of evidence adduced by the prosecution. While exercising revisional jurisdiction, errors of jurisdiction can be corrected. Even if a conclusion is erroneous in part on factual aspects, interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction is to be made in rare cases. I do not find this to be a case where exercise of revisional jurisdiction is warranted. ( 10 ) THE revision application, therefore, is of no consequence and is rejected. Petition dismissed.