Judgment :- Guttal, J. This appeal by the wife, G. Sarala, is against the decree of divorce in favour of her husband K. Nalinakshan, made by the learned Additional Sub Judge, Trivandrum, in O.P. (HMA) No. 49/81. The learned judge upheld the respondent's case that the appellant deserted the respondent without any cause on 29-8-1974.. In this judgment, the appellant and respondent are referred to as Wife and Husband respectively or W and H for the sake of brevity. 2. The parties were married on 30-5-1958 according to Hindu rites and lived together at Pattern till 29-8-1974. There are three daughters born of this wed-lock, two of them since married while living with the wife. There is no dispute that the wife physically left the husband's house on 29-8-1974. What is disputed is the element of desertion, for, the wife urges that she was driven out by the husband after continued ill-treatment. Before considering whether the wife deserted the husband on 29-8-1974, a reference to certain previous proceedings between the H and W is necessary. The details of these proceedings are set out in paragraph No. 3 below. 3. In 1975, the H filed OP (HMA) No. 49 of 1975 (Ext. B1) for a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. The petition was dismissed after a contest. The findings of the court delivered on 31-3-1976, have become final, as no appeal was preferred against the dismissal of the petition. The conclusions arrived at by the Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum, were:- (i) The husband's story about desertion by the wife on 28/29-8-1974 without any cause was rejected. The testimony of the daughter (C.P.W.2) who was then 14 years of age, and schooling was accepted. (iii) on 29-8-1974 H beat and physically chased the W around, the H carrying stones in his hand. Therefore she left the house. (iv) The W was driven to leave the Its house and live separately because the H treated her with cruelty. The second proceeding between the parties was the wife's suit O.S. No. 60 of 1975 against the husband, for alimony. Therefore she left the house. (iv) The W was driven to leave the Its house and live separately because the H treated her with cruelty. The second proceeding between the parties was the wife's suit O.S. No. 60 of 1975 against the husband, for alimony. The Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum, on evaluation of the evidence of the H, W, their daughter, and neighbours held that the husband had treated the wife with such cruelty as t c a use reasonable apprehension in the wife's mind that it will be harmful and injurious to live with the husband and therefore she was justified in living separately and claim alimony. A decree for maintenance was made in favour of the daughters. The wife was not granted maintenance as she had separate income as a teacher. This decree was made on 31st March, 1976. The third and the last litigation between the parties, was a petition for divorce filed by the H before 'the Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum. It was OP (HMA) No. 96 of 1978 (Ext. B3). In this petition, the husband made the following accusations against the wife: (a) The wife deserted him on 29-8-1974 without any cause. (b) The wife treated the husband with cruelty by making false allegations of adultery. (c) The wife is "now living in adultery". The O.P. (HMA) No. 96 of 1978, containing the above allegations was dismissed for default of appearance and was never restored. 4.On the arguments advanced before us and on the admitted facts set out in paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 above, the following questions arise for consideration: (i) Do the findings in O.P. (HMA) 49/1975 and O.S.60/1975 that the H, treated the W with cruelty and on 29-8-1974, drove her out, preclude in the present proceedings, the trial of the issue of desertion by the W on 29-8-1974 on the doctrine of Resjudicata? (ii) The OP (HMA) No. 96/1978 in which the Have red that the wife deserted him on 29-8-1974 was dismissed for default. Having regard to the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is the O.P. (HMA) 49/81 out of which this M.F.A. arises, maintainable? (ii) The OP (HMA) No. 96/1978 in which the Have red that the wife deserted him on 29-8-1974 was dismissed for default. Having regard to the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is the O.P. (HMA) 49/81 out of which this M.F.A. arises, maintainable? (iii) In view of the decision against 'the husband in the three previous cases, referred to in paragraph 3 above, is the institution and prosecution of the O.P. (HMA) No. 49 of 1981, an abuse of the process of the court? (iv) Has the wife deserted the husband from 29-8-1974? 5. The essence of the doctrine of Res Judicata is that judgment of a court upon a point is conclusive between the same parties and is, as a plea, a bar or as evidence, conclusive, in a subsequent proceeding. (Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure -Seventeenth Edition, Page 75). The rule of res judicata bars the trial of an issue which arose directly and substantially in a previous proceeding and has been adjudicated upon in such proceeding. The rule is founded in two principles. Firstly a litigant should not be vexed twice for the same cause and secondly public policy requires that all litigation must end at some point of time. 6.Although the doctrine of Res judicata finds legislative expression in S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the section is not exhaustive of all circumstances in which an issue may be Res judicata. The doctrine exists apart from the limited compass of S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The doctrine has been applied, to cases to which S.11 does not strictly apply. It has been applied to execution proceedings, (flam Kirpal Shukul v. MussumatRup Kuari, XI Indian Appeals 37 = ILR 6 All. 269) to a subsequent stage of the same proceeding (See Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure, Seventeenth Edn., Pages 148-149. Y.B. Patilv. Y.L. Patil, 1977 (1) SCR 320, Mohammed Khalidv. Chief Commissioner, AIR 1968 Del. 13) to special Acts like Debt Relief Acts and consolidation of holdings Acts (Sita v. State, AIR 1969 All. 342, Munshiv. Chiranjit Singh, AIR 1956 All. 237, Sheshamma v. Gangaraju, AIR 1957 AP 841). Displaced Persons (Compensation and rehabilitation) Act (Jhuma Ram v. Prami Bai, AIR 1973 Raj. Chief Commissioner, AIR 1968 Del. 13) to special Acts like Debt Relief Acts and consolidation of holdings Acts (Sita v. State, AIR 1969 All. 342, Munshiv. Chiranjit Singh, AIR 1956 All. 237, Sheshamma v. Gangaraju, AIR 1957 AP 841). Displaced Persons (Compensation and rehabilitation) Act (Jhuma Ram v. Prami Bai, AIR 1973 Raj. 234) to orders of remand (See Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure, Seventeenth Edn., Pages 148-149) and to awards under the Arbitration Act (P.C. Ray & others v. Union of India, AIR 1971 Cal. 512). 7. It has been stated above that the Doctrine of res judicata applies to cases under various special Acts. In our opinion it should be applied to the cases under the Hindu Marriage Act also. The O.P. (HMA) 49 of 1975 by the H was for decree of restitution of conjugal rights and O.S. No. 60 of 1975 by the W, was for maintenance. In both the proceeding the W raised one defence. The H beat her, treated her with cruelty and compelled her to leave the matrimonial home. The H and W led evidence on this question and invited a finding from the court. The finding was necessary because if it went in favour of the W, she was justified in living away from the H, disentitling the H to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and entitling the wife to maintenance. For this reason the finding on this matter was directly and substantially in issue in the previous proceedings. In the present O.P. (HMA) 49 of 1981, the H once again urges that the W deserted him on 29-8-1974. In the previous proceedings too, he had pleaded desertion with reference to the same date. The defence of the Wise that she was driven out after cruel treatment. The essence of desertion is that W had the animus deserendi. It has been found in the two earlier proceedings that the W did not leave the house voluntarily but wa- beaten and driven out. There is therefore a conclusive finding in two previous proceedings between the same parties that the wife did not intend to leave the Husband or the matrimonial home. This finding was delivered on a matter Which was directly and substantially in issue. Therefore the H is precluded from raising the question of desertion by the Win O.P. (HMA) 49 of 1981. This finding was delivered on a matter Which was directly and substantially in issue. Therefore the H is precluded from raising the question of desertion by the Win O.P. (HMA) 49 of 1981. The reason is that in the two previous proceedings there is a conclusive finding that the W's act of leaving the H lacked the essential element of desertion viz. animus deserendi. 8. No doubt in the O.P. (HMA) No. 49/1975 and O.S.60 of 1975 the reliefs sought by the H and W were different from the relief of divorce sought in the petition giving rise to this appeal. In our opinion the difference in the reliefs in the previous and the present proceedings is immaterial. What is of the essence is that the "matter" should be "directly and substantially "in issue in both the sets of proceedings. On the same set of facts which is the "matter", different reliefs could be claimed. Therefore reliefs are not of importance. In Trilok Singh's case, (Trilok Singh v. Smt. Savitri Devi, AIR 1972 All. 52) where facts were identical, the Allahabad High Court held that the finding in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights that the wife was turned out of the house, barred, in a subsequent petition by the H for judicial separation, trial of the issue whether the W deserted him. We concur with this view. For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs we hold that the O.P. (HMA) 49 of 1981 is barred by principles of Res judicata. 9. The next question is whether the present proceedings are barred by reason of the provisions of Rule 8 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The H's petition O.P.(HMA) 96 of 1978 which was based, inter alia, on the allegation that the W deserted him on 29-8-1974, was dismissed for default of appearance. It is not disputed that the dismissal was under Rule 8 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Although in one earlier proceeding the date of desertion was stated as 28/29-8-1974,it is common ground that only one incident resulting in the wife's leaving the house occurred on 28-8-1974. Therefore, all the three proceedings relate to I lie same incident. In other words the causes of action in O.P. (HMA) 49/1981 and O.P. (HMA) 96/1978 a re made up of one and the same incident. 10. Therefore, all the three proceedings relate to I lie same incident. In other words the causes of action in O.P. (HMA) 49/1981 and O.P. (HMA) 96/1978 a re made up of one and the same incident. 10. Where a suit is dismissed, wholly or partly, under Rule 8 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff shall be precluded from filing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. (See Rule 9 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The question is whether the provisions of Rules 8 and 9 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to petitions under the Hindu Marriage Act. Subject to the other provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act and the rules made by the High Court, "all proceedings" under the Hindu Marriage Act, shall be regulated, "as far as may be", by the Code of Civil Procedure (S.21 of the Hindu Marriage act). Order 9 being a part of the Code of Civil Procedure governs the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act. The words "as far as may be" no doubt, qualify the application of the Code of Civil Procedure to the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act. These words merely mean that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, by reason of their nature are incapable of application to the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, may not be applicable. For instance the provisions as to the place of suing (S.15-16 of the Code of Civil Procedure) the institution (S.26 of the Code of Civil Procedure) of suits by presentation of plaints and such other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as are inconsistent with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, may no t be applicable to matters in respect of which Hindu Marriage Act has different provisions. (Contrast Ss.19 and 20 of the Hindu Marriage Act with Ss.15,16 and 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure with reference to institution of proceedings, place of suing and contents of petition/ plaints). However, in the context of this case, there is no provision of the Hindu Marriage Act or Rules made thereunder, which suggests exclusion of the application of Rules Sand 9 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in the context of this case, there is no provision of the Hindu Marriage Act or Rules made thereunder, which suggests exclusion of the application of Rules Sand 9 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Manjit Kaur's case, (Smt. Manjit Kaur v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1978 P & H 150) in identical circumstances, Rule 9 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was held applicable to the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act. We have no hesitation in agreeing with that view. For the reasons stated above, the institution of O.P. (HMA) 49/1981 is barred by virtue of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. Is the institution of O.P. (HMA) 49 of 1981 by the H on the ground of desertion by the W, an abuse of process of the court? Every citizen has a right to litigate his cause and seek justice from a court of law. It is of the essence of this right that it is exercised bonafide. To use this right to seek remedy by misuse, wrong or bad use of the judicial process is, to abuse the process of the court. (The New Webster's Dictionary of English Language assigns the following meanings to the word "Abuse" To misuse; to put to a wrong or bad use; to do wrong to; injure; dishonour; violate; ravish; to cheat). In legal thinking abuse of process of the court is a term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bonafides and is frivolous vexation or oppressive. (Words and Phrases Legally Defined Second Edition (1969) Page 10). Abuse of process of the court, however, takes various forms. For instance, securing an injunction to protect one's possession when he is not in possession, filing successive suits in respect of the same cause, securing a relief by suppression of facts and so on. 12. In this case the H, in the previous proceedings O.P. (HMA) No. 49 of 1975 contested the W's claim that she was compelled to leave the house because of the H's cruelty. H knew the court's verdict that his cruelty drove the W away and therefore she did not desert him. Again O.S.60 of 1975, upon the W's defence it was held that the H treated the W with cruelty and therefore the W was compelled to leave his house. The third proceeding viz. H knew the court's verdict that his cruelty drove the W away and therefore she did not desert him. Again O.S.60 of 1975, upon the W's defence it was held that the H treated the W with cruelty and therefore the W was compelled to leave his house. The third proceeding viz. O.P. (HMA) 49/1981 out of which this appeal arises is founded on the same cause, which was negatived twice before. The H has misused his right to seek relief from the court. He has misused the liberty to seek redress from the court, has vexed his wife and his conduct in filing successive proceedings and agitating the point rejected earlier, is oppressive. We hold that the H has abused process of the court by filing O.P. (HMA) 49/1981 on the ground that his wife deserted him on 29-8-1974. In our opinion the very institution of O.P. (HMA) 49/1981 is tainted by the vice of abuse of process of the court. On this ground also O.P.(HMA) 49/1981 deserves to be dismissed. 13. Although in the view which we have taken of the matter, the merits of the case cannot be gone into, we would briefly observe that the evidence reveals that the W did not leave the H's house with a view to terminating the matrimonial relations. The evidence reveals that she was driven to leave the house as a result of the ill-treatment meted out to her. Therefore the physical act of leaving the house is devoid of the element of the animus to put an end to the matrimonial co-habitation. Therefore W did not desert the petitioner. 14. For all these reasons we allow this appeal by the wife and set aside the decree and order of the learned Second Additional Sub Judge, Trivandrum, in O.P. (HMA) 49 of 1981. The O.P. thMA) 49 of 1981 hereby stands dismissed. The appellant will get costs of the appeal from the respondent.