ORDER A.G. Qureshi, J. 1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 11-2-1988 passed by the District Judge, Ujjain in C. S. No. 8-A 1985, whereby the interim application No. 10 filed Under Order 8, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code was disallowed by the learned District Judge. 2. The facts leading to this revision petition, in short, are that the respondent in the present petition has filed civil suit against the present petitioner for taking back the possession of the house on the ground that the defendant-petitioner is a licensee in the house and the house is of the ownership of the plaintiff. The house was given to the defendant by the plaintiff in view of their cordial relations and partnership in the business. However, later on their relations became strained and, therefore, after revoking the licence, the plaintiff wanted the possession of the suit house from the defendant. 3. The defendant resisted the suit raising multi-pronged pleas including a plea that the suit house was given by way of oral gift to the defendant and has also pleaded that with the consent of the plaintiff he has spent a substantial amount on the repairs of the house. After filing the written statement, the defendant moved an application Under Order 8, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code making a prayer therein that the plaintiff be asked to file a rejoinder in respect of the averment made in the written statement by the defendant. 4. The learned lower Court after considering the arguments advanced by both the parties disallowed the application holding that the pleadings of the parties are unambiguous and, therefore, it is not necessary to give any direction to the plaintiff to file an additional written statement by way of rejoinder. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order this revision petition has been filed. 5. The learned lower Court after considering the arguments advanced by both the parties disallowed the application holding that the pleadings of the parties are unambiguous and, therefore, it is not necessary to give any direction to the plaintiff to file an additional written statement by way of rejoinder. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order this revision petition has been filed. 5. The learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner Shri S. D. Sanghi has strenuously argued that in view of the pleadings of the defendant in the written statement the Court should have directed the plaintiff to file a rejoinder because if a rejoinder is not sought in view of the averments of the defendant, then the defendant would not know the case of the plaintiff in respect of the pleas raised by the defendant in respect of Hiba (oral gift) and expenditure on the repairs incurred by the defendant on the suit house with the consent of the plaintiff. 6. On the other hand the learned counsel for plaintiff-respondent Shri A. K. Jain, supporting the finding of the learned District Judge argued that the pleadings of the parties are unambiguous and there is no question of directing the plaintiff to file a rejoinder. 7. In support of his arguments Shri Sanghi has cited one Division Bench Authority of the Madhya Bharat High Court and a judgment of the Supreme Court. Let me first deal with the aforesaid two judgments. A Division Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court in the case of Bhagirath v. Champalal, 1956 MPLJ 416, has held that when the contention of the defendant is that lease was granted in his favour after determining tenancy of the plaintiff and after giving him an opportunity to redeem, the plaintiff should have filed a rejoinder to support his contention that the patta granted to the defendant did not affect his right to redeem. There were four cases and in each case the defendant had contested the suit mainly on the ground that the patta which he had obtained from the landlord, was given to him by the landlord, after determining the tenancy of the plaintiff and after giving notice and opportunity to the plaintiff for redemption of the mortgage property. There were four cases and in each case the defendant had contested the suit mainly on the ground that the patta which he had obtained from the landlord, was given to him by the landlord, after determining the tenancy of the plaintiff and after giving notice and opportunity to the plaintiff for redemption of the mortgage property. The Court, therefore, felt necessary that in order to support his contention that the patta granted by the landlord to the defendant had no effect on his right to redeem the property and that the mortgage was subsisting and the mortgagee had obtained the lease from the landlord by taking advantage of his possession as a mortgagee in possession of the land should have filed a rejoinder. As such in view of the facts and circumstances to clarify the legal position the pleading of facts was found necessary by the Court and therefore, a direction for filing a rejoinder was given and the case was remanded to the lower Court for framing necessary issues after the rejoinder and then to dispose of the suit in accordance with law. 8. The Supreme Court decision in the case of Mst. Kirpal Kaur v. Bachansingh and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 199 , lays down the proposition that when in the plaint there was no mention of the custom and the plea raised by the defendant was about the adverse possession and the plaintiff after the incorporation of this plea by way of amendment in the written statement never filed any replication setting up the special custom alleged by them as they should have done if they wished to rely on it in answer to the case made by the defendant by the amendment, coupled with the fact that both the parties admitted before the trial Court that the custom governing the parties was that the widow of a predeceased son was only entitled to maintenance out of her father-in-law's estate, it was held that the widow of a predeceased son was not a heir of her father-in-law, but in tribes a special custom prevailed which made her the heir, and the onus of proving the special custom lay on the person who pleads it. Therefore, in the absence of pleading of a special custom and proof in that regard, the question of deciding the special custom did not arise. 9. Therefore, in the absence of pleading of a special custom and proof in that regard, the question of deciding the special custom did not arise. 9. Thus, it will be seen that in Bhagirath v. Champalal (supra) in view of the pleading made in the written statement it was necessary to clear the ambiguity in respect of the subsistence of the patta and further to show that the grant of patta by the landlord in favour of the defendant had no effect on his right to redeem the property and that the mortgagee had obtained the lease from the landlord by taking advantage of his position as a mortgagee in possession of the land. As this fact was absent from the pleadings of the plaintiff a direction in that behalf was given. The Supreme Court in Mst. Kirpal Kaur v. Bachan Singh (supra) has reiterated the well settled principle that when a special custom is pleaded the onus is on the person pleading such custom to prove that custom and if that fact does not find place in the pleadings and no evidence is led on that point, therefore, in the absence of pleading and proof the question of special custom cannot be considered. 10. In the instant case, however, as rightly pointed out by the learned District Judge the pleadings are very clear and only for denying the pleadings of the plaintiffs the defendant has raised the special plea. As such there is no ambiguity in the matter for which a rejeinder by the plaintiff may be necessary. 11. As regards the legal position in respect of the direction to the plaintiff for filing a rejoinder I may refer to some cases of different High Courts on the point. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Veerasekhara Varmarayar v. Amirthavalliammal, AIR 1975 Mad. 51 , has held that the provisions contained in Order 8, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code do not compel the plaintiff to file a rejoinder challenging the allegations made in the written statement. The failure to file a rejoinder cannot be treated as an admission of the plea in the written statement. In AIR 1929 Bom. 413, Chimawa Rachaya v. Gangawa Gangadharaya, the Bombay High Court has held that Order 8, Civil Procedure Code applies only to a written statement and a set off. The failure to file a rejoinder cannot be treated as an admission of the plea in the written statement. In AIR 1929 Bom. 413, Chimawa Rachaya v. Gangawa Gangadharaya, the Bombay High Court has held that Order 8, Civil Procedure Code applies only to a written statement and a set off. The plaintiff could not be called upon to put in the counter written statement. It has further been held that when there is no date for a counter claim the plaintiff cannot be called upon to put in his counter written statement (rejoinder). Even if the Court is of the view that it is necessary to clear up the ground further, the proper procedure is one which is laid down in Order 10, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code to call upon the pleader or party by examination to admit or deny the allegations. 12. In Rohanlal Choudhary v. Prem Prakash Gupta, AIR 1980 Pat. 59 , the Patna High Court had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of Order 8, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code and it was held that the subsequent pleading by way of defence to a set off or counter-claim can be filed by the plaintiff as a matter of right, but the provisions do contemplate the filing of other pleading as well but by the leave of the Court and invest the Court with the widest possible discretion. Either party may, with the leave of the Court file a supplementary written statement but at the same time the law does not compel the plaintiff to file a rejoinder to the allegations made in the written statement and the failure of the plaintiff to file such a rejoinder cannot be treated as an admission of the plea in the written statement. The plaintiff is entitled to join issues with the defendant with respect to all those allegations which are made in the written statement and may lead evidence in rebuttal of those allegations notwithstanding the fact that he does not file any rejoinder. As such according to the Patna High Court a plaintiff cannot be compelled to file a rejoinder if he does not choose to do so and he can very well lead evidence in rebuttal of the allegations made in the written statement irrespective of the rejoinder denying the allegations made in the written statement. As such according to the Patna High Court a plaintiff cannot be compelled to file a rejoinder if he does not choose to do so and he can very well lead evidence in rebuttal of the allegations made in the written statement irrespective of the rejoinder denying the allegations made in the written statement. The Patna High Court had followed the Division Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1975 Mad. 51 (supra). 13. I am in respectful agreement with the Madras and Patna views expressed in the aforesaid two judgments in respect of the scope and ambit of Order 8, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code. If the defendant in every case adopts the practice of seeking a direction against the plaintiff compelling the plaintiff to file a rejoinder in respect of some special plea raised by the defendant, then this practice will not only unnecessarily delay the proceedings in the Court, but compelling the plaintiff to file rejoinder would also be against the provisions contained in Order 8, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code. The Division Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court also does not lay down that the provisions Under Order 8, Rule 9 give a power to the Court to give a direction to the plaintiff to file a rejoinder if the defendant may make such a request. It is only in the particular circumstance of the case, as explained above, that the Court came to the conclusion that the pleadings of the plaintiff in respect of the defence version are necessary and as it was not possible to decide the suit without the specific pleading of the plaintiff on the point of validity of the patta by the landlord in favour of the mortgagee, that the said direction was given. However, no such circumstances exist in the present case. 14. In the result I am of the opinion that the discretion exercised by the Court in refusing to allow the application of the defendant is neither against the law nor arbitrary. As such I find no force in this revision petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 150/-.