Prabir Kumar Mukherjee v. Steel Authority of India Limited
1991-05-03
BABOO LALL JAIN
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 1. This petition has been made by Prabir Kumar Mukherjee and 26 other employees of the Steel Authority of India Limited who is the respondent no.1, inter alia challenging the order dated 7th January, 1987, issued by the Controlling Officer of the Steel Authority of India Limited. The said notice was issued to each of the petitioners and it was inter alia stated therein as under:- "It has been noticed that on 1.1.87 during the period from 12.30 P.M. to 12.50 P.M. you were not available in your place of work/did not attend to your duties, without due permission. Abstaining from duty for the above period was unauthorised. Therefore, since you failed to perform your duties for the above period proportionate deduction will be made from your wages for such period." 2. The said letter was replied by one R.P. Banerjee by his letter dated 13th January, 1987 which inter alia, is to the following effect:- "I have received the memo no. B & 5/1(1)/ Admn/cont/85 dated 7th January, 1987. I am surprised to find that you have decided to proportionately deduct the salary for alleged absence from 12.30 p.m. to 12.50 p.m. Such a penal measure has been adopted unauthorisedly in violation of service rules. I would request you to withdraw the aforesaid memo." 3. According to the petitioners, the petitioners voiced their protest to the said order of the Controlling Officer by the aforesaid letter dated 13th January, 1987. On 20th January, 1987 the petitioners obtained an interim-order from this Court and I understand that by virtue of the interim-order the deduction of salary could not be given effect to and the said interim-order is still subsisting. 4. According to the respondent no.1, the petitioners unauthorisedly absented themselves from their place of work and did not attend to their duties during the period mentioned in the said notice dated 7th January, 1987. On the said date i.e., 7th January, 1987, demonstrations, slogans shouting were organised at the Calcutta Office of the respondent no.1 by the Association of SAIL employees, a union of employees of the Central Marketing Organisation at the gate of office premises at Calcutta. The said demonstration took place within working hours during the period mentioned above and therefore, there were reasons for the management to take note of such concerted absence by the employees including the petitioners. 5.
The said demonstration took place within working hours during the period mentioned above and therefore, there were reasons for the management to take note of such concerted absence by the employees including the petitioners. 5. In the affidavit-in-reply affirmed by Prabir Kumar Mukherjee on the 30th March, 1988, he has stated, inter alia, as follows:- "I say that admittedly there was demonstration in the office which is a part of lawful trade-union activity and the same being accepted by the employers in the industrial world today the respondent authorities being the model employer, cannot take the irrational stand of deduction of pay for the alleged proportionate absence from duty." 6. Therefore, the fact that there was demonstration and that there was absence from work for the limited time, is not disputed. 6A. The petitioners relied on the judgment of Mr. Justice A.N. Sen J., Monoj Kumar Basu & other vs. Bank of India 1976(2) CLJ 427. In the said case it was held that the members of the staff were permanent employees of the Bank. It was also held as follows:- "An employee was entitled to a monthly salary on the basis of his scale of pay under the terms of the employment. The monthly salary payable to the employee was a fixed sum. Under the contract of employment, the employee was required to work during fixed working hours. Although the employee was required under the contract, to work during fixed hours, it could not be said that the employee was paid on the basis of the number of hours of work put in by the employee in course of any month." 7. In that case, the contract of employment, according to the learned Judge was not a divisible one. The consideration for payment of the salary to the employee might be the services to be rendered by him. The consideration was not related to any fixed period of work for any month. The consideration was one and indivisible and was not entirely dependant on the particular hours of work put in. The consideration being one, the failure or refusal on the part of one employee to do the fixed period of work on any particular day resulted in the partial failure of the consideration in consequence whereof the employer might claim compensation against the employee.
The consideration being one, the failure or refusal on the part of one employee to do the fixed period of work on any particular day resulted in the partial failure of the consideration in consequence whereof the employer might claim compensation against the employee. But the employer could not claim the right to deduct any part of the salary on any pro-rata basis or otherwise. The definition of a term in any particular statute, according to the learned Judge, was for the proper understanding of the meaning and import of the term used in the statute for the purpose of true construction of the statute in which the said term had been used by applying the definition of the term wherever the said term had been used in the statute. The definition of any word by itself did not create any right or liability. It was only intended to give the true meaning of the word defined and used in the various sections of the statute. The rights and obligations under a statute arose not under the definition of any word in the statute creating such rights and obligations. In construing a statute and its various provisions, the definition of the word given in any statute had to be generally accepted. According to the learned Judge the definition of Wages in the Payment of Wages Act was of no help so far as the case before him was concerned. The Payment of Wages Act had no application to that case. The Shops and Establishments Act which applied to the case contained no provisions similar to Ss. 7 and 9 of the Payment of the Wages Act. His Lordship held that an act of refusal or failure on the part of employees to carryon with their work during working hours might amount to misconduct and suitable disciplinary action might be taken by the employer. But for such an act of the employee, the employer was not entitled to deduct his wages. His Lordship also held that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice in making the order for deduction from the salary of the employees for their unauthorised absence on 30th June, 1976. 8. The respondents relied on the judgment of Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee J., Algemene Bank Nederland and N.V. vs. Central Government Labour Court at Calcutta 1978(1) CLJ.
8. The respondents relied on the judgment of Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee J., Algemene Bank Nederland and N.V. vs. Central Government Labour Court at Calcutta 1978(1) CLJ. In the said case the facts were as follows:- The employees of a Bank a commercial establishment governed by W.B. Shops & Establishments Act, 1963, did not work on a particular day between 3 p.m. and 5:45 p.m. during which time they held a meeting and demonstration within the Bank premises. The Bank did not pay any wages to the employees for the period during which they were absent from work on the basis 'No Work, No Pay'. One of the employees applied to the Central Government Labour Court under S. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for recovery of a sum of Rs. 11.41 being the amount deducted from his wages by the Bank for his said period of unauthorised absence from work. The employee's contention before the Labour Court was that under the terms of his employment as determined by various awards and a bipartite settlement, the Bank had no right to make any deduction pro-rata from his wages for absence from work and that in any event no such deduction should have been made without recourse to established disciplinary procedure. The Labour Court allowed the employee's claim holding that absence from work without leave was minor misconduct and the Bank was not entitled to make the deduction without taking disciplinary proceedings against the employee: This order of the Labour Court was challenged by the Bank by a Writ petition. 9. It was held in the said case that the Labour Court's order must be set aside on the following grounds:- (1) A contract of employment involves reciprocal promises, the employee's right to remuneration depending generally upon performance, of work by him during the period of employment. Wages are payment for services rendered. Deduction from wages pro-rata for failure of consideration from the employee's side is permissible in law. Deduction in such cases is not a penalty. That apart wages as defined in the W.B. Shops and Establishments Act means remuneration, payable if the terms of employment were fulfilled. Performance of work for a specified period is one of the principal terms of employment. No wages therefore became payable under the Act for the said period of unauthorised absence from work on the part of the respondent employee.
Performance of work for a specified period is one of the principal terms of employment. No wages therefore became payable under the Act for the said period of unauthorised absence from work on the part of the respondent employee. (2) The Labour Court was wrong in holding that the petitioner Bank had no right to make the deduction without holding disciplinary proceedings. The fact that the petitioner could have proceeded against the respondent employee for minor misconduct could not detract from the petitioner's right not to pay wages which was not payable under the contract of employment. The question of giving a hearing could not arise in such cases. (3) The Labour Court had also exceeded its jurisdiction. The Labour Court's jurisdiction under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was a limited one viz. computation of a benefit demonstratively existing. In exercising its jurisdiction the Labour Court is, no doubt entitled to look at settlements to interpret their terms and ascertain the rights flowing therefrom. The Labour Court cannot, however, in the name of construing an agreement adjudicate claims which do not arise from such agreement." 10. Mr. Ginwalla appearing on behalf of the respondent no.1 also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court of India reported in Bank of India vs. T.S. Kelawala, 1990(4) SCC 744 , where the Supreme Court held as follows:- "22. The principles which emerge from the aforesaid authorities may now be stated. Where the contract, standing orders or he Service rules/regulations are silent on the subject, the management has the power to deduct wages for absence from duty when the absence is a concerted action on the part of the employees and the absence is not disputed. Whether the deduction from pages will be pro-rata for the period of absence only or will be for a longer period will depend upon the facts of each case such as whether there was any work to be done in the said period, whether the work was in fact done and whether it was accepted and acquiesced in etc. 23. It is not enough the employees attend the place of work they must put in the work allotted to them. It is for the work and not for their mere attendance that the wages/salaries are paid.
23. It is not enough the employees attend the place of work they must put in the work allotted to them. It is for the work and not for their mere attendance that the wages/salaries are paid. For the same reason, if the employees put in the allotted work but do not, for some reason may be even as a protest-comply with the formalities such as signing the attendance register, no deduction can be effected from their wages. When there is a dispute as to whether the employees attended the place of work or put in the allotted work or not, and if they have not, the reasons therefor etc. the dispute has to be investigated by holding an inquiry into the matter. In such cases, no deduction from the wages can be made without establishing the omission and/or commission on the part of the employees concerned. 24. When the contract, Standing Orders, or the service rules/regulations are silent but enactment such as the Payment of Wages Act providing for wage cuts for the absence from duty is applicable to the establishment concerned, the wages can be deducted even under the provision of such enactment. 25. Apart from the aforesaid ratio of the decisions and the provision of the Payment of Wages Act and similar statutes on the subject, according to us, the relevant provisions of the major legislation governing the industrial disputes viz. the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 also lend their support to the view that the wages are payable pro-rata for the work done and hence deductible for the work not done. Section 2(rr) of the said Act defines wages to mean "all remuneration which would, if terms of employment expressed or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to workmen in respect of his employment or work done in such employment" while S. 2(q) defines strike to mean cessation of work or refusal to continue to work or accept employment by workman. Reading the two definitions together, it is clear that wages are payable only if the contract of employment is fulfilled and not otherwise. Hence, when the workers do not put in the allotted work or refuse to do it, they would not be entitled to the wages proportionately." 11.
Reading the two definitions together, it is clear that wages are payable only if the contract of employment is fulfilled and not otherwise. Hence, when the workers do not put in the allotted work or refuse to do it, they would not be entitled to the wages proportionately." 11. It was sought to be argued that the petitioners had carried out their work which was allotted to them for the day and as such the wages for the period of 20 minutes could not be deducted. However, the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that where the contract, standing orders or the service rules/regulations are silent on the subject, the management has the power to deduct wages for absence from duty when the absence is a concerted action on the part of the employees and the absence is not disputed. The absence from work has not been disputed by the petitioners/employees during the period when the demonstrations were carried out. The said demonstrations were admittedly carried out during the office hours. That the action of the employees was a concerted action can also not be disputed and in fact it stands admitted since the demonstrations and the slogan shouting during the period is admitted. The employees have tried to justify the same on the ground that the same was part of lawful trade union activity. However, the Supreme Court has gone to the extent of holding that whether a strike is legal or illegal, the workers are liable to lose wages for the period of strike. The Supreme Court, has, in my opinion, overruled the judgment of A.N. Sen, J. by which it was held that the contract of employment is indivisible. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has held as follows:- "We are unable to see any difficulty in equity or impracticability in construing the contract is divisible in different periods, such as, days and hours for proportionate reimbursement or deduction of wages which is normally done in practice." 12. According to the Supreme Court, the pro-rata deduction of wages is not an unreasonable exercise of power. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, I do not think that the petitioners are entitled to any orders in this writ petition. 13. In that view of the matter, the rule, if any is discharged, and the application is dismissed.
In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, I do not think that the petitioners are entitled to any orders in this writ petition. 13. In that view of the matter, the rule, if any is discharged, and the application is dismissed. All interim orders made in this petition are hereby vacated. As the respondents could not make deduction by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court I make it clear that the respondents will be at liberty to make such deductions from the future wages of the petitioners. 14. There will be no order as to costs. Order to be drawn up expeditiously. Application dismissed.